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Abstract 
―Parallel Ruptures: Jews of Bessarabia and Transnistria between Romanian Nationalism and 
Soviet Communism, 1918-1940,‖ explores the political and social debates that took place in 
Jewish communities in Romanian-held Bessarabia and the Moldovan Autonomous Soviet 
Socialist Republic during the interwar era.  Both had been part of the Russian Pale of Settlement 
until its dissolution in 1917; they were then divided by the Romanian Army‘s occupation of 
Bessarabia in 1918 with the establishment of a well-guarded border along the Dniester River 
between two newly-formed states, Greater Romania and the Soviet Union.  At its core, the 
project focuses in comparative context on the traumatic and multi-faceted confrontation with 
these two modernizing states:  exclusion, discrimination and growing violence in Bessarabia; 
destruction of religious tradition, agricultural resettlement, and socialist re-education and 
assimilation in Soviet Transnistria.  It examines also the similarities in both states‘ striving to 
create model subjects usable by the homeland, as well as commonalities within Jewish responses 
on both sides of the border.  Contacts between Jews on either side of the border remained 
significant after 1918 despite the efforts of both states to curb them, thereby necessitating a 
transnational view in order to examine Jewish political and social life in borderland regions.  The 
desire among Jewish secular leaders to mold their co-religionists into modern Jews reached 
across state borders and ideological divides and sought to manipulate respective governments to 
establish these goals, however unsuccessful in the final analysis.  Finally, strained relations 
between Jews in peripheral borderlands with those at national/imperial cores, Moscow and 
Bucharest, sheds light on the complex circumstances surrounding the inclusion versus exclusion 
debates at the heart of all interwar European states and the complicated negotiations that took 
place within all minority communities that responded to state policies.    
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Introduction 
 At the coming of the Russian Revolution in 1917, most Jews of Transnistria and 
Bessarabia, regions along both banks of the Dniester River that today comprise the Republic of 
Moldova, still maintained traditional lifestyles marked by particular Jewish dress, food, festivals, 
religious observance and urban life in shtetls that culturally, linguistically, and physically set 
them apart from surrounding peoples.  These ―Dniester Jews‖ maintained extensive contacts not 
only with co-religionists across the Dniester, but also with communities throughout the southern 
Pale of Settlement.  Their economic condition and occupational distribution differed not 
significantly from the rest of Russian Jewry, although many more made their living through 
agriculture than was common across much of the Pale.  Travel by Jews throughout the region, 
especially between market centers such as Odessa (first and foremost), but also Kishinev, 
Soroca, Benderi, and Tiraspol, formed a regional identity that traversed the Dniester River and 
recognized no boundary along its length.   
 Less than one generation later, by the onset of military operations in the region in 1939, 
circumstances had changed significantly.  As a result of the Soviet occupation of Bessarabia, a 
term of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact signed in August 1939 with Nazi Germany, all of the 
region‘s Jews again found themselves united under Russian (now Soviet) rule as before 1918.  
The preceding two decades, however, had witnessed Bessarabia under Romanian control and 
Transnistria under Soviet authority, when the Dniester River was a zealously guarded and 
patrolled border between the Soviet Union and Greater Romania.  On the left or Soviet bank of 
the Dniester, Jews had to a great extent ceased to live as they had before under autonomous 
Jewish traditions: many had become integrated into Soviet culture and had moved toward Soviet 
cultural and economic centers and away from the region despite state efforts to support 
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indigenous minority cultures.  Those that remained witnessed Soviet domination of economic 
and cultural life.  There were many Jews in positions of authority, yet the primacy of Jewish 
concerns was no longer central for Jewish leaders as before—divisions within the Jewish 
community far outweighed the common ground.   
 On the opposite side, in Romanian Bessarabia, because of the arrival of refugees first 
from Ukraine, then from Germany, and finally Poland, there were more Jews residing in 1939 
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than before 1918, even though the state did everything possible to make the place inhospitable 
for them.  Many Bessarabian Jews continued to live on much as they had, with traditional 
institutions and leaders still largely intact, despite tremendous economic difficulties.  The 
challenge to their authority from new ideas and a new generation of Jewish youth was 
unprecedented, however.  Vast gulfs of opinion among residents had formed over the Jewish 
future, which, in the context of European-wide debate over responses to modern transformations, 
was standard.  Yet, there remained a sense of Jewish community; in fact in the late 1930s, 
Bessarabian Jews moved toward greater unity in the face of extreme discrimination and political 
isolation.  Overall, increasingly virulent discrimination and rigid exclusion from Romanian 
society kept the community together, while in the Soviet case the already present centripidal 
forces within the Jewish community were successfully exploited by Soviet policy makers.   
 Within the span of just over twenty years, a regional community that was more or less 
one was torn violently into two.  Even more remarkable was the level of social, political, 
institutional, and cultural transformation achieved.  The modern had been encroaching on the 
traditional here for at least the previous century, but in the interwar years the pace of change 
quickened to render the past almost unrecognizable: historical continuity of the gradual if 
quickening transformation of Jewish society toward a West European standard was ruptured.  
This rupture was not unitary, but rather took place on opposites sides of a created political divide 
along the Dniester River, occurring simultaneously and in different directions; in parallel.  How 
could such radically abrupt changes have been accomplished?  Jews on both banks of the 
Dniester came to bestride the greatest ideological separation in an age of extreme ideologies: 
ethnic and racial nationalism on the one hand and socialist internationalism on the other.
1
  Was 
this political division, perpetrated by two eagerly modernizing, authoritarian or near-
                                                 
1
 Eric Hobsbawm, The Age of Extremes: A History of the World, 1914-1991 (New York, 1994). 
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authoritarian states, the unquestionable determinant of Jewish life, identity and culture by the end 
of this interwar era?  Are modern states, such as those that ruled and divided this borderland after 
1918, sufficiently powerful that they can profoundly shape people‘s identity and daily lives in 
such a short period of time, or are they rather too weak to do so and thus forced to negotiate with 
strong national groups and identities, as Kate Brown suggests?
2
  Are the modern borders 
constructed by non-democratic regimes powerful ―institutions of isolation‖ as Andrea Chandler 
asserts, capable of shaping identity in the people they isolate, or are they permeable and fluid 
enough to permit the coalescence of modern identities governed by transnational forces?
3
  Or is 
it possible that the historical reality lies in between the binaries?  
 How strong were transnational forces for Dniester Jews?  Was it true, as Ezra 
Mendelsohn asserted some time ago, that the environment in interwar Eastern Europe was bad 
for Jews while not necessarily bad for Judaism, because virulent anti-Semitism and exclusionary 
state policies elicited a response of unprecedented Jewish cultural creativity; while the interwar 
Soviet system proved good for Jews but bad for Judaism, because new political and economic 
opportunities came at the cost of assimilation?
4
  In other words, was Soviet Jewry well on its 
way toward becoming a ―Western type‖ Jewry, meaning secular and assimilated, or modern, 
while because of antisemitism and exclusion, Romanian Jews (among others in Eastern Europe) 
had remained the ―Eastern type,‖ that is traditional and religious, or non-modern?  Such a 
powerful division suggests that modern states are strong enough to make people into whatever is 
necessary, was this the case here?  Such questions delve into the heart of the role of nation and 
                                                 
2
 Kate Brown, A Biography of No Place: From Ethnic Borderland to Soviet Heartland (Cambridge, 2004), 13-14. 
3
 Andrea Chandler, Institutions of Isolation: Border Controls in the Soviet Union and Its Successor States, 1917-
1993 (Montreal, 1998), 9-14. 
4
 Ezra Mendelsohn, The Jews of East Central Europe Between the World Wars (Bloomington, 1983), 6. 
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state in modern society.  The place of the Jewish minority in this borderland region, because it 
was divided between two state-modernizing projects, is a fertile laboratory to examine issues. 
 Of course, the utility of studying the Jewish minority in a provincial borderland would be 
limited if the only increase in understanding came concerning specifically the Jews.  In 
attempting to examine the experience of interwar Jewish communities on both sides of the 
Dniester, it is important to understand first of all the points of similarity of their experience as 
well as the points of difference, and secondly to understand the reasons for those differences.  
What were the causes that served to move the Jewish community and politics toward 
marginalization toward the late 1930s in Bessarabia (representative for Eastern Europe more 
broadly), while the experience in Transnistria was marked by continued participation, even if 
circumstances changed significantly?  Clearly, official antisemitism was much more a problem 
west of the Dniester than east of it, but what role did popular antisemitism play?  More broadly, 
what role, if any, did the growth and prestige of racism and racial sciences such as eugenics, both 
as a system of establishing a healthy, hygienic and racially advanced social body for the nation 
and as a system of exclusion and branding as Other those outside the nation, have on 
circumstances for interwar Dniester Jews?  What does the impact of such policies say about the 
society and political system that displays them?  
 
Historical Outline 
Before WWI, confessional and ethnic communities of the region were not untouched by 
state-backed modernization programs, but their lives were significantly less in contact with state 
bureaucracies than after 1918.  Like many other borderlands on the periphery of the Russian 
Empire, the Dniester area, part of the Jewish Pale of Settlement in the 19
th
 century, had become a 
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highly heterogeneous region of numerous ethnic groups after a century of Russian rule.   
Transnistria had become a part of the new territory acquired by Catherine the Great after the 
Treaty of Jassy (Iaşi) was signed on January 9, 1792, ending the second Russo-Turkish War and 
extending Russia‘s southern frontier to the Dniester River.5  Bessarabia was annexed by Russia 
in1812, recognized by the Treaty of Bucharest, after another successful war against the Ottoman 
Empire, and was later given the status of a guberniia.
6
  Transnistria and Bessarabia were thus 
really part of a region of the Russian Empire and one part of the Jewish Pale of Settlement—a 
region known as ―New Russia,‖ comprising of territory along the north and west Black Sea shore 
taken in stages from the Crimean Tatars and the Ottoman Empire.
7
  The economic and cultural 
heart of Jews in New Russia was the port city of Odessa, which toward the latter part of the 19
th
 
century became a center of the Haskalah, or the Jewish Enlightenment, in the Russian Empire.   
The region‘s most numerous inhabitants around the time of Russian annexation were the 
titular Moldovans (Eastern Orthodox Romanian-speakers), who comprised 86% of the 
Bessarabian population in 1817.  While not a majority in Transnistria, Moldovans together with 
the Ukrainians constituted the overwhelming majority of the population—even though in 
Romanian nationalist mythology the Dniester River formed the northeastern boundary of 
Romanian civilization.  Minorities increasingly composed a greater share of the population 
through the settlement of runaway serfs and religious dissenters from inside the empire together 
with Bulgarians, Germans, and Gagauz (Orthodox Christian Turkic-speakers), who were enticed 
to settle in Bessarabia by land allotments and military service exemptions until 1874, as well as 
                                                 
5
 Keith Hitchins, Rumania, 1866-1947 (Oxford, 1994), 4.  
6
 Nicholas V. Riasanovsky and Mark D. Steinberg, A History of Russia, 7
th
 edition, (New York, 2004), 246, 287-88. 
7
 On the question of conquest of New Russia see Andreas Kappeler, The Russian Empire: A Multi-Ethnic History 
(Harlow, 2001), 60-108; for the Jews of New Russia see Mikhail Polishchuk, Evrei Odessy I Novorossii: sotsial’no-
politicheskaia istoriia evreev Odessy i drugikh gorodov v Novorossii, 1881-1904 (Jerusalem and Moscow, 2002).  
For insights into Jewish Chişinău (albeit from a Russian perspective), see Sergei D. Urussov, Zapiski Gubernatora: 
Kishinev, 1903-04, (Moscow, 1907).   
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by a favorable climate and productive land.
8
  In addition, serfdom was never imposed in 
Bessarabia despite initial fears, a fact that caused thousands of peasants, if they were able, to 
move to Bessarabia from within the empire.
9
  Thus, at the time of the 1897 all-Russian census, 
the Moldovans who after WWI would be considered by the Romanian government as the titular 
nationality, on whose behalf policies would be enacted containing various degrees of exclusion 
for the other ethnic groups, was no longer a majority in the province.
10
  Well before the post-
WWI contestation for the province between Romania and the Soviet Union, Bessarabia had been 
a Russian Imperial borderland.  Multi-ethnicity on its borders was the policy pursued by Russian 
monarchs and state builders during the 19
th
 century for the same reason that Romanian leaders 
would later desire mono-ethnicity: state security.
11
  Transnistria, not a province in its own 
administrative right, was inland and received less attention from Russian policy-makers.  It was 
part of the Kherson guberniia and in terms of Jewish culture a provincial area, culturally and 
intellectually revolving around Odessa. 
As the Russian government, intelligentsia and society struggled with the questions posed 
by modern changes, Russia‘s Jewish minority had also been confronted with debate over the 
direction of modern Jewish identity.  Since the era of the French Revolution, the possibility for 
Jews to choose their religion and national identity opened for the first time in European history.  
West European Jews often chose assimilation; East European Jews more often tried to maintain 
                                                 
8
 For a good summary of the population movements of 19
th
 century Russian-ruled Bessarabia see: Michael F. 
Hamm, ―Kishinev: The Character and Development of a Tsarist Frontier Town,‖ Nationalities Papers, Vol. 26, No. 
1, 1998, 19-37. 
9
 See Rebecca Haynes, ―Historical Introduction,‖ in Occasional Papers in Romanian Studies No. 3: Moldova, 
Bessarabia, Transnistria (London, 2003), 77-80. 
10
 The Russian policy of ethnic mixing to legitimize and solidify its claims to Bessarabia has been noted by 
Moldovan historians, see for example Ion Chirtoagă, Din istoria Moldovei de sud-est până in anii ’30 al sec. Al XIX-
lea, (Chişinău, 1999), 184, op. cit. Haynes, ―Historical Introduction,‖ 80.  Moldovan pan-Romanian historians 
usually note this point of Russian imperial policy as implicit justification for Romanian ethnic policies from a need 
to reverse generations of Russian administrative abuse, a deliberate taking of Moldova away from its rightful 
possessors, the Romanians.  As a recent example, see Octavian Ţâcu, Problema Basarabiei şi relaţiile sovieto-
române în perioada interbelică, 1919-1939 (Chişinău, 2004). 
11
 Kappeler, The Russian Empire, 283-323. 
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culture, faith, and community.
12
  Yet in Bessarabia as elsewhere, the pull of Russian high culture, 
especially the critical idealism of the intelligentsia, was for Jews strong despite a deeply 
ambivalent history in Russian Bessarabia and Transnistria marked by antisemitism.  Partly 
because of Jewish economic dominance, the province‘s Jews had known difficult times and 
violence, most famously during the Kishinev pogrom of 1903.
13
  Despite the strength of 
Hasidism in the southern Pale, the influence of the Haskalah, which spread steadily into the 
Dniester region from Odessa, had also been notable since the late 19
th
 century.  Indeed, Odessa 
had been a center for Haskalah proponents, the maskilim: in 1847 it became home to the first 
secular Jewish school (together with Vilna) in the Russian Empire.
14
  Within Jewish lore in the 
Pale of Settlement, the southern Jewish towns to some extent inherited the reputation of Odessa, 
its cultural center: a wild place, torn from Jewish tradition and home to thieves and prostitutes.
15
   
For outlying regions such as those along the Dniester, this was mostly rumor, although 
their economic links to Odessa were real enough.  Local Jewish thinkers and leaders, often in 
connection to the intellectual ferment taking place in Odessa, turned to new ideas to wrestle with 
traditional Jewish issues as much as they were shaped by new and changing circumstances.  
Publishing in both Hebrew and Yiddish spread in the Dniester region prior to WWI, and 
Bessarabia particularly was not far behind Poland and Lithuania in the concentration and number 
of Hebrew-language institutions.  Particularly strong was the Tarbut cultural and education 
movement, modern Hebrew schools from kindergartens to high schools that numbered about 70 
                                                 
12
 Best captured by the collection of primary sources in The Jew in the Modern World: A Documentary History, Paul 
Mendes-Flohr and Jehuda Reinharz, eds. (New York & Oxford, 1995); Paula Hyman, Gender and Assimilation in 
Modern Jewish History (Seattle & London, 1995). 
13
 See Edward Judge, Easter in Kishinev: Anatomy of a Pogrom (New York, 1992).  
14
 Howard Sachar, A History of the Jews in the Modern World, (New York, 2005), 69. 
15
 For history of Odessa Jewry see Steven Zipperstein, The Jews of Odessa, A Cultural History, 1794-1881, 
(Stanford, 1985); for the place of Odessa in Russian-Jewish cultural memory, see Jarrod Tanny, City of Rogues and 
Schnorrers: The Myth of Old Odessa in Russian and Jewish Culture (PhD. diss, Berkeley, 2008).   
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in Bessarabia before the arrival of Romanian troops in 1918.
16
  Jewish political activism was 
strong in the years prior to 1917, influenced especially by socialism and Zionism as was much of 
Russian Jewry prior to the revolution.
17
  The tremendous political activity during the final years 
of the Empire increasingly challenge the autocracy, leading to expectations of greater economic 
and cultural autonomy among many Jews.   
Thus, many Jews greeted Romanian annexation of Bessarabia sourly, particularly 
because they were aware of the revolution taking place across the border and the enthusiasm 
with which many of their co-religionists greeted it there (not to mention that some had been 
active revolutionaries themselves).  This could not but influence relations between Jews and 
Romanian military administrators in Bessarabia.  Nonetheless, along with repression, the 
Romanian army brought with it stability.  The Romanian government annexed Transylvania, 
Bukovina, Bessarabia and part of Dobruja in 1918, thus attaining very quickly the proportions of 
Romanian ethno-nationalist mythology: finally all ‗Romanians‘ were united within the borders 
of their motherland.
18
  As a result, hostile neighbors that desired the return of land lost to 
Romania surrounded it.  For the first time in its history, the state became host to millions of 
Hungarians, Germans, Jews and other minorities (35% of the overall population), a sharp 
contrast to the relative ethnic homogeneity of the Old Kingdom which had been comprised of 
Wallachia and Moldavia (Moldova) that achieved de facto autonomy and union in 1859.   
                                                 
16
 Carol Iancu, Evreii din România: de la emancipare la marginalizare, 1919-1938, (Bucharest, 2000), 71. 
17
 See Gassenscmidt, Christoph, Jewish Liberal Politics in Tsarist Russia, 1900-1914, the modernization of Russian 
Jewry (NewYork, 1995); Hans Rogger, Jewish Policies and Right-Wing Politics in Imperial Russia (Berkeley, 
1986). 
18
 The impact of the unified ethnic nation living under one government that served and protected their interests was 
the core of nationalist ideology among most intellectuals in Eastern Europe, living as they did during the 19
th
 
century under either Russian, German, Hapsburg, or Ottoman imperial domination.  In Romanian national 
formation, the role played by ―Romanians outside Romania‖ cannot be overstated: see Keith Hitchins, The 
Romanians, 1774-1866 (Oxford, 1996); and A Nation Discovered: Romanian Intellectuals in Transylvania and the 
Idea of Nation, 1700/1848 (Bucharest, 1999). 
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On the opposite side of the Dniester there was no stability: chaos and bloodshed were 
commonplace during the Russian Civil War from 1918-1921.  Jews in Transnistria were 
devastated by pogroms and the violent establishment of Soviet economic policies known as War 
Communism, which together caused the flight of tens of thousands of Jews (and others) across 
the Dniester River into Bessarabia.  Circumstances began stabilizing only in the mid-1920s, 
although soon traumatic upheavals would follow—the Ukrainian famine of the early 1930s hit 
Transnistria hard, and Jews did not escape.  Such turmoil kept people moving back and forth 
across the Dniester River border between Romania and the Soviet Union despite great risks.   
Interwar policies in Bessarabia were driven by the need to create loyal subjects trusted to 
preserve Romanian cultural and territorial integrity, particularly in the newly acquired regions of 
Transylvania, Bukovina, and Bessarabia.  Such loyalty, very much in line with interwar 
ethnonationalist politics Europe-wide,
19
 became increasingly defined along ethnic and later on a 
racial basis. 
20
  Jews in the Old Kingdom, in contrast to those in Hungarian Transylvania or 
Austrian Bukovina, had never achieved equality under the law. Romanian leaders, despite 
external pressure from ―Europe,‖ particularly during the Berlin Congress in 1878, managed to 
avoid granting them civic rights.
21
  At the Paris Peace talks after WWI, the issue could no longer 
be avoided since minority rights was a condition of recognizing the expanded Romanian state—
Jews grudgingly received civic equality.  But for leaders in Bucharest of most stripes, all 
minorities, but Jews in particular, were suspected of representing foreign revisionist interests, 
                                                 
19
 The term ethnonationalism belongs to Walker Connor, Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding, 
(Princeton, 1994).  
20
 See Mark Mazower, Dark Continent: Europe’s Twentieth Century (New York, 1998), especially, 41-75.  
Mazower shows that new states during these years were viewed as homes for the titular national majority, which had 
a right to absorb into itself minority groups as the best way to prevent ambiguous spillovers of non-state populations 
into neighboring states.  On race as governing ideology in Eastern Europe see Blood and Homeland: Eugenics and 
Racial Nationalism in Central and Southeast Europe, 1900-1940, Marius Turda and Paul J. Weindling, eds. 
(Budapest, 2007).  
21
 See Carol Iancu, Jews in Romania 1866-1919: From Exclusion to Emancipation, Carvel de Bussey, trans., 
(Boulder, CO, 1996). 
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particularly from Hungary and the Soviet Union.  In Bessarabia especially, Jewish cultural and 
religious institutions were perceived and treated as political by the Romanian security police 
because they were seen as foreign and dangerously subversive to Romanian national-cultural 
aspirations in a sensitive border region.   
In the provincial borderland of Soviet Transnistria, literate cadres were in desperately 
short supply, and the Bolshevik leadership found willing participants among the Jews, who led in 
the creation of Soviet Moldovan culture while also spearheading the propaganda campaign to 
undermine Romanian control of Bessarabia, both locally and internationally.  For this very 
reason the Moldovan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (MASSR) was founded in 1924.  
Jewish communists in the MASSR were often much more concerned with Jewish events and 
circumstances in Romanian Bessarabia, across the ideological and state border, than they were 
with what transpired in distant places in their own Soviet Union.  The construction of Soviet 
consciousness took time, but the desire to use Soviet power to achieve desired goals in a 
traditionally imagined homeland (as Bessarabia remained for many MASSR Jewish 
communists), was immediate.  For them the division between the Soviet Union and Eastern 
Europe was temporary, permeable, and something to be overcome.  In Bessarabia, many among 
the minorities, including Jews, Russians, Ukrainians, Bulgarians, and Germans, looked longingly 
toward the promise of a liberal revolution that they had initially welcomed with enthusiasm in 
1917, enthusiasm that Soviet propagandists worked hard to maintain by emphasizing Romanian 
chauvinism and concealing the abuses of Soviet power.  Romanian state policies and popular 
attitudes that grew increasingly anti-Semitic especially into the 1930s in turn encouraged 
receptivity to the Soviet message among many Jews, just as it did among Russians, Ukrainians 
and even Moldovans.  The resulting enthusiasm of Jews in the MASSR (and elsewhere) for 
12 
 
Soviet power and Bolshevik culture was of central importance in understanding the effectiveness 
with which the Soviet state was able to divide and conquer Jewish traditional society much better 
than Romanian exclusionary policies were able to.  
 
Historigraphical Themes 
As the violence and chaos of WWI still raged in 1918, two states with radically different 
modernizing ideologies and conflicting territorial interests moved toward consolidating their 
positions in the region.  Armed forces on both sides mobilized and encamped along the Dniester 
River, dividing Jews and other peoples who had previously lived in a fluid and undivided 
community.  Each state began mobilizing its citizenry beyond the armed forces—seeking the 
establishment of reliable state subjects to maintain its hold on its geographical perimeters, 
especially contested peripheries such as Bessarabia.  The process of state colonization of 
peripheral subjects, the creation of model subjects to serve each state‘s needs, proved traumatic 
for local residents in terms of cultural, political and economic changes that accelerated rapidly 
under the political programs of the Soviet Union and interwar Romania.  For the Dniester region, 
the interwar years were marked by the reach of the modernizing state into rural areas and toward 
the entire social spectrum, no longer limited to the educated and urban social elements as had 
largely been the case before WWI in these borderlands.
22
   
In Eastern Europe more broadly, the interwar era was marked by accelerated state 
intervention into the routine of daily life in the service of accepted values of the state elite.  In 
                                                 
22
 Here I refer to Eugen Weber‘s Peasants into Frenchmen: the modernization of rural France, 1870-1914. 
(Stanford, 1976), in which he famously showed just how modern a phenomenon the creation of national identity 
was—in the French case, it largely took place during the two generations prior to WWI.  Despite arguments that 
place the national movement in Romania back to Roman Dacia, the interwar period was the era of ―Bessarabians 
into Romanians,‖ although it was more sloppy, heavy-handed, ineffective and controversial than in the French case, 
especially for the national minorities. 
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much of European society, this social engineering was directed toward the ‗higher‘ civilization 
understood as national community striving for patriotic ecstasy increasingly defined in racially 
pure terms.  Eugenics, the social engineering ambitions of the ―gardening state‖ as the means to 
develop the desired type of human being for the fatherland, spread from Central Europe to the 
new states of Eastern Europe especially during these years.
23
  The series of treaties signed after 
WWI in 1919 and 1920 re-drew the map of entire region, ending multi-national empires in order 
to create national communities based on ethnic self-determination in accordance with Wilsonian 
principles.  As Mark Mazower puts it: ―Such was the logic of European nationalism as it tried to 
rationalize the end of multi-confessional empire. People were re-defined, nationalities created.‖24  
Kate Brown has shown in her work on the kresy region of Poland that an ethnically diverse 
borderland proved problematic for nationalizing state officials from all sides, who tried to alter it 
―by making it comprehensible as ethnically pure national space.‖25   
Despite the tremendous importance of borders in interwar Europe, they have largely only 
been looked at from the center out.  Only recently has the transnational identity of people living 
within state borders come to attract significant interest and indeed come to challenge, through a 
cross-border, regional historical analysis, the very notion of the state as the sole constructor of 
modern identity.
26
  For Moldovan historians, the international setting has always been important 
                                                 
23
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in examining the interwar years,
27
 although their focus is diplomatic and political history.  The 
examination of peripheral subjects and their identity in a non-state paradigm, that is to say a 
transnational perspective, is not an issue of interest.  The history of the Dniester region has never 
been analyzed in an integrated perspective precisely because it has been treated as a peripheral 
region divided by different cores.
28
  In the case of East European Jews, the national framework is 
clearly inadequate: Jews found themselves confined within the newly created nation states and 
were hard-pressed to accept the mono-ethnic designs of the national elites that came to govern 
them.
29
  Again, the international setting has of course been central to histories of Zionism; 
likewise the impact of transnational concerns on antisemitism, for example Polish suspicions of 
pro-Soviet Jewish communism, has been a subject of scholarly investigation.
30
  However, the 
impact of transnational relationship on Jewish history, or specifically the impact of the 
movement of people and ideas across national borders on circumstances of Jewish life is new as 
a field of inquiry.
31
   
The growing weight faith in racial traits based on genetics as determinative of the social, 
cultural and political threatened the Bolshevik faith in inevitable historical process based on 
Marxism: in the 1930s, specialists were tasked with proving that social and economic conditions 
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determined human development rather than racial ones.
32
  In Russia also there existed a long 
tradition of the authoritarian state as modernizer (in a European understanding of  the term 
modern) that stretched back at least to the reign of Peter the Great, what Richard Wortman has 
called ―the civilizing role of force imposed from above.‖33  The Soviet Union, despite the 
radically new, revolutionary Bolshevik culture, remained true to the Tsarist ideals of 
modernization, in fact its leaders intended to greatly pick up the tempo, especially in the 1930s.  
Thus, both socialist internationalists and ethnic nationalists were modernists: they were utterly 
unsatisfied with the ambiguity of the present and fully ensconced in constructing a better and 
more orderly future, which would be ensured through state power and repression if necessary—
what Zygmunt Bauman calls an obsessive march forward that is by definition intolerant of 
ambiguity and violent.
34
   
This intolerance of ambiguity was central to the Jewish experience in Europe during 
these years.  While Romanian antisemitism has been well documented,
35
 the impact of interwar 
political interests, when Jews became dangerous not only for religious and economic reasons but 
as seditious servants of foreign interests—especially in Bessarabia where ―Jew‖ became 
synonymous with Bolshevik—has not been seriously studied.  As Mariana Hausleitner has noted, 
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for historians of Romania and Moldova, the Jewish minority has not been a subject of interest, 
while Western scholars interested in Jewish history in the region have been concerned primarily 
with the Kishinev Pogrom of 1903 and the Holocaust.
36
  Indeed, in terms of Jewish history of 
Russia and Eastern Europe in general, study of Romanian Jewry, third in size only to Poland and 
the Soviet Union, remains conspicuously absent.
37
  Romanian Jewish émigrés in Israel or Jewish 
scholars in Bucharest have focused overwhelmingly on the assimilated, Romanian-speaking 
communities of the Old Kingdom, lacking access to the multi-lingual communities of the 
Romanian periphery that came under Romanian rule in 1918.
38
  Exceptions to this are works by 
Irina Livezeanu, Carol Iancu, and Mariana Hausleitner, who address more broadly questions of 
antisemitism in interwar Romania that go beyond traditional economic explanations.  Yet, the 
focus of these works is the state‘s attitude toward the Jews; Jewish voices and local politics, 
especially in interwar Bessarabia, have essentially not been examined at all.  Jewish responses to 
Romanian state policies, from the explosion of Zionist youth groups in Bessarabia to the rapid 
increase in membership and leadership roles attained by Jews in the Komsomol across the river 
in Transnistria, have not been dealt with.  The best work done on this question for this region is 
by a local Jewish historian, Jacob Kopansky, whose work in Russian on Jewish communal 
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philanthropic organizations, although funded by the American Jewish Joint Distribution 
Committee, remains largely inaccessible to readers of English.
39
 
For Jews living on lands along both riverbanks of the Dniester River, the tearing of one 
community into two was the result of two states seeking to establish unambiguous control over 
their understood resources and populace.  Not only was this separation itself violent, but for the 
Bessarabian Jews who struggled to maintain Jewish cultural autonomy under Romanian 
nationalist policies and the Transnistrian Jews who endured Soviet policy endeavors to integrate 
Jews into socialist visions, the interwar years were marked by the violent onslaught of 
modernizing and homogenizing state policies from both regimes: parallel ruptures of continuity.  
These ruptures challenged traditional understandings of the space between Jew and non-Jew; 
they undermined the power of long-standing Jewish communal leaders and institutions; and they 
thrust new actors and ideas into the public sphere and facilitated the spread of new national, 
secular, and gendered conceptions of Jewish identity.   
Yet despite the more clearly visible ruptures, in important ways the struggle to maintain 
Jewish identity against the homogenizing forces of national consolidation, even when defined in 
accordance with radically different modernizing state visions, was marked by similarities and 
continuities, both geographically and temporally.  Significant strands of social continuity, 
particularly in how Jews in both Bessarabia and Transnistria dealt with rapid and dislocating 
change by relying on or trying to reconstitute communal institutions, remained significant into 
the interwar years on both sides of the river.  It is in this sense that the regional term ―Dniester 
Jews‖ for Jewish communities in Bessarabia and Transnistria is useful: not as a distinct unit of 
concrete territorial or regional identity, and clearly nothing to rival national identity construction, 
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but rather as something more ambiguous yet certainly a signifier of a local sentiment based on 
local traditions and social relations that were at least to some extent resistant to impositions of 
broader, state-sponsored identity from either the Soviet Union or Greater Romania.  This 
resistance, which was indicative of the frayed edges around the project of the modernization 
employed by both states, was stronger here precisely because of the Dniester Region‘s location 
on the periphery of both states—a borderland between them.   
Nevertheless, Jewish life in interwar Bessarabia and Transnistria was much more 
profoundly marked by the ruptures imposed by the two new states than by its continuities from 
existence in multi-ethnic empires from before WWI.  These ruptures were radical, often violent 
changes in the social fabric resulting from the lethal combination of what James C. Scott has 
called high-modernist ideology, or the modern state‘s need to make its population legible in 
order to facilitate social engineering toward a particular goal, together with authoritarian 
government that disregarded the local and individual interests of its subjects.
40
  This imposition 
of legibility
41
 entailed labeling and classifying residents as members or foreigners and as loyal or 
seditious, a process that was necessarily violent but common to all modern states and 
institutions—understanding order as task and battling with ambiguity.42  Through what Nicholas 
B. Dirks has called the ―cultural technologies of rule,‖ whether censuses, centralized education 
systems, and/or literacy campaigns, state-sponsored programs clashed violently with the 
traditional organization and privileges of Jewish communal governments, the kahals or kehilot, 
even as many individual Jews, particularly in Soviet Transnistria, were attracted to the modern 
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ideas they espoused.  A central theme of this dissertation analyzes this structural change in 
Jewish organization and its impact on Jewish society and place in the broader national culture. 
Because these changes took place in a contested borderland region that was politically 
sensitive for both regimes, the interwar years witnessed a redefinition of the relationship between 
Dniester Jews as subjects and the state ideologies that sought to manage and control them.  This 
region had for generations been a classic borderland—a region that, like the Kresy between the 
Polish and Russian spheres of influence, had never in recent centuries been a seat of political 
power or independence but was rather a complex and interwoven cultural and linguistic fault line 
between Slavic and Romanian civilizations.
43
  The Dniester borderland was turned into a cultural 
battlefield between state conceptions of the modern versus the backward in the interwar years.  
But exactly what was modern and what was backward? 
In Soviet Transnistria on the left or east bank of the Dniester, civic belonging in Soviet 
society was made possible for Jews provided they internalized Soviet ideological principles by 
abandoning their ―bourgeois nationalist‖ faith and adopt instead a communist, proletarian 
ethos—in Yiddish.  Proletarization was largely carried out here (as in much of the former Pale) 
by Jews themselves—communists sharing many of the modernizing ideals of Soviet communism 
as goals for their co-religionists.  Methodologically, it included resettlement of unemployed 
Jewish artisans from the shtetls (primarily Jewish towns or villages) into agricultural colonies, 
either collective or individual, and a displacement of traditional Jewish religious education with 
pro-Soviet indoctrination in state-funded, Yiddish language schools.  The new occupations 
intended for Jews would transform the backward old, weak, bookish, ―feminine‖ and bourgeois 
Jew of the past into the modern new, strong, physical, masculine and proletarian Jew of the 
future.  Transnistria required considerable state attention because like other border areas, it was 
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designated as a launching platform for exporting communist propaganda to the lands and peoples 
beyond Soviet borders.  In establishing order, the young Soviet bureaucracy relied on Jews as 
some of the most literate people in this area on the farthest European fringes of the Soviet 
empire.  Thus, in terms of ethnicity, Soviet modern did not mean a reversal of the pre-
revolutionary multi-ethnicity that was very much the hallmark of the region.  
But while Russia and the Soviet Union have of course received much greater Western 
scholarly interest than Romania, including on matters of Jewish history, the examination of the 
imposition of modernity has been viewed primarily from the center rather than the periphery.  
The seminal text about the early Jewish communist movement in the Soviet Union by Zvi 
Gitelman deals mostly with the center of the Jewish Sections in Moscow;
44
 much less work has 
been done on the boerderland areas of the socialist empire.  The record of this borderland is 
imperative to integrate into the Soviet Jewish narrative because, as Charles King has shown in 
his work on Transnistria, there was a real discrepancy between Soviet ideology and its 
application on the ground in this tumultuous border region.
45
  Even as a new communist regime 
eschewed anti-Semitism, much of the populace maintained their pre-revolutionary attitudes.  
Inter-ethnic relations were sometimes improved by the new state, but often strained by state 
policies that in attempting to implement a broad vision toward modernizing the nationalities 
often hindered specific national realities on the ground.  The noted concern among state officials 
to the rising anti-Semitic violence in the countryside by the late 1920s, caused largely by the 
competition felt by Ukrainian farmers from the state-sponsored settlement of Jews on contested 
land, was one example of the unplanned consequences of Soviet modernizing policies. 
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 Although arguably Soviet patterns for Jewish modernization were similar across the 
USSR, the examination of local circumstances in this border region incorporates and builds on 
the existing scholarship.  Recently, new work on Soviet-Jewish history has shown that there was 
more to Jewish participation in the socialist project than just modernization, and challenged the 
idea that Jews incorporated Soviet ideology wholesale, rather than appropriating some aspects of 
it to suit their own ends.
46
  Again, most of these works focus on the centers of Soviet policy, 
while much less study has been conducted of the periphery.  Likewise, the question of popular 
negotiation with state policies is a contemporary scholarly conversation, but only beginning for 
Soviet Jews.
47
  In particular, creating the ―Soviet Jew‖ through a Soviet-Jewish homeland has 
attracted scholarship, but the impact of agricultural re-settlement on Jews in the provinces has 
only recently gained serious scholarly attention.
48
  In addition to examining the ideas and 
motives of local Jewish state and party activists who sought to create Soviet-Jewish culture, 
piecing together the popular calls from everyday Jews to describe Jewish reactions to Soviet 
policies is fruitful for understanding broader reactions to policies; part of a greater scholarly 
interest in the initial Jewish encounter with the Soviet project.
49
  The evidence suggests that, 
despite Soviet ideology, many Jews maintained their faith and tried to re-create Jewish 
communal structures in this distant periphery.   
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In Bessarabia, the meaning of modern and backward was in many ways similar, but in 
ethnic legibility quite the reverse from across the Dniester.  From the perspective of Romanian 
administrators, Bessarabia, on the right or west bank of the Dniester, was their most backward 
region—lowest in literacy, urban development, and national sentiment.  Part of the Romanian 
historical nation as imagined by Romanian intellectuals, Bessarabia was Romanian but had been 
―made‖ multi-ethnic by one hundred years of deliberate Russian imperial policy.  Now part of 
the Romanian state, Bessarabia required not only greater ethnic normalization for purposes of 
state security (meaning homogenization, or Romanianization) but a reversal of ethnic fortunes: 
the Romanians (Moldovan identity was not recognized by Bucharest) were to become dominant 
among the urban middle classes, rather than remaining relegated to the countryside as illiterate 
peasantry, a result of their historical abuse by foreigners.  For Bucharest policy makers, invested 
in a Romanian ethno-nation and part of the European-wide faith in the unbreakable link between 
social engineering and racial purity, the multi-ethnic state of affairs they inherited from the 
Russian Empire was clearly backward and in need of overturning.  Like other modern visions 
modeled on the West, Romanian subjects should also become strong and vibrant in the service of 
the fatherland, but this vision, unlike the Soviet, clearly excluded Jews.
50
 
For Dniester Jews, the state notion of backwardness was imposed; their own sense of 
identity was not so neatly rooted in ideas of progress as understood in the Western sense as 
technological, material and cultural but rather in the strength of communal autonomy and support 
networks, as well as faith.  Nevertheless, this is a broad stroke—there was significant divergence 
of opinion between Zionists, socialists, devout Orthodox, secular Yiddishists, Bolsheviks 
supporters, etc.  In Bessarabia, however, there was near complete agreement on opposition to the 
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state policies Romanian chauvinism.  Multi-ethnicity had been the norm throughout the long 
nineteenth century, an important factor in understanding the resistance and resentment toward 
Romanianization after WWI, since Jews felt that Bessarabia was rightfully as much their 
homeland as the titular Moldovans‘.  
Using the ideas of modern national construction as a springboard, Larry Wolff has 
presented the history of certain contested parts of Europe, even of contested peoples, in a new 
light.  The successful integration and establishment of distinct national units in the modern era 
out of a multitude of geographical and confessional identities in the medieval and early modern 
centuries was never an exercise in certainty, much to the contrary from all nationalist mythology 
that seeks to stretch national bonds to the distant, mythic past.  The winners established their 
historical line as justification for their victory, always after the fact.  Wolff presents the 
Morlacchi of 18
th
 century Venetian Dalmatia as one possible nation that never made it, although 
their defeat was by no means clear during the Enlightenment.
51
  Likewise, eighteenth and early 
nineteenth century Galicia was a contested place: there was a significant effort to create 
Galicians as their own identity and no certainty until later in the 1800s that Galicia would 
become divided between Poles, Ukrainians, Slovaks and Jews.
52
   
In the same vein, Romanian military and political leaders in the interwar years imposed a 
definition of Bessarabia as Romanian national space on a local populace that had a different 
perception of the land and of their place in it.  National identity was not already established 
among a Moldovan population that was less than 10% literate with minimal if any standardized 
education with which to imagine national community: this identity had to be constructed and that 
construction was violent and naturally resisted.  Bessarabian Jews had plenty of reason to 
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consider themselves native to the land.  They had a more developed cooperative economic 
system that by its example influenced the move toward greater Jewish economic autonomy 
across Romania in the interwar years.  Bessarabian Jewish writers led the way in Yiddish 
literature for the entire country.  Jews were more urban, more literate, more wealthy and were 
tremendously important to the local economy.  Despite their inexperience with modern mass 
politics in a nominally democratic state structure, their classification as backward represented the 
view of the government in Bucharest—their own political activity was a rejection of this view 
and came into conflict with state agendas and agents, which made integration and civic 
belonging increasingly challenging for the Jews into the interwar years.  In many ways, the 
healthy debates among Jews concerning their future as reflected on the pages of Bessarabian 
Yiddish and Russian newspapers was a more democratic debate than that taking place in 
Romanian society.    
For Jews on the Soviet side of the Dniester circumstances were clearly different: ethnicity 
was something to be transcended on the road to communist construction, but it was a useful tool 
for incorporating a huge number of national minorities into a state that was scarcely able to force 
them to do it.  Backwardness was reserved for religion and capitalism, or any combination of the 
two.  Nationalism was tolerated if it could serve to promote communism; as long as it was not 
bourgeois nationalism, such as Zionism.  Thus in contrast to Romania, Jews in the MASSR were 
not discriminated against by the state for being, but only for doing—practicing Judaism or 
capitalism.   
For the Jewish elite on both sides of the Dniester, modern meant the Universalist cultural 
ideals of modern European civilization as interpreted and expressed by the Russian intelligentsia: 
civic equality and legal rights, democracy and political participation, and an end to hierarchies 
25 
 
based on birth.  For everyday Jews from ―the Jewish street,‖ to the extent that positive qualities 
were conceived in connection to being modern, it meant regional and religious autonomy, the 
latter particularly important as the means of protecting future generations of Jews from 
assimilation.  For increasingly more Jews, it meant the right to leave and emigrate to Eretz Israel, 
to take part in what was understood as the Jewish people‘s rightful claim to be a nation like other 
civilized peoples, and for even more Jews on both sides of the Dniester it meant understanding 
the Jewish past as one of victimization and desiring to construct a Jewish future of heroism and 
masculinity.  Taken together, these ideals were a means of assuring Jewish cultural, linguistic 
and religious survival under new authority: Jewish intellectuals and leaders voiced their demands 
in the language of Enlightenment ideals while everyday people fought to maintain cultural and 
religious control over their lives.  The Romanian and Soviet governments, on the other hand, 
were not necessarily invested in the ideals of individual freedom so much as collective 
achievement, and national political leaders sought to ensure the legibility of the society for the 
benefit of the state—―to arrange the population in ways that simplified the classic state functions 
of taxation, conscription, and prevention of rebellion.‖53  In essence, this is a story of the 
confrontation between competing visions of modernity, or competing modernities: on the one 
hand the state‘s use of efficient and advancing administrative power and control to create model 
subjects; on the other a minority population pursuing its own agenda to achieve and/or maintain 
religious and cultural autonomy as promised by contemporary political ideals.   
 Thus, there was no firm agreement on what it meant to be modern.  Both states attacked 
what they labeled as backward as the first step toward constructing what they labeled as modern.  
Not only was this an appeal to better organization, greater technical specialization, notions of 
social progress and centralization of state power, but also a direct political program for state 
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security.  Each state sought to inculcate into its citizens what its leaders saw as superior values 
while at the same time training them to resist the political aspirations of the opposing regime.  
Dniester Jews, as the most urban, economically dynamic, and often most highly educated 
population among mostly rural, provincial residents, were caught between two state projects.  
They found themselves either in demand as agents of socialist order (Soviet Union) or dangerous 
by definition as subversive foreigners (Romania).   
 Yet, despite the increasing administrative authority and drive to make its population 
legible within the needs of a modern state, what I call the Dniester region cannot be understood 
without appreciating its position as a contested border region infused with transnational political 
and cultural activism: its interwar past was dominated by the fact that it lay between two states 
with radically different visions of modernity.  Perhaps the most lasting ideology of the modern 
perspective is the national framework itself, not only for political and social organization but 
historical interpretation as well.  Much of the history of marginalized groups in general, and 
ethnic and religious minorities in particular, has been written from a national perspective.  In the 
case of Dniester Jews, this has limited historical investigation to their role as either Soviet or 
Romanian Jews.  As such, the history of Dniester Jews has been written, if at all, from national 
historiographic perspectives seeking to mold Dniester Jewry‘s historical narrative to the 
contemporary political interests of the state.  Thus among historians of contemporary Moldova, 
who overwhelmingly seek to construct Moldovan history as inseparable to Romania, Jews are 
the other, the enemy, the treasonous, pro-Soviet communists—precisely because the only real 
interest is the national interest which Jews don‘t serve.54  In the case of the current illegal, 
unrecognized, breakaway Transdneistrian Moldovan Republic, historians seek to construct a past 
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of multi-ethnicity as higher path.
55
  In such a place Jews fit better, but again secular, Soviet Jews 
generally devoid of religious practice. 
 The most important goal of this work is therefore simply to write a history from outside 
the confines of the nation-state that necessarily maintains a dialogue with the state as mover of 
history.  Political identity and interests of most Dniester Jews remained quite independent from 
the modernizing interests of either state, which is precisely why I have introduced referring to 
them by a non-national, geographic description, Dniester Jews, as opposed to Bessarabian or 
Transnistrian Jews.  Not only were these categories resisted through political activities that 
sought to re-affirm a Jewish religious and increasingly a secular national identity through 
communal politics, economic connections, and youth activity, but they were subverted on some 
level by physical reality as well.  Jews, like some (though fewer) Ukrainians and Moldovans, 
crossed the Dniester and tried to join society on the other side often during the interwar years, 
most especially during times of political crisis or famine.  Economic circumstances were difficult 
in the best of times and catastrophic during the worst, and people fled repeatedly across the 
border when they believed life to be better ―over there.‖  Appreciating such tense political and 
economic circumstances is vital for analyzing the ways in which Jews negotiated with Romanian 
and Soviet state building programs—it cannot be done without taking into account the reality of 
being able to physically leave, despite the dangers, even as both states did their best to control 
human mobility as much as possible.  Furthermore, while physical mobility could be controlled 
to a considerable degree, it proved more difficult to control people‘s thinking.  Imagining greater 
freedoms or better prospects across the border had an impact on politics, most clearly in the 
underground communist movement in Romanian Bessarabia. 
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 For Dniester Jews, modern national identity—meaning speaking the state language 
fluently, voting in elections, dressing in urban fashion but also working in factories or farming 
and having nationalist sentiment—clearly formed in relationship with the modern state, but by no 
means exclusively so.  Much of what Jewish understanding of what being Jewish in the modern 
world meant, particularly in Bessarabia, was shaped by political forces from outside the state 
through interaction with Jewish culture across a broader geographical space.  The formation of 
their modern, national identity was constructed in a transnational context—not only in terms of 
the supra-national, European-wide Zionist movement but even closer to home, across the 
culturally permeable Dniester border between interwar Romania and the Soviet Union.  For 
better or worse, their setting close to the contentious and closely guarded yet transversable 
border shaped their interwar experience: it meant greater opportunity for involvement in Soviet 
revisionism toward Bessarabia just as it led to greater oppression in Romania for fear of their 
pro-Soviet, anti-Romanian activities.    
Jewish political aspirations in this region thus shed considerable light on how states 
sought to create model subjects.  By examining in comparative context the history of these 
separated Jewish communities of Romanian Bessarabia and Soviet Transnistria during the 
interwar years, we see how a confessional community confronted two ideologically distinct 
modernizing states and was changed by them in accordingly different ways.  However, changes 
that resulted from the confrontation cannot be understood properly unless historical 
developments in the region are situated as the interplay of these two states—that is to say, the 
Dniester Region as a political and cultural fault line between Romanian and Soviet cores of 
influence in competition for control over the subjects of this borderland.  Jewish voices within 
the community, which can be heard in debates over communal politics, efforts at continued 
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economic cooperatives and Zionism and communism, are imperative to understand their political 
perspectives, goals, and fears—the everyday lives of Dniester Jews themselves, many of whom 
felt that tsarist stagnation and oppression had given way to traumatic and violent change: a new 
oppression.    
 This dissertation was initially imagined as grounded in popular culture, but two things 
turned it in a more political direction.  First, the wealth of archival and newspaper materials 
created such a powerful picture of state policy toward the Jews that I was moved to explore the 
relationship between national policies and Jewish politics.  Secondly, the comparative 
perspective did not work in terms of popular culture because the wealth of voices from 
interviews and the press in Bessarabia truly put in perspective the paucity of such sources across 
the Dniester.  The first chapter explores the state perspective from both sides of the Dniester and 
examines in depth some examples of the efforts made by each state to make their populations 
more ―legible:‖ the secret police surveillance of the Yiddish Cultural League, an autonomist 
cultural group in Bessarabia, and Soviet attempts at controlling international Jewish philanthropy 
in Transnistria.  Chapters 2 and 3 turn from the state to deal with Jewish political and social life 
in Bessarabia, including the effect of modern ideas on communal organization, the birth of the 
Jewish National Party and the debates within the Jewish community itself, particularly over 
philanthropy, education and reactions to increasing Jewish exclusion.  The theme throughout is 
the effect on Jewish integration, culture and identity that their status as ―disloyal foreigners‖ 
had.
56
  Chapter 4 describes the crisis in Jewish life resulting from the spread of Soviet power into 
the region on the left bank and the founding of the MASSR as a launching platform for anti-
Romanian propaganda into Bessarabia, as well efforts to destroy Jewish religious infrastructure 
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and Zionism and replace them with socialist spirit.
57
    Significant attention is paid to Jewish 
agricultural re-settlement projects and Yiddish-language education politics.  Chapter 5 attempts 
to understand Jewish political aspirations through a comparative inquiry into the idea of Jewish 
transformation at the core of both Bessarabian and Transnistrian Jewish youth culture—Zionism 
on right bank and the Young Communist League as part of Bolshevism on the left.  In addition, 
the chapter explores the Yiddish Cultural League as an example of autonomism and argues that 
this same sentiment in Jews in the MASSR was expressed through attempts at communal 
cohesion. 
The research ends before the Soviet occupation of Bessarabia, which sets the stage for 
several years of war and Holocaust when the two communities, separated by national politics 
during the interwar years, were reunited in extermination.  Romanian troops, after being forced 
out of Bessarabia in 1940, returned in 1941 under the auspices of a Romania-Nazi alliance and 
penetrated deep into Soviet territory, to the Bug River.  They implemented a campaign of 
genocide that was second only to Nazi Germany‘s in brutality, in which some 250,000 Jews, and 
by some estimates more, were murdered.  Yet by focusing on the Holocaust, as historians of 
Romania and more recently Soviet Jewry have done, we forget that the interwar years were an 
era of incredible Jewish cultural and political mobilization and activism.  The interwar history of 
Dniester Jewry serves to remind us that Jewish life in interwar Europe lay not in the shadow of 
the Holocaust as it does for us today, but at the borderland of new, modern states and conflicting 
ideologies, as well as at the confluence of temporal and cultural continuity and rupture.   
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Chapter 1 
A Borderland Transformed 
 
 
For millions of Jews in Eastern Europe, modern Jewish national identity took shape in the 
interwar years within an international context influenced by Zionist mobilization and the desire 
for cultural autonomy across the region, in sharp contradistinction to the nationalizing policies of 
the young states across much of Eastern Europe where Jews lived.  The newly drawn national 
borders separated Jewish communities and placed Jewish intellectuals in positions where they 
often did not know the national language of their new state of residence.  In addition to the 
extreme decimation of the Jewish economy across the region as a result of the Great War, many 
Jewish professionals (such as teachers, engineers, lawyers, and bookkeepers) could not subsist as 
they had done before the war, and became unable to support their families.  Many businesses 
from before the war could not re-adjust to the radical re-alignment of political borders after its 
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end, often suffering not only from loss of broader markets but also from the impoverishment of 
the remaining Jewish market.  Because many Jews in Eastern Europe understood Jewish life and 
politics as traversing the constricting national borders drawn at Versailles, national leaders 
suspected them of disloyalty to the newly created states in which they resided. 
In the newly created Greater Romania, Romanian intellectuals and politicians suspected 
Bessarabian Jews of sympathizing with Soviet interests.  This was also the state of affairs in 
Transylvania and in the Slovak area of Czechoslovakia, where Romanian and Slovak local 
administrators assumed that Jews identified with Hungary, their former host culture.  Because of 
this tension between the national and transnational as it pertained to Jews in the outlook of 
Romanian policy makers, it is reasonable to ask to what extent was Jewish public debate in 
Bessarabia, as well as a modern Jewish national identity, shaped by Romanian state policies.  
Even more important to this project—how important was the position of Bessarabia as a tense 
borderland lying at the conflict zone between Romanian and Russian spheres of cultural 
influence?   
In Bessarabia in particular, the reality of Romanian identity among the population, an 
identity that the state sought to foster, was, if not the most ambiguous and contested among the 
newly acquired territories of the country, then certainly the most underdeveloped.  Creating a 
Romanian national identity in a multi-ethnic borderland that historically lay at the confluence of 
competing zones of influence from different civilizations would require reversing the ambiguity 
that Bessarabians felt about national identity.  The process of labeling and classifying members 
and foreigners, loyal and seditious, began in earnest, a process that Zygmunt Bauman has noted 
is common to all modern states and institutions—understanding order as task and battling with 
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ambiguity.
1
  This process, he further maintains, is always violent.  The unwillingness of some 
Jewish leaders to see a mono-ethnic future in Bessarabia put them in conflict with Bucharest 
politicians and more directly with the regular, secret and military police that served as their 
representatives in this distant borderland.   
Seen from the perspective of Bessarabian Jews, the interwar years were characterized 
primarily by the intermittent, unsteady yet inexorable expansion of an alien and hostile 
institution into their daily lives and cultural institutions.  For Romanian policy makers, of course, 
the process of national consolidation was a legitimate historical mission, a national right; one 
which they must fight for against foreign influences and were destined to win, having suffered 
long enough through past centuries.  A central component of the conflict was that for Romanian 
administrators, Jews were occupying Romanian space specifically, while for Bessarabian Jews 
little of their outlook and identity was tied specifically to Romania—in fact their perspective 
cannot be understood if looked at only through a specific national paradigm. 
 
Establishing Control of the (Romanian) Borderland 
For both the Soviet Union and Greater Romania, integrating foreigners into its social 
fabric was less important than the uncontested control of its territory.  For Romanian politicians, 
the wartime realities brought into focus the contrasting historical legacies between the Romanian 
center and peripheries, further solidifying their deep anxiety toward the complex ethnic reality in 
the northern borderlands that contradicted sharply with their perception of a unified Romanian 
national future, informed by their relatively mono-ethnic, pre-Versailles national past.  
Annexation of Bessarabia was the result of wartime political upheavals stemming from the 
Russian Revolution and the successful Romanian diplomatic maneuvering during the last year of 
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the Great War. This was the political reality despite Romanian national historiographic 
arguments that union with Romania was achieved after centuries of struggle against foreign 
occupation and the will of the Bessarabian people.
2
  Members of the Moldovan Sfatul Ţării 
(General Assembly), first convened in June 1917, had sought Moldovan autonomy within a 
Federated Russia, but Bolshevik military incursions, Ukrainian nationalist claims on Bessarabia, 
and the reality of Romanian military occupation together decided the region‘s political future 
within Greater Romania, culminating in its ―decision‖ in March 1918 to join with their 
―motherland‖ ―in accordance with historic and ethnic rights.‖3   
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Figure 1. Official photograph of members of the Sfatul Ţării.  The caption below reads: ―This photograph shows 
fighters in the cause of the Romanian nation, former deputies of the Sfatul Ţării who voted for unconditional Union 
of Bessarabia with its Motherland and for agrarian reforms in Bessarabia—November 27, 1918.‖ Not all members 
of the Sfatul Ţării voted for union, but one doesn‘t get that sense here. ANRM photo collection. 
 
With the establishment of a de facto, militarily controlled border between Romania and 
the Soviet Union along the Dniester River, Jews in Bessarabia became isolated from their former 
cultural centers, most notably Odessa and Kiev, and were forced to confront the idea of life 
under Romanian rule.  The political and cultural status of Bessarabian Jews as an urban minority 
with significant economic power in a contested borderland could not but shape the terms of their 
confrontation with Romanian military control.   The idea that Bessarabia had always been 
Romanian land that was illegally seized by Russian Tsars and now needed to be not only 
reclaimed but purified of foreign interests would comprise the core of Romanian state 
understanding of not only the Jewish Question but of minority problems more broadly in 
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interwar Bessarabia.
4
  Faced with Soviet anti-Romanian propaganda, repeated attempted 
incursions into the territory,
5
 and open rebellion in Hotin in 1919 and Tatar Bunar in 1924, 
Romanian administrators in Bessarabia believed that local minorities were responsible for 
undermining Romanian national interests and that greater military force and repression were 
needed to silence them.  A considerable amount of this concern was focused squarely on Jews in 
particular.  Building on well-established precedents dating back to the mid-19
th
 century, many 
interwar Romanian intellectuals and politicians saw national identity along ethnic lines: Romania 
was the motherland of all Romanians, including those who lived in Bessarabia.
6
  Those 
borderland residents who did not welcome Romanian rule as liberation and ―union‖ or did not 
share Romanian national pride were considered foreigners.   
In fact, there was significant resistance to the arrival of Romanian occupation, especially 
since the campaign to reverse the multi-ethnic identity of the locals began almost immediately.  
In Bălţi, for example, military administrators executed leaders of a peasant conference who 
demanded the removal of the Romanian Army almost immediately after their takeover of the 
region, in mid January 1918.
7
  Minority leaders who expressed opposition to Romanian rule, 
such as the Social Democrat Nadia Greenfeld or the newspaper editor N. Kovsan, were also 
                                                 
4
 For example, in a compilation of historical essays from several Moldovan historians, edited by Ion Scurtu and 
published in 2001, Chapter 7, titled ―The Integration of Bessarabia into the Romanian National-Unitary State: The 
March 1923 Constitution,‖ begins: ―The realization of the Great Unification—the many centuries old Romanian 
dream—presented many unique problems before the government of that time…‖ Ion Scurtu, ed., Nicolae Encu, 
trans., Istoriia Bessarabii ot istokov do 1998 goda, (Chişinău, 2001), 129.    
5
 Future Romanian Prime Minister Gheorghe Tătărescu reported in 1925 that between 1921 and 1925, there were 
118 attempts at military incursions into Bessarabia from across the river and several thousand smaller incidents of 
spying on behalf of Soviet authorities; Bessarabie et Moscou. Discours pronnoncé a la chamber des deputes de 
Bucarest le 9 dé1925 (Bucharest, 1925), 5-35, op. cit. Haynes, ―Historical Introduction,‖ 104. 
6
 It is important to note that few Romanian speakers in Bessarabia (Moldovans) necessarily identified themselves as 
Romanian in 1918—the construction of this identity, and thereby their difference from other national groups in 
Bessarabia, was the goal of Romanianization policies.  The idea that ethnic Moldovans did not approve of Romanian 
rule was generally either rejected or seen as a product of Russification that required reversal through 
Romanianization in education and national-cultural programs.  
7
 Hausleitner, Deutsche und Juden in Bessarabien, 70. Such stories have been silenced to a great extent in Romanian 
and Moldovan national historiographies. 
37 
 
summarily executed.  In the successive meetings of the Sfatul Ţării, some delegates were 
frightened by personal violence from speaking out against Romanian rule.  The expression of 
displeasure with the idea of being a part of Romania, something that had been previously 
tolerated as legitimate opinion, began to be seen as dangerous or anti-national.  Jewish lawyer 
and Sfatul Ţării member Eugene Konigschatz, together with another ―Jew‖ named Grossman, 
were blamed by the Siguranţa for spreading rumors that Bessarabia would be taken over by 
Ukrainian forces, highly unlikely given the general Jewish sentiment about Ukrainian 
independence.  Allegedly, Konigschatz stated publicly that only in a Bessarabia free from 
Romania could Jews hope to achieve equal rights, and that the Romanians ―have cut us off from 
our mother country.‖8  Some Moldovan politicians who grasped the essence of Romanian 
military policy began to describe non-Romanian speakers as ―guests,‖ whereas previously they 
had been residents of equal status.
9
  Romanian efforts to establish legitimacy and control of 
Bessarabia, especially in the face of Soviet claims to the province, clearly would require 
silencing competing claims of national identity. 
As the Romanian government set out in the 1920s to conduct an official census across the 
entire country, its methodology comprised a politically motivated effort not only to make this 
Bessarabian population more legible, but also to show the validity of Romanian claims to the 
province based on the majority Romanian ethnic composition of the population.  According to 
the last Russian Imperial census in 1897, after decades of population movements facilitated by 
the interests of the Russian state to control its Balkan borderland, Bessarabia had become 
ethnically mixed and Moldovans were no longer the majority: 47.6% Moldovans; 19.6% 
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Ukrainians; 11.8% Jews; 8% Russians; 5.3% Bulgarians; 3.1% Germans; and 2.9% Gagauz.
10
  
Romanian historians focus much on this creation of multi-ethnicity as something that destroyed 
part of Romania by purposefully introducing foreign bodies.
11
  Indeed, the last years of the 
Russian Empire were marked by tremendous population growth in Bessarabia: from 1,935,000 in 
1897 to 2,686,000 in 1915.  This continued the 19
th
 century pattern of Russian efforts to settle an 
imperial borderland region: Bessarabia‘s population increased roughly twice faster than the 
Imperial population did as a whole.
12
   
Almost immediately after annexing the province in 1918, Romanian administrators, many 
of whom had internalized the late 19
th
 century nationalizing narrative of the ethnic and national 
unity of Bessarabians and Romanians, came up against the fact that Russification of the elite in 
Bessarabian society was strong: most privileged, urban Russians, as well as Jews, Germans, 
Ukrainians and even Romanian-speaking Bessarabians (Moldovans), were devout followers of 
Russian high culture.  To these people, who were absolutely vital for the local economy, 
Romania was ―uncivilized.‖  Romanian military administrators realized quickly that much work 
would need to be done to reverse the level of Russification in the state bureaucracy and middle 
classes.
13
  It became also clear to Romanian leaders that the pan-Romanian nationalism 
necessary for Bucharest‘s Romanianization of the newly acquired territory would have to be 
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―wholly imported to Bessarabia by Transylvanians, Bukovinians, and propagandists from the 
Old Kingdom.‖14   
In Bessarabia, as in other peripheral parts of the previously expanding Russian Empire, 
Russian had been the language of state administration and of elite society.  Identification with 
Russian high culture was notable among the urban classes who in Bessarabia were typically not 
Moldovans but Russians, Germans, and to a much lesser extent Poles, Armenians, Czechs, and 
Greeks—but especially Jews.  Jews represented 37.18% of the urban population in 1897,15 but 
their urban concentration was most pronounced in the largest towns: 60,000 in Chişinău 
(Kishinev), or over half the town‘s residents; and over 60% of the population of Bălţi,16 Soroca, 
and Orhei.  Because Russian was the language of inter-ethnic communication, Jews contributed 
significantly toward making Bessarabian urban centers islands of Russian surrounded by the 
Romanian spoken in the countryside.  Moldovans that moved into the urban centers assimilated 
into this Russian milieu.  In many smaller towns particularly in the Bessarabian north, where it 
was not unusual for Jews to be 90-95% of the town populace, there was not this same effect 
because Yiddish was heard exclusively on the streets.
17
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Map 3. Map of the Jewish population of interwar Romanian Bessarabia according to official totals from the 
1930 Romanian national census. The concentrations of Jews in the largest urban areas are characteristic; 
significantly more Jews lived in the Bessarabian north and east than south and west.    
Jews were the most highly urbanized ethnic group because the Russian administration 
relied on them to develop the region‘s commerce and industry throughout the 19th century.  Jews 
had begun to move into the territory in greater numbers beginning in the 1820s, as local 
autonomy confirmed by the 1818 Russian administrative statute granted greater freedom in 
economic life.  By 1897, most of the non-agricultural economic sector was controlled by Jews.
18
  
Unlike Jews, Moldovans generally lived in the countryside, although the rapidly growing 
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economy was providing impetus for many Moldovans to move into the urban areas, in some 
cases seasonally, as was common throughout much of the empire during these years.  For 
Romanian administrators, the reality of urban settings across the northern periphery of the 
country being culturally and economically dominated by ―non-Romanians‖ was untenable.  They 
pursued policies that sought to reverse generations of Russian ethnic policies in order to raise the 
status of the Romanian-speaking peasantry (whom Bucharest politicians viewed as 
―disadvantaged‖ after centuries of deprivation)19 and ensure their loyalty to the Romanian crown.  
Their task was a difficult one, and not only in the urban centers:  nineteenth century Russian 
policies of forbidding Romanian-language instruction in the schools or prayer in the churches 
had fostered significant attachment to Russian Orthodox Christianity among the Moldovan 
peasantry even outside the towns.  As late as the 1930s, Romanian police reported how 
frustrating it was to find Moldovan peasant families in villages with pictures of Nicholas II and 
Alexandra still hanging on their living rooms walls.
20
  Nor was the difficulty of the task limited 
to the cultural sphere or the problem of imposing order one of language preference and multi-
ethnic identity—basic economic realities worked against a century of inertia.  The entire railroad 
system was constructed over the 19
th
 century to link the province directly with Odessa.  The 
railroad lines themselves were the wider Russian variety and practically no new lines linking the 
region with the rest of Romania were built until 1923.
21
  For the first five years of Romanian 
rule, train transit in Bessarabia was made useless by new national borders.  
 No modern state can achieve control over its residents unless it can first control 
knowledge of who they are, which is why Romanian administrators began in earnest with plans 
                                                 
19
 Haynes, ―Historical Introduction,‖ 103. 
20
 Haynes, ―Historical Background,‖ 107. 
21
 Joseph Rothschild, East Central Europe between the Two World Wars: A History of East Central Europe, Vol. 9 
(Seattle & London, 1974), 319. 
42 
 
to count and categorize Bessarabians in accordance with nationally understood categories.
22
  In 
1923, the Romanian state conducted preliminary census research on which it based the 1924 
Mărzescu Law on obtaining and losing citizenship.  It conducted a preliminary census in 1927 
but never published the results.  Rumors spread that the decision not to publish these findings 
was because the result showed insufficient numerical predominance of the titular nationality.
23
  
According to the 1930 national census, the only official one compiled in Greater Romania, the 
ethnic distribution in Bessarabia differed significantly from the last Imperial Russian census, 
showing a significant growth in the Moldovan population in particular.
 24
  Jews were 7.2% of the 
population, a significant drop from their nearly 12% from the last Russian census—and the 
statistical change was most prevalent for the urban areas.  Jews were 26.6% of urban residents 
(down from 37% in 1897) while comprising only 4.3% of the total rural population (down from 
7% in 1897), even though more than half of Bessarabian Jewry—107,566 out of a total of 
206,958—was classified as rural.25   
These numbers are especially problematic when compared to the preliminary calculations 
made in 1923 in preparation for the publication of the Mărzescu Law.  According to these 
numbers, 238,000 Jews lived in Bessarabia, with some 129,000 urban and 109,000 rural.
26
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Clearly, there was a notable drop in the Jewish urban population in only a few years of 
peacetime, where Jewish economic predominance was most prevalent (and most problematic for 
establishing urban areas as centers for pursuing policies of Romanianization).  In the 1920s the 
Soviet Union consistently challenged Romania‘s claim to Bessarabia, and statisticians desired to 
numerically solidify the legitimacy of Romanian claims.
27
  Many educated members of the 
minorities regarded the census as a numbers game to establish Romanian administrative 
legitimacy and underscore the necessity of pro-Romanian ethnic policies.  For example, a joke 
that circulated among Chişinău Jews in 1931, carried in the Russian-language press soon after 
the results of the national census became known, questioned the census‘s legitimacy:  
A census taker comes to the door and knocks.  A servant answers the door and is asked what 
language the owner of the home speaks.  She replies ―he speaks to his wife in Yiddish, to his 
children in Russian, and to his servants in Moldovan.‖  The census worker writes down 
―Romanian.‖  Question 2: ―How old is the owner?‖ Reply: ―I don‘t know!‖  The census worker 
writes down: ―35.‖  ―His education?‖  ―I don‘t know, but every Sunday he buys a newspaper.‖  
Writes down: middle education.  When the census bureau at the League of Nations got the results, 
they saw that most Romanians were 35 years old, had a middle education and spoke Romanian 
well.  In such a way, it is possible to hide the fact that in Romania, there are 8 million Romanians 
and 10 million minorities.
28
 
There was an undeniable desire on the part of the new authorities to show the numerical 
predominance of those whom they considered ethnic Romanians, thereby ensuring legitimacy of 
the annexation of the new territories as ―re-uniting with the historical motherland.‖29  
Recognition of Romanian rule in Bessarabia at the League of Nations was lukewarm at best, and 
the Soviet Union, often by using Bessarabian voices, consistently refuted Romanian historic 
claims to the land.  For example, Bessarabian- Russian aristocrat Aleksandr Nikolaevich 
Krupensky spoke at the Paris Peace Conference and argued that Russia cannot be seen as having 
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taken Bessarabia from Romania because Romania was not a country in 1812.
30
  The Soviet 
authorities called for a plebiscite of the local population at every opportunity, which the 
Brătianu-led Liberal government consistently refused to allow and thereby added tension to the 
political life of an already tense region.
31
 
Many members of minority groups looked upon the Romanian Army, especially because 
of its policy of harsh suppression of resistance, as trampling upon the promise of equality that the 
Russian Revolution represented for them.  After February 1917, the Provisional Government 
granted Jews full civic rights across the Russian Empire while in Romania they remained 
second-class residents, without equal access to education and public life.
32
  When word of the 
results of the Paris talks later spread to minorities in the newly-acquired territories, many Jews in 
Bessarabia looked upon Romanian rule with ambivalence: initial negativity mitigated by the 
promise of equality.  This was much more positive than the outright hostility with which many 
Hungarians, Germans and Jews in Transylvania and Bukovina greeted Romanian rule.  In the 
chaotic months after the Bolshevik coup, however, there was much fear that Bessarabian Jews 
would miss out on the freedoms granted their co-religionists across the Dniester.  On July 23, 
1918, at a meeting of Bundists, Social Democrats, Zionists, and many Jewish activists belonging 
to local unaffiliated workers‘ parties that took place in the Chişinău mayoralty, local Zionist 
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leader Yakov Bernstein-Kogan
33
 spoke to the crowd in a manner that drew a clear and direct 
connection to Jewish politics across pre-revolutionary Russia, as well as giving grounds for 
concern for Romanian police:  ―Workers have created a revolution in Russia, and it will find its 
way into Bessarabia also, after which we will create Jewish rule that will protect the 
independence of Jews in Bessarabia and will continue to fight for the idea of revolution.‖34 
Others from the Jewish crowd spoke about the need to create a unified group of Jewish 
revolutionaries that would fight for socialism.    
Given such publicly voiced opinion, which police monitored carefully, almost 
immediately after the arrival of Romanian military rule in Bessarabia, police officials in this 
borderland began to be concerned with Jewish politics, focusing on those political expressions 
that were potentially contrary to Romanian state interests of establishing full control of 
Bessarabia.  International circumstances contributed much to the fear among Bucharest leaders.  
None of the parties involved—neither the Soviet nor Romanian governments nor the local 
residents of the land contested by them—felt that the borders drawn at Versailles were secure.  In 
the spring of 1919, a serious fear about the communist threat spread across Romania after a 
successful takeover of the government in Budapest through a revolt led by Jewish communist 
Bela Kun.  Anti-Semitic advertisements warning residents of the ―Red Beast,‖ which equated 
Jews with communism, could be seen across the country and were in many cases spread by the 
police.
35
  In the first several years of Romanian rule, military governors and police agents in 
Bessarabia would paint a portrait of Jewish politics in a manner that clearly represented Jewish 
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political expression as anti-Romanian activities, doing much to convince leaders in Bucharest of 
Jewish ―disloyalty.‖   
In the minds of policemen and administrators, calls for Jewish autonomy represented a 
clear conflict for Romanian national ideals.  For example, letters from 1918 from local officers 
of the Siguranţa, the Romanian secret police charged with preserving national integrity in the 
new territories, accused Jewish members of the Sfatul Ţării of being most resistant to union with 
Romania, thereby partaking in an act ―against the will of the people.‖36  Likewise, Jewish 
merchants were accused of desiring either independence or conspiring to unite with the ―new 
Russia.‖37  As the Romanian government‘s relationship toward the Soviet Union grew 
increasingly difficult, military administrators representing Bucharest clamped down on cross-
border relations, displaying intolerance toward cross-Dniester traffic.
38
  There was among the 
local people memory of significantly freer movement prior to 1918: Count Sergei Urussov wrote 
in his biography that farmers moved relatively freely not only across the Dniester but even across 
the Prut, the then border between Romania and Russia.
39
  With the breakup of empires, the 
governing elites of the new modern nation states across Eastern Europe zealously guarded the 
political borders that bounded and insured their realms of influence.
40
   
The question of Romanian border control took on more urgency in the immediate post-
war years because of the ongoing violence against Jews in much of the Pale of Settlement, 
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including across the border in Transnistria.  Jewish refugees began to flow across the border into 
Bessarabia to escape the violence; many individuals, unable to find means to sustain themselves, 
later tried to return across the border.  Some tried to return to aid family still there.  Given the 
antagonistic atmosphere between the two states and the complete lack of diplomatic relations 
between them during these years, the formerly readily transverseable Dniester River became a 
closely watched and guarded border; something of a no-man‘s land in urban rumor once stories 
began to spread that military police on both sides often shot civilians trying to cross over the 
frozen ice in winter.  Romanian military administrators were deeply concerned about the 
uncontrolled movement of thousands of people across the newly established national border, and 
took immediate and often harsh steps to curb and control it.   
They were nevertheless overwhelmed with refugees in Bessarabia, making thousands of 
arrests in the early 1920s.  Romanian statistics placed the number of total refugees at 168,000 
between January 1918 and April 1922.  Such numbers overwhelmed local communities in 
Bessarabia: in several cases refugees represented over 60% of the town‘s population.41  
According to Romanian administrators they were mostly Russians, Ukrainians and Jews, but in 
fact the majority of these were Jews.
42
  One such example was Rachel Deich, an unmarried 
Jewish woman of 25 from Ukraine who fled into Bessarabia, and was arrested on May 4, 1922, 
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for illegally entering Romania.  She intended to proceed to the United States to join her mother 
in New York, who sent her money to Chişinău to pay for her way.  It was months, however, 
before Deich was released and unclear that she ever received the money sent for her.
43
  In other 
cases, Jews were arrested for heading in the other direction.  Some, like Felix Melobensky from 
the town of Napadova near Soroca, were arrested and charged with trafficking in persons on June 
2, 1922.  Typically, those charged with trafficking in persons were assisting people fleeing 
toward what they hoped would be better circumstances.
44
   
The history of the refugee crisis has remained a difficult issue for Moldovan historians 
who desire to place a pro-Romanian bias on its interpretation.  For example, a recent work by 
Nicolae Enciu admits that most of the refugees were indeed Jews, but also cites and repeats an 
earlier source that argued that most of the arrivals were ―communists, anarchists, and 
criminals.‖45  The reality of so many foreigners arriving uninvited complicated political efforts to 
create a mono-ethnic homeland.  Part of the problem was that determining what ethnicity the 
refugees belonged to was not always easy: arrested August 9, 1921, Meer Davidovich 
Tartakovsky had no papers with him.  He told the arresting Tighina officers that he was headed 
to Bâlţi and then to America, but they nonetheless held him in prison for weeks and classified 
him only as ―of the Mozaic faith.‖46   
The refugee problem was not the only example of unequal treatment of Bessarabian 
residents based on their national categorization.  As would also be the case in 1940, accusations 
of anti-Romanian activities fell disproportionately on Jews despite the fact that members of other 
minorities together with members of the titular nationality also acted according to their own 
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interests that might similarly be perceived as contrary to state interests.
47
  Moldovans living 
outside the borders of Bessarabia within the Russian Empire had been instrumental in founding 
the Moldovan National Party that had struggled for Moldovan autonomy under Tsarist rule; but 
many of them were not eager to join with Romania.
48
  The influential Bulgarian communist 
Cristian Rakovsky, for example, who himself was from Dobruja, organized in Odessa groups of 
Romanian-speaking troops by using propaganda in Romanian to fight against the Romanian 
occupation of Bessarabia.
49
  Clearly, joining the historic motherland was not as obvious for local 
residents as for Romanian policy makers—the discrepancy was understood in terms of enemies 
to the national project (enemies of the nation), who logically were more easily targeted if they 
were non-Romanian.  
Jews were a particularly ready-made ―other.‖  The Siguranţa chief in Bessarabia warned 
the Romanian administration on September 30, 1918, that the ―Jewish nobility‖ have decided to 
inspire the Jewish masses ―against the security of the state‖: they propagandize that Jews should 
be allowed a separate entity within Romania.  There were even those, such as Solomon Shur, 
described by the report as a wealthy Zionist and a parasite, ―who openly does not desire to be a 
subject of the Romanian crown.‖50  Jewish national autonomy was untenable in a contested 
Bessarabia under questionable control: the Jewish Bund, for example, was regarded as a 
separatist political movement and made illegal within a month of the establishment of Romanian 
military control.  Yet the Bund remained legal in its heartland in interwar Romania, Bukovina, 
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which had a significant impact on Jewish politics in Bessarabia.
51
  Bessarabian Bundists with 
links to parent institutions in Bukovina had been active in the Russian revolutionary movement 
and were forced underground almost immediately after the arrival of Romanian power.  They, 
along with other Jewish political activists, would be persecuted to a greater degree largely 
because they represented interests that were widely understood as anti-Romanian. 
The right wing press consistently denounced Bessarabian Jews as ―Soviet agents,‖ a 
notion that by the 1930s had spread sufficiently through Romanian society that most aspects of 
Jewish life were suspect.  The Iron Guard paper, Porunca Vremei,
52
 for example, complained 
about Jewish reading rooms and libraries in Bessarabia as representing the spread of ―nests of 
Judeo-communism.‖53  Such views were not limited to the far right.  In September 1924 there 
was a serious uprising against the Romanian military administration in the southern Bessarabian 
town of Tatar Bunar.  The Romanian Army occupied the town outright and killed hundreds; 
hundreds more were arrested.  Gheorghe Tătărescu, then State Secretary of the Interior Ministry 
and later Prime Minister, reported on the incident as having been directly provoked by Russian 
and Jewish agents from across the border.  At the trial of the accused, however, the defense 
attorney Jacob Pistiner carefully pointed out that all the defendants were locals.  There were very 
few Jews among them, as this was an area populated mostly by Bulgarians, Germans, and 
Russians.  Local Jews, in fact, were largely rural and had remained neutral in the conflict for fear 
of being defenseless in the face of reprisals.  The uprising was provoked by the economic trauma 
caused by the loss of Odessa as a traditional market for Bessarabian agricultural products, and by 
the exceptionally corrupt and destructive administrative methods of Romanian military 
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governors, who within six years had bled the local peasant economy so badly that a serious 
famine took place that winter.  Several politicians from Bessarabia that had fought for Moldovan 
autonomy in the Russian Empire and then joined Romanian national parties after 1918 
complained about this corruption and asked for administrative autonomy, going so far as sending 
an appeal to the king in July 1924 in which they lamented that ―Bessarabia is administered like 
no one [in Europe] would administer a black colony in Africa.‖54  Romanian military cruelty was 
well known across the border, where it was exaggerated whenever possible for political gain.  A 
sketch from the Soviet anti-Romanian propaganda journal Krasnaia Bessarabia makes clear the 
suffering of poor Moldovan peasants by corrupt Romanian military administrators: 
 
Figure 2. ―The collection of taxes from Bessarabian peasants,‖ from Sovit anti-Romanian journal Krasnaia 
Bessarabia, 1927; ANRM photo collection, #41340. 
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The National Liberal Party in power at the time, however, continued to pursue a policy of 
rigorous centralization and Romanianization, which took a toll not only on Jews in Bessarabia.
55
  
The notion that Judeo-communists were responsible for the uprising was an important tactic to 
shift the blame from government incompetence in order to maintain Romanian administrative 
control over a disputed territory, and it took strong root in the minds of Romanian 
administrators.
56
   
Numerous other incidents during the early establishment of Romanian control of the 
province point to the conflict between state policies and the political interests of the Jewish 
minority.  Despite the willingness of Bucharest to leave Jewish organizations in tact (unlike 
Soviet modernizers across the Dniester), Jewish organizational prowess made Romanian 
administrators nervous.  Already suspecting that Jews controlled too much of the Romanian 
economy, a Siguranţa agent observing the opening meeting of the Union of Bessarabian Jewish 
Credit Cooperatives in October 1920 wrote in his report: ―through their cultural, commercial and 
worker organizations, and under the leadership of the Zionists, the Jews have a well-organized 
state of their own within our state.‖57  As tackling this would take time, Siguranţa agents focused 
on observation, taking direct action only when Jewish activity posed immediate threat, such as in 
cases of illegal border crossing or transaction, or communism—which was considered a threat by 
definition.  Police reported with obvious concern that Jews were speculating on the open market, 
converting between Romanian lei and Russian rubles
58
; Romanian Army cadets were fleeing into 
Ukraine and ―spreading anti-Romanian propaganda there,‖ ostensibly because they fell under the 
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sway of Soviet propaganda.
59
  A newspaper ―smuggling ring‖ was ―discovered‖ in August 1918 
at the Benderi (Tighina) paper Bessarabskii Krai, which was ―bringing into the country‖ the 
Russian-language leftist paper Odesskii Novosti.
60
  With consternation, Siguranţa agents 
informed the Chişinău police prefect that they had ―uncovered‖ communication between a local 
Bundist group and Bund leaders in Odessa.
61
  Thus, cultural activities that had only weeks or 
months before been normal interaction became marked and categorized as national sabatoge. 
Nor was this concern only a police matter, but rather an outlook that had taken shape 
among urban classes on a deeper cultural level.  The Siguranţa informed Chişinău police on 
October 19 that a certain teacher named Veisman at a local Jewish school was not teaching his 
pupils positive things about the Union of Bessarabia with Romania.  The letter surmised that the 
preponderance of Russian and Jewish teachers in the schools presents a very serious danger to 
the security of the state.
62
  Leaders in the Romanian 5
th
 Army Corps that had occupied 
Bessarabia were also concerned: they often informed Siguranţa agents of potential or actual 
disloyalty among residents.
63
  Despite the fact that these activities were hardly controversial to 
people attempting to live as they always had, national order as perceived in Bucharest was being 
subverted, requiring action from the Siguranţa in defense of the nation.   
Despite the harsh suppression of resistance by Romanian military governors, there was 
indeed significant chaos across the border, and this was well known by the Bessarabian public 
and used by its administrators.  Romanian military administrators realized that public fear of the 
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chaos and violence across the border was a useful propaganda tool in helping them secure 
control of the province.  In the spring of 1919 rumors spread across Bessarabia that an entire 
Bolshevik army was coming to take over the province, finding fertile soil among residents who 
during the previous winter witnessed Soviet troops bombing the town of Tighina (Benderi) on 
the Dniester River after being driven out of Bessarabia by the Romanian Army.
64
   In response to 
rumors that Tiraspol had become a completely empty city due to the chaotic violence there, 
Romanian chief minister for Bessarabia D. Cugurianu noted in an interview in April 1919 that 
Soviet forces have terrorized the people there and the Romanian Army did battle with them from 
across the river.  He also noted that Romania has been accepting thousands of Romanian 
refugees from across the river that fled Soviet oppression, although he left out the fact that most 
refugees were Jews fleeing not from the Bolsheviks but from their opponents.
65
  Nevertheless, 
distorting facts about the ―other side‖ helped the authorities maintain control: it was one of few 
examples when its position as borderland actually served to the state‘s advantage in terms of 
security. Bessarabia was indeed spared much of the terrifying violence that took place in Ukraine 
at least in part because the Romanian Army was professional and well-supplied while roaming 
bands of royalists, Ukrainian nationalists and even sometimes Bolsheviks needed to live off the 
land and thus terrorized local residents. 
Most instructive in understanding this conflict between the interests of Romanian state 
centralization and local desires for cultural autonomy among Jews is a close examination of the 
problems encountered by one Jewish cultural organization, the Yiddish Cultural League 
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(YCL),
66
 founded in Chişinău in 1919 by a Jew from Cernauţi,67 Gherş Gelişenschi.68  At the 
time when the YCL was registered with Romanian military administrators, peace negotiations 
were still underway in Paris.  Western leaders fixed their gaze on Romania and its treatment of 
minorities, and Jewish organizations were not really impeded from operating.  As the closing of 
the local Bund and communist party attest, however, Bucharest was very concerned almost 
immediately with Soviet designs on Bessarabia, and increasingly distrustful of the region‘s 
Jewish residents whom it feared were pro-Soviet sympathizers.   
Not long after the YCL began functioning, the Chişinău Siguranţa became increasingly 
concerned with its activities and began to monitor the organization members and its meetings.  
Beginning barely a month after registering with the new authorities, Siguranţa reports about 
Gelişenschi clearly show that he was highly suspect as a Bundist from Bukovina—the Bund‘s 
messenger in Bessarabia, in fact, where the Bund was already illegal.  Police reports noted 
concern that he traveled often to Russia and brought back with him Bundist manifestos.
69
  From 
as early as January 1920, the Chişinău Siguranţa decided that Gelişenschi was a dangerous man 
and had him closely followed.
70
  In February 1920, members of a Siguranţa Brigade from 
Chişinău entered Gelişenschi‘s home and found ―suspicious literature‖ there.  Within hours, the 
Siguranţa arrested Gelişenschi for suspicion of communist activities while he taught evening 
class, confiscating his books and personal papers.  The Siguranţa produced a detailed and 
descriptive list of his articles for their superiors that pointed to his educational and activist past 
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reaching across the newly drawn national boundaries.
71
 While this evidence of activities 
indicated a young man of energy and deep involvement in Jewish politics in a direction not 
uncommon for young, secularly educated Jewish men of the former Russian Empire, it was 
interpreted by the Siguranţa to mean that he displayed clearly pro-Bolshevik and anti-Romanian 
sympathies.  His ―wandering‖ into lands that had come to represent the archenemy of the 
Romanian state, the Soviet Union, was highly suspect, even if he had gone there while 
Bessarabia was part of the Russian Empire.   
As a member of an organization suspicious in Bucharest, he was tortured by the 
Siguranţa, even though Gelişenschi openly admitted to the police that he was a member of the 
Bund.  He displayed clear Jewish national identification, explaining that he engaged in cultural 
work because it was his duty as a Yiddishist, and that he desired for Yiddish, which he called the 
mother tongue of the Jewish people, to be taught to all Jewish children.
72
  He was indeed charged 
and tried for anti-Romanian activities, although he was eventually acquitted.  Almost all of his 
documents, the police wrote in consternation, were written in the Jewish ―jargon‖ (Yiddish), 
requiring the hiring of a Yiddish-speaking agent by the Siguranţa in order to decipher them.  The 
suspicion of Jewish communism only made more immediate in the minds of Siguranţa agents the 
need to infiltrate Jewish organizations.
73
  Yet, even aided by difficult economic circumstances 
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that motivated some Jews to join the Siguranţa to spy on their co-religionists, the linguistic-
cultural barrier was only partially overcome.  As Siguranţa records indicate, Jews typically did 
not serve for very long because most clearly had issues with playing for the Romanian side.
74
  In 
some cases, the hiring of certain Jewish agents displayed either bureaucratic ineptitude and/or 
desperation on the part of Romanian authorities.
75
  The failure to maintain Jewish agents speaks 
volumes about the emotional direction of Jewish national sentiment, which for some more 
clearly than others made serving the Romanian state, especially against other Jews, very 
uncomfortable.  The fact that there is essentially no evidence of Jews working for the Siguranţa 
after 1925 is also important, pointing to a solidification of the Romanian police position on the 
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Jews and their leaning toward other means (such as imprisonment and torture) for obtaining 
information.
76
  
The month after Gelişenschi‘s arrest, the office of the Bessarabian Regional Inspectorate 
received a letter of concern from the Chişinău police, noting that the YCL, an organization 
described in the report as ―literary with a Jewish character,‖ had begun to operate ―in a mode of 
serious activity.‖  The report asked for assistance in the form of ―a good agent that understands 
‗Jewish‘ and can talk of their tendencies and mood.‖77  This report indicated a problem for the 
Siguranţa that would persist: the difficulty in gathering information on people that did not use 
Romanian for either their meetings or their written communication meant often relying on 
Jewish agents or at least interpreters accompanying agents.   
Some days later in February 1920, an agent observing a meeting of the YCL in Chişinău 
noted in his report to the office of the regional inspector that among the Jews present was a man 
who recently arrived from Russia and was suspected of being a ―red Bolshevik revolutionary;‖ 
the agent thus concluded in his report that the YCL is ―simply a mask for Bolshevik 
revolutionary organizations.‖78  This description of the YCL would stick, used by dozens of 
Siguranţa agents throughout the interwar period to describe the organization and its perceived 
goals.
79
  A March 13, 1925, report from a military officer described the YCL as being a part of 
                                                 
76
 Not all Jews hired by the Siguranţa were used exclusively as spies: a Meer Greenberg was hired in August 1922 
exclusively for work in the ―border regions,‖ allegedly to help police extract information from captured Soviet spies.  
It appears that he managed to direct his work almost exclusively toward helping the authorities communicate with 
Jewish refugees from Ukraine.  He was fired in October, after about three months of secret police service, ANRM, f. 
680, op. 1, d. 753, l. 1. 
77
 ANRM f. 680, op. 1, d. 3168, l. 15. 
78
 ANRM f. 680, op. 1, d. 3168, l. 20. 
79
 ANRM f. 680, op. 1, d. 3168, l. 40 from January 1921, ―the Bund (YCL) is just a mask for communist interests‖; 
l. 83, a report from May 27, 1925 described the director of the Chişinău YCL library as ―a known communist,‖ a 
description that stuck with her for the remainder of the interwar period even though evidence of her communist 
activity can only be found for the revolutionary years; ANRM f. 680, op. 1, d. 3354, l. 89, a telegram from the 
Bessarabian regional inspector to the Ministry of Internal Affairs on March 3, 1930, stating that ―the Cultural 
League masks itself as a cultural organization when it is in fact a communist organization with members active in 
communist activity.‖  
59 
 
the young communist league with connections across the Nistru (Dniester).  He maintained that 
the money it received for plays and cultural gatherings come from the communist party, a serious 
and in fact inaccurate accusation made with no supporting evidence.
80
  Other reports from 
Siguranţa field agents show that during 1925, books held in YCL libraries came under 
suspicion,
81
 and that YCL programming—in this case pertaining to youth theatrical 
performances that were already censored—began to be impeded more actively from being staged 
because ―this group has communist sympathies and partakes in subversive acts—their plays can 
bring no benefit.‖82  While there were reports to the contrary, such as that of a Bălţi agent from 
January 1922 arguing that this really is a cultural organization, most accused the YCL of 
communist activity. 
Over the course of the 1920s and into the 1930s, the focus of the police clearly became 
fixated on the members themselves and their suspected communist activity rather than on the 
work of the organization.  For example, a note from an officer in the Romanian 3
rd
 Army Corps 
in Chişinău to the regional inspector from November 23, 1929, noted with horror that at a 
performance staged by the YCL, most of the audience in attendance were, according to him, 
participants in communist activities.
83
  A telegram from the Soroca police to the regional 
inspector from January 27, 1930, noted that several YCL members were arrested immediately 
when during a performance attended by about 300 people, they attempted to stage a play that 
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they called ―Down with Politics.‖  This incident began a furious review of the organization, with 
many local police branches, led by Soroca, calling for the closing of this organization on the 
grounds of its connections with communism and anti-state activities.   
Indeed, it is clear that over the course of the interwar period, the Siguranţa came to view 
Bessarabian Jewish organizations in general, even cultural or religious ones, as political, since 
any organization that sought to resist Romanianization was seen as having political aims contrary 
to state interests.  In September 1925, the Bessarabian regional inspector wrote to the Siguranţa 
Directorate in Bucharest that the Tarbut organization, which they correctly described as 
supporting a network of Jewish primary, secondary, lyceums and professional schools in 
Hebrew, is nevertheless under close Siguranţa supervision because of its suspected leftist 
political activity.
84
  Although less common, some Siguranţa agents even suspected the Orthodox 
religious society Agudat Israel of communism.
85
  The YCL, with members that really were in 
some cases connected to underground communist and Bundist organizations, was not 
surprisingly tolerated with extreme tenuousness, especially as the 1930s progressed.   
The regional police, particularly in the newly joined territories, were required by 
superiors in Bucharest to submit annual reports detailing ―the mood of the population.‖  The 
serious misconceptions evident in the report filed on September 3, 1929, from Bessarabia serve 
as an excellent example of state attitudes toward Bessarabian Jews.  The report stated that the 
public mood was mostly fine, but that the Jews were a notable exception to this, because they are 
against the Romanian state—they harbor communist ideas and want a revolution like in Russia, 
even though more than 90% (!) of them were Zionists.  Apparently, this did not interfere with 
their communist, revolutionary ideas.  The police reported that this was particularly true among 
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the youth, but even the Orthodox were ‗guilty.‘  The report went on to explain that antisemitism 
was strong in the region among Christians that were opposed to Judaism because of their support 
for the ideas of true Christianity, implying that antisemitism is understandable for devout 
Christians.
86
   
Among the police reports from the peripheral towns of Bessarabia to the Chisinau 
regional inspector, police prejudice against the YCL organization and against Jews in general can 
hardly be discounted.  The tone betrays a consistent theme of surprise that this organization 
received permission to operate at all, asking for assurance that it is in fact legal and permitted to 
have branches in the country.
87
  Police descriptions of the organization‘s activities throughout 
Bessarabia were consistent in describing cultural objectives—the reading of Jewish authors like 
Haim Nahman Bialik and Sholem Aleichem, dancing and theatrical groups of Jewish youth, a 
growing list of Zionist speakers—yet the conclusions drawn, based largely on the fact that 
sometimes some of the members had been arrested and served time in jail for communist and 
anti-Romanian activities, was that the association was a cover for Soviet-inspired and influenced 
communism.
88
   
Other police reports betray strong misconceptions of Jewish political movements.  For 
example, reporting from Lipcani in July 1930, the police complained that the YCL members read 
modern Marxist writers like ―Bukharov (!), Henry Barbusse, Sholem Aleichem and Sholem 
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Asch.‖89  A March 26, 1929 report from Orhei accused the local YCL leader and most members 
of communism and ―Red ideas‖ because they were teachers in Tarbut schools with strong 
contacts with the Tarbut organization.
90
  Other reports display clearly anti-Semitic attitudes.  For 
example, in their assessment of the central Chişinău YCL chapter, the Bessarabian Regional 
Inspectorate recommended to the Ministry of Internal Affairs that the organization be closed 
because, while ―the membership is mostly youth, their elders have no moral standing,‖ and ―are 
mostly communist propagandists.‖91  Others were obviously reaching in their efforts to show that 
―Jew‖ and ―Communist‖ were synonymous: the Orhei Siguranţa wrote on May 8, 1929, that 
―because the YCL welcomes members from all social levels, in cannot be excluded that they 
have communist tendencies.‖92   
By 1933, the National Liberals returned to power and pursued internal state policies that 
proved less tolerant toward ethnic minorities.  The persecution of the YCL was stepped up.  In 
1934, the Siguranţa increased its efforts to control the books that the organization received from 
abroad, and began doing thorough inspections of YCL library holdings with the aid of 
translators.
93
  On September 25, the regional inspector wrote to the Siguranţa Directorate in 
Bucharest that 115 books of communist character were found in the Chişinău Jewish library and 
confiscated.
94
  On January 28, 1935, the Chişinău central chapter of the YCL was physically 
closed, and on February 4 deemed permanently closed for acts against the security of the state 
and the library for spreading communist propaganda.  It is likely that debt may have been an 
additional immediate factor for the closing of both the organization office and library.
95
  Soon 
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after this, Siguranţa brigades from other Bessarabian towns, most notably Bălţi, began writing to 
the regional inspectorate asking for permission to close down the YCL chapter in their towns.  
Bălţi police made the case that since the YCL charter allowed it to open affiliates in the province, 
these affiliates should be closed if the central office was closed, but were informed by the 
regional inspector that the chapters cannot be closed without proof of illegal activity.  Final 
approval for the closure was granted on March 12, 1937, after the Bălţi YCL library was 
thoroughly searched and several books deemed to be of communist character were found.
96
  By 
the end of August 1937, it appears that only one YCL chapter remained open, in Hotin.
97
   
There is little evidence that local police were interested in understanding that contacts 
between Jews on both sides of the river may have been perceived as perfectly normal to them, 
and that cutting them off entirely because of Romanian state interests were unnatural and greatly 
disruptive to social, cultural, and economic relations.  The Romanian state policy toward 
Bolshevik Russia was unambiguous, and the reality of Jewish political relations with co-
religionists across the border quickly made them suspect.  In local historiographic treatment of 
the subject there is focus on the extreme right as the only agent of anti-Semitic discrimination, 
but in fact the normal process of creating model subjects that all post-WWI states expanded great 
resources on partook in discrimination.  In the interwar period discrimination against minority 
rights was not monopolized by conservatives or reactionaries—its primary advocates were 
modernizing liberals who often believed that minorities stood in the way of the modern state‘s 
effort to create a national community.
98
  Already predisposed to looking upon Jews as foreigners, 
military police and administrators quickly came to view Bessarabian Jews in particular as 
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subversive and dangerous foreigners because of Jewish contacts with co-religionists across the 
Dniester, especially given the state of deteriorating Soviet-Romanian relations. 
As the interwar years progressed, stronger national community was increasingly 
understood in racial terms across much of Europe, and Romania was no exception.  Societies and 
organization dedicated to racial hygiene and promotion of educating the public in eugenics 
spread grew in England and Germany at the turn of the century, spreading to central European 
capitals before the war and to the Romanian capital by 1919.
99
  By the second half of the 1920s, 
Romanian eugenicists had interpreted West European ideas of Social Darwinism and applied 
them to serve national needs: to justify the domination of the titular nation, the Romanians, as the 
nation.  Eugenics re-organized the way that the body politic was perceived: the nation became a 
living organism that derived its health from racial purity.  Romanian society also, the argument 
went, was subject to biological laws of health and degeneration very much in relation to its racial 
purity.
100
  Becoming modern, in the liberal democratic sense or later in the corporatist fascist 
sense, meant not only modernizing infrastructure, education, the military, etc, but modernizing 
(meaning purifying) the people themselves.
101
   
Aggressive measures taken by the police served to increase resistance among those 
unwilling to accept the new order.  Almost immediate also were Soviet politicians‘ urges for 
international resistance to Romania‘s acquisition of Bessarabia and the organization of 
underground efforts to undermine it.
102
  Romanian leaders in turn were quickly concerned with 
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Soviet designs on Bessarabia, and increasingly distrustful of the region‘s Jewish residents, whom 
many in Bucharest already considered to be pro-Soviet sympathizers.  Concerns about anti-
national activities of ―foreigners,‖ especially Jews, became greater as the economic crisis caused 
by the Great Depression worsened and the international order defended by liberal democracies 
seemed unappealing compared to the dynamic state ideologies of Germany and Italy.  The 
geopolitical struggle for Bessarabia between Moscow and Bucharest made any real 
understanding of Jewish cultural activities practically impossible for Romanian leaders.   
 
On the Other Side: Creating the Moldovan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic  
Across the Dniester River, the battle for the establishment of Bolshevik control over the 
vast remnants of the Russian Empire determined considerably different circumstances for Jews.  
The builders of Soviet communism had at first been ambivalent about the Jewish Question.103  In 
the early years of Bolshevik power, the new regime treated the Jews as a distinct national 
minority while rejecting their religious distinctiveness.  The Bolsheviks had been surprised and 
disturbed by the strength of national movements during the revolutionary years, particularly in 
Ukraine.  They did not possess a coherent nationalities policy when they seized control, although 
they proclaimed faith in national self-determination, in part as a means of consolidating support 
for the revolution among the national minorities.  In the years after the revolution, the nation-
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builders, led by Lenin and Stalin, succeeded in implementing a system of national ―affirmative 
action‖ as governing policy rather than simply revolutionary sloganism over the objections of the 
internationalists led by Piatakov and Buhkarin.
104
  Lenin recognized that the reality on the Jewish 
street would require specific policies toward Jews, including setting up special agencies within 
the state and party to deal with Jewish issues and bringing the Bolshevik message to the Jewish 
masses in their own language.105 
For this purpose, party leaders set up in 1918 the Jewish Sections of the Communist 
Party, the Evsektsiia, and the Commissariat for Jewish National Affairs, the Evkom, within the 
People‘s Commissariat for Nationalities (Narkomnats).  These were to be agencies run by Jews 
for Jews.  They would manage Jewish life while simultaneously implementing Soviet policy, i.e. 
to bring Russian Jews into Soviet modernity.   The Evkom dealt with the social and economic 
problems of the Jews, including the regulation of philanthropic assistance to refugees, the 
establishment of secular schools in Yiddish, and increasing the circulation of pro-Soviet, 
Yiddish-language newspapers.   It was the responsibility of the Evkom to work with Jewish 
institutions and bring them in line with Bolshevik national policy.  Thus, an important early 
distinction between Jewish policies pursued by the nation states of interwar Eastern Europe, 
including Romania, and the Bolsheviks, was the desire on the part of the latter to co-opt Jews 
and utilize them to create and disseminate Soviet culture while in the former case the chief aim 
was to exclude Jews from the rungs of political power. 
Jewish policy-making from within the Communist Party was of course not the only or 
even an initially popular alternative: autonomous Jewish political parties and organizations had 
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been devastatingly weakened before coming under attack from the Soviet authorities.
106
  In the 
years after 1917, the Bolsheviks took every advantage of the perception on the Jewish street that 
in the face of violence from white armies, Ukrainian nationalists and Polish legions, the Red 
Army was the Jewish people‘s only protector.  In Ukraine Jews were very wary of Ukrainian 
independence due to widespread suspicion that any Ukrainian government would sooner or later 
take an anti-Semitic position.
107
  The Communist Party‘s drive toward political monopoly among 
the Jewish people gained steam thanks to its military superiority as well as the legacy of 
antisemitism under the old regime, as the ranks of Jewish communists swelled and provided vital 
assistance to the Bolsheviks in pushing Jewish political alternatives to Bolshevism out of the 
picture.
108
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Figure 3: Bolshevik troops in Tiraspol, 1920. ANRM photo collection #50145. 
Across the Soviet Union, in fact, Jewish communists engaged in heated debates with 
Jews of various other political persuasions and cultural beliefs for the hearts and minds of ―their 
masses‖ precisely because they believed that the Soviet bureaucracy and ideology could help the 
Jews.  Such views had no significant historical popularity: the pre-revolutionary Komfarbund 
(Jewish Communist Party) was profoundly weak with very little support among Russia‘s Jews 
before the revolution.  Yet in the years immediately after the Bolshevik seizure of power it 
became, with the support of the Communist Party, the most powerful Jewish force for pro-
regime change of traditional Jewish life.  The Komfarbund was incorporated into the Communist 
Party and organized politically as the Evsektsiia.  As David Shneer points out, the policies 
pursued by the state and party to create a Soviet-Jewish culture were complex, multivalent, and 
sometimes conflicting—one cannot focus simply on the Evsektsiia as the mover of state 
ideology.
109
  Nevertheless, it was the Evsektsiia members that were often seen as implementing 
state policies that undermined Jewish culture, and as doing this quite enthusiastically; it was 
                                                 
109
 Shneer, Yiddish and the Creation of Soviet Jewish Culture, 12.  
69 
 
popularly held belief within Jewish society that the Evsektsiia members were ―more communist 
than the Communists.‖110  Nor was the Jewish acceptance of communist ideology limited to the 
sections of the party: Jews were vastly over-represented in the Komsomol organization (the 
Young Communist League) and the NKVD, for example.
111
  As expressed by many 
contemporary Jewish writers such as David Bagritsky and Itsik Fefer, the aggressive anti-
traditionalism of pro-Soviet Jews resulted from a profound frustration with traditional Jewish 
culture and authority among many well-educated, secular and progressive Jewish youth with 
little previous economic opportunity.   
The attack on Jewish tradition cannot be understood otherwise, including in the MASSR.  
By 1924, the Soviet economy had improved significantly after the extreme conditions during 
War Communism.  The Party‘s ideological firmness toward less harmful unwanted classes such 
as the Jewish kustars (artisans), gave way to a more gradualist approach toward their 
assimilation into the proletariat championed by Nikolai Bukharin, who was at the apex of his 
influence within the party during the early-middle twenties.
112
  Always treading carefully due to 
consistent insecurity, the Evsektsiia Central Bureau slowly followed suit in its politics toward the 
Jewish petit-bourgeois traders and kustars of the former Pale, as Bolshevik politics toward the 
latter would shift throughout the 1920s.  Having been extremely mindful not to overstep the 
party line in its early years, during this period of general calm between the calamities of 1917-21 
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and Stalin‘s Cultural Revolution at the end of the 1920s, the Jewish communists gingerly felt out 
their own path. 
Educational transformation and agricultural re-settlement became the central methods by 
which state-sanctioned, secular Jewish reformers attempted to merge their own solutions to the 
Jewish problem (leading them from what they saw as a stunted, backward, religious, petty-
bourgeois past into a bright, secular, muscular, proletarian future), with broader Soviet 
modernization policies.  Agricultural colonization of mostly Ukrainian Jews had a history dating 
to the 1890s, when the Jewish Colonization Association based in Paris began to support 
colonization efforts.  After 1914, the American Joint Jewish Distribution Committee (JDC or 
Joint) became the largest sponsor of efforts to re-settle Russian Jews, spending millions of 
dollars over the interwar years.
113
  As the war devastated Jewish life in Western Russia, the need 
to help Jews only increased and became more urgent, while the Soviet government proved a 
mixed blessing to agricultural colonization.  While at first not overtly opposed to the project and 
in any case too weak to tightly control its peripheral areas, the Soviet government eventually 
greatly exacerbated Jewish economic woes by relegating huge numbers of shtetl Jews (in some 
Transnistrian towns as much as 65% of the working population)
114
 to the category of lishentsy—
―nonproductive‖ members of petit bourgeois professions—and thereby depriving them of 
housing, employment, and education for their children.
115
   
On the Soviet side of the Dniester River in Transnistria, Jewish communist party 
members that quickly reached positions of mid or even high administrative capacity, particularly 
in the Agitation and Propaganda (Agitprop) Division, instituted modernization campaigns for the 
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Jewish people with equal enthusiasm as in Moscow.  The goal was not only to transform the 
Jewish street, but also to extend effective Soviet government control over the entire unruly 
borderland area.  To be sure, the personal motivations among Jewish secular activists varied and 
cannot all be ascribed to strong support for the Soviet project.  Most did not condone the 
complete destruction of traditional Jewish culture in the name of Soviet progress and desired the 
use of state resources to assist devastated Jewish communities.  Some saw playing ball with 
Soviet leaders as the best means of ensuring a Jewish voice among the power brokers; many 
maintained ideals of Jewish autonomy within the Soviet Union and attempted to use Soviet 
policies to pursue such aims.
116
  Others used their position in the new government to avenge 
personal suffering caused their families or loved ones during past years of chaos and violence.  
Without question, the political activity of such workers served to extend and solidify Soviet 
influence and control first and foremost.    
The solidification of Soviet power in Transnistria was thus by no means established 
through repression alone.  The appeal of the Soviet vision of modernity was inculcated through 
progressive policies of social engineering that would ―build‖ better citizens: orderly, healthy, 
clean, hard working, and committed to socialism.
117
  The interwar years were the heyday of 
policies designed to improve the collective body of society—and the terms of this improvement, 
as many scholars have shown, were increasingly racial in their understanding.  Soviet scientists 
were also interested in racial theories and hygiene, and worked closely with German scientists on 
issues concerning social medicine and racial theory, or eugenics.  To that end, the Kaiser 
Wilhelm Institute of Anthropology, Human Heredity and Eugenics, as well as the German-Soviet 
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Racial Laboratory, were set up in Moscow in 1927.
118
  But unlike scientists in Romania and 
other nation-states of central and eastern Europe, Soviet eugenics remained focused on the realm 
of improving medicine and health as means of assisting modernization, but without going down 
the dark path of using science to justify racial discrimination.
119
  The fascination with blood as 
direct connection to homeland and the peasant as the ―racial repository‖ of the nation that 
became so common across Eastern Europe, particularly in Romania, never took in the Soviet 
Union because of the Marxist commitment to the proletariat (with the accompanying focus on 
technological and industrial modernization and urbanization), but also because tolerance of 
multi-ethnicity was a necessity and not simply about respecting peace treaty obligations that 
could be entirely jettisoned once Hitler came to power and superseded France and Britain as 
Western model and defender.  
No clearer example exists of the difference between the nationalistic regimes of interwar 
Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, and their uses of racial constructions of ethnic utopias 
based on blood, than that of the inclusion versus exclusion of the national minorities (especially 
Jews) in state-sponsored modernizing policies, often precisely because in states such as Romania 
Jews were placed outside the imagined nation that was more and more based on Romanian 
intellectuals‘ construction of blood and racial ties as the basis for the nation.120  Quite simply, 
racial discrimination was used in Romanian Bessarabia to exclude Jews from policy decisions 
concerning them, while in Soviet Transnistria they were very much involved in the process.   
The region of Transnistria had little of the territorial integrity in the imperial 
administrative imagination that Bessarabia enjoyed even before the revolution.  The word itself, 
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meaning ―across the Nistru‖ (the River‘s name in Romanian) was used in general and did not 
imply a specific bordered region.  Appropriately from the Russian perspective, the term for the 
region is Pridniestrovie, which means ―before the Dniester.‖  Although in Romanian nationalist 
imagination Transnistria lies beyond historic ―Romanian lands,‖ the reality is that many 
Moldovans had lived in this region since well before its Russian occupation.  The population 
statistics from the last Imperial Russian census of 1897 offer strong indication of how ethnically 
mixed both Bessarabia and Transnistria were, although it is difficult to be precise for Transnistria 
because it was not a province onto itself at this time but rather part of the Kherson Gubernia.  
Transnistria only became a bounded political entity in 1924 with the creation of the Moldovan 
Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (MASSR) within the Ukrainian SSR: the Soviet census of 
1926 was the first evidence of a specifically ―Transnistrian‖ populace because the territory had 
before been part of the larger Kherson gubernia and no separate statistics existed until that year.   
The MASSR, at only 8,429 square kilometers (smaller than Rhode Island), accounted for 
only 2% of Ukraine‘s total land mass and population.  Like Bessarabia, Transnistria had never 
been the center of any regional or even local power—it had always been peripheral; a borderland 
of other powers including the Ottoman Empire, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the 
Russian Empire, and in the interwar years the Soviet Union.  Like other borderlands of Eastern 
Europe, it was tremendously diverse in terms of ethnic composition and languages spoken, 
although the overwhelming majority of the population professed Eastern Orthodox Christianity.  
This was similar to Bessarabia, except for the majority nationality: the creation of an 
autonomous republic was justified on the basis of a Moldovan majority population, but the 
majority population was in fact Ukrainian, especially after the extension of MASSR territory 
deeper into Ukraine in 1926.  Out of a total population of 572,339 in the MASSR in 1926, 
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Moldovans comprised 30.13%, Ukrainians 48.49%, Russians 8.54%, and Jews 8.48%.
121
  
Additional censuses in 1930
122
 and 1936 noted similar population distributions except for a 
decrease in the Jewish population and an increase in the numbers of Russians and Moldovans.
123
  
By the 1939 census, the Ukrainian population had risen to form the overall majority while the 
Moldovan population decreased slightly and comprised 28.54%.  Significant demographic 
change came also in the influx of Russians into the region, whose number increased to 10.23% 
by 1939, but especially in the even more dramatic out migration of Jews from the MASSR into 
the larger urban centers of the Soviet Union, a wider trend in Soviet Jewish life in the interwar 
years.  Jews were only 6.18% in 1939, representing a population drop from 48,868 in 1926 to 
37,035 in 1939.124  A full quarter of MASSR Jews left in half a generation. 
Initially, the capital of the autonomous republic was located in Balta because the Tiraspol 
was too close to the border and unsecure.  The government was eventually moved to Tiraspol in 
1931, largely because Balta—located further inland from the Dniester River on territory added to 
the MASSR in 1926—contained too few ethnic Moldovans to justify housing the republic capital 
there.  After 1924, the local party propaganda aimed at constructing Tiraspol as the heart of the 
republic was intense; it had to become the most industrialized and culturally leading city, even 
though this was not easy since it had been devastated between 1914 and 1920 and had become a 
backwater.  Birzuli was the most important industrial town and Balta was the local trade 
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Map 4.  The Moldovan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. 
center.
125
  The importance of Tiraspol as the heart of a Moldovan Republic ―built on socialist 
principles‖ was stressed by Ukrainian party leaders charged with overseeing the MASSR.  By 
October 5, 1933, the Tiraspol Gorkom (city committee) opened a new city theater 
commemorating the anniversary of the MASSR and the success of Tiraspol as ―a socialist city 
and the real center of national construction in Moldova.‖126  The establishment of Tiraspol as 
center was symbolically important for the Soviet regime‘s control of the borderland and 
imposing a new socialist order being created from Moscow.   
Similarly, the urban/rural dichotomy was another source of tremendous concern for 
Soviet leaders, who saw the preponderance of rural residency, like Romanian administrators 
across the Dniester, as a clear sign of backwardness.  For the Bolsheviks, who carried out a 
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revolution on behalf of the proletariat, however, this overwhelmingly rural reality was especially 
problematic—in Romania, the national elite were focused on their own national path toward 
progress that maintained respect for the peasant, at least in romantic visions if not in real life, as 
the soul of the nation.  Soviet modernization left no room for romantic notions of traditional 
agrarian life, nor was it wedded to service to any particular national group, at least in the 1920s.  
Aside from the need to show the Moldovans as significant enough to warrant a Moldovan 
national autonomous republic, Soviet census takers, unlike those in Romania, were not motivated 
to display ethnic homogeneity.  Transnistria was understood as a multi-ethnic region; what was 
demanded and sought at great pains was homogeneity of socialist consciousness.  Thus, there is 
reason to understand the census statistics of national composition as more accurate than those for 
Bessarabia taken in the same year by the Romanian government.
127
   
This urban/rural dichotomy in Transnistria was similar to the Bessarabian case, although 
the division was even more pronounced and the obvious lack of sizeable urban communities 
pointed to the even greater provincialism of Transnistria.  In 1926, 96.5% (!) of Moldovans in 
the MASSR lived in areas classified as rural, while 89.4% of the Ukrainians were likewise 
classified.  The urban centers of the MASSR were also dominated by minorities: 52.5% of all 
Jews in the MASSR resided in the urban centers and 40.2% of Russians did likewise, but only 
10.9% of Ukrainians and 3.7% of Moldovans lived in urban centers.  Similarly according to the 
1930 census, only the Germans and Bulgarians, who for generations had maintained autonomous 
farming communities, were more rural than the Moldovans, while Jews, at just over 8.5% of the 
total population, represented more than 30% of MASSR urban centers:  
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Table 1: 1930 Soviet Census results for the Moldovan Autonomous Republic 
 Total Mold. Ukrain. Russ. Jews Poles Germ. Bulg. Others 
Total 605,679 181,838 293,229 52,249 52,184 5002 11,301 6313 3563 
Urban 89,839     6791   32,145 20,991 27,338 1417     189     75   843 
Tiraspol 23,707       331     2822 12,992   6970   118      71     47   356 
Balta 25,066       501     9575   4562   9901   375        1       1   150 
Ananeev 19,341     4042     9786   1566   3732    77      38      4     96 
Birzuli 11,487       218     6491   1390   2884  264      68    12   160 
Rybnitsa 10,238     1699     3471     481   3901  583      11    11     81 
Rural 515,840 175,047 261,084 31,258 24,796 3585 11,112 6238 2722 
% rural 85.2% 96.3% 89% 59.8% 47.5% 71.7% 98.3% 98.8% 76.4% 
% urban 14.8% 3.7% 11% 40.2% 52.5% 28.3% 1.7% 1.2% 23.6% 
Demographic statistics taken from AOPSRM, f. 49, op. 1, d. 1871, l. 25. 
By 1939, this figure had changed by only 4% for both ―titular nations:‖ 92.5% of 
Moldovans and 85.6% of Ukrainians were still rural in the MASSR.  Also, by 1939, only 23% of 
the Jews were left in rural areas in the region, again reflecting the rapid movement of Jews into 
larger urban areas, despite the state-sponsored efforts to resettle thousands of Jews onto 
agricultural land (mostly outside the MASSR).
128
  Unlike in Bessarabia, where there was a 
significant presence of Jewish farming communities, in Transnistria rural classification for the 
most part meant village life in traditional Jewish occupations, although some exceptions, such as 
the successful Jewish tobacco growers of Dubassari, did exist.   
The demographic reality in Transnistria would prove significant for the establishment of 
Soviet power and control of the region.  Hardly any part of Soviet space in Europe was as 
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heavily rural, with the Jewish population in typical fashion being the only ethnic group that was 
majority urban.  Even the Russian population—newcomers to these lands, arriving as 
administrators, architects and engineers over the course of the 19
th
 century when the region was 
part of the Russian Empire—was more rural than the Jews.  Of even more importance was the 
fact that the overwhelming majority of the population, the Ukrainians and Moldovans, more than 
9 of every 10 people, lived in rural areas.  The reliance of the Bolsheviks on Jews to implement 
policies in Transnistria would prove important. 
Transnistria had been hard hit by the war, revolution, and famine.  Years of shifting front 
lines during the civil war, followed by expulsions and pogroms at the hands of White Armies, 
decimated many Jewish communities of the Dniester borderland, just as it did with many others 
across much of the former Pale of Settlement.  These pogroms increased markedly in their 
brutality from those that took place before.  Henry Abramson noted the difference in multiples of 
ten—during 1881-84 Jews were killed in the tens; during 1903-05 in the hundreds, and in 1919-
21 in the tens of thousands.
129
  Elias Haifetz, who was in Ukraine during the revolutionary years 
operating the Red Cross that supported the All-Ukrainian Committee for the Victims of the 
Pogroms, put the number of Jewish dead at 120,000, and some estimates ran as high as 
150,000.
130
  Even Samuel Agurskii, a Jewish member of the Communist Party since before the 
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revolution, a staunch defender of Bolshevik policies toward the Jews and the officially 
sanctioned historian of the Jewish workers‘ movement, wrote that at least during the 
revolutionary years, widespread displacement of Jewish civilians and the inability to resettle 
them with gainful employment led many toward petty trade and speculation, the very things the 
party proclaimed to be fighting against.
131
   
Such widespread and staggering violence against Jews during the revolutionary era took a 
toll on the traditionally urban Jewish economic structure.  The urban population as a whole in 
what would become the Moldovan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (MASSR) decreased 
during the turbulent years of war and revolution, as it did across much of the former Russian 
Empire.  A session of the MASSR branch of Narkomnats in 1927 reported the terrible suffering 
of the national minorities during the years of the ―imperial and civil war‖ was marked by many 
locales still in ruins.  Thanks to the government of the MASSR, however, the report continued, 
things have improved economically and socially.
132
  In fact, prior to the formation of the 
MASSR in 1924 when the most widespread violence had ended, Soviet officials struggled to 
gain control this distant region.  The Central Executive Committee (TsIK) of the MASSR, which 
helped solidify the Soviet presence along the Dniester left bank, was in part an effort to extent 
effective Soviet administration into an otherwise lawless area.  While across the Dniester the 
Romanian Army instituted stability in Bessarabia (albeit brutally), in Transnistria chaos reigned 
until well into the mid-1920s.  By 1924 when the MASSR was formed, effective administration 
was clearly the government‘s most important mission despite widespread suffering from the 
violent chaos and famine on the ground.   
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State administrators demanded that Jewish representatives gain complete control over 
Jewish life, including over the distribution of foreign Jewish assistance.  In an illustrative 
example of Soviet efforts to assert control, very similar to what was occurring on the opposite 
bank of the Dniester (albeit for different ideological reasons), the Ukraine Evobshestkom (Jewish 
Social Committee—within the Evkom), which was responsible for maintaining state control over 
assistance from abroad for pogrom victims, grew increasingly uneasy between 1922 and 1923 
with the apparent lack of supervision over local relief work and insisted on its own control even 
if this hampered assistance efforts.  On January 25, 1923 it sent a circular to all Odessa Raion 
Committees (which included Transnistria until 1924) demanding that they ―make sure to inform 
us of any dealings with Joint—we remind you that you are not to deal with Joint independently 
but only through us.  We have informed them of this fact as well.‖133   
Relief for suffering Jews was of course important, but it would have to occur on the 
state‘s terms: on February 28, 1923 the Ukraine Evobshestkom informed raion (county) 
committees in these devastated regions that they should help suffering Jewish families by 
―sending them [the Evobshestkom] photos of talented children, regardless of the talent, to help 
these kids,‖ although it was not specified how they might be helped.134  A week later, another 
circular to the raion committees expressed dissatisfaction with the amount of photos being sent, 
noting that ―they understand the situation is difficult in the area of Odessa,‖ but they insist that 
every effort be made to speed-up the processing of their request in order to ―keep records not 
only of the tragedy of pogroms in the area, but also of the positive work of children, including 
drawings, clay and other [artwork].‖135   
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Jewish emigration, which in this area was intense given the chaos and bloodshed on the 
ground, would also have to come under bureaucratic control: in March 1923 the Evobshestkom in 
Moscow sent circulars to local party committees (partkoms) notifying them that intending 
immigrants would now need a visa for the country they desired to go to, a visa to exit the Soviet 
Union, and to present transit visas for all the countries they planned to pass through en route to 
their destination!  Furthermore, to get an international passport, intending émigrés would have to 
present proof of residence in the gubernia (county in pre and post-Soviet parlance) in question to 
the Gubotdel (the provincial party section) in order to receive the necessary documentation that 
they do not owe military service.  If all was well, then the intending émigrés would have to pay 
24 rubles in gold to the local section of the NKVD, understandably for the state‘s loss of the said 
person‘s potential productivity.136   
As Romanian Army statistics across the river reflect, however, few Jews that fled into 
Bessarabia bothered to do this, no only because of the chaotic urgency of flight in many cases, 
but also because of the extreme difficulty involved in getting the papers together given that the 
Soviet state had not achieved recognition or diplomatic relations with most other states.  In this 
sense, the impossible bureaucratic demands of the state given the circumstances of the day were 
similar on both sides of the river.  Animosity from Romania was strong because of Soviet claims 
to Bessarabia, and because official relations were not renewed between the two states until 1934.  
The Evobshestkom nevertheless tried to control all aspects of Jewish flight; in another circular 
dated May 14, 1923, it expressed concern over the ―democratization‖ of the immigration process, 
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noting that American families were sending documents directly to their families in the desperate 
regions rather than going through the Soviet administration.
137
 
Evobshestkom circulars to local committees were also clear about the importance of 
information collection and control.  The Odessa Evobshestkom demanded that local party 
affiliates take better accounting of Jewish children‘s homes and report at least twice monthly on 
their level of supplies and numbers of children there.
138
 The Evkom presidium in Moscow called 
for detailed reports about the number of Jewish associations formed in previous years, including 
numbers of workers and amount of funds brought in.
139
 Most vehemently, the presidium warned 
they were aware that foreign Jewish associations had been conducting local inquiries about 
Jewish circumstances in the peripheral areas of upheaval, and reminded local affiliates that it was 
their duty to carry out policies based on information at the center, not the other way around.  
Only the Okrug committees and at their discretion the raion committees would have authority to 
devise policies and initiate distribution of assistance to victims.
140
   
Control of information was pivotal to establishing complete control of the region, and the 
Evkom was reflecting the party demand to complete control of information about circumstances 
within the Soviet Union to the outside world.  On May 3, 1923, for example, a circular to Odessa 
raion committees expressed great displeasure with the fact that independent of Evobshestkom 
control, local affiliates had provided information about Jewish circumstances to Joint, which had 
written about how Jewish life in the provinces was affected by pogroms.  They reminded the 
local affiliates that Jewish correspondents in ―Der Emes‖ and ―Komfon,‖ state-sanctioned and 
controlled Yiddish-language newspapers, were working to present a clear picture both in order to 
                                                 
137
 AOSPRM, f. 2670, op. 1, d. 1, l. 33. 
138
 AOSPRM, f. 2670, op. 1, d. 1, l. 24, March 3, 1923. 
139
 AOSPRM, f. 2670, op. 1, d. 1, l. 27, April 2, 1923. 
140
 AOSPRM, f. 2670, op. 1, d. 1, l. 29, April 12, 1923. 
83 
 
secure assistance from ORT and other philanthropic organizations while also seeking to fight 
Soviet enemies.  Disorganization did not help, so they vehemently demanded, in repetition of 
past circulars, that all information about local conditions be communicated to the central Evkom 
office.
141
  The Tiraspol Evkom office was warned on May 2, 1923 that packages sent from 
America would have to be sent through the Odessa office and not directly to the families in the 
provinces.
142
   
Finally, there was the question of state finance.  The All-Ukraine Evobshestkom had 
earlier in 1923 informed local party committees that Joint donations would be taxed at a rate of 
21%.
143
  Clearly not enough collection of such funds was taking place and the Moscow Evkom 
presidium was angry with this by the Spring of 1923.  On May 3, 1923, it scolded raion 
committees that they were not sending the necessary share of foreign assistance to the presidium, 
calling this ―unacceptable.‖  Local Jewish committees were warned that the Evkom survived on 
foreign remittances (!) and that failure to send assistance up the chain could jeopardize the entire 
operation.  To remedy this state of affairs, partkoms would now be required to submit daily 
accounts of their activities rather than the previous norm of weekly accounting.
144
  As with 
education, Evobshestkom directives from the central organs to the outlying regions make clear 
the priority of Jewish administrators within the young Soviet state—the most important thing 
was to establish state control (and the Evkom’s indispensability to the bureaucracy in doing so); 
helping suffering Jewish families would be relegated to secondary status.  Thus, despite the fact 
that much of state policy was being executed through Jewish administrators, in sharp contrast to 
the circumstances in Romania where Jews were not invited to perform important tasks of state 
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administration, the initial impact of the expansion of state power into the Dniester borderland 
was remarkably similar for lower-class Jews.  For many Jews in positions of authority, faith in 
socialism as espoused by Bolshevik leaders was mixed with the opportunity to improvement of 
their own lot and that of their families. 
 But aside from the extension of effective state institutions to all peripheral regions of the 
western borderlands plagued by violence and chaos, the area along the Dniester River was of 
particular political interest to Soviet planners.  As justification for more efficient Soviet control 
of the area, leaders at the All-Ukraine Narkomnats declared the need to recognize the national 
rights of the ethnic Moldovans living in the area.  This part of southwestern Ukraine was given 
the status of an autonomous republic in 1924 and called the Moldovan Autonomous Soviet 
Socialist Republic.
145
  The move was part of the new policy of korenizatsiia, ―nativization,‖ or 
―indigenization,‖ that was initiated at the Twelfth Party Congress of April 1923.  On October 12, 
1924, Ukraine Narkomnats Chairman V. Chubar stated before the Ukrainian Communist Party 
Central Executive Committee (CEC) that the MASSR would be comprised of about 400,000 
people, including some 58% Moldovans.  This was already an exaggeration of the Moldovan 
population in 1924, but after Moscow pressured the Ukrainian CEC to extend the MASSR 
border on September 29, 1926, the Moldovan population was diluted further.
146
  As in Romanian 
Bessarabia, state censuses reflected political interests first and demographic reality second. 
The reasons for the formation of the MASSR were several-fold, serving both Soviet 
foreign policy objectives and internal issues relevant to those living in the region.  The 
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nativization campaign was supposed to fight against Russian chauvinism and institute more 
equal and humanitarian relations with Russia‘s neighbors, as well as to maximize Moscow‘s 
influence in the non-Russian periphery by ―restructuring recruitment policies in the party and 
state organs and reorganizing local organs of power to reflect the multinational character of the 
Soviet state.‖147  Moscow leaders hoped also to increase institutional efficiency and training of 
local cadres by allowing training in their own languages (which would also raise the cultural 
level of the peoples on the periphery) in order to solidify support for the revolution among local 
peasants who were feared to be skeptical to Bolshevik ideas.   
The Soviet government wished also to create an institution that would facilitate the 
penetration of Soviet propaganda into the Kingdom of Romania, in the hopes of fomenting a 
socialist revolution there.
148
  A special ―Bessarabian Bureau‖ was created and headquartered in 
Odessa for this purpose soon after the Romanian annexation.
149
  In addition, a supposedly non-
government ―Salvation of Bessarabia‖ organization had existed in Odessa since early 1919.150  It 
was precisely because of Soviet propaganda goals in Romania and the Balkans beyond that an 
autonomous republic, rather than an autonomous region, was set up along the Dniester‘s left 
bank.  Autonomous regions were not granted their own constitutions or a sense of quasi-
statehood.  Soviet leaders felt that such elements, granted to the MASSR, could better spread 
pro-Soviet, anti-Romanian propaganda.
151
  They were willing to pay for the extra level of 
bureaucracy: at initial budgetary meetings, TsIk members calculated and reported to superiors 
that they expected a budgetary shortfall of at least 500,000 rubles annually for several years for 
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the MASSR, especially as they fully expected that they would need to support refugees that 
would continue to traverse across the border.
152
  The willingness of the Soviet bureaucrats to 
accept and plan for refugee needs stands in stark contrast to the way the problem was dealt with 
on the Romanian side of the border.  The creators of the MASSR also sought to ensure that the 
Bessarabian question would continue to be a difficult issue for Romanian diplomats at the 
League of Nations.  Finally, the ―Moldovanization‖ campaign was not simply the putting into 
action by local politicians and intellectuals of a policy laid out entirely in Moscow, but the result 
of the convergence of Soviet policy and local mobilization.
153
  Charles King argues that the 
eventual abandonment of the korenizatsiia (indigenization) campaign, at least in Moldova, had as 
much to do with the failure of local political elites to improve political and economic efficiency 
to meet Bolshevik expectations as with the broader turn away from national affirmative action 
policies because of ―right deviations‖ during the late 1920s.154 
The MASSR was unusual in that its Moldovan population, the autonomous region‘s 
titular nationality as far as the state was concerned, was more numerous across a hostile Soviet 
border that remained permeable despite efforts by both regimes to close it.  Thus, its very 
existence, at least as a semi-autonomous political entity, was justified only through transnational 
action to return the ―Moldovan people‖ to their motherland.  The Romanian categorization of 
Moldovans as Romanians was stridently rejected, so much so that a Cyrillic-based Moldovan, as 
opposed to the Latin-based Romanian that had been constructed by Romanian intellectuals in the 
19
th
 century, was created for Moldovan speakers and taught in Soviet Moldovan state schools.
155
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Journals, such as the literary journal Moldova Literară, were published in this Cyrillic Moldovan 
while Romanian was banned, although Soviet cultural planners went back and forth between the 
two alphabets over the course of the interwar years.
156
  Monthly editions of the Moscow-
published Krasnaia Bessarabia, the official mouthpiece of the Soviet government on the 
Bessarabian question, always began with the slogan ―Romanian occupiers, hands off 
Bessarabia!‖157  The journal was the most virulent and consistent condemner of ―Romanian 
bourgeois imperialism‖ and sought to construct a Soviet Moldovan identity in contradistinction 
to the Romanian one across the river.  In many ways the Soviet project mimicked the nationalist 
discourse from Bucharest that sought to convince Bessarabian Romanian speakers of their 
unquestionable Romanian credentials.
158
  MASSR Jews were over-represented as editors of and 
contributors to these journals, as they were more broadly in Soviet Moldovan nation building.  
The ethnicity of the top party position in the MASSR, the chair of the Moldovan oblast party 
committee, is telling: of 11 different chairmen between 1924 and 1940, 5 were Jews and not a 
single one was an ethnic Moldovan (3 Russians, 2 Ukrainians, 1 Armenian), reflecting not only 
the state‘s effective use of Jews to implement its policies in the borderlands of the former Pale, 
but also the Machiavellian use of the nationalities question to fulfill other party aims.
159
      
 
Conclusion 
As in many parts of the new Soviet state, in the southwestern border region of interwar 
Ukraine that became the Moldovan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, Soviet leaders sought 
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to expand the reach of Soviet institutions and political culture by integrating all national 
minorities, not just Jews, within the Communist project.  As a border region and a launching 
platform for Soviet socialist propaganda into the Balkans, the MASSR was closely monitored to 
ensure ethnic and national harmony in the project of creating a new Soviet citizen, a project that 
included the transformation of the Jew from traditional into modern, or more specifically, 
modern Soviet.  Yet, as an administrative part of Soviet Ukraine, the MASSR was subject to the 
same centrist policies that governed the rest of Soviet Ashkenazic Jewry.  Just as Dniester Jews 
on the left bank slowly assimilated into broader Soviet culture, they participated in the more 
narrow project to undermine Romanian claims to Bessarabia, which earned Jews in Bessarabia 
growing animosity from Romanian administrators who were able to scapegoat Jewish 
communist proclivities (which were tiny compared to the growth of Zionism, Yiddishism, and 
the maintenance of Jewish religious tradition) rather than suffer public blame for often corrupt, 
brutal and destructive policies.  Some Jews took active part in Soviet state building because they 
had internalized Soviet policy objectives out of faith in the communist ideal; some sought to 
remove the political distance between themselves and their families and relatives across the 
Dniester; some did it out of nostalgia for their own pre-revolutionary past.   
Both state-building projects had powerfully ruptured traditional Jewish life, the chief 
difference being only that in Bessarabia the road toward exclusion of Jews quickened pace as 
state policies increasingly discarded Jewish interests, particularly as the understanding of the 
Jews as outsider and/or foreigner grew and hardened with the development of racially-inspired 
theories of social engineering.  In Soviet Transnistria certain Jewish interests were effectively co-
opted within the broader aims of Soviet modernity and it was primarily Jews themselves in the 
service of the state and party that undermined traditional Jewish life, bringing economic 
89 
 
dislocation and ruin together with war against religion and traditional Jewish communal 
institutions that had been the source of autonomy for centuries.  The specific changes are the 
subjects of the next chapters.  What is clear, however, is that the histories of Bessarabia and 
Transnistrian Jewry were intricately linked: Dniester Jews cannot be understood in one national 
paradigm, for their political and social reality traversed the Dniester River and affected the shape 
of Jewish life on each bank. 
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Chapter 2 
Under a New Roof: Hope and Disappointment in Post WWI Bessarabia 
 
In many respects, there was little opportunity for constructive relations between 
Romanian leaders and Romanian Jews, particularly in the newly acquired territories.  There was 
a fundamental conflict of interests between Romanian and Jewish nationalist agendas.  Jewish 
political interests stood to gain nothing from the state goal of bringing together all members of 
the understood Romanian ethno-nation.  Additionally, for Bessarabian Jews their province was a 
land noted for its multi-ethnicity and relative cultural autonomy, often simply because the 
territory had always been a distant provincial land where the reach of the Russian Imperial 
government was limited.  Bessarabia had remained throughout the 19
th
 century outside the 
Romanian nationalist awakening,
1
 and most of its local politicians were not looking to Romania 
as homeland when Romanian troops arrived.  In the minds of its ethnic minority population, 
officially more than half its residents in 1897, Bessarabia was a provincial place where cultural 
autonomy was possible and where much of their identity beyond family and faith was tied to 
locality, such as their town of residence.  Recalling his childhood in interwar Benderi, Victor 
Kucherenko notes clearly that the arrival of Romanian state control was strange for residents 
because they had always considered themselves as residents of Benderi before subjects of the 
Russian Tsars—becoming subjects of the Romanian crown was equally, if not more so, alien to 
them.
2
   
Furthermore, many of its people perceived their identity in numerous ways that were 
usually not at all in accordance with the desires Bucharest politicians who sought the 
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implementation of a secure ethno-national, indeed increasingly racial, Romanian order.  This is 
made abundantly clear when one examines the Bessarabian police records of citizens‘ own 
petition for citizenship in Greater Romania in 1922.
3
  There was no clear pattern for national 
self-identification for local Romanian speakers, much to the chagrin of Romanian administrators: 
Ion Greico (file 199) declared himself Moldovan while Fidosia Manolachi (143) declared herself 
a Bessarabian by nationality.  Nicolae Chivula (208) declared himself Bessarabian by nationality, 
and below for the second listing amended this to ―Romanian Bessarabian.‖  A more educated 
man, a member of a liberal profession, Gheorghe Crudu (212) declared himself Moldovan twice, 
obviously consciously and deliberately.  Zinovia Margoci (219), a day worker, and Nicolae 
Harnocu (220), who also described himself as a ―lucrator‖ by profession (a worker, but in 
language that betrayed his poor knowledge of Romanian), did the same.  Iulian Lebedev (214), a 
worker, skipped nationality at the top of the form, and below wrote ―Orthodox‖ for religion and 
―Romanian Christian‖ for nationality.  Vicheniţa Gorodev (215) considered herself Catholic by 
religion, but also wrote ―Romanian Catholic‖ under nationality.  Marea Lev (223, possibly a 
converted Jew) wrote Moldovan in both spaces for nationality.  Vasili Munteanu (226) wrote 
―Orthodox‖ and ―Romanian Christian‖ for nationality in different places on the declaration form.  
Marfa Efremovna Banah (508) wrote Orthodox for nationality and Christian for religion.  Taken 
together, it was clear that local residents by no means displayed the kinds of national leanings 
that were considered desirable for ―good Romanians.‖   
In fact, Russians, Germans and Ukrainians had an easier time declaring their nationality 
and being firm on Orthodoxy as religion, while declaring ―subject‖ to Romania for citizenship.  
The Moldovans had the most difficulty subscribing to the state category of Romanian 
nationality; clearly many knew nothing about this, but it meant very little to them or they 
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disagreed with the assertion even when they knew more.  The process of creating a nationally-
decipherable, ethnically legible space in Bessarabia, i.e. the process of getting people to 
understand and internalize state-created and sponsored categories by which their identity could 
be marked, would be a long and arduous one, especially for members of the minorities who 
challenged the new regime‘s national order.  This challenge was unavoidable in numerous 
spheres of life where the imposition of a Romanianization policy stepped on the local multi-
ethnic reality.  For example, the establishment of Romanian rule in the southern Bessarabian 
town of Cahul, founded in 1835 by Russian Governor General Fiodorov, was perhaps most 
keenly felt by locals through the implementation of Romanian language teaching in most of the 
public schools.  The speed with which the change in language instruction was carried out created 
havoc in the schools because most children (and even many educators) did not know any 
Romanian, as this was a multi-ethnic area where Moldovans were not the majority.  In fact, they 
were a tiny minority of the children attending school in the town: 1.7% of female pupils and 
10.5% of male pupils were ethnic Moldovans (or Romanians as the state saw them), compared to 
Jews who were 49.6% of the male and 24.2% of the female pupil body.
4
  This was not the only 
case where the language of the minority was made the new requirement for the majority.   
Jews had been very active in the economic and political life of the Russian province.  
Having been part of the great debates about the future of the Jewish people across the wide area 
of the former Pale, Jewish leaders in Bessarabia did not share a common, firm vision of a Jewish 
homeland in the region—but they certainly imagined widely held autonomy for Jews across 
Eastern Europe, including Bessarabia, which as residents they considered their home no less than 
for any other group of people, even though popular antisemitism was common.  Confronted by 
state interests that repressed Jewish hopes for autonomy, Bessarabian Jewry reacted in many 
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different ways, but what they shared was a rejection of the state-building project of the 
Romanian metropole when it became increasingly clear that the project left no room for Jewish 
autonomy.  Once the values and goals of Romanianization became clear, it met resistance across 
a broad spectrum of Jewish society.  What was important and not tremendously surprising was 
that the increasingly discriminatory policies of the Romanian administration over the course of 
the interwar years succeeded in unifying initially tremendously disparate Jewish minority 
interests to a considerable extent—something completely different from the Soviet situation 
where Jewish differences, including generational, religious, and socio-political, were 
successfully exploited by the state to much more successfully silence Jewish national 
autonomous interests. 
Strength of their own tradition as well as links to Russian culture remained that 
intensified a feeling of otherness for Jews in Romanian society.  Jewish political and cultural 
movements in Romanian Bessarabia, including Yiddish Diaspora revival, Orthodox religious 
traditionalism, socialist and communist underground activism, and Zionism from the Marxist 
Paolei-Tsiyon on the left to the right-wing Revisionism of Vladimir Jabotinsky on the right, 
resembled the pattern of Jewish cultural activism in Eastern Europe more broadly.  That is to say, 
as in most other young and unstable interwar East European nation-states, Jewish political 
endeavors failed to significantly improve Jewish life or to seriously affect the persistence of the 
Jewish Question even in cases where there was considerable unity of national-political 
orientation, a state of affairs that Ezra Mendelsohn has called ―the dilemma of the powerless.‖5  
Jewish cultural groups to some extent struggled against the suspicion of the local Siguranţa and 
the intolerance of the central government in Bucharest, based on its misunderstanding of Jewish 
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politics and a predisposition to view all Jewish political activism as communist-oriented and 
Soviet-inspired.  By the mid-1920s not only Jewish leaders and activists but also many lower-
class Jews that had until then remained outside politics increasingly were forced to personally 
confront the direction of Romanian state policies.  Hope and faith in Jewish autonomy within a 
Romanian parliamentary system, where national parties represented Jewish interests, slowly gave 
way to increasing dissatisfaction and efforts to fight for Jewish autonomy on their own terms.  
This chapter will outline the political circumstances facing Bessarabian Jews and describe how 
Jewish politics began changing in light of Romanian state policies. 
 
Jewish Identity and Romanian Politics: Background to Discrimination 
As the Romanian Siguranţa increasingly viewed Jewish cultural activity in Bessarabia 
through the prism of assumed communist conspiracy and a perceived anti-Romanian bias, the 
policies they formulated and pursued aimed at what they believed safeguarded the state‘s 
interests while containing possible problems from the Jews.  Due to their fear of Jewish and 
Soviet influence (which for many agents became increasingly synonymous), Romanian leaders 
took more repressive measures in the northern newlt-annexed territories and particularly in 
Bessarabia.  Unlike in the rest of the country, where communist parties remained legal and 
participated in national elections until 1924, the Romanian authorities suppressed socialist and 
communist activity in Bessarabia almost immediately; activities of the Bund were suppressed 
soon thereafter.
6
  All communist and socialist organizations were closed in Bessarabia by official 
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decree on November 13, 1918, within the first year of Romanian military occupation of the 
province.
7
  Jewish political and cultural leaders quickly felt the pressure of the new state system.   
Romanian intellectuals, defining Romanian national identity on ethnic terms and 
increasingly on arguments of racial purity that stretched back to the conquest of Dacia by Roman 
legions in 101 C.E, generally saw non-ethnic Romanians in the country as foreigners.
8
  In the 
case of the Jews, this foreignness was especially alarming because of the widespread perception, 
actively spread by public officials and much of the state press, to say nothing of the right-wing, 
that Jews dominated the Romanian economy, particularly in the urban areas.  Romanian 
administrators were concerned with this apparent preponderance of urban Jews and their 
perceived economic dominance and ―control‖ of the Romanian, and especially the Moldovan9 
and Bessarabian, economies.  Such concerns existed not only among state officials.  In 
November 1918, police reports noted much talk in the Bessarabian capital of impending pogroms 
against the Jews because of the high prices in town.  Apparently, Jews held a monopoly on 
speculation in the minds of many Chişinău residents.10  As with many stereotypes, there was 
some basis in reality.  According to Romanian statistics, Jews represented 7.2% of the 
Bessarabian population but owned 21.3% of industrial enterprises in the early 1920s.  In the 
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urban centers as a whole, 58.2% of industrial enterprises were Jewish-owned, or exactly three 
times as many as were owned by ethnic Romanians, the next most important owners.
11
   
Table 2: Rural/Urban ownership of industrial enterprises in Bessarabia, 1923 
Owner‘s nationality Urban communes Rural communes Total 
Romanians 58 527 585 
Russians 48 374 422 
Ukrainians 1 42 43 
Germans 3 24 27 
Bulgarians 6 102 108 
Turks 3 247 250 
Jews 174 247 431 
Greeks 4 17 21 
Others 2 114 116 
Total 299 1725 2024 
Statistics compiled from Calendarul Basarabiei, 1923 annual edition. 
Nevertheless, significant evidence exists, much of it from Romanian state and police documents, 
that Jewish communities faced extreme economic hardships by the mid-twenties: in 1925, as 
only one of many examples, Jewish orphanages and societies for the poor in Chişinău petitioned 
authorities and received the right to beg on city streets.
12
  Jewish parts of Bessarabian towns, 
even Chişinău, were among the poorest—those that remember those years recall how Jews were 
much less likely than other residents to plant gardens or hang art on their walls, out of the 
traditional Jewish fear that they would have to answer to jealous neighbors should they display 
good living and because they had been conditioned to be prepared to leave quickly if necessary.
13
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New issues at the national level compounded the problems of traditional peasant attitudes 
toward Jews which made Jewish daily existence often times problematic.  Antisemitism had a 
strong tradition in Romania.
14
 Equal civil rights for Jews had never been granted in the Old 
Kingdom,
15
 and was in fact seen as not representing the natural desires and evolution of 
Romanian society but rather as an imposition from the West—which many Romanian 
intellectuals believed did not have Romania‘s best interests in mind.  Romanian antisemitism 
changed with general European patterns: by the 1880s, the primary basis of new thinking dealt 
with the perceived negative impact of Jews on the romanticized peasant—the source of the true 
Romanian nation.
16
  Jews, as leaseholders and tavern-keepers were seen as ―bloodsuckers of the 
villages,‖ resulting in part from the fear among Romanian intellectuals that capitalism was 
undermining the traditional lifestyle of the peasantry—nearly all Romanian intellectuals were 
strongly opposed to granting equal rights to Jews.
17
  Civic equality for Jews was avoided during 
all critical moments when the question was up for examination; the Treaty of Paris in 1858, the 
inclusion of Article 7 in the 1866 Constitution, at the Congress of Berlin in 1878,
18
 but most 
notably in peace talks in Paris in 1919, when Prime Minister Brătianu famously walked out of 
talks with the Great Powers rather than agree to Jewish rights to citizenship in the newly created 
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Greater Romania.
19
  The Jewish question became intertwined with the agrarian question, the 
central economic problem of Romanian society before and after the First World War.  Romanian 
intellectuals inhaled modernity through the prism of perceived foreign threat and an inferiority 
complex before Western Europe—xenophobia was a central element of Romanian elite culture.  
External foreigners such as Turks, the Russians, and Hungarians were dangerous, but it was the 
internal foreigner, the Greeks and the Jews, that was most menacing.  Greeks had over the 
centuries assimilated, however, but Jews had not.
20
  By the close of the 19
th
 century the European 
intellectual climate of racial hierarchy and purity, very much consumed in Romania as well, 
precluded this option.
21
  The importance of the Jew in Romanian national identity formation 
should not be understated: the Jewish Question became in the words of Leon Volovici ―a catalyst 
for the consolidation of nationalism and a stimulus to national awakening.‖22   
The lines became particularly sharply drawn in the interwar years.  Romanian politicians 
and intellectuals saw the accomplishment of Greater Romania as a precious and triumphant 
attainment after centuries of striving and deprivation, an attainment that was threatened by 
openly revisionist policies from the Soviet Union and from Hungary, and to a lesser extent 
Bulgaria.  In contrast to pre-war Hungary, where the Hungarian ―core nation‖ represented less 
than 50% of the population but held unparalleled cultural, economic, and political power, 
interwar Romania was a state where Romanians represented the clear numerical majority but 
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held much less cultural and economic influence.  Therefore, the central thrust of state 
modernization in the interwar years took on an ethnic flavor: not so much to integrate the 
powerful minorities, since their numbers were not needed as they had been in imperial Hungary, 
but rather to economically and culturally empower the core nation at their expense.
23
  The arrival 
of Romanian military control (in Transylvania and Bukovina also, not only Bessarabia) clearly 
brought with it this ethnic frame of reference in governing: Siguranţa officials were instructed to 
cleanse the local police of minorities, as there was a need ―to enlist elements of good Romanians 
that will work together in the interests of the ideas of State and Nation.‖24  Greater Romania 
sought to embrace European modernism: multi-ethnicity was an intolerable ambiguity. 
Following the redistribution of agricultural land by the new government immediately 
after the war, the interests of Romanian leaders remained fixed on agricultural improvement and 
affirmative action policies on behalf of ethnic Romanians, such as in business and education.  
Part of the special path of Romania toward national regeneration free from Western tutelage, this 
policy was long before the war associated primarily with the platform of the National Liberal 
Party, ―through ourselves alone.‖25  While their platform was pro-industrial, it also understood 
the need to address immediately the pressing agrarian problem.  Liberals were also nationalist—
they focused on improving conditions for ethnic Romanians at the expense of the previously 
privileged minorities, as they saw it.
26
  Because three-quarters of industrial labor was ethnically 
non-Romanian in 1930 and represented less than 10% of the labor force overall, the pro-industry 
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Liberals were a mixed blessing for Hungarians, Germans, and Jews.
27
  As the most urban ethnic 
group in Romania, and one concentrated in trade and crafts, Jews found that the pro-agricultural 
and ethno-culturally chauvinistic policies of Bucharest leaders were often sharply in conflict with 
their own interests, a state of affairs that reinforced a sense of Jewish difference.   
This ―Romanianism‖ as governing ideology gained strength in the interwar period 
because of the inexperience of Romanian leaders in managing a multi-ethnic society.  Developed 
toward the end of the 19
th
 century as an ethno-national myth centered on Christian Orthodoxy, 
Romanianism placed the Jews firmly outside the national margins.
28
  Closely connected to the 
notion of Jew as permanent foreigner or outsider to the organic community was the trope of 
Jewish disloyalty that gained its greatest currency during the interwar years particularly in 
reference to Bessarabia, where Romanian leaders assumed Jewish support for communism and 
the Soviet Union in direct opposition to Romanian national interests.  ―When I say communist, I 
mean Jew,‖ wrote to his legionnaires Corneliu Zelea Codreanu, the interwar leader of the 
Romanian right-wing Iron Guard movement, capturing and in fact influencing the sentiment of 
many Romanian intellectuals and politicians of his era.
29
  It was a sadly paradoxical reality that 
both local and national leaders suspected Jews, particularly in Bessarabia, of capitalist 
speculation and communism simultaneously.
30
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The “Problem” of Jewish Autonomy 
Yet despite such views not only in Bessarabia but in much of Eastern Europe outside the 
Soviet Union, Jewish institutions persisted and in many instances thrived despite the gravest of 
political pressure and economic hardship.  Despite rapid advances made by the Romanian state 
school system, autonomous Jewish education, both religious and secular, persevered and in a few 
cases prospered.  Hassidism, very strong in Bessarabia throughout the 19
th
 century, remained so 
into the interwar years and supported an established network of hadorim and yeshivot.
31
  Russian 
Kishinev had also been home to a strong Hovevei Zion movement beginning in the 1880s that 
began training Jewish youth for emigration to Eretz Israel and founded a network of 
―modernizing heders‖ called hadarim metukanim before 1900.  The latter became the Tarbut 
schools with the expansion of political Zionism in the province by the early 20
th
 century.
32
  In 
addition to the mainstream Zionist parties, Keren Kayemet (Jewish National Fund) and Keren 
Hayesod (United Israel Appeal) were very active in collecting funds for the purchase of land in 
Eretz Israel.  Zionist youth movements grew strong during these years: He-Haluts (The 
Pioneers), Ha-Shomer ha-Za’ir (The Youth Guard), Dror, Gordonia, Brit-Trumeldor, Betar, 
Maccabbee, Hacoah, and several others made their impact on Jewish life.  Literary life 
blossomed in the interwar years.  Over 50 Bessarabian Jewish writers, many of the best known 
from the shtetl of Lipcani, which Haim Nahman Bialik called the ―Mount Olympus‖ of 
Bessarabian Yiddish literature, had a significant impact on the Yiddish literary scene outside 
their province.  Bessarabian Yiddish writers led and dominated the Yiddish-language literary 
movement across Greater Romania; Itzik Manger, Moshe Altman, Eliezer Steinbarg, Yakov 
Sternberg, Yehiel Schreibman and many others migrated to Bucharest or Iaşi where their essays 
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and plays were staged in Jewish theaters.
33
  Manger, the best known Yiddish poet of Greater 
Romania, became established in Iaşi while Sternberg created the Bucharest Yiddish Theater Bist, 
where his own works were set to stage side by side with those of Peretz, Sholem Aleichem and 
Avrahm Goldfadn.  Yakov Fishman and Shlomo Hayes led the way among Bessarabian writers 
in Hebrew.
34
   
Politically, some Jews had turned toward revolutionary activism before the Russian 
Revolution in the hope of creating greater autonomy and equality, and radicalism on the left 
certainly did not end with the arrival of the Romanian Army.  Jewish and non-Jewish radicalism 
sometimes was associated with Bolshevism across the Dniester and in Bessarabia, a fact which 
seemed to confirm the idea so common among Romanian military administrators and police that 
Jews in particular were Soviet conspirators.  Revolutionary sentiment among Bessarabian Jews 
cannot simply be explained through the prism of Soviet influence, however; rather it reflected a 
broadly-defined hope in Jewish national-cultural autonomy held by many, coupled with romantic 
faith in the Bolshevik revolution as bringer of equality for the Jewish people and an end to 
discrimination.   
The case of interwar Bessarabia was representative of the wider condition of East 
European Jewry during these years, although there were particularities that were specific to the 
region.  Due to Jewish economic, social, cultural, and political difference and exclusion common 
to all East European societies during previous centuries, but also partly because most of the 
Jewish population had migrated to the region during the previous century of Russian rule, there 
was very little connection to Romanian culture among Bessarabian Jews.  In 1918, few 
Bessarabian Jews spoke the language of the majority—Romanian, unlike in Poland, Hungary, or 
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Ukraine where many Jews, if not most, knew the majority tongue.  Nevertheless, given their 
extremely difficult relationship with the Russian Imperial authorities, many Bessarabian Jews 
harbored ambivalence about becoming part of Greater Romania—a feeling that was markedly 
less extreme than the hostility with which many Jews in Transylvania and Bukovina, the other 
territories acquired by Romania as a result of the Paris treaties, greeted the idea.
35
  Some of this 
cautious optimism is evident in the names of Yiddish-language newspapers like ―Der Morgn‖ 
(The Morning), ―Unzer Tsayt‖ (Our Time), and ―Das Naie Lebn‖ (The New Life), many of 
which were founded soon after the Great War‘s end.36   
Compared to the Jews of Bukovina or Transylvania, who had enjoyed complete legal 
emancipation under Austro-Hungarian Imperial rule since 1867; or the Romanian Jews of the 
Old Kingdom, who were never granted equal rights but enjoyed greater urban concentration and 
economic modernization; Bessarabian Jews were the most politically immature in Greater 
Romania.  They had never been given opportunity to share political power under Russian rule 
and remained disproportionally engaged in traditionally Jewish economic activities; i.e. petty 
trade, crafts, etc.  Nevertheless, Jewish popular political movements within the Russian Imperial 
framework had grown rapidly in the inter-revolutionary years, between 1907 and 1917.  Jewish 
political radicalization, largely the result of rising popular antisemitism and unwillingness on the 
part of the Russian government to address Jewish popular concerns, had also greatly increased.
37
  
As Zvi Gitelman has shown, during the All-Russian Constituent Assembly elections in 1917, 
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Jews voted for myriad Zionist parties as well as the national parties on the left (Social 
Democrats) and center (Kadets).
38
   
Yet the reality of Romanian annexation—resulting in a new managing metropole in 
Bucharest enforcing a new political culture with new rules, goals, categories, and most 
importantly, a new language—left Bessarabian Jews in a state of collective political confusion 
until well into the late 1920s.  The interwar experience of Romanian rule was a harsh political 
baptism for them.  By all accounts, it took several years after 1918 for the Romanian takeover to 
feel like something relatively permanent.  Bessarabian Jews seemed initially to be expecting a 
reversal of the post-war status quo: undercover Siguranţa agents attempted to interview market 
Jews one numerous occasions during 1918-20 after gaining their trust and reported that most 
believed Bessarabia would be re-annexed by Russia, that it had no future in Romania.  One agent 
warned of the Jewish ―pentagon‖ he saw on a copy of the ―Jewish paper‖ Der Shtern in 1920: in 
their desire for communism Jews had brought down the Russian provisional government in St. 
Petersburg he reported, and they will do the same in Romania if given the chance.
39
  Consistent 
rumors about Soviet designs on Bessarabia helped fuel this sentiment—here the position of 
Bessarabia as a political and geographic borderland was influential to both Jewish perceptions 
and attitudes toward the Romanian state and vice versa.  Jews that had been politically active and 
fought for greater freedoms under Tsarist rule had a difficult time accepting Romanian 
nationalist chauvinism as the outcome of years of war and revolutionary struggle; like Kogan-
Bernstein they spoke about coming change in a manner that could not but be seen as subversive 
by Romanian police.  There is ample evidence suggesting that Jewish identity was and continued 
to be for many lower-class Jews not something easily classifiable in the terms desired by a 
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modern state.  According to Bessarabian police files of petitions for citizenship, Jews displayed 
no clear pattern for national self-identification, just like the Moldovans, although arguably not to 
the same extent.  A Iosif Ghelam (l. 198) declared himself Moldovan by nationality and Jewish 
by religion; Baruh Ghelfer (l. 144) left his religion blank but declared himself a Jew by 
nationality, as did a Shmil Duma (147); Sara Gresner, apparently a convert, wrote Orthodox for 
religion and Jew for nationality (222).
40
   
 Many continued to display the mindset of the Pale, which after 1918 can be called a 
transnational mindset in that they remained more interested in issues affecting their co-
religionists in distant lands than those affecting the state in which they lived.
41
  Toward the close 
of the 1920s, however, more than most other ethnic or national groups in interwar Romania, 
Bessarabian Jews became highly politicized, especially toward Zionism, and developed, as noted 
by Raphael Vago, something of a siege mentality.
42
  It was not that Bessarabian Jews became 
Zionist during the interwar years—they already were in many cases—rather, they required some 
years to learn how to negotiate with a new state to institutionally express their collective political 
interests and perhaps more to the point, lose any faith in democratic integration into Romanian 
society.   
Indeed, what becomes apparent through an examination of the Bessarabian Yiddish and 
Russian language press (with Jewish concerns being front and center in the latter also), as well as 
through details of meetings of various social, cultural and youth groups, is a growing sense of 
unease and desperation at the state of Jewish life in Romania.  Theatrical performances in 
Yiddish across Bessarabia, carefully watched typically by Jewish agents working for the 
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Siguranţa, focused overwhelmingly on Jewish and to a lesser extent Russian subjects, despite 
state support and encouragement for Romanian-national themes.
43
  For example, a Yiddish 
troupe performed J. Gordin‘s ―Der Vilder Mentsch‖ several times in December 1918 and again 
in 1922; another performed a dance-play called ―The Last Ballet Party,‖ which included a Gypsy 
dance, a Mazurca.  Jewish dramatists also performed an interpretation of Dostoevsky‘s ―Idiot,‖ 
but nothing, local Siguranţa reports noted, from Romanian authors or depicting Romanian life.44   
Not only did Bessarabian Jews not find a home in Greater Romania, but because of their 
having been a part of the Russian Empire they maintained a distinctive identity separate from the 
other regional Jewish communities that became a part of the expanded Romanian kingdom.
45
  
The central interwar question for the Jews in Bessarabia, as in other newly-acquired territories of 
Greater Romania and, indeed, as in other young nation-states of Eastern Europe, became the 
extent to which they could appropriate the national identity of their host state in addition to a 
Jewish one, as a barometer of wider socio-economic conditions and cultural and political 
integration.  In the case of Bessarabian Jews, this appropriation proved highly problematic.  Most 
Bessarabian Jews arguably never considered themselves ―Romanian,‖ and by the late 1930s the 
Jewish minority was marginalized in national life and isolated politically to such an extent that 
this was no longer possible.  By this point, as shown most clearly by the research of historian of 
Romanian Jewry Carol Iancu, Jewish institutions and leaders moved toward unity out of 
necessity despite vast gulfs separating their views on Jewish life in modern European society. 
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Politics in a New House 
Nevertheless, Jewish leaders did engage, often intensely, with Romanian political 
realities in attempting to secure for their co-religionists greater legal and civic rights, economic 
circumstances, and cultural autonomy.  Jewish leaders from the newly annexed territories needed 
to adjust to a new system that spread to Bessarabia from the Old Kingdom—that is, pre-war 
Romania.  In making decisions about the newly enlarged Jewish minority in their country, 
Romanian politicians referenced their own political relationship with Jews in the Old Kingdom,
46
 
where since 1862 the Romanian government had stayed out of internal Jewish affairs while 
denying Jews legal and civil equality.
47
  The Jewish religion, in fact, had no legal status at all in 
pre-1918 Romania—it was juridically non-existent.  This was not the case for the communities 
of Transylvania, Bukovina, and Bessarabia, which all had legal status before 1918.  This legal 
limbo was extended to the new territories after 1918 rather than being reversed for the Old 
Kingdom community.  In the 1920s, Jewish leaders embarked on a course to achieve legal 
recognition for the Jewish community along the lines of the other faiths in the country, 
culminating in the promulgation of the Law of Cults in 1928, which nevertheless left many 
Jewish issues unsolved.
48
   
If there was anything like a period of hope held by Bessarabian Jews for the Romanian 
state, it was in the early interwar years.  After Romania finally signed the Minorities Treaty on 
December 9, 1919, then Romanian Prime Minister Alexandru Vaida Voevod made a speech in 
Parliament to mark the event, calling on Jews and Romanians to reconcile their past and work 
together to take the country toward progress and civilization.  Others voiced similarly hopeful 
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future plans, including Conservative leader and former Prime Minister Alexandru Marghiloman 
and liberal leader Ion Duca.  Even Nicolae Iorga, the greatest Romanian historian, nationalist 
intellectual and influential politician noted that Romania should honor all its treaty obligations 
even though they were accepted under pressure from foreigners.  Such statements by Romanian 
leaders were of course closely followed by the Jewish press, particularly the Curierul Israelit 
(Jewish Messenger), the Bucharest-based, Romanian language Zionist daily from which political 
news from the capital was often re-printed in Jewish papers throughout the country in Yiddish, 
Hebrew, Hungarian, Russian, and German.
49
   
As Romanian administrative control solidified in the years after the takeover, Bessarabian 
Jews struggled to understand the nature of the new government.  State control over the economy 
proceeded intently but at first carefully; quicker and bolder were state propaganda campaigns 
initiated for the formation and spread of national myths to foster ethno-national pride in Romania 
among the residents of the newly annexed territories.
50
 The Russian language newspaper 
Bessarabia, for example, printed as its front-page article on March 24, 1919 a celebration of the 
one-year anniversary of the ―Bessarabian-Romanian Union,‖ calling it ―a great day that ended a 
historical injustice that had lasted for over a century,‖ when Bessarabian Romanians ―had been 
forcefully torn from their mother country but never forgot their homeland or their brothers across 
the Prut.‖51   
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The Romanian state point of view as expressed through the state-censored press was 
often at odds with Jewish interests, feeding a sense of otherness and exclusion.  For example, 
there was considerable news from the Soviet Union in the press during these years, much of it 
obviously dogmatic in its consistent anti-Soviet sentiment.  Sometimes such reporting was 
peripheral to Jewish interests and not controversial, such as news that the Bolsheviks had lost 
Ekatorinoslav, which was greeted with completely unveiled glee by the Romanian-censored 
press.
52
  Other times the position or interpretation taken was very problematic for a Jewish 
audience, such as when a local article completely exonerated Symon Petliura, the anti-Bolshevik 
Ukrainian nationalist leader during the Civil War, of any of the anti-Semitic violence taking 
place in Ukraine at the time, something Jews did not accept for obvious reasons.
53
 
Increasingly more troubling for Jewish social and political life in the new state was the 
problem of citizenship and legal equality.  Jews were allowed to participate in elections, for 
example, only by virtue of citizenship acquired through individual petition.  Citizenship 
remained subject to individual petition through the signing of the Minority Rights Treaty, even 
though the treaty obligated the Romanian government to grant unconditional citizenship to all 
Romanian Jews.  By July 1921, the Union of Native Jews
54
 asked for and received a meeting 
with the Justice Minister, only to learn that not only would individual petition remain the basis 
for acquiring citizenship for Jews, but also that there would be a deadline for naturalization 
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demands, September 1, 1921.
55
  The Union appealed to the Alliance Israélite Universelle, 
members of which met with the Romanian Foreign Minister Take Ionescu in Paris on October 7, 
1921.  Ionescu explained that his government was dedicated to honoring the terms of the treaty 
and any problems would be solved by a new Constitution that the Parliament was working on, 
but nothing was done on this question over the course of 1922, a year of rapid political turnover 
at the national level.
56
  The Union of Native Jews organized a congress in the capital and made 
public a motion in which they called for measures expediting Jewish naturalization. They also 
called for the legal recognition of Jewish communities, institutionalization of a Jewish cult like 
that of each of the other minority groups that could receive state support, and state recognition of 
Jewish community schools, including the granting of state-recognized diplomas—all issues for 
Romanian Jews.   
Union leaders also voiced their strategy to politically achieve these goals for all 
Romanian Jews—they called on Jews not to run on separate Jewish party lists in national 
elections but rather vote for representatives from large, national parties that could be trusted to 
serve Jewish interests, which at this time meant the Democratic Party of Take Ionescu and the 
Peasant Party led by Nicolae Lupu.  In the early 1920s, this was indeed the strategy pursued by 
most Jewish leaders in the new territories, although concerns were raised because some members 
of the influential Liberal Party led by the Brătianu family were already making anti-Semitic 
speeches.
57
  In March 1922, eight Jews entered the Romanian Parliament for the first time: 6 
deputies (of 376) and 2 senators (of 198).  For the remainder of the year this Parliament and 
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much of national cultural debate became focused on the question of the new Romanian 
Constitution.  For a time it appeared that emancipation and autonomy promised by Article 7 of 
the Minority Rights Treaty would be enshrined in the new document, but after the January 1923 
assumption to power by the National Liberal Party the conversation about the Jews turned 
toward limitations.  The status of Jews in Greater Romania became codified in the Constitution 
of March 28, 1923 by Article 133: ―the Jews that on August 2, 1914 resided in the Old Kingdom 
and that claimed no other citizenship are recognized as full Romanian citizens without any 
formality.‖58 This measure intentionally excluded from citizenship tens of thousands of Jews, 
and was a significant step back not only from the Minority Rights Treaty but even from the 
Decree Laws that regulated Jewish legal status in years prior.  Jewish deputies in Parliament 
refused to vote for the new Constitution. 
Because the newly ratified constitution did not provide any legal basis for managing 
questions of citizenship in the annexed territories, the Parliament drafted laws governing the 
attainment and loss of Romanian citizenship for Jewish residents there.  An initial draft in 
October 1923 was supplanted by the ratification on February 23, 1924 of what became known to 
Bessarabian Jews as simply the Mârzescu Law, after the last name of the new Justice Minister.  
The previously established concept of ―residency‖ became replaced by that of ―indigenousness,‖ 
which allowed those in the annexed territories to individually apply for Romanian citizenship if 
they could prove that their parents were born or had residency in the Old Kingdom.  However, 
―citizens of the former Russian Empire residing on Bessarabian territory‖ were required to prove 
that they themselves were residents there on or before March 27, 1918 (the date of the Act of 
Union with Romania).  A special law was made for Jews, specifying that Jews in any of the 
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annexed territories would be governed in accordance with Article 133 of the Constitution on this 
question, i.e. they would have to prove residency as of August 2, 1914.
59
  
The drafters of the law were clearly interested in limiting application for citizenship in 
general, but for Jews especially.  Minister Mârzescu later justified this project by stating that the 
state needed to control the populations of the annexed territories, excluding foreigners ―that did 
not have a right to Romanian nationality.‖60  By these he meant refugees from Russia, whom all 
public officials knew were mostly Ukrainian Jews.
61
  The Mârzescu Law continued to govern 
questions of citizenship for Bessarabian Jews until more restrictive laws were introduced in 
1938.  The Union of Romanian Jews (URJ)
62
 and other Jewish politicians repeatedly and 
unsuccessfully made attempts to change the law; attempts that Carol Iancu argues were not 
counter-productive despite total failure because they likely prevented the introduction of even 
more restrictive legislation.  Jewish hopes for a modern and inclusive Romania where they 
enjoyed equal rights were buried by the one-two punch of the new Constitution and the 
Mârzescu Law, which together made clear that Romanian politicians desired to limit the number 
and rights of Jews in Romania and were seeking as much as possible to circumvent the promises 
made in Paris on behalf of their state.  In this sense 1924 was a turning point for Bessarabian 
Jews, as hope and apprehension increasingly and steadily gave way to fear and radicalization.   
 
Economic Conditions & Jewish Institutions: Credit Cooperatives 
The pressures on Jewish life were not only political.  The Jewish economy was 
devastated during the Great War, and it never recovered throughout the interwar years largely 
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due to the violent readjustment that well-established markets had to endure because of the 
drawing of national borders that were much more jealously guarded than under pre-war multi-
national empires.
63
  Jewish socio-economic conditions in Bessarabia resembled those of the 
Tsarist Pale in that a few Jewish magnates were interspersed among a majority of Jewish poor, 
an over-preponderance of whom remained in the artisan and craftsmen fields that increasingly 
subsisted by day labor and begging.  But there is no question that economic circumstances, at 
least in Bessarabia, were worse in terms of direct comparison: according to statistics compiled by 
the Chişinău branch of the JDC, Jews represented nearly 25% of all Bessarabians classified as 
having ―occasional and accidental work.‖64  The promising conditions that had attracted Jews to 
Russian Bessarabia in the 19
th
 century were clearly history. 
Corruption added to the economic malaise.  Many Romanian officials sent to Bessarabia 
were corrupt and wanted to make a quick profit during their tenure, and often badly damaged the 
local economy in the process.
65
  Despite the deep anxiety felt by Romanian politicians toward 
Bessarabia as the most backward region of Romania in terms of living standards, health, literacy 
and Romanian national sentiment, Bucharest sent its most inept administrators there.  Nor was 
this unique to Romania, according to Joseph Rothschild:  
Yet another experience shared by the three states [Poland, Yugoslavia, and Romania] was the existence of a 
particularly backward, refractory, and incendiary region (Bessarabia, Macedonia, or Eastern Galicia and the 
kresy) whose problems were then compounded by its use as a bureaucratic exile for incompetent, corrupt, 
sadistic, or politically out-of-favor administrators.
66
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Institutionalized corruption was the norm in interwar Romania; as witnessed by the wild swings 
in election results that could not possibly reflect actual voting trends of the populace.  But 
corruption at lower levels was even more endemic, and generally more debilitating the further 
from the capital one ventured.  Bessarabia was among the worst regions: in 1929, the American 
Committee on the Rights of Religious Minorities conducted surveys in Bessarabia and found that 
corruption was rampant and deeply imbedded.  Representatives were told openly by one 
Chişinău civil servant, for example, that minority rights was a question of bribery—the civil 
servant needs money while the minority applicant needs the protection of the state; this is simply 
a circumstance of supply and demand.
67
  Nonetheless, in cases pertaining to Jewish questions, 
especially Jewish petitions for naturalization, Romanian bureaucrats were particularly negatively 
predisposed.  A corrupt bureaucracy that was typically perceived as malicious among 
Bessarabian Jews did nothing to quell Jewish apprehension about life in Greater Romania.     
Romanian state policies toward minorities in the newly acquired territories caused 
additional havoc in other ways also. Citizenship rights were denied to thousands of Jews, many 
of whom had lived in Bessarabia all their lives, because they could not prove fulfillment of 
residency requirement due to their inability to produce many documents demanded by the 
Romanian ―Committee of the Three‖ (responsible for investigating local citizenship claims) that 
had been lost during the war.  Many others lost rights to petition for citizenship because they 
missed set deadlines, usually not knowing about them.
68
  Without citizenship, legal work was 
difficult to maintain and deportation an increasingly looming reality.  In addition, tens of 
thousands of Jewish refugees from Ukraine and Poland were also mostly denied citizenship, and 
without means for subsistence they threatened to overwhelm Bessarabian Jewish philanthropic 
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organizations.  During the early interwar years there was considerable help for the refugees from 
the JDC, but this assistance eventually diminished, and in any case Joint later ran into problems 
with the Romanian government and its efforts became more difficult.  In 1935, JDC leaders 
attempted to implement ―Jewish colonization in Bessarabia,‖ whereby Jews would move to 
farmland and take up agriculture, much like the hope of Jewish communists in Soviet 
Birobidzhan and socialist Zionists in Palestine.  Romanian leaders did not take kindly to this, and 
some wanted to forbid Joint from further functioning in Romania.  At a session of the council of 
ministers on Saturday, Nov 11, 1935, Interior Minister Inculeţ made clear that instead of working 
toward philanthropy, the Joint colonization project attempts to spread Jews around Bessarabia, 
and thus its functioning must be stopped.  Minister of Agriculture Sassu added that because of 
this organization, a lot of Romanian land has fallen into the hands of Jews.
69
  The work of the 
JDC was made more difficult but they were not driven out of the country until the war. 
Unlike many Jews in the other newly annexed parts of Greater Romanian such as 
Transylvania or Bukovina, who had known the benefits of relying on an enlightened, relatively 
benevolent Imperial system, most Bessarabian Jews had never considered the Russian state as 
protector and defender of their rights and livelihood.  The interwar experience of violence and 
discrimination under Romanian military administration in Bessarabia confirmed previously 
developed prejudices that underscored their wariness of the modern state.  In the early years of 
Romanian rule, however, many Jewish institutions functioned with relatively mild state 
interference (so long as they were not suspected of communism) and allowed to establish the 
institutional framework necessary to support a modernizing and increasingly fractured 
Bessarabian Jewish culture.  Romania was ill-equipped to provide much support to its newly 
incorporated residents, many of whom were in desperate need.  Most leaders in Bucharest and 
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their administrators in the ―newly acquired territories‖ had a specific pro-Romanian ethnic 
agenda that did not favor state aid for minorities, especially Jews.  As they had in the past, 
Bessarabian Jews turned toward Jewish institutions, the persistence and importance of which 
helped build and sustain growing Jewish national separateness.
70
  Local Jewish cultural 
institutions in Bessarabia faced tremendous strain during the interwar years and likely would not 
have survived if not for the considerable assistance from international Jewish funds, particularly 
from the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, or JDC.
71
      
Despite the presence of successful, Jewish-owned enterprises and a significant level of 
integration of the Jewish economy into that of the region as a whole, Bessarabian Jews 
maintained throughout the interwar years considerable communal and administrative autonomy, 
supported by economic self-reliance.  Of tremendous importance in financing Jewish economic 
autonomy were Jewish credit cooperatives, which were self-organized trade and banking groups 
that pooled resources in order to provide low-interest loans to assist Jewish entrepreneurship and 
support communal life.  In Bessarabia, Jewish credit cooperatives dated to the turn of century, 
when the first such organization opened in Russian Kishinev (Chişinău) in 1901, followed by 
one in Bălţi in 1907.72  Following legal reforms that eased restrictions on forming cooperatives 
without a majority Christian membership in 1904-05, more credit cooperatives were opened in 
1906, 1907, and 1908, reaching 35 by 1910.
73
  In addition to the box tax and individual 
contributions of wealthy Jews, Jewish credit cooperatives had been an important means in the 
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Russian Empire of maintaining communal, cultural and religious life that remained largely un-
acculturated into the Russian milieu up to and through the revolution.   
Credit cooperatives were the central means for Jewish economic growth in an imperial 
system that developed late in terms of modern finance and banking, and even then discriminated 
against the middle and lower classes and certain minority populations, including Jewish artisans 
and craftsmen.
74
  Jewish businessmen thus often had to approach private lenders who typically 
charged 18-24% per year in interest.
75
  In such a business climate, Jewish credit cooperatives 
filled a very necessary and important economic niche, as evidenced by their rapid growth 
throughout the Russian Empire after 1905 once legal restrictions were eased.  According to pre-
revolutionary cooperative member Moshe Sharand, Jewish credit cooperatives spread rapidly in 
Bessarabia, reaching almost 38,000 members in the province by 1913, with more than 5,000 in 
Kishinev alone.
76
   
Credit cooperatives were run with a significant spirit of philanthropy in addition to profit 
making.  In times of loss and difficulty, such as the war years, cooperative members often agreed 
to write off much of their capital to help those that could not repay their loans, sometimes as 
much as 90%.  In addition, emergency funds were used to bail out cooperatives that were 
threatened with financial ruin.
77
  The Jewish Colonization Association (ICA) had began working 
with Jewish agricultural colonies in Bessarabian in 1899, but they increasingly relied on 
cooperatives after the turn of the century to distribute assistance, and this would be true with the 
JDC during the years of Romanian rule as well.  Credit cooperatives functioned in effect as the 
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face of the Jewish economy that international Jewish aid worked with.  Cooperatives were also at 
the heart of maintaining Jewish communal structures that, in the absence of significant state 
support and a weakening ability to sustain themselves by traditional means such as the box tax, 
sought to provide for every conceivable need for their members.  Such needs included a wide 
array of Jewish traditional functions from schooling to health care and from burial services to 
famine relief.  Indeed, Jewish life functioned as parallel but separate from the general socio-
political life of Romanian society, although the Jewish economy in the region never grew like in 
the years immediately prior to WWI, and supporting Jewish communal organizations became 
increasingly difficult.   
The chaos of WWI decimated the Jewish economy and cooperative membership with it.  
Jewish businesses in Bessarabia never fully recovered from the loss of traditional markets, most 
notably Odessa.  Still, following a brief period of precariousness after Romanian annexation, 
membership began to grow again, helped this time by the organization—spurred by the JDC—of 
the individual cooperatives into an umbrella ―Union of Bessarabian Jewish Cooperatives,‖ which 
was legally recognized by the Romanian government on October 14, 1920.
78
  As evidence of the 
high hopes held by many Bessarabian Jews for Jewish life in a democratic Romania, during an 
electoral meeting of cooperative members in May 1920, there was significant rejoicing over the 
agreement to form a Union, and much discussion over the need to elect Union members to the 
Romanian Parliament in order to ensure furthering Jewish interests.  Yet the problematic nature 
of such hopes was already apparent in the report on the meeting filed by the attending agent of 
the Siguranţa, who viewed such plans as ―directly against the security of the state.‖79  
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The statute of the Union provided for significant powers and economic levers over the 
individual cooperatives, which upset many older cooperative members at its founding meeting in 
October 1920.
80
  Nevertheless, by placing Union leadership in the hands of experienced and 
knowledgeable economists such as Nahum Roitman and Moshe Ussoskin clearly helped steer 
thousands of members through the very harsh waters of the interwar East European economy, 
especially during the 1930s.
81
  A total membership of 30,000, after the traumatic revolutionary 
years, was the highest membership achieved in the interwar period, in 1930.  After this date, 
economic problems and increasing discrimination led to steady impoverishment that reduced 
membership to 19,000 in Bessarabia by 1937.
82
  Nevertheless, the activism of cooperatives grew 
rapidly in the post-war years.  By 1926, for example, 35 credit cooperatives made 47,130 
individual and group loans valued at over 230 million lei ($1.15 million) to Jews across 
Bessarabia.
83
  Throughout these years, Jewish cooperatives remained very self-reliant or 
supported by international Jewish donations: only 7% of Union funds come from state 
subsidies.
84
  The long history of credit cooperatives in Bessarabia compared to the novelty of the 
idea in the rest of Jewish Romania, paradoxically placed Bessarabian Jews in a leadership role in 
the development of the Romania-wide Jewish cooperative movement.
85
  The first such 
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cooperatives outside Bessarabia opened only in 1925 in Bucharest, although they developed very 
rapidly during the late 1920s.
86
   
In addition to small business loans, the cooperatives, known to Bessarabian Jews as 
―kasses,‖ had special programs to help artisans purchase equipment necessary to manufacture 
their wares, and even a program to help artisans sell their products.  With the help of 
international Jewish funding, mostly from the JDC, the cooperatives helped give long-term, low-
rate credit for instruments and short-term credit for renewables, such as gas and feed.  
Sometimes, help was available for taxes.
87
  Many of the kasses purchased from the individual 
artisans, particularly poor ones, and then resold their products in bulk, functioning in effect like a 
guaranteed buyer.  The cooperative directors saw benefit for the individual craftsmen by keeping 
them in greater contact with others in their field, thus informing them about what kind of 
products were in demand, while the cooperative would be better informed of potential buyers to 
whom it could then sell at a profit.  It could more accurately calculate products‘ real market 
value.  This was socialized capitalism at its grass roots level—protecting the artisan from ruin by 
picking up most of the risk, perhaps then allowing the non-competitive among them to make a 
smoother transition out of the market and into something else, whereas otherwise they would 
likely starve along with their families.
88
  The importance of the cooperatives‘ role as helping the 
Jewish community only increased with time; by the 1930s, the economic problems were much 
worse and came hand in hand with increasing anti-Semitic popular violence and legal and civic 
marginalization of Jews across Greater Romania.
89
  Nevertheless, the credit cooperative 
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philosophy was focused on self-help; members worked heart to avoid being viewed as offering 
handouts.  
Many cooperative members felt a particular attachment to associations that reinforced 
their own perception of Jewish difference on this ―organically socialist‖ basis: here was a system 
that cared for individual members as opposed to the capitalist state that did not and instead 
favored the rich.
90
  The leaders of the cooperatives, and later of the Union of Jewish 
Cooperatives, were cognizant of the socialist base of their economic visions: they clearly saw 
themselves as not capitalist and were proud of it.  In the monthly journal that served as the voice 
of the Jewish cooperative movement, Das Kooperative Vort, later Cuvântul Cooperatist (The 
Cooperative Word), members addressed their difference from capitalism.
91
  The cooperative 
movement had a different attitude toward competition because they believed there was room for 
cooperation to ensure employment for all workers in achieving good production.  The 
cooperatives were not against competition, but against exploitation.  Furthermore, there was a 
difference between cooperatives and professional associations as they saw it; the latter 
represented a particular class that typically professed to do battle against capitalism; a 
cooperative was composed of people of all classes focused on cooperating to help each other and 
did not profess to battle against anyone.  The cooperative movement saw itself as between 
anarchy on the one side and socialism on the other. 
Jewish cooperatives often demanded respect for worker rights; in fact members often 
were among the most vocal in calls for improved conditions for all workers.  The cooperative of 
washers, dyers, and pressers for example submitted on July 5, 1920 to the Chişinău municipal 
government a demand for the establishment of regular working hours, acceptable conditions for 
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negotiating with owners, financial assistance to workers in need, better provisions for medical 
needs, and the establishment of cheap living spaces and dining halls.
92
  As in Imperial Russia, 
the cooperatives continued to grant reasonable interest on loans compared to the broader 
economy: in 1922, banks averaged between 36% and 42% interest on loans in Bessarabia while 
the Jewish credit cooperatives set a maximum of 18% interest on all their loans.
93
  They 
organized a rally in Chişinău on September 8, 1920 that was joined by non-Jewish workers.  In 
addition to demands for better working conditions, organizers included calls for an 8-hour day 
and a day off on Saturday for Jews and Sunday for Christians.  Siguranţa reports noted that the 
rally leaders were two women from Ukraine living in Chişinău since 1909—this did not elicit 
their sympathy for whom they openly referred to as ―parasites.‖94  Given such reactions, together 
with numerous incidents of discrimination in the Bessarabian marketplace, the overall effect of 
the vibrancy of and self-sufficiency of Bessarabian Jewish economics served to underline Jewish 
independence and eventually greater calls for political and cultural autonomy.  Without question, 
the economic basis of these cooperatives enabled more vocal demands from a new generation of 
leaders in the Jewish community for more consideration and respect from the Romanian 
leadership. 
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Figure 4: Das Kooperative Vort, May 1927 edition (Romanian Academy of Sciences).  Monthly newsletter of the 
Union of Bessarabian Jewish Credit Cooperatives, edited for much of the interwar years by Moshe Sharand.  It 
began publication from the cooperative headquarters on Kiev Street, #56, in Chişinău.  The subscription price was 
30 lei (15¢) per year or 3 lei per issue; circulation reached 6000 during the best years, 1928-30.  The first 91 issues 
came out in Yiddish; in February 1933 a Romanian supplement was added as the journal started circulating in 
Romania as well.  Despite this, circulation went down from a peak in 1931.  By 1936, it was the central publication 
of the Romania-wide Jewish cooperative movement. The dual-language format came out until February 1938, when 
the last issue in Yiddish, #152, was printed.  Starting in March 1938, resulting from new state regulations limiting 
printing in foreign languages, the journal came out only in Romanian. It was the only Jewish paper in Bessarabia 
that made this transition and thus survived into the war years—other papers, including Russian language ones, 
closed down in March 1938.   
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As with much of Jewish civil society in the interwar years, the interests of Bessarabian 
Jewish cooperatives were markedly international—with more attention paid to Jewish 
cooperative news from outside Romanian borders than within them.  On the pages of Das 
Kooperative Vort there was consistent and prominent focus on the cooperative movement in 
Palestine.  The movement in Poland, however, where by far the greatest number of Jewish 
cooperatives was centered, took up the greatest print space.  In the immediate post-war years 
Jewish cooperative leaders raised the question of a united institution that would link cooperatives 
from several countries.  In 1923 in particular, discussions floated of designating Berlin as the 
center of a region-wide cooperative—an idea that never materialized because leaders from 
Poland resisted the location choice.  Nevertheless, these discussions, in which Bessarabian 
members were active, are a clear insight into the transnational thinking of Jewish economic 
leaders at a time when they were also committed to Jewish economic autonomy.
95
   
Jewish credit cooperatives were even more imperative for Jewish farming, which was 
important to the Bessarabian Jewish economy overall.  The Jewish Colonization Association 
(ICA) had been active in Bessarabia during the pre-revolutionary period, and it was especially 
interested in investing in Jewish agricultural training and development in preparation for 
emigration to Palestine.  ICA aid was an important factor in explaining the survival of Jewish 
farming in the province throughout the revolutionary years.
96
  Agricultural land in Romania, 
previously held disproportionately by the aristocratic elite, was redistributed after the Romanian 
agrarian reform acts of October 1920.  Some 4500 Jewish farmers in Bessarabia received 
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between 4 and 6 hectares of land as a result.
97
  Yet despite the necessary redistribution of land 
from the few to the many, there were numerous problems with the agrarian reform, most notably 
that no significant means was secured, such as state-backed low interest loans, for poor and small 
scale farmers to acquire the equipment necessary to successfully farm their newly allocated 
land.
98
 
The effects were problematic for Jewish farmers also.  Jewish agriculture in Bessarabia 
had traditionally been sharply divided between the poor (individual farmers) and better off 
(usually arendashi—managers of the aristocratic lands).  Many individual farmers found it very 
difficult to set up successful operations without inventory under the jealous competition of 
peasant farmers who also received new lands—many found the work hard and failed through 
their inexperience and lack of credit.
99
  The former arendashi (certainly the peasantry‘s most 
hated segment of the Jewish population) often found themselves out of work as aristocratic land 
holdings were reduced.  The JDC, together with the ICA, lent the credit cooperatives $10,000 in 
the spring of 1922 to allow Jews that received land as a result of the agrarian reforms to have 
credit to purchase the tools and equipment they needed for farming (land that they would have 
lost had it not been cultivated, in accordance with the rules of the reforms).  The JDC also later 
helped Jewish farmers pay for some of the land that had been allocated them by the government 
but required payment.
100
   
The importance of JDC and ICA money, and its distribution to the broader Jewish 
population through the credit cooperatives, cannot be overstated for Bessarabian Jewish 
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agriculture in particular: between 1924 and 1930, Bessarabian Jewish farmers received 74 
million lei (about $350,000) in loans—by 1930, 71% of Jewish credit cooperative members from 
rural areas, or at least 7000 Jewish families, were relying on such loans for survival.
101
  Credit 
cooperative leaders were very aware of their pivotal importance for Jewish agriculture in 
particular—members sometimes noted how Jewish farmers were completely dependant on the 
local kasses, which sometimes even served as grain storage for them.
102
  In times of draught, 
money was set aside by the Union specifically for Jewish farmers.
103
  Ironically, in many cases 
such assistance earned Jewish farmers animosity from their peasant neighbors who had less help 
from a corrupt and largely unresponsive state administration in the province.
104
  It seems that 
among the hardest hit by the agrarian reforms in Bessarabia were actually Slavic farmers, who 
could not turn anywhere for serious support.  The Ukrainians in particular were often forced to 
serve as day laborers on others‘ farms and many became more susceptible to Soviet anti-
Romanian propaganda as a result.
105
  Considerable assistance not only from the Bessarabian 
Jewish credit cooperatives but also from international Jewish philanthropy kept Bessarabian 
Jewish farmers in business through difficult times. 
The JDC was in fact the most important donor during the interwar years for Bessarabian 
Jewry, as was true for East European Jewry as a whole and for the Jewish agricultural 
resettlement campaign within the Soviet Union.
106
  Hundreds of thousands of Jewish families 
whose livelihood was destroyed during the war were helped by JDC money; many were helped 
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to emigrate and settle into new places while others given direct aid.  When emigration to 
America became extremely difficult after 1924, the focus of JDC changed toward assisting Jews 
in their respective countries of residence.
107
  Much of this help was directed toward working with 
the local credit cooperatives, including in Bessarabia.
108
   
The JDC‘s first representative to Bessarabia, Baruch Zuckerman, arrived in May 1919 
and met with cooperative leaders.  In June 1920 Joint forwarded a $200,000 loan under the 
stipulation that a Union of cooperatives be created.  After the creation of the Union that October, 
JDC assistance went directly to it, from which the individual cooperatives in turn borrowed.  In 
May 1924, the JDC and the ICA joined forces by forming the American Joint Reconstruction 
Foundation, known to locals simply as the ―Foundation.‖  Foundation loans helped ease the 
hardship during the famine in northern Bessarabia in 1925 and in the south in 1929.
109
  
Bessarabian concerns were high on the agenda of the Foundation executive committee for East 
European Jewry, only Polish and Lithuanian representatives were more influential.
110
  Financial 
assistance helped with reconstructive funds for other specific plights, such as during floods in 
Romanovca, Petrovca, and Căuseni in 1928 and in Rezina and Soroca in 1932; and after fires in 
Soroca and Hotin in 1930 and Lipcani in 1932.
111
  Later, as the economic crisis of 1930s spread, 
Foundation money helped cover some losses from the loans made by the cooperatives, as well as 
providing some financial inspectors who helped in examining the loans being granted in order to 
prevent future loss.  The importance of the cooperatives, supported by Foundation money, cannot 
be understated: Mariana Hausleitner estimates that given its membership of 30,657 in 1930, well 
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over half of Bessarabian Jews were directly connected to and often dependant on cooperative 
programs.  Throughout the interwar years, cooperation between the JDC, ICA and the 
Bessarabian cooperatives remained central: representatives of the Foundation and especially 
from the JDC often attended meetings of the Union of Jewish Cooperatives.
112
  By 1930 the local 
cooperatives were already in debt to the Union by over 90 million lei (about $50,000), although 
many Jews acknowledged that without the assistance of the JDC to the Union there would only 
have been weak Jewish banks that would not have been able to sufficiently alleviate the 
economic crisis.
113
  Even as debt mounted, the credit cooperatives remained open throughout the 
difficult 1930s and even through the war; the last ones were finally closed in 1945 by the Soviet 
government.   
Cooperatives, again with Foundation funds, were also instrumental in assisting important 
Jewish institutions, which suffered from lack of funds consistently throughout the interwar years.  
Important Jewish health organizations like Ezras-Hoilim and OZE, and poor-aid societies like 
Soimekh-Noiflim, all received most of their funding from the JDC and ICA, either directly or by 
borrowing from credit cooperatives.  An excellent example is Jewish hospitals, which functioned 
in all the major Jewish communities across the province and in some towns remained throughout 
the interwar period the only medical facility for miles around.  Hospital records, painstakingly 
reviewed by Jacob Kopansky, clearly show that all patients were cared for in Jewish hospitals, 
not only Jews.  Despite this fact, Romanian government support for such hospitals was 
inconsistent and hospital administrators often turned to private fundraising that relied on support 
from local Jewish benefactors and international Jewish money, mostly from the ICA and JDC, 
even though Jewish hospitals were likely the most strongly and openly supported of Jewish 
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institutions by Romanian legislators.
114
  The most visible in terms of its longevity (it was 
founded in 1834) and attention in the local press was the Chişinău Jewish hospital, whose 
administrators consistently fought against bankruptcy, eventually turning to private fundraising 
and finally raisingits rates and cutting back on patient care.
115
   
Jewish hospitals in the provinces suffered similarly (and often worse) from lack of funds, 
and taken together served to increase Jewish insecurity and sense of separateness from broader 
society in Greater Romania. Financial problems of the Jewish hospitals, as well as burial 
societies, health organizations, and cafeterias for the poor, were consistently newsworthy on the 
pages of Russian and Yiddish Bessarabian papers, and again served to undermine faith among 
everyday Jews in the Romanian state system due to a growing perception that Bucharest was not 
favorably inclined toward Jewish institutions.  In the final analysis, credit cooperatives and the 
institutions they supported provided the economic backbone that served as the base from which 
the continued existence of a separate Jewish society was made possible.  Without an economic 
basis, even if an ailing and unstable one, such a society could not exist and would be bound to 
disintegrate, as the case of the Transnistrian situation across the Dniester will make clear.   
 
Refugee Crisis and the Growth of Jewish National Separateness 
Although such concerns over needy Jewish institutions highlighted the growing distance 
between Romanian and Jewish national interests in Bessarabia, the initial push toward widening 
the chasm of misunderstanding was given in the immediate postwar years by the Ukrainian 
refugee crisis.  During the Russian Civil War, the overwhelming focus for not only the JDC and 
ICA in Bessarabia but for Jewish philanthropy in general, including the cooperatives, was to help 
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the huge number of Jewish refugees from Ukraine.  In order to escape the violence of the 
pogroms there, tens of thousands crossed the Dniester into Bessarabia, usually on foot, especially 
in the winter when the river froze, despite the efforts of Romanian military police to patrol the 
border.  The majority of the refugees were Jews: at least 80,000 made this journey from 1919-
1923, but likely many more.  Official statistics capture only part of the number but clearly 
support the hypothesis that Jews were the majority: according to the Ministry of Interior (which 
was in charge of the Siguranţa that commanded the border police) between 1918 and 1922, 
38,116 refugees were registered by military police in Bessarabia, and of these fully 33,449, or 
88%, were Jews.
116
  Many arrived without any means of subsistence and needed much assistance 
in attempting to proceed to either to the United States, South America or Eretz Israel.  Most 
came from regions close to the border, such as Moghilev-Podolskii and Uman‘, and they were 
disproportionally young.  Statistics for arrivals in Chişinău in November 1920 are revealing: of 
194 arrivals, 25 were 18; 25 were 19; 38 were 20; and another 86 between the ages of 21 and 24.  
Clearly, escaping the Ukrainian pogroms was for the young—the elderly perished if they could 
not manage to hide. Leaders of the Zionist group Zeiri Zion lamented this state of affairs while 
noting the potential strength of so many young Jews arriving every month.
117
 
Together with local Jewish organizations, the JDC worked to provide basic necessities 
for as many as possible.  In response to the petition from prominent Chişinău Jewish leader and 
Zionist Jacob Bernstein-Kogan, officially supported by the government of Great Britain, 
Romanian leaders reluctantly agreed to allow Jewish refuges to remain in the country on June 23, 
1920 with the understanding that their presence was temporary and that the responsibility for 
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their provisioning and behavior rested entirely with the Bessarabian Jewish communities.
118
  By 
this point tens of thousands had already fled into Bessarabia and mass deportation was 
impractical and problematic for Romania‘s international image.  In 1919 there was already 
established an organized effort to distribute Passover matzo and food to aid starving Jewish 
refugees in Bessarabia.  Some of the food was sold, but most was donated to over 12,000 people 
through four distribution centers in Chişinău and a few other towns.119  Nevertheless, there was 
not nearly enough matzo for Passover in 1919, when Bessarabian Chief Rabbi Tsirelson publicly 
permitted Jews to consume mămăligă out of necessity.120   
With all responsibility for provisioning the refugees falling on the local Jewish 
communities, helping the Jewish refugees became a frantic and emotional mission that rallied 
members of all classes of Jews to help the less fortunate.  The press was very important in 
galvanizing Jewish attention and support, and not only in Bessarabia.  Money was also collected 
throughout the communities of Greater Romania, where local ―Ukrainian committees‖ were 
founded to collect funds.
121
  The leader of the Union of Romanian Jews and President of the 
Romanian JDC branch in Bucharest, Wilhelm Filderman, did much to assist in this effort.
122
  In 
Bessarabia itself, the Jewish credit cooperatives were also an important source of aid.  The crisis 
greatly increasing the visibility of the Jewish credit cooperatives because of the Union leaders‘ 
noted efforts to help suffering victims.  Credit cooperatives maintained a consistent effort to help 
the helpless and starving and often noted in their press and meetings the communal function 
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fulfilled through charity that binds the giver and taker of the aid within the same community.  An 
important part of the cooperatives‘ philosophy of giving was based on equality: not to make 
anyone who comes for aid to feel that they are lower for asking, because ―we are all part of one 
community and tomorrow the roles of giver and taker may be reversed.‖123  Zionist youth 
organizations were also very active in Bessarabia, especially in the capital and in the northern 
town of Bălţi were Jewish youth attempted to aid refugees as well.  Most focused on re-locating 
them to Eretz-Israel, but some did considerable legwork in raising money for their immediate 
support.
124
   
Yet, as respected interwar Chişinău lawyer and prominent Zionist Michael Landau later 
recalled in his memoirs, most of the money needed to keep the refugees alive, especially in the 
first years before an effective infrastructure was set up to deal with the extent of the crisis, was 
provided directly by the JDC.
125
  JDC money was instrumental in providing funds necessary to 
rent the required shelter and purchase needed provisions.  JDC representatives secured 
apartments, warehouses and even space in synagogues mostly in Chişinău for the refugees, 
where thousands were housed.
126
 JDC funds paid for free cafeterias that fed thousands while they 
waited to determine their fate.
127
   
Efforts to institutionalize refugee assistance led to the formation by Bessarabian Jewish 
leaders, in conjunction with the JDC, of the ―Society for the Defense of the Interests of Jewish 
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Émigrés,‖ or SDIJE.   It was registered with the Romanian authorities July 14, 1921, and its 
executive committee chair was Bernstein-Kogan.
128
  In addition to assisting new arrivals in 
Bessarabia, the society sent out aid to Jews on the left bank of the Dniester through couriers that 
crossed illegally into the Soviet Union at considerable risk to themselves.
129
  As well as 
permanently based representatives, JDC delegates from the United States made periodic visits 
during the postwar years to examine the refugee circumstances.  One such visit was by a Naum 
Simchin on November 5, 1920, who made visits to camps in Chişinău and the Dniester town of 
Vortejeni, whose Jewish community was struggling to provide for the massive numbers of 
refugees.  Despite being American, Simchin was registered as part of the Zionist organization 
and closely followed, according to Siguranţa reports.130   
Much effort was made by many Jewish communities to take in as many refugees as 
possible.  In Seculeni, for example, a Jewish boarding school took in numerous refugee children 
in March 1920.
131
  The Chişinău police prefecture was inundated with petitions from SDIJE on 
behalf of fleeing Ukrainian Jews, asking for them to remain in Bessarabia until they could 
receive papers necessary to emigrate to Palestine.  Romanian leaders were quite agreeable in 
granting exit visas to Jews embarking (usually from Galaţi) to Eretz-Israel, although Jews 
remaining in Bessarabia was becoming a growing problem for them.
132
  Given that the refugee 
crisis occurred quite early in the relationship between Bessarabian Jewry and the Romanian 
military administration, considerable problems resulted simply from a lack of established norms 
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that made effective communication and understanding between Jewish leaders and Romanian 
administrators difficult.  A clear example of this was a letter dated January 11, 1919 received by 
the Chişinău police prefect office from Rabbi Tsirelsohn on behalf of an arrested Jewish refugee 
named Haim Trocker.  The letterhead carried the Russian stamp ―Kishinevski Gorodskoi Ravin‖ 
(Kishinev City Rabbi) while the letter itself was written in French.  Even as the Chief Rabbi‘s 
office continued to use stationary from the Tsarist era, Tsirelson did not feel competent enough 
to make requests in Romanian and understood that official addresses in Russian would not be 
appreciated.  Such was the political tension in the province at the time.
133
   
Despite consistent appeals from Jewish institutions, the Romanian government did not 
allocate aid for the crisis and was in fact increasingly concerned about the number of refugees 
residing within its borders.
134
  Despite formal requests from Rabbi Tsirelson, Romanian 
authorities never permitted the arrival of undocumented refugees.  Given what the refugees were 
fleeing from, however, many were without papers and attempted to cross the border illegally.  
The fate of many such Jews that were not fortunate enough to evade the Siguranţa appeared 
routinely in the press, such as that of a Jewish teenager named Kirsanov, who was tried and 
convicted in 1922 before the Chişinău municipal tribunal for illegally crossing into Romania and 
sentenced to 10 months in prison.
135
  
Romanian military administrators in Bessarabia reacted with initial ambivalence and with 
increasing concern to the influx.  Already in 1918, Minister of Education Simion Mehedinţi 
voiced his fear that Romania as undergoing ―a Jewish invasion,‖ and lamented that only in 
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Romania were towns mostly comprised of foreigners.
136
  By 1922, additional funding allocated 
for the creation of special police units assigned to deal specifically with border issues were 
justified on the basis of ―restless elements in Bessarabia, mostly Jews and refugees from Russia,‖ 
who were deemed increasingly dangerous.
137
  With the passage of the Mârzescu Law on 
February 23, 1924, Jews became subject to special legislation requiring them to prove their 
residency in the province as early as 1914 in order to receive permission to remain.
138
  After 
1924, police made regular and irregular checks of papers in the refugee camps, and succeeded in 
expelling as many as 16,000 to 20,000 Jewish families despite the appeals of SIDJE on their 
behalf.
139
  Despite such police efforts, widely viewed by the Jewish public as draconian, there 
likely remained in 1925 at least 100,000 undocumented Jews in Bessarabia.
140
  The Romanian 
Interior Ministry received numerous direct appeals on the refugees‘ behalf during these years.141  
Part of the problem was the consistent discrepancy between orders issued by the Interior 
Ministry in Bucharest and their implementation at the Bessarabian frontier, where considerable 
hardship was caused the refugees by the already noted severe police corruption in the province.  
Without question, Romanian state policies toward the Jewish question hardened and problems 
intensified as a result of the refugee crisis. 
Much of the Romanian intellectual and political establishment would later mimic its 
Education Minister at the time in referring to the refugee crisis as a ―Jewish invasion,‖ a reaction 
logical given the rising antisemitism in the country in the 1930s.  Since evidence exists that 
Bucharest was willing to help ethnic Romanian refugees from abroad but not those of other 
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nationalities, the policies pursued were of specific discrimination rather than simply the desire 
for order.
142
  In the contemporary Romanian historical imagination, the refugee crisis remains an 
episode when Romania extended its hospitality to the Jews, who wished to come because 
Romania was a desired place to live, and then suffered because of Jewish ingratitude.
143
  The 
Jewish popular opinion on this question was and is quite different, of course.  The refugee crisis 
and the effective response of solidarity from the province‘s Jewish community, together with the 
state‘s indifference to the problem, strengthened Jewish separatism and national sentiment 
among thousands of lower-class Jews who had until then mostly been unconcerned with political 
questions.   
The Jewish press in Bessarabia was instrumental in raising financial support for refugees 
and in galvanizing and unifying Jewish national solidarity around the issue.  News of the 
refugees‘ plight and of state reactions reached the Jewish public, both in Bessarabia and Greater 
Romania more broadly, through the Yiddish Zionist dailies such as Der Yid, published in 
Chişinău until 1922, and afterward on the pages of the longest surviving Yiddish daily of 
interwar Romania, Unzer Tsayt, published by Michael Landau until 1934 (and then after his 
emigration to Eretz Israel by contacts until 1938).  Some of these articles were re-published by 
Romanian Jewish papers in Romanian, Hungarian, and German, as well as by several American 
Yiddish papers, including the New York-based daily Forverts.
144
  Also, the Russian language 
press in Bessarabia, where many of the journalists were Jews, was important in reporting on the 
problems associated with the state‘s treatment of the refugee problem.  Throughout 1920 another 
Yiddish daily, Der Morgn, carried articles about the violence in Ukraine and the plight of the 
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refugees in almost every issue.  Advertising sections often contained numerous institutional 
requests for donations as well as proudly paraded lists of donations given and by whom, which 
were intended to increase donations through the pressure of maintaining one‘s public image in 
communities small enough that those with money were known by all.
145
   
Editors published many desperate letters that they received from readers, pregnant with a 
tone of impending death.  To the extent that local news was conveyed at all in Der Morgn, it was 
relegated to a single section called ―News from the Provinces,‖ since interest among Bessarabian 
Jews in what occurred to Jews in other lands was so great.
146
  In many of the articles and letters 
in Der Morgn, the implicit connection drawn between those Jews dying en masse from the most 
violent pogroms in history and those watching helplessly is unmistakable: ―Ladies and 
Gentlemen! Our day of reckoning is coming for our lack of concern for our people.  We have no 
excuses.  Quietly but intensely increasing is our fear for our lives, a fear that only we can 
know.‖147  The article goes on to call for Jewish unity to use ―the spirit that remains within us 
still‖ to defeat the surrounding evils.   
It was through the press that residents and refugees alike learned of new legal 
developments in Bucharest that would affect their ability to register and establish residency.  
Consistent announcements were carried in the Russian press throughout 1923 and 1924 in 
anticipation of and reaction to the Mârzescu law.
148
  Frantic articles alerted Jewish organizations 
to local police efforts in Bălţi to round up Jewish refugees in 1923 into something like a prison 
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camp and likewise to transport outside the country several trainloads of refugees from Chişinău 
by force.  In both instances Jewish lobbying halted the police actions.
149
  In the years following, 
the press informed Bessarabian Jews of state plans to deport undocumented refugees
150
 as well as 
of the consistent postponement of such plans due to the efforts of Jewish dignitaries in Bucharest 
and sometimes pressure from international lobbying.
151
  For Bessarabian Jews, these issues were 
closer to home than just support for suffering co-religionists: more than 100,000 Jews in 
Romania, mostly in the new territories like Bessarabia, were never able to establish legal 
residency and remained, in terms of civic rights and economic opportunities, stateless.
152
   
The tone of the articles was thus clearly short-tempered with Romanian policies.  
Sometimes articles addressed heart-wrenching problems caused Jewish families because of the 
difficulty in establishing legal residency, as in the case of a Jewish artisan from Tiraspol whose 
daughter could not begin school because he could not prove residency in Bessarabia.
153
  When 
not censored, vocal complaints were printed about the unfairness of the residency requirements, 
such as in October 1925:  
In demanding this or that document from years past, it‘s as if they [the commission for establishing 
residency] don‘t realize what Bessarabia and Bessarabians went through!  The entire Russian Empire 
collapsed in a matter of days—the revolution can‘t be forgotten, but it is by our residency commission…it 
is imperative that people be allowed to verify they claims through witnesses as well as documents.
154   
Taken together, the Jewish press‘s highlighting of the refugee issue, together with broader legal 
problems faced by Bessarabian Jews, did much to raise anger about discrimination from the 
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Romanian authorities, and a direct corollary, also raised Jewish national sentiment in the 
province. 
 
The Press and Jewish Concerns   
As with the refugee crisis, the Jewish press played a central role in cementing a modern, 
national Jewish identity in Bessarabia not only through steady focus on Jewish issues but also 
through galvanizing public perception about the ever present and indeed growing threat of 
Romanian antisemitism, even though this question could not openly be discussed in the censored 
press.  Despite the very short life span of many Yiddish papers that began publication especially 
in the 1920s, there was certainly a flowering of the Jewish press in the region compared to the 
publication limitations under Soviet rule.  Fully 22 publications devoted to Jewish issues were 
founded during these years mostly in Yiddish, sometimes in Russian, and in one case in 
Romanian.  Of these 19 were published in Chişinău, 2 in Bălţi, and one in Hotin.   A significant 
number of Jewish journalists worked both for Jewish and non-Jewish journals, although not all 
Yiddish newspapers could support their own journalists and simply re-printed news from other 
sources.
155
  In addition—Bessarabian Jews read Jewish papers from other countries, particularly 
Yiddish-language Zionist papers, especially from the later half of the 1930s when publishing in 
foreign languages became increasingly problematic in Greater Romania.  Romanian Siguranţa 
officers in Bessarabia frowned upon such foreign papers, and archival files contain numerous 
confiscated copies of foreign Jewish newspapers.
156
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As expected, the pressing issues of the day comprised much of the coverage of local 
Jewish papers, although the hidden and carefully presented underlining theme was often the 
struggle for Jewish autonomy and equality against Romanianization.  The solution advocated 
reflected the political leaning of the editorial staff—as educated and urban, Jewish journalists 
generally leaned toward European liberal tolerance as the means to ensure respect for Jewish 
civil rights in Romania, something that in the 1930s especially earned many Jewish journalists 
warnings and attacks from the extreme right not just in Bessarabia but throughout the country.  
Jewish concerns were prominent in articles that pointed to unfair treatment, consistently referring 
to the Paris Peace talks and particularly the Treaty of St. Germaine and its Minority Rights 
component, signed by all new states including Romania, as the basis for higher expectations.  
Yet these efforts failed to win support from an intellectual and political Romanian elite that 
overwhelmingly considered these treaties as something forced upon Romania and therefore not 
binding morally, if potentially enforceable legally. 
As already seen, in the early interwar years the press was full of heart-wrenching concern 
about the suffering of Ukrainian Jews across the Dniester, victims of massive and widespread 
pogroms across much of the former Pale of Settlement.  There was typically little mention of 
Romania in the Yiddish press during these years, the focus being the problems of European 
Jewry across the continent.  Many Jewish intellectuals, journalists, and social activists that had 
been brought up following and being involved in Jewish politics, discussions and demonstrations 
across the vast Pale of Settlement, continued to see Jewish identity across the newly-drawn 
national boundaries during the interwar years.  They reacted very emotionally and personally to 
violence taking place, as if the state borders now separating them from suffering co-religionists 
were implicated in the suffering as well.  With shock and revulsion journalists described how in 
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March 1920, 125 Jewish families from the Krakow district of Galicia were beaten and hung by 
mobs, and nothing was done to help.
157
  The lessons drawn were varied: one author bemoaned 
the days of lost Jewish unity of mindset, such as in the days of Moses Mendelssohn; another 
blamed assimilation of the Jewish elite because many already wrote in foreign languages; 
another blamed Jewish poverty and dependence on American Jewish money.
158
  Most, but not 
all, agreed on the need to leave Europe, especially Eastern Europe, and go to Eretz-Israel. 
Not only Yiddish or Hebrew newspapers reflected such strongly Zionist leanings; at least 
one Zionist paper, the monthly journal Răsăritul (Sunrise), was published in Romanian in Iaşi 
and also circulated to a considerable extent in Bessarabia.  Besides news from across Romania, 
Palestine and Europe, the paper‘s staff published translations of Yiddish writers into Romanian, 
such as Y.L. Peretz, who‘s ―Three Gifts‖ as translated in the September 1922 edition.159  The 
paper‘s editorial staff was composed of strong adherents to the broader philosophical arguments 
expounded by Western European champions of Zionism during the interwar years, and their 
editorials in the journal were clear evidence of this: Zionism was a movement that promised 
―normalization‖ for the Jewish people.  The Jewish people have been ―in physical and moral 
decline,‖ and need a strong shot of national pride in order to experience a collective resurgence.  
In the same issue, an article about Winston Churchill quoted him as supporting the merits of 
Zionism because it ―brings together in one national home Jews from all over the globe, who 
nevertheless are all of one race.‖160  Very much a product of the era‘s preoccupation with racial 
purity and national ethnic-uniformity, Zionist papers like Răsăritul and Unzer Tsayt, argued that 
Jews have no place in Romania and need to emigrate to Eretz Israel, thereby clashing with the 
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basic theme of Jewish autonomy and civic equality in Europe.  The Yiddish press especially was 
instrumental in indoctrinating the lower-class Bessarabian Jewish masses in the national 
message.  
Răsăritul began publication in 1921 but barely stayed afloat; it had more success after a 
lapse in autumn 1922, in part because of the mass demonstrations that summer by Iaşi University 
students, members of the ―Generation of 1922,‖ who sought the establishment of numerus 
clausus to limit the enrollment of Jews in Romanian universities.
161
  In addition to being shocked 
by the anti-Semitic student demands, Răsăritul provided editorial coverage of the July 24, 1922 
decision by the League of Nations to enforce the Balfour Declaration, widely interpreted by Jews 
as a recognition of their right to settle in Palestine: 
We are certain that all Jews have been following the debates in the League of Nations, and their 
decision to mandate the creation of a new nation in Palestine.  After 18 centuries of wondering, 
humanity has recognized us a nation with a right to our own home and to feel ourselves like other 
people and nations.  This is a fantastic thing and a huge event in Jewish history.
162
 
Thus as early as 1922, the pro-Zionist press in the newly acquired territories was becoming more 
vocal due to the clearly rising anti-Jewish movement among the educated youth on the one hand, 
and the growing hope in a Jewish future in Palestine on the other.  This article informed readers 
that the collection activities of the Jewish National Fund (Keren-Kayemet) have vigorously 
spread to hundreds of synagogues and community centers throughout Romania, and that all Jews 
should join in giving what they can for the Zionist cause.   
The most successful interwar newspapers in Bessarabia that catered partly or completely 
to a Jewish readership were two Russian-language papers, the dailies Bessarabskoie Slovo 
(Bessarabian Word) and Bessarabskaia Pochta (Bessarabian Post), and the Yiddish daily Unzer 
Tsayt (Our Time).  The latter two each surpassed a circulation of 15,000 in their best years, 
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1928-32.
163
  No other Jewish publications in any language in Bessarabia came close to these 
numbers.  There was much more consistency in the Russian language press than in Yiddish, as 
evidenced by the noted fact that Yiddish newspapers sprang up throughout the interwar years but 
tended to not survive for more than several issues, and very rarely for more than a year.
164
  
Generally, Yiddish language papers failed to become economically viable in Bessarabia and 
closed quickly.   The most notable exceptions was Unzer Tsayt noted above, which remained 
open from 1922-1938, and the trade and business cooperative monthly newsletter, Das 
Kooperative Vort, which, due to the leadership of the Bessarabian credit cooperatives among 
Romanian Jewry, survived from 1925 to 1940.
165
   
Yiddish-language papers charged more because of usually more limited circulation and 
because printing and typesetting in Yiddish cost more.  Higher cost meant less circulation than 
the Russian papers, especially since the most important newspaper market was in Chişinău where 
most Jews were able to read Russian, not to mention the additional readership for such papers 
among other ethnic groups, especially the Russians.  In the minds of many Bessarabian Jews, the 
press remained something associated with the intelligentsia, which had during Russian Imperial 
times and still during the interwar era gravitated toward Russian as the language of modern 
civilization.  The greater success of, and Jewish participation in, the Russian press, particularly in 
the immediate post-war years, reflected the experience of journalists working in the Russian 
language from the days of the Russian Empire.  Yiddish papers eventually did gain ground in 
Bessarabia, however. The political leanings of the papers were also a factor in their circulation; 
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the Yiddish press bent increasingly toward Zionism,
166
 while the Jewish perspective in the 
Russian press bent toward liberal participation in Romanian politics and sometimes toward pro-
Soviet leftist ideas, though particularly vocal leftist papers did not last long.  The best example of 
this was the openly pro-Soviet Raboche-Khristianskaia Pravda (Worker-Peasant Truth), which 
was tolerated briefly by the more liberal National Peasants in 1928-29, but quickly closed 
nonetheless.  The National Liberals, who held power for much of the 1920s and then again after 
1933, had much less tolerance for anything but pro-Romanian perspectives and more stringently 
curtailed freedom of the press.   
In commenting on political and public life, the Russian press was the vehicle by which 
Jewish socialists, liberals, and Yiddishists denounced both the Orthodox and the Zionists.  The 
broader success reflected in the wider circulation of the Yiddish language papers toward the late 
1920s and early 1930s, indicated not only greater experience of local journalism in Yiddish but 
also a greater appeal of Zionism for lower-class Jews, who increasingly felt sufficiently pressed 
by the discriminatory policies of the Romanian state to invest in a Zionist newspaper.  The 
handling of Jewish concerns in the sometimes relatively freer press in Romania, at least in 
comparison to the firmer grip on the press in the Soviet Union, served as a barometer of rising 
Jewish nationalism as well as a reinforcement and an outlet of it.  But again, as the next chapter 
will explore, this was no longer true by the late 1930s when Jewish interests and concerns were 
sufficiently marginalized to deprive them of any serious voice in the national political arena.  
Most people in Romania read about the Jews what others, especially the right, said about them.   
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Jewish Education and Religion  
No issue raised emotions among Jewish communities more than education.  The state 
education system, like other Romanian institutions, was designed to uplift the peasants and 
Romanianize the foreigners, with little benefit, in the minds of central administrators, in 
supporting a separate Jewish education system, which had existed in Bessarabia for centuries.  
Constantin Angelescu, who served as Education Minister for much of the interwar years, was 
quite clear that the unification of the four disparate education systems inherited in 1918, and thus 
implicitly the unification of the nation as a whole, was for him the most important goal of the 
national education system.
167
  Thus, Jewish education, to the extent that it was tolerated, 
remained separate, with extensive communally-supported parallel school systems emphasizing 
several approaches toward Jewish modernization.   
Politicians across the mainstream political spectrums in Romania viewed the university 
system as a training ground for the national elite.  Law school especially was training ground for 
national politicians—which was why Jews were most stringently excluded from institutions of 
legal training: foreigners had no business training to be national leaders.  Jews gravitated toward 
other faculties, especially medicine, and increasingly sought higher education outside 
Romania.
168
  Generally, public intellectuals purveyed the perception that minorities, especially 
Jews, were over-represented in national universities, even though in fact Romanians were 80% 
of all students while only some 70% of the total population by the 1930s.
169
   
Perception proved more important than fact in this case.  Both students and faculty 
gradually but more loudly began to call for stricter implementation of numerus clausus to limit 
the number of ethnic minority, especially Jewish, students.  In the primary and secondary 
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schools, numerus clausus had been on the books since 1882 after large numbers of Jews entered 
the public schools in the late 1870s.  Romanian politicians responded to the ―Jewish invasion‖ by 
mandating quotas for Jews in the public schools.
170
  Jews were seen as foreigners who were 
subjugating the Romanian education system for their own benefit.
171
   
Jewish schooling in Romania had been an indicator of the wider problem of remaining a 
juridically non-existent community in pre-WWI Romania: the kehilot could not own their own 
property, nor could their leaders have full authority to collect communal taxes, such as the 
kosher tax.  The Romanian government remained consistently opposed to granting total legal 
recognition—as late as 1896 when the issue was up for debate before Parliament, Romanian 
deputies killed the measure, arguing that recognizing the kehilot would strengthen the greatest 
obstacle to Jewish assimilation, even though there was already by then little real interest in 
assimilating the Jews.
172
 After the establishment of Greater Romania, the legal problems of the 
Old Kingdom Jews were exported to the new territories, where the Jewish communities had 
enjoyed more solid legal footing prior to Romanian annexation.  Jewish leaders in the country 
maintained considerable pressure on Parliament on behalf of Romanian Jewry to achieve a 
common legal status that ensured Judaism‘s position as a unitary religion of equal standing to 
other existing faiths.
173
 Considerable progress took place under Minister of Cults Constantine 
Banu, but after his departure legislation was promulgated that undermined the legal unity of the 
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Jewish religion in the country.
174
  In 1928 this fragmentation was reversed in the official Law of 
Cults, but the damage had already been done—hundreds of articles in the press had pointed in 
the interval to the negative predisposition of the government toward the Jewish religion.
175
  By 
then a robust Jewish nationalist movement flourished in the new territories that flatly rejected 
working with Romanian national parties, choosing instead to support Jewish parties that 
demanded autonomy.  The problem of Jewish legal status was deeply embittering particularly for 
Jews from the new territories and served to increase their political radicalization.   
The problem of Jewish public education contributed greatly to this sentiment even earlier, 
beginning in 1922.  Romanian administrators inherited a highly diverse educational system in 
Bessarabia alone, to say nothing of the various education systems across the country.  In 
Bessarabia in 1918 there were beginning church schools of 3-4 years; 4-year zemstvo schools; 
and 4-year middle schools of various types and specializations.  In addition, there were numerous 
schools systems supported and maintained by national minorities. What must be stressed, 
however, is that in 1918 there were no Romanian language schools in Bessarabia, since all state-
funded schools had been run in Russian.
176
  Immediately after annexation, schools began to 
undergo re-organization according to the educational principles in place in the Old Kingdom.  By 
1921, significant inroads had been made in Romanianizing the education system and even the 
pupils attending school: out of a total of 1747 rural and urban schools in Bessarabia, 1233 were 
Romanian language schools; 200 were Ukrainian; 120 Russian; 73 German; 38 Jewish, 3 Polish 
and 2 other.  No statistical separation was made between Hebrew and Yiddish for the Jewish 
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language reaching.
177
 While progress in Romanianization was swift, Bucharest was careful until 
1922 to not offend the educational needs of the minorities in accordance with its compliance 
with the minority rights treaties it had signed in St. Germaine.
178
   
After the National Liberals took power in 1922, however, Romanianization was extended 
to the private religious schools of the minorities, over their consistent pleas and complaints.  In 
1922 Education Minister Angelescu began implementing radical changes for private education: 
all confessional schools required permission from the Ministry to remain open; all schools had to 
meet state school obligations for Romanian subjects; exams for these subjects had to be 
conducted in Romanian before committees appointed by regional state inspectors.  During the 
1923-24 school year additional restrictions, known as the Angelescu Laws, were implemented: 
teachers and directors in private confessional schools had to swear loyalty to the Romanian king 
and pass exams in Romanian history, geography, constitutional law and language; Chişinău 
Jewish High School #4, the single previously state-approved Jewish high school in Chişinău, was 
targeted for closure, as were all kindergartens in Yiddish and Hebrew.  All Jewish teachers were 
to conduct classes in Romanian only.  Holding classes on Sunday was banned, and all schools 
unable to secure a Ministry permit were to close.
179
  The law maintained a provision that allowed 
minorities to study in their own language, but the fundamental problem for Jews was that their 
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mother tongue was deemed Romanian: ―In the schools where there are pupils with a mother 
tongue other than the state language, this language can be the language of instruction…For 
Jewish pupils, the mother tongue is the state language.‖180  Hebrew was permitted in limited 
instances for religious instruction, but Yiddish would no longer be allowed.  Clearly, Romanian 
administrators judged a nationally varied and multi-lingual community based on the 
circumstances of Jews in the capital, many of whom had indeed linguistically assimilated into 
Romanian.  Jews in Transylvania, many of whom were Hungarian speaking, were similarly 
negatively affected by this legislation.
181
 
Protest erupted among Jewish organizations in Bucharest in May, and among Bessarabian 
Jews by September 1924, evident especially in the Yiddish press, in reaction to what most 
considered as draconian measures.  Jewish leaders in the Senate and Chamber of Deputies, 
including Rabbi Tsirelson, the lawyer Jacob Pistiner from Bukovina, and Adolph Stern from 
Bucharest, continually spoke against the new legislation.  A Congress of 6000 parents of Jewish 
pupils took place that month: a mass letter of protest was handed to Interior Minister Tătărescu 
on a visit to Chişinău, but with no effect.182   
Using pseudonyms, Unzer Tsayt editor Michael Landau began protesting against the 
private education laws even before their passage.  In June he published an article titled ―The 
Tragedy of Our Schools,‖ denouncing the closing of Jewish schools and forced Romanianization 
as ―the politics of destruction.‖  Bitterly, he accused Romanian officials of using Jewish money 
to support public institutions that then suppress Jewish private schools, and called on officials to 
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respect the Minority Rights treaties they had signed.
183
  On May 26, 1925, Unzer Tsayt again 
carried Landau‘s complaint that only the Jews apparently do not have a language of their own—
unlike the other minorities, Romanian is the mother tongue of the Jews according to the 
Angelescu Laws.  Landau called the law a ruin for the Jewish people, taking away their last 
freedom to preserve their identity through education.  It is enforced educational assimilation 
targeted specifically and only at the Jews.  Accompanying the article was a long list of signatures 
in protest, many from well-known political opponents side by side.  The Angelescu Laws served 
to unify a Jewish community that had grown accustomed to communal infighting.
184
  On 
December 12, 1925, Rabbi Tsirelsohn gave a stirring speech on the floor of the Romanian 
Senate, something of a war cry in anticipation of the passage of a modified education law later 
that month:   
The Jews represent a specific ethnic group, a nation like other nations, despite the fact that they  
are spread across numerous states.  Yiddish, the mother tongue of the majority of the Jewish  
nation, in which a rich literature developed, remained also a language of instruction.  Hebrew, the  
eternal language, joins the Jews from all over the world…Hindering the Jews in instructing their  
children in their national languages represents a great discrimination.  In the case that the project  
of Minister Angelescu is not modified, the Jews will resist, as they have done throughout their  
long history.
185   
Tsirelson also made reference in his speech to the revolt of the Maccabees against 
Antiochus Epiphanes, an unveiled warning about what can happen if Jews are pushed too hard.  
Other Jewish parliamentarians also made strong speeches in the days after Tsirelson.  The head 
of the Union of Romanian Jews in Bucharest, Wilhelm Filderman, met with Minister Angelescu 
and presented a lengthy list of demands.  The total effect of the protest, hardly surprising given 
the crushing implications of the proposed legislation, had their effect.  The finalized Law on 
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Private Education of 1925 averted the greatest crisis feared—it permitted private Jewish 
education in Hebrew and Yiddish.  It alleviated some of the most abusive problems of state 
exams by giving private Jewish school teachers five years in which to pass state exams and it 
slowly lowered the exam fees for Jewish students.  Nevertheless, struggles went on with the 
Education Ministry on a number of issues such as the right to schooling on Sundays, the right of 
private schools to have diplomas recognized by the state, the discrimination against Jewish 
schools in terms of state subsidies when compared to other minority groups, and most 
prevalently, against numerus clausus for Jews in state institutions, especially universities.  
Despite all efforts, the Angelescu private education law remained in effect until 1940, when far 
more restrictive legislation was introduced.
186
 The net effect of these problems was culturally 
and politically to solidify nationalist calls at the expense of those who called for cooperation with 
the state.  Prior to the 1928 elections, the Bucharest Jewish leadership was largely able to 
persuade Jews from the new territories to vote for the National Liberals.  In 1928 the Zionists in 
particular voted for the National Peasants, in part in retaliation for the problems caused by the 
private education law under Ministers representing the National Liberal Party.    
Ironically, there was a certain level of cultural assimilation that was naturally taking place 
that was undermined by such widely-interpreted draconian proposals.  State schools were free to 
all citizens while the Jewish schools remained, with practically no state support, privately 
funded—thus they were often out of reach for the increasingly impoverished Jewish masses.  By 
the 1930s, the majority of Jewish children in Bessarabia were attending Romanian state 
schools.
187
  Modernizing Jews like Bucharest lawyer Adolph Stern thought it necessary and 
reasonable for Jews all over the country, including in the new territories, to linguistically 
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assimilate toward Romanian the way that Jews in Bucharest had done, but he warned that forcing 
the hand of a natural process that must be allowed to take years would backfire—oppression only 
strengthened national consciousness, he argued, citing the Romanians of Transylvania as his 
example.
188
  This was indeed what occurred. 
The Jewish school in Bessarabia not only survived but expanded in certain areas in the 
interwar years.  A network of Talmud Torah schools continued functioning into the interwar 
years, administered largely by traditional leaders that were affiliated with the Agudat Yisrael 
religious organization.  A Hebrew teacher, Itshal Alterman, opened a teacher training school in 
Chişinău in 1920—many of the teachers who graduated from the school went on to teach at 
Jewish schools, in both Hebrew and Yiddish, in other parts of Greater Romania, especially the 
Old Kingdom.  In 1923, mostly through the effort of Chief Rabbi Tsirelson, an Orthodox high 
school in Hebrew was opened in Chişinău, and remained open until 1935.189  By far the most 
active and successful of the Jewish schools were the modern Hebrew Tarbut schools.  The Tarbut 
schools‘ curriculum was approved by the Ministry of National Enlightenment, which required 
them to ensure the teaching of Romanian language and history.  In 1930, in 9 towns and tens of 
villages across Bessarabia, the Tarbut organization was administering 11 high schools, 38 
elementary schools, and 17 kindergartens with a total enrollment of 6000 pupils between 
them.
190
  There was a greater number than this studying in Yiddish.  All of these struggled to 
make ends meet, largely through local and international charity, due to the almost complete lack 
of state support.  They all served, in general, to cement a modern sense of Jewish national 
identity very much in response to the rising ethno-nationalism of the Romanian state. 
 
                                                 
188
 Iancu, Evreii Din România, 134. 
189
 Iancu, Evreii Din România, 78.  
190
 Kopansky, Blagatvoritelnye Organizatsii Evreiev, 12. 
153 
 
Conclusion 
In the early interwar years, when much of European society attempted to move past the 
shock and horror of the Great War and the redrawn map of Eastern Europe was supposed to 
bring about an era of national self-determination, Bessarabian Jews‘ expression of a transnational 
national sentiment was unwelcomed.  The Great Powers were uninterested in expanding 
resources badly needed at home or felt that these newly created national ―democracies‖ needed 
time to coalesce into a viable, unified national public, just as had taken place gradually in the 
West.  Ironically, Weimar Germany, given the number of Germans living across Eastern Europe 
(and the Soviet Union), was most interested in forcing compliance with minority rights treaties—
France, Britain and the United States did little in response to cries of antisemitism in Poland, 
Romania and Hungary voiced occasionally in the press and by Jewish representatives of 
international philanthropic agencies or by Zionists.  Jews were left stateless in an era and place 
of national states: with the exception of Czechoslovakia, they were unwanted foreigners and their 
attempts to bring the abuses of the host governments to the attention of the world by relying on 
Jewish brethren in the West was seen as proof of their treason, as was their propensity for 
communism.   
As the political dust settled after the Great War‘s end, Bessarabian Jews found 
themselves in unfamiliar but potentially unfriendly circumstances.  The process of 
familiarization took the better part of a decade, but led inexorably toward louder calls for 
national and religious autonomy and resistance against state efforts to categorize Jews in a 
manner that contradicted with Jewish collective identity.  Conditioned by a repressive Russian 
Imperial regime, Bessarabian Jews developed communal economic, social and cultural 
institutions very much in parallel with those across the former Pale of Settlement.  The end of 
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Tsarism came as an understandable shock, given especially the constricting reality of newly 
drawn and militarily enforced national borders that cut Bessarabian Jews from their co-
religionists in other parts of the former Pale, which they clearly felt most painfully in economic 
terms with the loss of Odessa as market for their agricultural and manufacturing production.   
Jewish ambivalence toward becoming subjects of the Romanian Crown, given the history 
of Romanian antisemitism, should hardly have been surprising, but state officials and military 
administrators assigned to rule Bessarabia were not given toward patience and understanding of 
Jewish concerns given their own efforts at establishing unchallenged control of this deeply 
contested borderland.  Early issues of border control and refugee assistance served as 
foreshadowing for the greater fights against which most Jews from all political, social and 
cultural persuasions agreed spelled destruction for Jewish religious and educational freedoms.  In 
responding to Romanian insensitivity to the plight of Jewish refugees from Ukraine; the blatant 
disregard to honoring minority rights‘ treaties signed in St. Germaine only several years before; 
but particularly in arising in shock and concern from the culturally destructive intentions of the 
profoundly ethno-chauvinist Angelescu Laws concerning Jewish education—Jewish national 
sentiment, as it would become shaped in this provincial borderland region of Romanian 
Bessarabia, was galvanized.  The early years of uncertainty, when hope for a democratic 
Romania combined with the bitter memory of life in Tsarist Russia, passed quickly and 
Bessarabian Jews learned quickly the uses (and hopelessness) of political activism as the walls 
seemed to close in around them.  The economic basis for a continued ―state within a state‖ 
existence for the Jewish community in interwar Bessarabia, something that was not unfamiliar 
given the Russian Imperial heritage, was made possible by the functioning of the ―kasses,‖ the 
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independent Jewish credit cooperatives supported by international Jewish philanthropy, 
particularly from the United States.   
  This Jewish separateness picked up cultural and spiritual strength in the early interwar 
years in Bessarabia even as economic realities made it increasingly unviable.  This was, very 
notably, in contradistinction to what was going on in Soviet Transnistria, and indeed to Soviet 
Jewry more generally.  The spread of Soviet power in the Dniester borderland across the river 
effectively supplanted Jewish economic autonomy while the successful incorporation of a 
significant portion of the local Jewish population in the multi-ethnic project of constructing 
communism undermined Jewish cultural and communal unity. 
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Chapter 3 
The Rise of Jewish Nationalist Politics in Bessarabia after 1924 
 
The reality of life in the Russian Pale of Settlement had seen the blossoming of Jewish 
institutions that sought to respond to the needs of their people when the state failed to provide 
them.  When Bessarabian Jews came under the control of the Romanian government, they had 
little political experience outside of communal politics and the Jewish worker movement, the 
Bund.  This inexperience was in marked contrast to the other Jewish communities in the country, 
most notably those of Transylvania and Bukovina.
1
  Pre-1918 Romania (Old Kingdom) had 
never emancipated its own Jews, but at the Paris Peace conference was forced to promise 
granting all Jews residing on the now vastly extended Romanian territory civil and legal 
emancipation, although as previously described, the obligations that Romanian representatives 
nominally accepted at the peace talks were circumvented.
2
  It was Romanian national-chauvinist 
policies that thrust traditional Jewish leaders and institutions into modern political life very much 
in an atmosphere of confrontation, thereby determining their nationalist direction.  The reality of 
segregated, communal institutions continued, only dissolving (and even then not completely) 
when significant internal challenge to them had mounted.   
This challenge was strongest from members the Jewish community of the capital city, 
Chişinău, the most Russified and modernized Jewish community in the province and the de facto 
leading kehila by virtue of its size, wealth and being the base of Bessarabian Chief Rabbi 
Tsirelson.  Reform-minded Jewish intellectual leaders here, most notably Zionists, wanted 
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Jewish autonomy within a democratic Romania and desired for kehila administrations to be more 
representative of the Jewish population as a whole.  The challenge was mounted in large part 
because of the upsurge of modern nationalist sentiment among lower-class Jews in response to 
rising antisemitism and discrimination in Greater Romania.  Along with this sentiment arose a 
growing dissatisfaction with the direction taken by traditional Jewish leaders vis-a-vis the 
Romanian authorities.  As calls to reform the communal administration and end Jewish 
traditional segregation grew louder, Romanian policies contributed indirectly but significantly to 
modernizing Bessarabian Jewish communal organizations.  This chapter examines the debates 
surrounding the desire for institutional change among Chişinău‘s Jews within the context of 
broader Romanian policies toward its Jewish minority.  It seeks to delve into Jewish public 
debate in order to ascertain the extent to which Romanian state policies shaped a modern Jewish 
national identity in Bessarabia, a province that was distant from the Romanian heartland and was 
for many residents, at least at the time of Bessarabia‘s annexation, certainly quite removed from 
a sense of Romanian national identity.    
 
Kehila Modernization Issues 
In order to understand the internal changes wrought it is important to understand the 
place of Jewish communal politics in a traditional sense.  Although modernizing challenges were 
very much already woven into the fabric of Bessarabian Jewish life by the arrival of the 
Romanian Army, especially in Chişinău, it is important to remember that this was a religiously 
devout community as a whole.  Most everyday Jews continued to strictly observe Orthodox 
Jewish tradition, and the rabbinic leadership maintained much of its influence and respect.  In 
fact, an important avenue of Jewish collective expression during the interwar years remained 
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Jewish tradition; Jewish political activity had to contend with the tremendous power retained and 
wielded by rabbis.  A very important factor in this support for traditional rabbinical leaders was 
the tight connection between the economic and religious elite in the community.  For example, 
during elections of new or replacement rabbis, the pivotal vote was usually from the chief 
benefactors of the individual synagogues, to say nothing of their influence behind the scenes.
3
  
Toward the end of the 1920s, there remained throughout Bessarabia 366 functioning synagogues 
and houses of prayer, including 77 in Chişinău, 60 in Soroca, 49 in Bălţi, 44 in Orhei, 31 in 
Benderi (Tighina), and 20 in Cahul.
4
  The most powerful organization of traditional Judaism in 
interwar Bessarabia was the Orthodox Agudath Israel, or Aguda, which had existed in the Tsarist 
period, and was successfully registered with the Romanian authorities on February 18, 1920.
5
   
Aguda in Bessarabia was led by the Bessarabian Chief Rabbi, Yehuda Leib Tsirelson.  
Tsirelson, son of a rabbi, was a child prodigy in rabbinical studies and became the rabbi of the 
town Priluki (east of Kiev) at the age of 19; he was sent to ―Kesheneff‖ (Chişinău in Yiddish) in 
1906 to preside over the Orthodox community there.  A leading voice in the creation of Aguda in 
1912, Tsirelson led the religious institutions of Bessarabian Jewry until his death in 1941, and 
served as the most visible leader of the region‘s Jews to the Romanian authorities in Bucharest 
for many years, even serving in the Senate in his capacity as head of the Bessarabian Jewish 
Cult.
6
  By all accounts he was deeply respected and held significant religious authority; this 
authority was augmented by the status conferred him by the Romanian government, making him 
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the de facto leader of Bessarabian Jewry although he was bitterly opposed by Jewish secular 
leaders from all political leanings.  Tsirelson‘s legitimacy from the Romanian government 
earned him animosity from Jewish youth, especially secular Zionist radicals, who saw him as 
supporting a regime that was anti-Semitic to its core.  As only one example, the Chief Rabbi 
spoke to a gathering of local rabbinical leaders in the Chişinău‘s Choral (central) Synagogue 
about the dangers of Bundism and Zionism on August 8, 1924.  He was rudely interrupted by a 
group of Zionist youth shouting that it was time to focus on things other than religion and 
blaming him for being limited in his interests and especially as a pawn of the state.  According to 
Siguranţa agents, who attended all such meetings and kept detailed notes, such disturbances 
plagued the Orthodox leaders on a regular basis in synagogues and religious schools.
7
  
 Orthodox rabbinical leaders strove to become involved in communal politics because 
they knew that traditional means of communal control were slipping away, and they feared the 
assimilation of future generations.  Often this concern was voiced explicitly, increasingly so 
toward the close of the interwar years particularly as a huge majority of the Jewish youth were 
attracted to Zionism, especially socialist-Zionism.  At an Aguda conference on June 8, 1937 
chaired by Tsirelson and attended by about 50 rabbis from communities across Bessarabia, the 
Chief Rabbi told his flock to set examples for Jewish youth to respect their religion ―because 
today, most young people are working on Saturday and eating food forbidden by Jewish law.‖8  
For Aguda members, politics was always seen from the perspective of preserving religious 
orthodoxy as the only means of preserving Judaism itself.  The very statute of the organization 
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approved by the Romanian authorities was very explicit about the purpose of the organization: 
―to unite all Orthodox Jews into one society and organization in order to observe Jewish 
religious principles…even to the exclusion of modern ones, for the benefit of the religious-
national interests of Judaism.‖9   
The activism of Aguda was impressive, and the group provided means and hope to many 
devout, lower-class Jews to help them deal with stressful and insecure times. Tsirelson‘s long-
time personal secretary in Aguda, Chmerl Epelboim, also published a weekly newsletter in 
Yiddish, Di Vokhe (The Week), addressing the concerns of the faithful in Romanian Bessarabia.  
Epelboim printed the paper in his own home in a relatively small and private operation.
10
  Its 
stance was a reflection of the views of Bessarabian Judaism‘s Orthodox leadership: Tsirelson 
was not a democrat—he was strongly opposed to any other religious Jewish organizations, 
believing that they weakened the already existing Aguda that served Jewish religious interests.
11
  
Aguda members organized religious conferences across Bessarabia throughout the interwar 
years; they demanded (unsuccessfully) Jewish teachers be permitted to teach in Hebrew and 
Yiddish in Romanian state schools with a significant Jewish population; they championed rural 
teaching of Hebrew; finally Tsirelson himself championed a separate tax system for religious 
needs that he wanted addressed by placing collection boxes in all synagogues and schools.
12
  As 
it turned out, collection drives for Zionist causes were much more successful.   
Tsirelson was particularly devoted to an Orthodox high school he founded in 1920 called 
Mogen-Dovid.  The high school was registered and authorized by the Public Instruction 
                                                 
9
 ANRM, f. 679, op. 1, d. 5410, l. 10. For the fulfillment of such goals, Aguda supported kindergartens, heders, 
Talmud-Torahs, primary and secondary schools, professional schools for girls and boys, religious seminaries for 
teachers, courses during evenings, holidays and Saturdays, sports clubs for physical health (in competition with 
Zionist ones), cooperative trade and philanthropic organizations. 
10
 Interview with Epelboim‘s granddaughter Dorina Shlein, March 23, 2005. 
11
 ANRM, f. 679, op. 1, d. 5410, l. 12. He spoke in favor of maintain one organization for all in order to maximize 
institutional strength. 
12
 ANRM, f. 679, op. 1, d. 5410, l. 16. 
161 
 
Inspectorate; the curriculum included courses on Romanian history and language.  The 
Education Ministry provided no money for the school, and Tsirelson worked hard to raise funds 
for it, especially from American Jewish donors; formal recognition of the school until 1938 was 
quite remarkable.  It was licensed only a few years later, and Siguranţa agents, reporting in 1927, 
expressed shock and concern that this school where everybody speaks an ―antique Jewish 
language‖ was permitted to function.  Despite some Romanian lessons, the general plan is to 
―preserve in Jewish children the antique Jewish language; there is nothing here connected to 
Romanianization.‖  Apparently most disconcerting were the symbols: ―in the place where there 
should be a portrait of the royal family hangs a portrait of Rabbi Tsirelson!‖13 
 
Figure 5: Chmerl Epelboim with his family, Chişinău, circa 1925; taken in the Jewish Museum  
of the Republic of Moldova; permission from granddaughter Dorina Shlein. 
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Thus, despite chasms of difference within the Jewish community itself, antisemitism 
clearly and powerfully affected the organization‘s political direction.  As previously outlined, 
long existing nationalist arguments that Jews were exploiters of the peasantry—the real vessel of 
the Romanian nation—became entwined with broader political-cultural ideology that Romanian 
nationalism justly aimed at redeeming the Romanian people from centuries of humiliation 
suffered at the hands of foreigners, including Turks, Russians, Hungarians, and Jews.
14
  Coupled 
with fear of Jews as communist national usurpers that were nonetheless profiting from Romanian 
educational institutions and business and employment opportunities at the expense of the ―real‖ 
Romanians, Romanian anti-Semites during the 1920s produced an explosive hatred that 
maintained the intensity of the wide-spread student demonstrations of the early 1920s and served 
to isolate Jews from Romanian society and feed Jewish nationalism.  The rapid onset of 
discrimination against Jews at the official level combined with toleration by the central 
government of ever increasing popular violence against Jews and Jewish institutions led rapidly 
toward a radicalization of Jewish politics in interwar Bessarabia and significantly, toward 
rapprochement between communal rivalries by the late interwar years.  For example, 
antisemitism was influential for Tsirelson, who was initially ambivalent about Zionism but over 
the course of the interwar years came to see Zionism as a possible solution to Jewish problems, 
provided that the settlements be assured of abiding by religious law.
15
  The Bessarabian Aguda 
under his authority thus began, together with the Mizrahi Zionist group in the early 1930s, to 
organize its own purchases of land in Palestine where it sought to create its own Orthodox 
communities of halutzim.
16
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Clearly, it appeared to many Jews that the Romanian government was not invested in 
ending Jewish segregation, and for Tsirelson and his supporters, it became impossible to focus 
on religious preservation and ignore the political realities of Jewish life in Greater Romanian 
Bessarabia.  After 1924, it had become clear that Romania would not honor its minority rights 
treaty commitments from Versailles.
17
  News in the press about the acquittal and release of 
murderers of Jews (such as Corneliu Codreanu, the leader of the Iron Guard, in 1925 and Nicolae 
Toţu in 1926) served to increase fear that Romania was becoming a dangerous place for Jews.  
On December 2, 1926, 200 hundred nationalist students from Bessarabia returning from a far-
right meeting in Iaşi caused disorder in many Bessarabian towns along their way, including 
Chişinău, Calaraşi, Edineţ, and Ungheni.  In addition to disturbing the Jewish population, they 
broke doors and windows of Jewish homes, attacked Jewish shops and synagogues, and began a 
new and potent anti-Semitic hooliganism that increasingly gained in popularity in the 1930s: 
throwing Jews from moving trains.
18
  Much of this extreme violence was not permitted to appear 
in the press, even though it was relatively democratic especially when compared to the level of 
journalistic control exercised across the Dniester.  Sometimes Bessarabian Jews read stories 
about violence in Bessarabia months later through Yiddish papers smuggled from abroad.  Quite 
often these papers were sensationalist, like Die Yiddishe Tsaytung from Buenos Aires, which 
reported that numerous pogroms occurred across Bessarabia during Christmas 1927 and the Jews 
live in ―indescribable fear,‖ while that Romanian universities have achieved a ―numerous nulus‖ 
on Jewish admission.
19
  Such stories often served to further frighten the local Jewish public and 
add to a mood of national separatism, which was influenced by international solidarity in some 
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cases: Bessarabian Jews read that Zionist association in Palestine had organized Jewish protests 
against pogroms in Bessarabia.
20
 
Nevertheless, the state‘s lack of concern for its Jewish minority ensured the need for 
Jewish economic self-reliance.  Despite the prominent and important growth of Jewish credit 
cooperatives described in the previous chapter, the financial heart of Jewish communal life in 
interwar Bessarabia continued to be, as it had been in the Pale, the korobka or box tax, which 
was established as a means to maintain the traditional community governments, the kehilot, and 
to see to the religious needs of community members.  This special fund, which was managed by 
communal leaders usually in close association with the rabbinical leadership, was comprised 
mostly from fees charged for the slaughter and sale of kosher meat, although in interwar 
Bessarabia it was also fed by a tax on Jewish artisans.  Across the Dniester River that now 
formed the international border between Romania and Soviet Russia, the new Soviet Jewish 
intelligentsia was dismantling the kehilot and the box tax in order to expedite the construction of 
a new Soviet Jewish culture.  In Bessarabia, kehilot remained until the late 1920s and early 
1930s, although this was a topic of heated debate among members of the Jewish community, 
particularly in Chişinău.  In the end it was the state, through its campaign of modernizing the 
legal status of all religions in Greater Romania that provided the impetus for the Jews to partly 
dismantle the old institutions themselves.   
Communal politics remained dominated throughout the interwar period by local Jewish 
elite in the traditional manner of Jewish reliance on the gevirim or shtadlanim, men of material 
means that served as ―intercessors‖ to protect the general Jewish public from the excesses of the 
broader public and the ruling authorities.
21
  In general these intercessors were not elected; they 
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served typically on the basis of their personal wealth, and remained in positions of authority 
either as long as they desired or broader political circumstances permitted.  Not surprisingly, 
there was often corruption and abuse of power within such an arrangement.  Such was the case in 
Chişinău.  In particular, one man was the locus of complaints from many Jewish voices: the 
manager of the box tax funds, Solomon Abramovich Shur.  Shur had taken this post in May of 
1909, and had served in this capacity for over 15 years when serious public complaints against 
him began to mount.  Shur had come from one of the richest Jewish families in Bessarabia, but 
by the mid-1920s, when most Bessarabian Jews were struggling, Shur had become notably 
richer.  Furthermore, he represented the Orthodox religious community, and had the support of 
Chief Rabbi Tsirelson, the most revered Jew in the province.
22
   
Calls for reform within the communal administration were in fact closely associated with 
the growing challenge from modernizing Jewish ideologies to the continued autocratic control of 
communal institutions wielded by the Orthodox.  Jewish communal relations in the Bessarabian 
capital were not unlike the battles that had gone on in communities in pre-revolutionary Russia 
or were ongoing in other parts of Eastern Europe, between a wealthier and more inegrated, 
modernizing economic elite and a traditional religious leadership supported by a majority of 
more traditionally-minded, lower-class Jews.
23
  As these debates came comparatively late in the 
case of Chişinău, the modern elite often pushed emigration to Palestine rather than acculturation 
as in previous generations.   
Relations with the Romanian government often spurred the demands for reform from 
within the community.  Under the new authorities, the Jewish community in Chişinău was 
permitted to maintain its status on June 23, 1923, when the Ministry of Culture approved the 
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statute of the community, although full legal recognition would come later.  According to 
Bessarabian Inspector General Roshanu, the government would continue to recognize the 
communal administration as it currently existed, that is, organized from among those elected by 
members of the community who then chose an executive commission.
24
  Under rules in place 
under the Orthodox kehila leadership, the electors had to be comprised of religious leaders 
and/or leaders of Jewish organizations and/or enterprises that used or contributed to communal 
funds.  Furthermore, only those that had maintained Kosher for at least two years prior to the 
election could be eligible to run.
25
   Thus, the range of people who could form an executive 
committee was off-limits to many would-be reformers, thereby ensuring the sort of executive 
committee desired by traditional leaders.  The position taken by the occupying Romanian 
military forces served to bolster traditional authority within the communal government, 
something that was not accidental—religious Jews were preferable to political ones as far as the 
Siguranţa was concerned.26   
When news that there would be no changes made to the communal statute under the new 
authorities was announced to an audience of hundreds of Chişinău Jews at a community 
administration meeting on June 28, 1923, it evoked a considerable disturbance from the 
attendees.  The meeting foreman was from the Orthodox camp and would not allow anyone to 
address the audience, explaining that he would not dare jeopardize the decision of the 
government.
27
  In fact, the Orthodox leaders‘ loyalty to the National Liberal Party then in power 
would put them at odds with reformers, especially the Zionists.  
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Some early calls for the democratization of the communal administration had come only 
a few days before from a representative of the Jewish community to the temporary town 
commission, a Mr. M. Sibirsky.
28
  As town residents, Jews received the right to serve on 
municipal councils in interwar Romania.  Since Chişinău was still more than half Jewish and 
most businesses were Jewish owned (official statistics notwithstanding), their voice was 
important.  Yet, the separate status of the central Jewish communal administration, at the center 
of which was the box tax council headed by Mr. Shur, interfered with the integration of the 
Jewish political leadership, and to some extent of Jewish interests, with those of the city 
government.  Wider circumstances in the country also were important in understanding this 
hesitation; anti-Semitic violence from students was already underway in several Romanian cities 
of the Old Kingdom, while Romanian police and the courts were seen as hesitant in prosecuting 
the assailants.
29
  Furthermore, the government was not seen as friendly toward local Jewish 
issues, particularly toward the huge refugee problem plaguing the city from the tens of thousands 
of Jews that fled to Bessarabia from across the border during the civil war years.  Institutional 
inertia also favored maintaining a traditional separation that had provided for Jewish needs for 
generations, and it seems that the interests of Romanian Cultural Ministers and Jewish traditional 
leaders coincided here. 
During the next months calls for democratic reform continued to be voiced in community 
meetings, and perceived intransigence was blamed on Shur, who was consistently denounced by 
reform-minded Jews in both the Russian and Yiddish local press.  For example Michael Landau, 
the locally well-known Zionist, lawyer, and editor of Bessarabia‘s longest running Yiddish daily, 
Unzer Tsayt, lamented that the municipal elections that were to take place across Bessarabia in 
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March 1926 did not include the Jewish communal council, whose mandate ―had long since 
expired.‖30  Aside from demanding democratization of the communal council, there was 
mounting frustration that Jewish schools, philanthropic organizations and medical institutions, 
especially the Jewish hospital in Chişinău, were not receiving sufficient subsidies from the box 
tax.  In numerous cases, the allegation was made explicitly that this was because Shur was 
corrupt, and he and his cronies on the communal council were bleeding Jewish public funds for 
their own benefit.  The main issue for reformers was political: because there was no voice given 
to non-Orthodox groups, Shur did what he wanted with the money.
31
   
Not surprisingly, debates at communal meetings often became heated, as on January 17, 
1925, when some members walked out of a communal election in protest to Shur‘s dictatorial 
style and sent a letter of complaint to the Romanian Culture Ministry.
32
  There was in Bessarabia, 
as in other parts of the former Pale of Settlement, a tradition from earlier times of competing 
Jewish groups occasionally petitioning the secular authorities to help settle internal Jewish 
debates.
33
  By the mid-1920s, Shur‘s dictatorship over the communal council was legendary: if 
dissenting members refused to be brow-beaten, he would simply exclude them from future 
meetings until they submitted.
34
  He was also known at times to be irrational and contradictory, 
as on November 4, 1925, when in selecting who would vote for Jewish representatives to stand 
for city elections the following March he reneged on a deal that had been brokered between the 
communal council and the Union of Jewish Cooperatives; Shur scrapped the entire session, 
stating that the communal council alone was the true representative of the Jewish masses.
35
  In 
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the end, a compromise had to be reached through the intervention of Chief Rabbi Tsirelson.  
Shur‘s style may have indeed been dictatorial, but his tenure for years despite bitter resentment 
from so much of the community attests to the continued power and influence of the Jewish 
traditional elite within the Chişinău communal government.  Tsirelson continued to support Shur 
because he felt confident in the latter‘s support for religious issues, such as support for 
education, but also because he feared giving ground to secular, socialist, and/or Zionist reformers 
much more than he feared Shur‘s unpopularity.  The arguably effective resistance to reform until 
well into the 1930s in Bessarabia stands in stark contrast to circumstances inside the Soviet 
Union, where modernizing Jewish activists had full state support in dismantling these traditional 
structures.   
Jewish complaints from members of the community remained focused on Shur, in part 
because his politics angered many, but largely because the more serious problem, the socio-
economic and national policies of the Romanian government, could not be freely criticized in the 
press and in any case could hardly be solved by Jewish leaders struggling to help their co-
religionists survive.  Shur served as something of a scapegoat for bigger problems.  By the mid-
1920s, even if Shur had not been corrupt and dictatorial, Jewish traditional institutions could no 
longer provide for the needs of Jewish communal life.  In 1925, the communal council devised a 
two-tier ranking system for Jewish institutions, whereby those of the first tier would always 
receive some funding while those from the second-tier would get support only if money was left 
over.  Not surprisingly, there was conflict over which institutions would occupy which tier.  At a 
council session in September, conflict erupted between Landau and Shur over this question.  
Shur originally stated that there was money for all, but later noted that there would not be money 
specifically for second tier establishments.  Landua screamed to the entire hall: ―Shur will betray 
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all Jewish establishments!‖36  Jewish institutions were in a constant state of crisis, and battles 
such as this raged at communal council meetings over the limited funds available to support 
Jewish life.   
Economic problems were contributing to a disintegration of Jewish communal cohesion.  
The problem was magnified by the growing perception among Jews from various classes that 
their traditional communal structure was hopelessly outdated in the face of modern realities.  
Because much of the money for Jewish institutions came from taxing ritual slaughter, much of 
the brunt of this tax was born by the devout Jewish masses, and those that did not eat kosher 
were seen as not contributing.
37
  Worse, in Bessarabia the Jewish masses were poor and getting 
poorer, so not only did a communal structure based on taxing the poor seem unfair (and received 
increasingly virulent criticism), but as circumstances grew worse, kosher meat became 
prohibitively expensive for most.  Many rabbis and even secular Jewish leaders feared and 
complained that Bessarabian Jews were eating non-kosher for economic reasons.
38
  Yet, raising 
the kosher tax was the only means available to communal leaders to raise revenue for Jewish 
institutions, even though this came to be seen by many as a conspiracy of the Jewish rich against 
their poor.
39
  According to box tax council vice-president Tumarkin there was a definite and 
steady fall in the revenues of the box tax, upon which 26 Jewish philanthropic associations were 
completely dependent, to the point that things had reached a crisis point by 1925.  Given the 
overall impoverishment of the Jewish people locally, many had turned away from Kosher meat, 
according to Tumarkin.  This is why the council had to break up the recipients of box tax money 
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into two categories based on tiers, and give associations like OZE and ORT funds only if 
available.  He argued during a meeting of the council that the way forward was to search for new 
sources of income, for which a special commission could be appointed—but the decision was 
made by Shur to keep the traditional structure intact and opt for dividing recipients into the two 
camps.  Tumarkin complained that this would not relieve the crisis long term.
40
  Certainly, the 
question of state support was raised often during these years, especially when some Jewish 
institutions, such as the Chişinău hospital and cafeterias for the poor, served all residents, not just 
Jews.  Yet, support was inconsistent, coming largely from city funds; central government money 
was on hold while debate in Bucharest was ongoing about the final status of Romania‘s 
numerous minority religions.   
 
The Law of Cults and Communal Recognition 
After pursuing a path with numerous stops and starts with several Romanian 
administrations and ministers, the Jewish community was finally recognized as a unified legal 
entity across the entire country on April 22, 1928, when a national law on religious cults, known 
simply as the Law of the Cults, was promulgated.  The law recognized an umbrella organization 
of which Jewish residents became a part. 
41
  Prior to this, religious leaders, such as Rabbi 
Tsirelson of Bessarabia, were given representative rights in the Romanian Senate, and Jews who 
had secured citizenship rights could vote to popularly elect Jewish representatives in national 
elections as private citizens.  However, there had been no hierarchical structure within the 
Romanian-wide Jewish community and very little Jewish unity across it.  The Union of 
Romanian Jews, a secular organization of mostly better-off, Romanian-speaking Jews based in 
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the capital and led by Adolf Shtern and later Wilhelm Filderman, had served as ―national 
intercessors,‖ defending the interests of the new state‘s various Jewish communities as best as 
possible.   
Now with legal recognition, Jewish communities throughout the country were asked to 
participate in electing Jewish political representatives to the government as each recognized 
―cult‖ would be permitted representation, in theory.  The Jewish ―cult‖ also became entitled to 
state subsidies after 1928, which did aid the community until they were curtailed entirely in 1936 
after successive reductions in the middle 1930s.
42
  Even then there were complaints about 
unequal distribution that were, in fact justified because the amount of the subsidies received by 
the Jewish community compared to that given other religious minorities clearly attested to the 
anti-Jewish bias in Bucharest.  In 1931, some 800,000 Jews received just over 9 million lei in 
subsidies from the state, compared with the 12.5 million lei received by a 200,000 strong Muslim 
community.  Likewise, 720,000 Protestants received over 53 million lei; 1.2 million Catholics 
received the same amount; and 1.3 million Uniates received over 105 million lei.  This subsidy 
never amounted to more than 1-2% of the community‘s religious needs.  Jewish politicians 
consistently and unsuccessfully attempted to raise the amount, citing discrimination to support 
their arguments.
43
   
Legal recognition of the kehilot on a national political level emboldened Jewish leaders 
not only in Bessarabia but also in Bukovina and Transylvania to seek better representation in the 
capital for their own interests directly because many Jews in the annexed territories increasingly 
looked upon the URJ as Romanian assimilationists for their efforts to convince Jews in all parts 
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of the country to support Romanian national parties.  For example, when one of the leaders of the 
URJ, Horia Carp, spoke in Bălţi in January 1928 after months of postponement, local Jewish 
supporters attempted to screen the audience, but his speech was nevertheless interrupted by 
detractors who criticized the URJ for supporting the Cult Law and for refusing to allow its 
organization, which claimed to be representative of all Romanian Jews, to stand for election of 
its members to Jewish voters from the whole country.
44
  This boldness was also a factor of the 
greater commitment to democractic tolerance on the national political stage—the National 
Peasant Party (NPP) came to power in 1928 and was led by Iuliu Maniu, a long-time 
Transylvanian moderate whose career stretched back to the Austro-Hungarian Parliament in pre-
1918 Vienna.  The NPP was much tolerant and liberal-minded than the National Liberals led by 
one of the leading noble families in the country, the Brătianus.   
Much of the tension between the URJ and the leaders of annexed territories reflected the 
overall lack of cohesion within Romanian Jewry, an understandable result of different historical 
developments that could only superficially be captured in the official state census of 1930.  
Tremendous diversity within the Romanian Jewish community, particularly linguistically, was a 
reflection of life in different empires.  In 1930, of 206,958 people who identified themselves as 
Jews by religion in Bessarabia, or 7.2% of the population, 201,278, or over 97%, declared 
Yiddish their mother tongue.
45
  This did not reflect the overall picture for the country, however: 
of 756,730 self-declared Jews by religion across Greater Romania in 1930, or 4.2% of the overall 
population, 518,754, or 68%, declared Yiddish as their mother tongue, the rest indicating mostly 
Hungarian (Transylvania), German (Bukovina), or Romanian (Wallachia, especially Bucharest).  
The level of assimilation into a non-Jewish society was least pronounced in Bessarabia, and 
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these Jews were the most traditional and ―Eastern‖ of the territories acquired by Bucharest in 
1918, albeit with a Russian-speaking core intelligentsia community in Chişinău and other towns 
with large communities like Bâliţ, Tighina and Sorocca.46 
The terms of this new status were thus not acceptable to all, and the debates that took 
place in the Chişinău community over the numerous questions concerning legal recognition 
sheds much light on the deep divisions within Jewish life at this time.  In the run-up to the 
passage of the Cult Law, Chişinău Jewish leaders had been notified in October 1925 that they 
were welcomed to send two representatives to Bucharest to partake in the debates over the 
drafting of the law.  Debates broke out at the communal council over who should go, since no 
electoral system existed for this purpose.  Rabbi Tsirelsohn was of course one of the two chosen 
over the dissent of the non-Orthodox.
47
  Orthodox leaders could not imagine being represented 
by Jews from outside their own sphere.  The political inexperience and depth of conflicting 
opinions among Bessarabian Jewish leaders was very serious, as noted by Jewish secular 
journalist Dad‘ in one of his reports from inside the communal council meetings: ―Instead of 
debate, there are evil glances of hatred. Instead of dialogue, smashing of fists on the table.‖48   
There were also significant concerns about the reality of the negotiations going on in 
Bucharest—the URJ was negotiating with the Romanian government on behalf of all the Jews in 
Greater Romania.  In Bessarabia in particular, as noted, the URJ had long been suspected of 
having assimilationist tendencies: its members were Romanian-speakers while Bessarabian Jews 
spoke Yiddish and Russian.  Perhaps even more importantly, the political policy of the URJ that 
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it fervently pressed upon the Jews of the new territories was that in the face of growing political 
antisemitism in the country, Jews should vote for the major national party that would protect 
their interests.  Talk of a separate Jewish party, which was raised by Zionists in Transylvania and 
Bukovina soon after annexation, was strongly opposed by the URJ for fear that it would make 
Jews appear disloyal.  The differences over the promulgation of the Cult Law, which Bessarabian 
Jews resisted right up to its acceptance in Parliament, was an important final split that led to a 
loss of authority by the URJ in the new territories and the eventual formation of a Jewish 
National Party, with its strength in these territories, in 1931.   
As negotiations went on throughout the mid-1920s, Chişinău Jews of all persuasions, 
including Zionists, the Orthodox, socialists, Yiddishists, and the so-called ―non-aligned,‖ seemed 
to agree that their interests were not being properly spoken for.  In a powerful statement to this 
effect, the Chişinău communal council members and representatives of the various synagogues 
in the city responded sharply in January 1928 to a request from the URJ leadership that they send 
representatives to Bucharest to determine how to divide the subsidy of 10 million lei offered by 
the government to all Romanian Jewry.
49
  They sent a letter to the URJ and the Minister of Cults 
declining the money, noting two principle reasons: 1) Jewish communities themselves must have 
the prerogative to comprise their budgets, without the demand for agreeing with state proposed 
subsidies; 2) the government must include in its annual budget a subsidy to the Jewish 
community based on its needs and in proportion to the taxes that Jews pay the government.  They 
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called for these points to be written in as part of the Law of Cults in the chapter on communal 
organization.
50
   
This statement reveals much of how Bessarabian Jews felt about their position in the 
country—they wanted Jewish cultural autonomy and demanded the state respect, support and 
protect this wish.  Hardly any among them trusted the Jewish leadership in Bucharest to press for 
autonomy, understanding that they were not invested in this issue like they were.
 51
  Carol Iancu 
compares the perspectives of the Zionists, who wanted to democratize but maintain the kehilot as 
a marker of Jewish national autonomy, with that of the Unionists (supporters of the URJ), who 
believed the kehilot were an important Jewish institution that could facilitate Jewish integration 
into Romanian society.
52
  In Bessarabia, however, the major split was between Zionists and the 
Orthodox, and both agreed on the need for Jewish cultural autonomy based on preserving the 
kehilot.  They disagreed on the form and purpose of the kehilot, with Bessarabian Zionists 
generally having social, national and secular interests, as well as a need to support preparing 
young Jews for aliyah, while the Orthodox desired maintaining the kehilot institutions as means 
to preserve the Jewish religion.  As a result, Zionists demanded democratization of the kehila 
council in order to wrest control from the Orthodox leaders and support Zionist interests while 
the Orthodox resisted democratization because they did not trust anyone else to maintain the 
traditional status quo that they felt protected the Jewish religion from disappearance through 
assimilation.   
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While there was agreement among many Bessarabian Jews that the Cult Law was 
destructive for their collective autonomy, national politics soon would magnify communal 
differences and lead to the democratization of the box tax council as demanded by Chişinău 
Zionists.  In the national elections of December 1928, the URJ continued to support the National 
Liberals while Zionists from across the country threw their support behind the National Peasants.  
The Orthodox leadership in Chişinău also supported the National Liberals, in part because this 
party had allowed the Orthodox leaders to maintain their control over local Jewish politics, and 
also because more than the Zionists, Orthodox leaders held to the URJ line that Jewish politics 
should ―stay quiet,‖ i. e. maintain alliances with moderate national Romanian parties.   Rabbi 
Tsirelson had made his views known to his flock five years earlier in 1923, when fear was 
mounting that unfavorable legislation concerning Jewish citizenship in Romania would pass 
through Parliament (which it did).  Asked quite sharply by members of his community then if 
Jews should take a more active and oppositional stance when they felt the government was 
against them, Tsirelson replied that despite the presence of anti-Semites and anti-Semitic actions, 
Jews in Romania have either received full rights or are in the process of gaining them.  
Therefore, as a peaceful people loyal to their state of residence, Jews should not participate in 
oppositional acts and demonstrations against the government.
53
  This was a political line from 
generations past, but by the 1920s, many Jewish leaders in Chişinău were bold enough to 
challenge it.  They used this stance taken by Tsirelson and other rabbinic leaders to undermine 
them as much as possible. 
When the National Peasants won a resounding electoral victory in December 1928, 
Jewish politics in Bessarabia were immediately affected, as all five Jewish candidates elected on 
the NPP ticket to Parliament, (Michael Landau, Solomon Berliand, S. Dubinsky, Meir Ebner and 
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M. Iahinsohn) were Zionists.  Pressure on the Orthodox, still holding on to the reins of power in 
the kehila council, to give up their control became intense.  Even before the elections, when an 
NPP victory seemed very likely (interwar Romanian elections were corrupt and never really 
democratic), concerns from the Orthodox mounted.  At a November 6 kehila council meeting, a 
full month before the elections, Reb Vekker from Shur‘s camp gave a lengthy speech arguing 
that no matter what kind of Parliament was chosen; Rabbi Tsirelson had to be among the 
representatives there.  Landau spoke about the realities of politics, coming close to denouncing 
the Rabbi—―Reb Tsirelsohn has become a handmaiden of the Liberal Constitution, for which we 
have shed blood.‖54   
 
Democracy comes to Jewish Chişinău 
With the Cult Law coming into force and with Bessarabian Zionists in positions of 
influence at the national level, the Orthodox grip on local power was weakened and communal 
re-organization became inevitable.  Jewish lobbying in Bucharest had succeeded in recognizing 
various aspects of Jewish life such as schools, synagogues, and philanthropic and cultural 
organizations.  These organizations in turn came to belong to one unified communal organization 
represented before the Romanian authorities by a council of all Jews in Romania.  Elections of 
local council representatives followed for several years after the Cult Law‘s promulgation across 
Greater Romania.  In Chişinău the vote took place November 3, 1929, when 71 members 
representing 14 different party lists ran for office.  The election was not without controversy 
within the community, because in order to have the election represent all ideological and 
religious perspectives of the community members, the ―democratic‖ bloc, which included varied 
secular, Zionist, and trade union interests, compromised with the demands of the Orthodox bloc 
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to forbid Jewish women from voting for this council.  In following years similar communal 
organizations were chosen in various Bessarabian towns with significant Jewish populations, 
including Bălţi, Bender, Orhei, Calaraşi, Soroca and Hotin.  In the spring of 1933 a unified 
council was elected to represent all the Jewish communities of Bessarabia, and this time women 
were allowed to vote.
55
  With the creation of an institution that gave voice to common Jews in 
communal affairs, the box tax administration finally became accountable to a broader number of 
local Jews, although it was not discarded. 
The debate over the elimination of the box tax and the communal elections had reached a 
fever pitch in the run-up to the Chişinău council representative elections.  These local debates, in 
turn, clearly pointed to wider questions of changes within Jewish identity that had already been 
ongoing.  For many Jews the elections were a natural process—Jews must make their institutions 
democratic in order to become a normal and active part of political life in a democratic, 
European Romania.  In many of the communal elections that took place in the early 1930s, this 
understanding was quite explicit, for example in Tighina on March 19, 1933: ―The communal 
council makes this heartfelt appeal to all the Jews of Tighina town and suburbs to fulfill their 
civil and national obligation to take part in the creation of the Jewish community of Tighina for 
the purpose of uniting and defending the Jews.‖56  Yet even at the communal level, different 
opinions clashed violently.  For example, at a conference about the Chişinău communal elections 
in October 1929 of the Bessarabian branch of ORT (Obshestvo Remeslenogo zemledelcheskgo 
Truda, The Society for Trades and Agricultural Labor),
57
 a Zionist youth from He-Halutz 
angered conference participants by refusing to speak Yiddish, the standard language of Jewish 
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communication in Bessarabia even among most Zionists, and insisting on Hebrew instead.
58
  
Such ideological differences over political, cultural and religious issues sometimes lead to 
fistfights.   
Not all Jews wanted to abolish the box tax, which had for better or worse managed to 
maintain Jewish religious and cultural institutions, such as they were, for more than a century of 
rule by the Tsars.  However, support for maintaining the box tax was perceived by many lower-
class Jews (generally accurately) as limited only to the wealthy and Orthodox, which earned both 
these camps of traditional Jewish leadership considerable animosity from many Jews and served 
to shake-up communal politics.
59
  With recognition of the kehilot came the opportunity for state 
subsidies (which proved disappointing but this could not be foreseen clearly in1928), but to 
collect these funds, taxation had to be organized on modern means other than the kosher meat 
tax.  Many Jews, particularly younger and more nationalist voices, looked upon the box tax as a 
relic of the past; as something preventing Jewish collective modernization.  Thus, despite 
traditional sensibilities, proponents of maintaining the box tax recognized the unpopularity of the 
idea, especially given the shift in power toward the Zionist, and largely dropped it.   
Political involvement dramatically increased among lower-class Jews by the last years of 
the 1920s across Bessarabia as a result of these changes, but especially in Chişinău.  According 
to a Jewish joke at the time: ―if you see a Jew on the street gesticulating wildly, chances are, he 
is making an argument for his favorite candidate.‖60  State records also indicate that Jewish 
interest in the elections and, by extension, in the political process more broadly, was remarkably 
vibrant.  Siguranţa agents reported that the week before the planned elections on November 3, 
the level of ‗propaganda‘ was intense because of the ―need to elect a communal council that 
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would protect the rights of the Jews.‖61  While Jews likely saw connections between their 
internal reforms and national politics, it would seem that Romanian police clearly looked upon 
Jews and their internal politics as completely foreign.  Jews‘ expression of interest in national 
politics as a means of protecting their people specifically and not serving the state was also 
highly suspect as anti-national and perhaps treasonous.  Romanian police wanted no part in 
Jewish affairs other than to keep them under control and away from other citizens, perhaps the 
starkest difference from the Soviet-Jewish reality across the river. 
Such rapid politicization worried traditional Jewish leaders, particularly the Orthodox, 
who worried not only about the loss of their own political power, but also about the future of 
Jewish life.  For members of Aguda, the organization that pressed both Jewish institutions and 
national governments on behalf of Orthodox interests, politics was always seen from the 
perspective of preserving religious orthodoxy as the only means of preserving Judaism itself.  
Members feared the assimilation of future generations.  Often this concern was voiced explicitly 
and this only intensified after the 1928 elections.
62
  This is the key to explaining why democratic 
proceedings proved difficult to accept when there were questions of power sharing with those 
considered to bode ill for the future of Judaism.  Within religious structures themselves, election 
proceedings were hardly new; nor were rabbinic leaders unfamiliar with secular politics or with 
the plight of their people under the new regime.  But religious leaders simply did not trust the 
secular elite to maintain Jewish life.
63
 
Extreme positions from all sides raised the political debate to a fever pitch on the pages 
of the Russian and Yiddish-language presses in autumn 1929.  In a letter published in 
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Bessarabian Post, a secular, left-wing Yiddishist named M. Uchitel‘ blamed both Zionists and 
Orthodox leaders for working against a Jewish ―Workers‘ Democracy.‖  He blamed the Zionists 
for raising the question of emigration for political expediency while not doing enough for actual 
resettlement in Palestine; and argued that the emigration question itself undermined Jews‘ local 
political connections.  He lambasted the Orthodox, calling them ―our parents‖ who had 
represented ‗us‖ before the Tsars but failed in demanding national rights, and were now insisting 
on an unreasonable share of power in communal affairs.  Uchitel‘ did represent the views of 
many in drawing a connection between Jewish oppression in Tsarist Russian and Greater 
Romania as both something that Jewish leaders have been unable to successfully address: ―We 
don‘t need the Saturday worship of the Orthodox or the ‗violent Judaization‘ and chauvinism of 
the Zionists,‖ Uchitel‘ wrote, ―who are making Yiddish—the actual language of Jewish culture, 
the living entity that holds Jews together—into a panacea.‖64   
The election results were controversial, as the campaigning had been, but the level of 
tension was undoubtedly greatest when time came to actually implement the mandated changes. 
Extremely tenuous negotiations among the leading parties, marked particularly by their inability 
to compromise, exposed the simultaneous embracing of and discomfort with the democratic 
process.  Most prominent among the 14 competing electoral groups were the Zionists and the 
Orthodox, the latter led by Chief Rabbi Tsirelson.  These two were by far best organized and 
already had a reputation as the political leadership of the community, yet they captured only 10 
and 12 of 71 council seats, respectively.  The largest share of 13 seats went to a loose 
confederation of craftsmen led by Alexander Zilberman,
65
 and the rest (actually a majority of 36 
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seats) went in smaller numbers to various blocs representing Jewish philanthropic associations, 
individual synagogues, and other religious affiliations.  Voter turnout was 5471, or over 60% of 
eligible Jewish voters.
66
  The result was clearly a set-back for the Orthodox religious leadership 
of Chişinău Jewry, and was publicly perceived as a defeat for them.  This was true for the 
Zionists also, who enjoyed greater political experience, more financial support and a particular 
appeal to the youth than any other reforming party.   
Not surprisingly, both factions refused to accept these election results, with the Orthodox 
using religious influence over devout Jews to maintain control despite their numbers; ―only if 
God is in our hands will we enter the communal government,‖ said Orthodox bloc leader 
Solomon Shur.
67
  The insistence upon their traditional authority by Orthodox leaders in the face 
of modern politics, such as democratic elections, was a specific response against modernity 
identified as the doctrine of daat tora.
68
  In Chişinău in 1929, traditional authority was clearly 
challenged through modern political ideas as never before, and Orthodox leaders retrenched 
themselves in religious ideologies in an attempt to avoid the repercussions of the changes.  The 
Orthodox and the Zionists soon formed competing coalition blocs in vying to select from their 
midst the leader of the communal government.  Despite a Zionist-led coalition majority, the 
Orthodox threatened to pull out of the communal government all together if Rabbi Tsirelson was 
not chosen president of the new communal administration.
69
  The warring camps finally reached 
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a compromise when the aging Dr. Slutsky, chief doctor at the Chişinău Jewish hospital for over 
fifty years, was chosen as president.   
The impact of modern ideas on Jewish life, which Chişinău‘s Jews had been reading 
about in the press throughout the 1920s, was evident in Slutsky‘s ceremonial speech on 
November 19, 1929.    His words served as an affirmation of Jewish national identity and of the 
power of democracy: he described Jewish education as the means to preserve Jewish national 
identity, and emphasized that this communal government, the first actually chosen by the Jewish 
people of Bessarabia, would ―see to their interests rather than rubber-stamping the dictates of the 
state as the old communal government did.‖  At the ceremony, two women leaders from the 
organization of Jewish women, Mrss. Babich and Schechter, stood up and protested that Jewish 
women had still not been allowed to vote, shocking many of the Orthodox men present as such 
an outburst would have been unimaginable only ten years before.
70
  In fact, it had taken over ten 
years since the end of Russian rule for Jews to form a nominally democratic municipal authority 
in Bessarabia for representation in Bucharest.  Nevertheless, the debates taking place clearly 
show that Bessarabian Jews were aware that they were living in an era of unprecedented change. 
 
Worsening Circumstances 
The financial crisis and the rapidly deteriorating economic circumstances facing Jewish 
life and institutions were imperative in understanding the Jewish popular vote—the failure of the 
two most prominent forces in local Jewish politics to do better clearly point to a high level of 
dissatisfaction.  Faced with growing insecurity in broader Romanian society, Chişinău Jews 
feared the loss of the Jewish institutions that they had come to increasingly depend upon.  Many 
chose new leaders out of personal connections, but many also expressed with their vote a hope in 
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running Jewish affairs more competently and with greater interest for the welfare of all involved 
rather than just the privileged.  The weakening of Orthodox hegemony on power was not 
unusual, but the failure to convincingly embrace Zionism, even if temporarily, was an important 
indicator that many Jews wanted better representation and were not necessarily ideologically 
driven in a pro-Zionist direction.  After a decade in Greater Romania, many lower-class Jews, 
with the exception of the youth, still hoped to enjoy cultural autonomy in their place of residence 
and were not sold that the only salvation for Jews was to leave their home and migrate to the 
land of Israel.  Here again, the broader picture of growing antisemitism must be considered in 
understanding the course of politics after 1930: by the early to mid 1930s, this hope in 
autonomism was largely dashed and Zionist solutions to Jewish problems made more appealing. 
In November 1929, with the official formation and state recognition of the Chişinău 
Jewish communal government structure, the community was able to make democratic decisions 
concerning its budget and expenditures, among a host of other matters.  There was little, 
however, that Jewish communal policies could have done to avert the coming financial disasters 
facing Bessarabian Jewry.  Communal governments were never able to do much other than try to 
alleviate an atmosphere of crisis, marked as it was by perpetual, unsolved problems from the 
post-war loss of markets made severely worse by the onset of the Great Depression.  By early 
1931, the Chişinău Jewish hospital deficit reached 1.6 million lei ($10,000), a fact reflected by 
articles in the local Russian-language press that expressed continued concern and foreshadowed 
the closure of the hospital.  As not only the hospital but also many philanthropic organizations 
and individuals were in a sad economic state, communal taxes suffered.  In late summer 1931 
hospital staff staged a brief strike against the hospital administrators for not alleviating the 
budget deficit, which they blamed for the delay or non-payment of their salaries.  By this time, 
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over 90% of all hospital patients were being treated for free because of their inability to pay for 
any of the services received.  The deficit of the hospital reached 2 million lei by the end of the 
year, and Chişinău Jewish community president Zilberman presented a memorandum outlining 
the state of crisis of the Jewish hospital and secured state funds of 1.3 million lei for 1932, 
managing to avoid going further into debt.
71
  Other Jewish hospitals in the smaller cities 
throughout Bessarabia, such as Balţi, Tighina, and Calaraşi, witnessed similar funding 
difficulties in the interwar years.  The small hospital in Calaraşi, serving a town that was more 
than 75% Jewish, did receive proportionally more funding from Joint, although it also often fell 
short.
72
  Hospitals are a good indicator that things were at least as bad, but likely worse, among 
other Jewish institutions, since hospitals usually received greater support from the state. 
All branches of Jewish public life were deeply affected by the deepening financial 
problems.  There remained a tremendous discrepancy between the rich and poor among Jews, 
often resulting in bribery that outraged the Jewish public.  In February 1931 uproar arose over 
the fact that the Hevra Kadisha, the Chişinău burial society, had accepted large bribes from 
wealthy Jews in order to secure the best cemetery plots.  The organization had not only violated 
an apparent public trust in not making such decisions democratically, but also for holding on to a 
large amount of money.  Private wealth was grudgingly left alone, but when Jewish social 
organizations were noted for holding significant money during a time of extreme hardship for 
many, they were viciously attacked.
73
  Bickering over dispersing of funds among Jewish 
organizations became so intense by early 1931 that a representative organization was formed 
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consisting of members from traditional religious aid groups such as Ezras Hoilim, the Jewish 
schools, and modern associations like ORT.  The organization met monthly from February 1931 
to determine how best to use the funds available for Jewish life, although decisions there were 
hotly contested also.
74
 
Because of the consistent financial problems facing most Jewish institutions, a well-
developed publicity campaign for supporting them through private donations developed over the 
course of the interwar years on the pages of the Russian and Yiddish dailies.  In addition to 
calling for donations through heart-wrenching pleas for worthy causes, journalists would 
shamelessly list those community leaders, whom everyone knew, who failed to give to various 
worthy causes.  Just as public pride was sought in supporting these causes, public shame was 
feared by wealthy Jews who failed to pledge support for those less fortunate, serving together as 
a powerful motivator for communal philanthropy among the better-off.
75
  In January-October 
1928, for example, Chişinău Jewish hospital head physician Dr. Slutsky led a fundraising 
campaign, mostly through the press, which raised half-a-million lei ($3000) for the hospital.
76
  
The number of charitable organizations that either organized philanthropic drives or benefited 
from them, as well as the number of poor and needy, was large.  On the eve of WWII, there were 
across Bessarabia 13 age-old homes; 27 committees for assistance to sick people (Ezras Hoilim); 
57 committees and organizations of different kinds for assistance to poor people (Ezras Aniim), 
and many other smaller institutions as well.
77
  Yet, the effect of such charitable drives seemed to 
underscore the growing feeling of desperation and deepening crisis on the Jewish street.  This 
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was doubly so because the economic problems grew in the early 1930s together with the rapidly 
disintegrating political status of Jews in the country.  
 
Nationalism and Antisemitism 
Harder economic times were obviously not only hitting Bessarabia but much of the 
world.  All of Romanian society was hard hit, especially the peasantry, too many of whom 
produced for export and had become dependent on international grain prices that now collapsed.  
Difficult circumstances made it easier for extremists to fan the flames of anti-Semitic hatred, and 
the threat and fear of violence continued to grow.  Anti-Semitic violence from students had been 
intermittent since 1922; the level of violence in terms of pogroms across the country spiked 
notably in 1927, led by student riots in Cluj and Oradea Mare that spread like waves into more 
rural areas where they became pogroms.
78
  In 1930 violence and anti-Semitic protests picked up 
again in several Romanian cities and began spreading to smaller urban and in some cases rural 
areas, while Romanian police and the courts were seen as hesitant to prosecute the assailants.
79
  
As reflected in press reporting, a growing panic began to grip Bessarabian Jews, which was of 
course very important in understanding Jewish politics.  The popular Jewish mood during the 
communal elections in 1929 had been influenced by rising fear of violence from anti-Semitic 
hooliganism; by the early 1930s, this threat increased and came together with economic crisis.  
Taken together, the effect was devastating on Jewish security. 
Zionist public activism had been increasing since the middle of the 1920s, particularly 
from the local members of Vladimir Jabotinsky‘s Zionist-Revisionists.  On September 17, 1929 
they organized a public meeting in front of the Mayoralty building in Chişinău on the question of 
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British policies in Palestine, calling for Jews to circumvent British immigration quotas and 
simply go on their own.
80
  The timing was in part a reaction to an article in the local Romanian-
language anti-Semitic paper Scutul Naţional, which printed an article on September 8 titled 
―Long Live the Arabs.‖  The article opened with a glowing tribute to the long-deceased Pavel 
Cruşevan, the former chief editor of the locally well-remembered anti-Semitic daily Bessarabets, 
which had been instrumental in instigating the 1903 Kishinev pogrom.  His photograph in the 
article included the caption ―now dead for 20 years after having been poisoned by kikes.‖  The 
article was met with a public outcry from the local Jewish community.
81
  In addition, news broke 
of Jews being attacked in Bessarabia while on board a train from Cernauţi to Bucharest, with 
victims reporting that Iron Guard hooligans threatened greater terror against the Jews and 
promised them that the Romanian government would never know or do anything about it.
82
   
Indeed, the growing state of perceived besiegement was largely connected to the fact the 
Romanian authorities seemed more willing to protect anti-Semites while failing to protect the 
Jews.  Much of the complaints were related to events in everyday life.  In October 1929, for 
example, 23 Jewish merchants from the New Market in Chişinău filed a complaint with the 
mayor against the controller of the market, a well-known anti-Semite named Vladimir Novitsky, 
for crimes against Jewish businessmen including extortion, beatings, and random organized theft.  
Romanian municipal administrators, however, did nothing.
83
  Complaints against Novitsky can 
be found in the press for many months after this date, as little was done to control him.
84
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Little comfort came from government representatives.  Following the events that 
preceded the communal elections, Jewish leaders petitioned the Romanian police to closely 
observe such disturbances, but a police report from September 25, 1929 noted that the only 
noteworthy popular movements were Zionism and communism among the Jews themselves.
85
  
As in many other instances, antisemitism was indeed observed but silenced in Siguranţa 
reporting, just like in other police actions.  For example, in order to ensure protection from 
antisemites rallying nearby at a joint meeting of the proto-fascist, anti-Semitic Iron Guard and 
League of National Christian Defense, organizers of a Zionist meeting in Calaraşi on November 
28, 1929 petitioned local authorities for six additional gendarmes.  It is unclear if the additional 
gendarmes were provided, but noteworthy that the police report agreed that violence could be 
expected against the Jews.
86
 A follow up report from December 4, however, noted that no 
antisemitism was observed.
87
  As a corollary to this, it was clear from Siguranţa reports that most 
police firmly believed that communism was being imported into the country to destabilize the 
state: the idea that it had inherent ideological and economic appeal was rejected wholesale.  
Several reports from the turn of the decade, for example, indicated that communism among the 
ethnic Moldovans was prevalent, but Siguranţa reporting, aiming to show that that communism 
was a foreign (especially Jewish) ideology explained this as resulting from local antipathy 
among ―ethnic Romanians‖ to the changing of the calendar.88  Moldovans were on occasion 
arrested, especially urban workers such as handicraftsmen, yet it seemed impossible for agents to 
accept that there was anything naturally appealing for them in the movement.  
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Particularly psychologically traumatic for Bessarabian Jews were the events of the 
summer of 1930, when a panic spread among Bessarabian Jews that detachments of the Iron 
Guard would be allowed by the Bessarabian regional authorities to march through towns as they 
requested.  By all accounts, events of this summer moved popular expectations from isolated 
incidents and unfriendly bureaucrats to a state of consistent fear that in some cases bordered on 
panic.  In days before reports spread of Cuzists (named after far-right, anti-Semitic, Christian 
nationalist Iaşi University Professor Alexandru C. Cuza) recruiting children to join their 
parades
89
 or walking through Jewish parts of towns and shouting anti-Semitic taunts.
90
  Reports, 
mostly in the Russian and Yiddish press, noted that in response to inquiries from Jewish leaders 
about the anti-Semitic marches, Romanian leaders explained that the Cuzists were planning to 
engage in pro-national propaganda, implying that the Jews should not feel threatened.
91
   
Reports circulated that advanced members of the Iron Guard crossed the Prut on July 15 
and attacked Jewish stores in Ungheni.  Codreanu himself would reportedly arrive shortly ―to 
beat the Jews‖ and ―the authorities will do nothing to stop him.‖92  The article held that the 
government had spoiled Codreanu by doing nothing to him in the past and now could not stop 
him (he had been acquitted in a clear murder case in 1925).  The author also expressed concern 
that the economic plight in the country was hitting the peasantry very hard, making it easy for the 
guardists to motivate them into violence against the Jews.
93
  Indeed, the level of antisemitism  
in much of the press and popular rhetoric was growing more extreme.  Already, articles had 
recently appeared in the popular Romanian language paper Universul defending the Iron 
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Figure 6: Iron Guard leader and popular hero Corneliu Zelea Codreanu, dressed in national peasant garb, 
with supporters on a visit to Bessarabia, Ungheni, 1930. ANRM photograph collection, # 3-62. 
Guard—complaints against their march were apparently being organized by communists in 
Moscow: ―How else can it be explained that there are no complaints against the communists, 
who are everywhere in Bessarabia?  But when a few teenagers, 15 year-old boys want to march 
around, they are labeled ―Cuzists‖ and other names by the press!‖94  Communism, the argument 
went, was completely foreign to the Romanian national character—a foreign import—while 
expressions of nationalism affirmed the strength and vitality of the nation; the only people 
opposing it are foreigners themselves. 
Undoubtedly, Jewish voices in the comparatively open press during these years were also 
instrumental in raising Jewish awareness and fear to the hatred around them.  The press was very 
important as a venue for voicing concerns—particularly during the government of the National 
Peasant Party from 1928-1932.  National Peasant leaders, Iuliu Maniu in particular, were 
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committed to democracy and maintaining European norms.  Ironically, this greater level of press 
freedom allowed Jewish interests freer expression to condemn state abuses, particularly those of 
local police and bureaucracy that did much to make Jewish national sentiment stronger.  Press 
reports noted that Jews had been attacked outside Chişinău but especially in Bălţi, where serious 
recent attacks against them were met with unwillingness from local authorities to do anything 
about them.  Not surprisingly this frightened and isolated the entire community.
95
  To calm these 
spreading fears, notable also in Ungheni where Iron Guard youth camps were often organized, 
the Bessarabian Governor insisted publicly that he would not cooperate with the Iron Guard and 
would not let them into Bessarabia.  Nonetheless, hundreds of Jews packed up and moved 
toward the north in early July.
96
  Yet the anti-Jewish perspective of the authorities became clear 
the same week when a delegation of Jewish communal leaders from various Bessarabian towns 
met with Deputy Governor Florescu.  In response to complaints that Jews were in a constant 
state of panic because of consistent anti-Semitic agitation among certain elements of the 
population, Florescu replied that ―Jews should be more sensible for their skin when they talk.‖  
He asked why the Jews were always concerned with Cuzism and never with communism: 
―Communism is dangerous for all, but Cuzism is dangerous only for a certain segment of the 
population, only for Jews.‖97  Indeed, police reporting on Jewish residents was by the late 1920s 
formulaic in its assumptions: ―antisemitism is not observed, but there are slight signs of 
communist movement.‖98  The hypocrisy of such reporting was abundantly clear: Siguranţa 
agents attempted to silence the danger of antisemitism in their reports while simultaneously 
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granting Jewish requests for additional gendarmes to prevent public disturbances because of 
expected violence from right-wing groups.
99
   
 Many Jews refused to wait for assurances of security from authorities, rather taking 
matters into their own hands as panic spread.  A local union of Jewish businessmen promised to 
blockade all roads into and out of Călăraşi in order to prevent the Iron Guard from arriving in 
their town.
100
  Rising panic also triggered a noticeable rise in Jewish migration out of Romanian 
Bessarabia beginning in 1930, although certainly economic collapse was also a very important 
factor in this.
101
  Hundreds of Jewish families were leaving Bessarabia every month beginning 
with 1930, mostly to Western Europe and more rarely Eretz Israel, but in some cases across the 
Dniester into Soviet Transnistria.
102
  Migration certainly existed since the establishment of 
Romanian state control in Bessarabia in 1918, but it terms of the Jewish population it was a net 
population increase; after 1930 the trend was clearly toward outmigration.  Leaving the country 
was quite difficult, however, and was of course never feasible for the entire Jewish population, 
just as had been the case during the waves of pogroms in the Russian Empire.
103
  Jewish 
reactions to circumstances in Romanian Bessarabia followed other avenues as well.  There was 
an upsurge in youth activism, particularly among the Zionists.  Many continued to lobby for 
Jewish interests on the local and national political stages.  Another was withdrawal into 
traditional religious life.   
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The modernization of communal administration that took place during these years was an 
important step toward greater politicization of Bessarabian Jewry.  Extreme divisions among 
political factions and interests, clearly visible in the late 1920s, began to subside by the mid 
1930s in the face of political isolation and real physical danger.  The Jewish National Party 
(JNP), formed in 1931, threatened the URJ‘s policy of persuading Jews to vote for Romanian 
national parties in power, so long as they were not overly anti-Semitic, in order to maintain 
perceptions of Jewish loyalty to Romania.  This was no longer acceptable to Jewish leaders in 
Transylvania, Bukovina, and Bessarabia in particular, where rising antisemitism and violence 
against a background of official indifference undermined the argument of the URJ—loyalty to 
Romania seemed pointless.  The nationalist perspective of the JNP, most clearly expressed in the 
following article carried in the only issue published of the Russian language Jewish nationalist 
paper Evreiskaia Tribuna (Jewish Tribune), turned away from cooperation with national parties.  
The article speaks loudly to the growth of a Jewish national identity that no longer can be 
contained within individual European nation-states but rather demands a Jewish national unity, 
even as historically apologist notions of the ―Jewish national character‖ are notable.  Over the 
next few years such views increasingly came to represent the sentiment of Jews not only in the 
new territories but in much of the Old Kingdom as well (certainly in Moldova, if less so in 
Wallachia) because of the spread of an increasingly virulent antisemitism: 
There has been a lot of talk about a Jewish national party, even among the Jews of the Old Regat, 
who have traditionally pushed for assimilation and have been viewed from Bessarabia as the 
assimilators of Jews into Romanian culture.  A Jewish national party is profoundly necessary and 
important, because we are not an ethnic group—we are a nation.  We have our own language and 
our own culture, our own literature and our own history, and in compact masses we live in one 
territory.  We have an unusual history, brought up with particularities shared by no other people, 
which entitle us to be called a nation.  Our people have their own characteristics…we are special.  
When other nations were fighting for their rights we were hiding in cellars like the living dead.  
The past has shaped our characteristics, our national response.  We have survived despite 
thousands of years of efforts to destroy us.  We have triumphed and preserved our religion.  
Despite having lost our political unity and being strewn about the globe, we have contributed to 
almost every field of knowledge.  Complaints swirl that national sentiment is not present in all 
segments of Jewish society, that some are more inclined toward assimilation.  This is unfortunate 
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and a result of improper upbringing not sufficiently entwined with our national spirit.  We must 
petition our national leaders to work to strengthen our national unity.  Assimilation is utopia.  No 
matter how Jews may try to change their national characteristics, this will not lead to anything 
positive.  We need a Jewish party we as we need life itself—other parties will only divide the 
Jewish nation.
104 
 
Turning Point 
This perspective voiced in Evreiskaia Tribuna exemplified the heights of Jewish political 
optimism at the close of the 1920s that would be subject to disappointment by the mid 1930s.  It 
represented the maturation of popular politics in Jewish Bessarabia, the ebbing of the appeal of 
centrist voices that called for maintaining the status quo and of the rise of radicalism on both the 
right and left to replace it.  Jewish nationalism in particular grew in strength and influence 
among not only the Jewish poor but also the most respectable elements of society.  The solution 
to the Jewish Question, that is, the search for a personal identity that would reconcile one‘s 
fluctuating Jewish identity with the demands and pressures of the modern world, had daunted 
Jewish leaders and intellectuals in Russian Bessarabia (and the rest of Eastern Europe) and 
continued to do so in interwar Romanian Bessarabia on similar terms.  Increasingly, many 
intellectuals that had been steeped in Russian high culture gravitated closer to their Jewish 
identity and embraced the Jewish masses as they were pushed to the margins of Romanian 
society.  Just as 1924 had been a turning point from hope to political interaction, and 1930 began 
to see the limits of interaction and made nationalist separation more appealing, 1933 witnessed 
another change in Bessarabian Jewish psychology; this time from interaction toward circling the 
wagons.  In 1933, a swift and brutal one-two blow was dealt all Romanian Jewry, not just in 
Bessarabia: Hitler took charge in Germany and Romania began moving closer to it economically 
and politically, and in the parliamentary elections in December 1933 Jewish parties were 
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completely shut out.  Circumstances after 1933 grew rapidly worse.  Yet the gradualism of 
popular attitudes and their reception among Jews across the entirety of the interwar period, as 
well as its legacy from decades before, is an important point to make, since often in treating the 
rise antisemitism in the country it is portrayed as something sudden and perhaps even limited to 
the growth of anti-Semitic legislation in 1938.  This is only part of the story, as the changes in 
legislation could not be implemented without the context of the previous years. 
The appeal of the Jewish National Party remained very strong and grew rapidly after 
1930.  Despite growing national problems, the political mood at the outset of 1933 was very 
positive, as witnessed by a visit of Michael Landau to Orhei on January 17 in which the well-
known newspaper publisher spoke at a political rally for the JNP attended by about 300 local 
Jews.  Landau touched on many of the reasons Jews were looking for political change.
105
  He 
spoke of the need to organize the Jews in towns like Orhei where they were a powerful majority 
but remained unorganized and thus their needs went unmet: committees of the JNP would be 
forming in Teleneşti, Bravicea, Cinişeuţi and Rezina, Landau declared.  He argued that in recent 
years, Jewish deputies in Parliament have failed to attain proportional representation while the 
impoverishment of the Jewish people in Romania continued.  He promised that a Jewish 
National Party would be able to better serve Jewish interests, especially when the movement of 
the Cuzists was on the rise.  Jews controlled only 5 seats in the Chamber of Deputies while 
various Cuzist parties control 20 seats, Landau maintained: such a state of affairs could only be 
explained by the fracturing of Jewish interests in Parliament and of the need to unite them.  Jews 
were divided among too many political parties and unable to achieve anything for their people as 
a result.  He called for an end to this.  Local communal leaders were very taken with these ideas, 
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and thanked him very warmly and threw a banquet for him that lasted well past midnight.
106
  
There was a general belief that Jews, now with greater understanding of the political process, had 
faith in their own ability to organize and affect a positive change in their own lives.  
Yet Jewish political sentiment in Bessarabia, and indeed across Europe, remained 
fragmented precisely when it was possible to affect politics through unity.  Soon that moment 
passed.  In Romania, the JNP and URJ disagreed on a Jewish future in the country only more 
bitterly when they enjoyed relatively more freedom to do so.  After the formation and successful 
performance of the Jewish National Party in 1931 and 1932, it was effectively blocked from 
representation by the National Liberals, who returned to power in 1933.  By that year Jewish 
concerns with Romanian antisemitism had become intense, eventually uniting Jewish activism of 
different stripes against a common danger.  At Zionist youth meetings, Jewish activists discussed 
growing threats from Romanian nationalist groups, which increasingly allied themselves with 
Nazi Germany by signing threat letters with swastikas.  For example, in February 1933 in 
Chişinău, Zionist fervor was whipped up at a youth meeting of Brit Trumpeldor (right-wing 
Zionists) when the following post card from LANC (Cuza‘s League of National Christian 
Defense) was received, passed around and discussed:  
To the death to save our country from being sold to the jidani (kikes)…you are blind, don‘t you 
see where, in what country you are? You are those that don‘t like our land and our nation.  
Confess yourselves, receive the Eucharist, if you believe in our law. Today, two of us go to make 
virulent justice. In vain you defend yourselves—we swear by our law, and we are not afraid of 
anything.‖107   
The post card was signed with a swastika mark.  Jews began organizing boycotts of German 
products, which were becoming increasingly common on store shelves across Romania as 
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economic relations between the two countries deepened.
108
  Particularly the right-wing Brit 
Trumpeldor voiced loud and determined desire to emigrate to Palestine, demanding unlimited 
emigration rights irrespective of negotiation circumstances between the British government and 
international Jewish representatives.
109
     
Vocal and united protest against Nazi Germany in 1933 and Romania‘s growing links 
with it united disparate Jewish perspectives on obvious common ground.  On March 23, 1933 
Chişinău Jews put together a committee to organize a boycott of German products in protest 
against the Nazi government and Romania‘s ties with it.110  The boycott committee grew into a 
major effort, with a women‘s section responsible for investigating the resources necessary for 
conducting the boycott.  By October 1933, a ―contact committee‖ was organized that saw to the 
enforcement of the boycott by examining Jewish businesses every Tuesday.
111
  Its members took 
the name ―Central Committee of the Anti-Hitler Campaign‖ and thru the local press called upon 
Jewish industrialists and merchants to fight against discrimination and forceful exile of German 
Jews.
112
  A manifesto of the committee from March 1933 aptly puts the goals of the anti-Hitler 
boycott and represents the appeal to Jewish national sentiment in interwar Romanian Bessarabia:   
Jews! The aggression of the new German authorities upon the rights of 600,000 German Jews, 
participants in the centuries-old project of the enrichment of Germany, everyday takes on a more 
beastly form.  German Jews are subject to treatment without any regard for the law, their lives 
threatened, their property destroyed.  Before this horror of the middle-ages, we cannot leave our 
German brothers without aid; every Jew must stand in their defense.  Their interests are our 
interests.  If the Hitlerites are allowed to win, then the program of these enemies will spread to all 
countries, as this is only the first point of the battle.  The victory of the Hitlerites carry with it dark 
times for the entire world, bringing with it the death of freedom, human progress, civilization and 
culture; the Hitlerites carry disrespect for peace agreements, current borders, and the horrors of a 
new war for humanity.  This is why, in the interests of self-defense, we must fight with the 
Hitlerites.  This task world Jewry has recognized by boycotting German products, and now it is 
the turn of Kishinev Jews to do the same.  Jews of Kishinev!  Remember—the economic 
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destruction of Hitlerite Germany will force it to release from its claws Germany‘s Jewry.  It will 
serve as a warning against all others that might follow Hitler‘s example.  Remember that 
Germany‘s economic destruction is the destruction of the nest of death for the Jews!  Every 
product you buy of German make assists the enemy of the Jewish people, the current destroyers of 
the German Jews.  Remember! Only with a united Jewish front can we defeat the Hitlerites.  
Remember to hate Hitlerism!  Don‘t purchase German products—they all come to us stamped 
with the blood of our brothers!  Don‘t purchase German products!  Avoid those dirty marauders in 
our very midst that buy and trade in products that are given life by the blood of our brothers, that 
enrich our enemies to the death!  Avoid them! Defend your interests; your deserved inheritance!  
Don‘t purchase German products!113 
 
On March 26 the first large protest meeting took place in Chişinău that was organized by 
communal government president Alexander Zilberman.  It was attended by more than 1000 
Bessarabian Jews to show solidarity with co-religionists in Germany and Poland. Speakers 
included Monera Bronfman, who spoke in Russian, Carol Steinberg, a well known Zionist who 
spoke in Romanian (perhaps to show loyalty to the Romanian state); Nuhim Buchurnsky spoke 
in Russian, harking back to the anti-Semitic movement of Crushevan that instigated the 1903 
pogrom.  Haim Kogan spoke in Yiddish and complained about the danger for the Polish Jews, so 
close to Hitler; Teodor Stancevici spoke in Russian against racial theory and politics; Moise 
Epstein from the Commerce Bank spoke in Yiddish; Luma Friedman spoke in Hebrew at the 
New Market against Hitler; led by Zilberman, they decided to meet the next day to organize a 
committee to assist German Jews.
114
   
In the next several months, similar rallies took place across much of the province, 
sending Siguranţa agents scurrying to follow, interpret and report on the proceedings.  On April 
5, 1933, a Sunday, all Jewish stores in Chişinău were closed and a great majority of the city‘s 
Jewish residents went to their synagogues for special services of protest.
115
  That same evening, 
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nearly 2500 people showed up to the Theater Express for a public protest rally.
116
  Rallies also 
took place on April 5 in Bolgrad, Bâlţi, and Izmail.117  The following Monday, concerned 
Siguranţa agents reported that protesting Jews filled all Chişinău synagogues.  The Bâlţi 
community sent a protest letter to the Parliament in Bucharest: ―We assembled at the Bâlţi 
Central Synagogue, and representing the Jews of Bâlţi, 30,000 strong, protest against the 
treatment of our brothers in Germany and vow not to buy a single product coming from that 
country.‖118  In Orhei, local merchant Moise Ravich spoke to hundreds of Jews assembled and 
reminded them that world Jewry was 20 million strong (!) and that if banded together they could 
cripple the German economy.119  Indeed, the victory of Hitler in Germany clearly struck an 
immediate nervous chord. Local Jewish leaders were interviewed and some spoke explicitly 
about the danger in Romania.  Signs went up all over the Bessarabian capital: ―Boycott all 
German Products—Don‘t Buy Them!‖120  Rallies and meetings typically filled to capacity before 
the organizers could show up.  A journalist captured the flavor of one such March rally: 
The hall [Chişinău stock market] was overflowing by the time the meeting was called and it was 
forced to actually start on time.  There were Jews from all walks of life, and among them could be 
seen the faces of the secret and open police agents, who want to know what kind of public comes 
to this kind of protest.  Outside, in front of the entrance to the stock market, Cuzist students protest 
against ―kike settlement.‖  The lawyer Steinberg announces that he never could have imagined 
that the vilest of hate could emanate from Germany—the cultural heart of civilization, where the 
Jews have contributed much.  He expressed confidence that Hitlerism would not survive the year, 
that Judaism would overcome the ―brown shirts‖ as it had overcome other terrors in the past.  He 
invited not only the Jews but the entire Christian population to a moral boycott of German 
products.
121
 
For many of the agents always present at such meetings, here was a case where Jews 
were clearly acting in a manner that set them apart from the general direction of the state: they 
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were protesting against the foreign policy direction of the Romanian government.  Clearly, this 
was against the national interests as far as they were concerned—an obvious display of 
foreignness.  What was also very worrying for the agents was the apparent effectiveness of the 
boycotts—urban economies ground to a halt in Bessarabia, so much so as to make recent census 
results seem questionable given their underestimating the Jewish population.  Boycotts seemed 
to be going up all over—Bessarabian Jews talked of the better organization already underway in 
Bukovina, for example.
122
  Siguranţa agents in the field sent flurries of disconcerted letters back 
and forth to their headquarters in the spring of 1933, the first months of relations between 
Bucharest and Hitler‘s Germany.  
The broad public outcry against the German economy must be understood against a 
background of growing concern among Bessarabian Jews for rising Nazi activism and local anti-
Semitic extremism at home.  Press reports of hooligan violence against Jews in the Russian and 
Yiddish papers consistently appeared, as in February 1931 when several Jewish merchants were 
found murdered on the road from Călăraşi to Chişinău.123  By March 1933 these reports reached 
a level that began to concern Siguranţa agents.  Noting the Bessarabian popular mood, a 
Chişinău Gendarmes Lieutenant Colonel reported that Jews were very upset about the situation 
in Germany, and warned that rumors were spreading around town that a Chişinău rabbi was 
murdered by Cuzists and then hacked into 180 pieces.  Not surprisingly, Jews were reacting with 
extreme shock and anger, so strong that he was concerned by it.
124
  By April the JNP made 
boycotting German goods an official platform: defending Jewish national identity and public 
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safety became a central party issue.
125
  By early May, Jews in Chişinău began to organize funds 
for arming themselves against extremists, particularly LANC and Iron Guard but also the 
Hitlerites, Bessarabian Germans newly indoctrinated into Nazi anti-Semitic ideology.
126
  
Violence was sporadic in Chişinău throughout the summer of 1933, as Zionist youth exchanged 
blows with members of LANC and the Iron Guard.
127
 
Activism against Germany continued steadily.  On June 13, a notable rally organized by 
leading Jewish women of Chişinău took place.  Prominent Bessarabian Jews like Michael 
Landau and Elena Babich, a vocal feminist leader, spoke in praise of efforts to boycott German 
products.
128
  Throughout these months, organization of the boycott committee became better and 
its reach through the community increased.  By November, when the committee called for a 
public rally and the closing of all Jewish stores in Chişinău, it was able to rely on several Zionist 
groups, including Maccabbee, Brit-Trumpeldor and Hacoah, to go door to door to enforce store 
closings.
129
  By the early fall there were daily rallies in support of boycotting Germany, and even 
Rabbi Tsirelson, despite his previous admonitions for Jews to remain politically quiet, voiced 
ardent support for the boycott and the committee‘s criticism of Nazi Germany and, implicitly, 
Romania‘s growing ties with it.130    
Enthusiasm for Jewish national solidarity spilled over into relations with other residents, 
not only the authorities.  On April 23, Bălţi police reported that when a German movie was 
noticed playing in a theater by local Jew, he demanded that it be stopped.  When the movie house 
owners refused, some 500 Jews soon entered the theater in protest and interrupted the showing.  
                                                 
125
 ANRM f. 680, op. 1, d. 3406, l. 405. 
126
 ANRM f. 680, op. 1, d. 3406, l. 410. 
127
 ANRM, f. 680, op. 1, d. 3406, l. 530. 
128
 Bessarabskaia pochta, #3846, June 13, 1933. 
129
 Bessarabskoe slovo, #3190, November 7, 1933. 
130
 ANRM f. 680, op. 1, d. 3406, l. 400, 570. 
204 
 
A fight ensued among some of them and members of the audience.  A similar event took place 
again in May.
131
  On October 27, a fight ensued between Jewish and Christian pupils at a French 
Lyceum after reports in the Russian language press circulated that there was ―Hitlerism‖ at the 
school.
132
  The owners of the cinema ―Orpheum‖ were asked by the Jewish boycott committee 
not to show German movies; when they showed in early October the film ―One Song for You,‖ a 
group of Jews walked into the movie house and tried to stop the film.  Another film shown later 
at the Orpheum called ―Bombs in Shanghai‖ (Figure 7 below) was also boycotted and publicly 
declared a provocation of the Jewish people by the boycott committee.   
 
Figure 7: Poster placed on buildings in Chişinău, October 1930, reads: ―The Cinema ‗Orpheum‘ helps Hitler!‖ 
From ANRM f. 680, op. 1, d. 3406, l. 571. 
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By autumn the Orpheum had become the symbolic epicenter of pro-Nazi support in Chişinău for 
the boycott committee, and the theater was aggressively pinpointed by organized protest.
133
   
The Bessarabian anti-Hitler campaign was effective: by October it had earned significant 
attention, so much so that Interior Minister Armand Calinescu demanded information about the 
―Jewish disturbances.‖134  The explanation provided by the Siguranţa for the increased activity 
was focused on Jewish communism: some of the Siguranţa agents‘ reports noted communism 
was the inspiration for many of the Jews; one report to the Interior Ministry claimed that some 
40% of the Jewish protestors were communists (!)
135
 This was very disconcerting for the 
Siguranţa, whose agents followed such reports until becoming convinced that the Jewish self-
arming was not dangerous.
136
  In August 1933 a city-wide commotion erupted involving the 
Jewish community.  Much of the Chişinău Christian population became very agitated because of 
occasional attacks against them by Jews who believed that they were providing housing for 
members of the Iron Guard that had in recent weeks been attacking Jews on the street.  On the 
nights of August 5, 6, 8, and 14, Jewish mobs attacked and beat several Christians.
137
   
In addition to daily reports of violence, usually anti-Jewish but sometimes eruptions of 
Jewish anger, the tension over Nazi Germany began to include new concerns toward the end of 
the year.  In parts of the province populated by a significant ethnic German minority, such as the 
south and southeast, Jews began to feel the rapid growth of Nazi antisemitism as the reach of 
Nazi propaganda, either through Germans returning from indoctrination trips to Germany or 
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through local Nazi organs that were permitted by the Romanian government, began to be felt.  In 
May 1934, Cetatea Alba (Akkerman) communal president M. Elman pleaded for help from the 
local authorities to protect Jews from the Hitlerites, stating that if they spread their hatred to the 
ethnic Russians the Jews would be enveloped in pogroms.
138
  By the next year and even more 
into 1935, circumstances for rural Jews particularly in such areas became dire.  In October 1935 
delegates from Arţiz arrived in Chişinău to meet with Rabbi Tsirelson and community president 
Steinberg and reported on events in their town.  A place where Jews and Germans had lived 
amicably for generations turned almost overnight into an orgy of violence against Jews.  The 
Germans had become livid with Nazi propaganda: they boycotted all Jewish businesses and were 
organizing a campaign to run the Jews out of town.  Worse still, Cuzists had also set up shop in 
the town and were making rapid progress in turning the non-Germans into anti-Semites.  The 
lack of police presence in rural areas, together with dire economic circumstances that was 
causing famine throughout the southeast, made the Jews extremely vulnerable—the very 
condition that had prevented Jews in the area from participating in the Tatar Bunar revolt in 
1924.  Arţiz representatives pleaded with Bessarabian Jewish leaders to petition the Romanian 
government for assistance.
139
  At a Lapuşna county (Chişinău) meeting of the National Liberal 
Party, Jewish deputies bombarded Minister of Interior Ion Inculeţ with complaints about 
antisemitism.  Steinberg used his minutes at the podium to address the same problem in an 
emotional speech that displayed a clear understanding of the Jewish predicament in the country:  
Every day I am told of the plight of Jews in the small towns and villages, where anti-Semitic agitation 
moves toward hysteria.  There is an entirely new understanding of the concept of citizen among the 
population—that it means someone of pure Romanian blood.  This is a completely voluntary concept being 
brought forth against the very meaning of the constitution.
140
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Reports in the press by 1935 contributed daily to an overall sense of Jewish besiegement.  
The situation of rural Jews in Akkerman county (Bessarabian south), including the capital town 
of Cetatea Alba, where Jews lived in constant fear for their lives, maintained their place among 
the daily headlines in the liberal Russian press.  The atmosphere was bordering on rapid descent 
into pogroms—Cuzists and Nazis controlled city streets and beat up Jews unfortunate enough to 
pass by.  Constant Nazi meetings took place with participants in full Nazi regalia and put up Jew-
hating placards all over town.  In the center Cetatea Alba a chapter of the anti-Semitic Romanian 
party ―Frontul Romanesc‖ opened operations.  Despite the presence of censorship laws that 
forbade circulating literature that threatened to disturb the peace, Romanian police did nothing to 
stop virulent anti-Semitic publications in Romanian, German, and Russian from spreading hand 
to hand and through the local press.  Delegate Brodsky from Cetatea Alba related to co-
religionists in Chişinău in November 1935 how propaganda was spread: since the Nazi Party 
remained officially illegal in Romania, Nazis organized under the cover of the Cuzist 
organization.  Literature inciting Germans to commit pogroms spread in mass quantities, 
although it was illegal.  Brodsky laid out the collapse of German-Jewish relations: young 
Germans went to Germany where they were indoctrinated in Nazi propaganda.  They came back 
spewing hatred for Jews and focused on converting fellow Germans.  Besides boycotts, there 
were methodical attacks on Jewish homes, and Jews were fleeing to the cities where they joined 
the impoverished.
141
  During the Jewish high holidays in 1935, posters had gone up around town: 
―Rabbi Katz has sucked the blood of your Christian child in order to bake his matzo.‖142  Not all 
such reports from the south were completely accurate, but they elicited a reaction from the 
Jewish public nonetheless, pushing collective psychology closer to panic in the capital.  This was 
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more so because while such violence was worst in 1935 in the majority-German areas, it was not 
limited to them.  Incidence of violence were on the rise all over the province, with many 
Moldovans, typically young men unable to find satisfactory work in an era of depression, joining 
the Iron Guard that blamed Jews for all Romanian problems.  Not surprisingly, Jewish refugees 
that were unable to get out of the country began to trickle into Chişinău, joining the tens of 
thousands already there.  
New Legislation: Jewish Unity in Marginalization 
Real physical violence, even as it increased dramatically by the mid-1930s, was not the 
only form of anti-Semitic violence, however.  Legislative violence was implemented during the 
second half of the decade through new rounds of laws that over time undermined completely any 
claim to rights and legal protection for Jews, including citizenship for many, thus destroying both 
their protection under the law and any opportunity for a reasonable livelihood.  Jewish political 
isolation and social marginalization was so complete by 1939 that no pressure by the Jewish 
community, Romanian or international, had any real impact.  After a stronger electoral showing 
in 1932 than the year before, temporarily feeding hopes for Jewish autonomy and motivating 
Jewish political activism, in the December 1933 elections to Parliament the Jewish National 
Party received only 1.29% of the vote. While many Jews, especially in the new territories, failed 
to show up at the ballot box for their own reasons (like lack of faith in democracy), many were 
turned away by brutal and effective electoral terror tactics by right-wing youth groups even 
though the police did attempt to keep order.  In Chişinău, 55-year old Nuta Bernshtein had his 
ballot card torn from his hands by Cuzist youths, for example, who called upon him to ―direct 
himself toward Palestine.‖143  Thus failing to pass the minimum 2% threshold for parliamentary 
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parties, the JNP lost all its seats in Parliament.  At the same time, the URJ failed to find any 
national Romanian party willing to share an electoral ticket with it and thus lost all its seats as 
well.  After 1933, unless they held places on other party lists, the only Jew free to pursue Jewish 
interests who held a seat in the Romanian Parliament was Romanian Chief Rabbi Jacob 
Niemerower, in his capacity as head of the Jewish cult.
144
   
With the swing of national culture to the political right, no longer limited to popular 
attitudes or discrimination by local police, the national government increasingly overturned the 
rights it had granted the Jews, however flawed, in the 1923 Constitution.  As early as 1934, a 
new employment regulation, ―The Law of Using Romanian Personnel at Enterprises,‖ was 
passed in order to ensure ethnic Romanian economic gains by requiring that at least 50% of all 
management personnel and 80% of all workers at all public and private enterprises must be 
ethnic Romanians, which was the first such discriminatory law passed at the national level in 
post-1918 Europe, preceding the Nuremberg Laws.
145
  Beginning in 1935, state inspectors went 
around to individual businesses to check on not only observance of this law, but the legal status 
of workers employed.
146
  The law clearly stipulated that workers beyond this quota would be 
considered ―foreign,‖ irrespective of their citizenship.  Not surprisingly, this move of the 
Romanian government received vehement criticism from international Jewry, most especially 
from the French Alliance Israélite Universelle, but it was largely not backed up by the French 
government which was more concerned with the potential of the minorities treaties to weaken its 
East European allies, including Romania.
147
  The most visible impact, in fact, was a popular 
reaction in parts of Romania against Jews and against France, such as a pogrom in the town of 
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Constantine where pogromists shouted ―down with Jews‖ and ―down with France.‖148  In the 
small artisan, trade and craft shops of Jewish Bessarabia, this law was devastating, even if it 
often proved nearly impossible to enforce.  By 1939 the unemployment rate among Bessarabian 
Jews was over 50%.
149
  The Great Depression hit Romania hard, and consecutive governments 
sought to increase ethnic Romanian employment at the expense of minorities who were 
progressively more isolated from political power, which was most true for the Jews.  
Government guilt at its inability to improve the economic malaise could be diverted by 
scapegoating Jews.  
By the end of 1935, new regulations had been passed limiting, for example, the ability of 
workers who failed to pass a Romanian language exam to draw a pension.
150
  Other examples of 
Romanianization included the successful exclusion of Jewish attorneys from the Romanian bar; 
at the same time attending a Romanian university was becoming increasingly difficult for many 
Jews, making study abroad (particularly Italy) a more reasonable option.
151
  Taken as a whole, 
there were never sufficient personnel at the state‘s disposal to fully implement employment laws 
across the entire country, and many undocumented Jews in Bessarabia and elsewhere continued 
to work in secret.
152
  Nevertheless, many Jews were affected by such regulations, often with 
disastrous circumstances, serving to further anger and appall Jewish public opinion.
153
  In 
February 1935, for example, the Chişinău municipal government fired 43 workers without 
citizenship.  These were all experienced specialists; some were in fact doctors who could not be 
replaced by any others at the time.  Many had lived in Bessarabia all their lives and had no other 
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means of providing a living for their families.  The fact that it was the middle of winter made the 
decision seem particularly harsh, but there was little effect from Jewish public opinion.  Politics 
swung sufficiently to the nationalist right that any party seen as catering to or even being 
concerned with Jewish opinion would be punished in the court of national politics: by the late 
1930s, Jews had become a liability in political terms.   
Thus, it had become readily apparent by 1935 that little aid or increased attention to 
Jewish concerns could be expected from the central or local governments, and Bessarabian Jews 
increasingly set differences aside out of necessity in order to attempt to prevent circumstances 
from deteriorating further.  On November 5, 1935, 92 Jewish representatives from 40 towns 
across the province met in the Chişinău Choral Synagogue and drew up a charter for a 
centralized Jewish communal structure for all of Bessarabia, something like a de facto separate 
Jewish government.  Against an air heavy with despair, Chişinău communal president Carol 
Steinberg mirrored common sentiment that the meeting was taking place not out of hope for the 
future but out of fear for the present: ―to try to let out a cry of protest so loud that politicians in 
Bucharest would hear it, for Bessarabian Jews had lost faith in the observance of Romanian 
laws.‖154  He opened the session with an outline of the goals of such a structure.  The congress 
would be called every three years, when it would be attended by secular and religious leaders (a 
rabbinical representative for every 1000 members of a community).
155
  Detailed rules were set 
down for electing an executive committee that would sit for three years, that is, in between each 
meeting of the congress of Bessarabian Jewry.  This committee would be heavily weighted 
toward Chişinău, which would have 8 representatives of 16, the other half to come from the rest 
of Bessarabia.  The 17
th
 member of the committee would be Rabbi Tsirelson.  The goals of the 
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organization included to protect the interests of all Jews in accordance with national 
jurisprudence, and to support Jewish institutions and schools.
156
 The congress was mostly used in 
the immediate to express despair, with the greatest attention paid to the rise of Nazism among 
Germans in the Bessarabian south.  As it turned out, the congress met only once again and had 
little influence on broader political and economic problems.    
Unification of Jewish institutions and politicians was also taking place on the national 
level, not just in Bessarabia.  A shift in the fundamental focus of national Jewish leaders had in 
fact occurred in 1934 after the ugly exclusion and crushing of Jewish political interests in the 
1933 election: they would no longer fight primarily for recognition of Jewish national rights and 
autonomy as previously, but rather now focus entirely on battling antisemitism directly together 
with working toward Jewish emigration from the country.  In 1935 friction between the 
government and Jewish leaders in Bucharest led to the formation of the Federation of Jewish 
Communities, under the leadership of Wilhelm Filderman.  This was not yet a unifying 
organization of the various Jewish communities but rather replaced the Union of Romanian Jews 
as the main Jewish lobbying arm in Bucharest, because the URJ had grown ineffectual—
Romanian politicians knew that it could not speak for all of Romanian Jewry.
157
   
By 1936 this hardly mattered because of the level of Jewish political marginalization in 
the country, but that year the Jewish National Party and Union of Romanian Jews, both largely 
isolated and powerless, finally set aside their differences and united into a central structure, the 
Central Council of Romanian Jews, on January 29, 1936.  It consisted of three leading members: 
the chief Rabbi of Romania (Niemirover until his death and then Alexander Şafran during 
WWII); the leader of the Union of Romanian Jews Wilhelm Filderman; and the leader of the 
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Jewish National Party Theodor Fischer from Bukovina.
158
  The leaders of the new organization 
pursued two strategies.  First, they attempted to end Jewish division and collect Jewish political 
will toward winning more seats in Parliament.  This failed in the last Romanian elections of 
December 1937:  the more unified Jewish Party was shut out from the halls of power as in 1933, 
this time receiving 1.42% of the vote.
159
  By way of comparison, the virulently anti-Semitic and 
racist Iron Guard political party ―Totul pentru Ţara‖ received 17% of the vote, becoming the 
third most powerful political formation in the country.  Shock and despair on the Bessarabian 
Jewish street spread quickly in reaction to members of both the National Liberals and the 
National Peasants signing a treaty of ―non-aggression‖ with Codreanu.160   
The second objective of the Central Committee involved bypassing the Romanian 
government and the national parties and attempting to appeal directly to the Romanian people 
largely through the press.  Appeals such as the following appeared in Romanian language Jewish 
press (because mainstream papers wouldn‘t carry them) on numerous occasions: 
Romanian fellow citizens, we are living together on Romanian land, and there were never between us 
differences of interests or aspirations or ideals or needs; in times of peace we enjoyed together the success 
of our work, and during war we lost together blood on the battlefields.  For several years we are the aim of 
a campaign of hate spread all over the country and across different classes of the nation.  We are considered 
to be foreigners and held responsible for all the ills plaguing the country.  We are not foreigners, we belong 
to this country, we are not hazardous and are not responsible for the bad things in the country.  We did not 
govern it and did not administer it. Like you we suffered from the defections of the laws because of 
incapable governments, like you we benefitted from good laws, from intelligent rulers and honest 
administrators…Fellow Romanian citizens, we appeal to your consciousness in these difficult moments 
when we are more than ever ignored.
161
 
Obviously, the attempt was desperate and bore no fruit: few Romanians read the Jewish press 
while comparatively (and increasingly) many more trusted Romanian leaders to interpret for 
them who the Jews were and what they were doing.  In fact, there was little that could be done by 
this point.  Raphael Vago has argued that the formation of this organization came too late to be a 
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sufficiently powerful force for change that could prepare Romania‘s Jews for the Holocaust.162  
Carol Iancu argues that unity was incomplete and largely insignificant in the face of a strong 
native antisemitism combined with Nazi Germany‘s growing influence in Romania.   
In any case, isolation grew worse.  The new government resulting from the 1937 
elections was a frightening prospect for Bessarabian Jews: it was led by nationally renowned 
poet and anti-Semite Octavian Goga (Figure 8 below), together with the father of the Cuzist 
movement, Alexandru C. Cuza.  Both men, particularly the latter, were well known as enemies 
of the Jews.  Even before his appointment was officially announced by King Carol on New 
Year‘s Day 1938, Prime Minister Goga gave an interview to the British Evening Standard in  
 
Figure 8: A younger Octavian Goga as Minister of Interior in the mid-1920s, from Calendarul Bessarabiei, 
1927. 
which he explained: ―Jews have control of the rail and oil industries and the mines in their hands.  
Under the principle of ‗Romania for Romanians,‘ we will replace the Jews with Romanians.  The 
change will take place peacefully, so that new life can be given to our people.‖163  ―Romania for 
Romanians‖ was a central policy direction of the Goga-Cuza government.  One of the 
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government‘s first acts was to ―nationalize‖ or ―purge‖ the press, closing down newspapers 
edited by Jews, including many of the remaining democratically-oriented papers in Romanian 
like Bucharest papers Adeverul and Lupta (which in most cases still employed some Jews), and 
many other papers in Hungarian, Yiddish and Hebrew throughout the country.
164
   
Other purging campaigns began in earnest.  Jewish journalists, lawyers, doctors in state 
service, and civil servants were increasingly forced from their jobs to make room for ethnic 
Romanians.
165
  As in Germany, Jews were forbidden from hiring Christian servants.
166
  The 
Yiddish and Russian press in Bessarabia closely reported on such developments, deeply 
increasing the collective insecurity of the Jewish public.  Ironically but understandably, the more 
anti-Jewish legislation emanated from the national government the more Bessarabian Jews paid 
attention to national events and news, something that they had tended to do much less during the 
early years of their incorporation into Greater Romania.   Most disturbing were reports on 
government plans to revisit the issue of Jewish citizenship,
167
 which proved to be true.  The 
decree law ―Revision of Jewish Romanian Citizenship‖ was passed January 21, 1938.  The stated 
goal of the law was to re-evaluate, in accordance with the Constitution of 1923 and the Mârzescu 
Law of 1924, Jewish claims to citizenship, particularly in the new territories, using a later date 
(November 11, 1918) as a requirement for establishing proven, continued residence.  The process 
of re-evaluation caused consistent panic because it involved local administrators receiving from 
the Ministry of Justice and/or Internal Affairs lists of local Jews whose claim to citizenship was 
under question.
168
  Those who were able to prove their claim would be left alone while those 
who could not would lose their status as Romanian nationals; but this was only in theory.  In 
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reality, problems of administrative corruption made circumstances unbearable particularly in 
Bessarabia, especially since the rumor-mill concerning the direction of national culture (Romania 
for Romanians) left little doubt that the goal of the policy was to remove Jews from the 
Romanian social body—a purification measure.  Once again Romanian Jewish leaders attempted 
to launch protests internationally, especially in Paris, but once again they proved counter-
productive: in response to questions that the League of Nations would step in to protect the Jews, 
joint Prime Minister Alexandru C. Cuza replied that he considered the League like ―a dead 
person not yet buried.‖169  The West was not going to save the Jews from Romanianization.         
The Goga-Cuza government was in power for less than two months, however, becoming 
very quickly unpopular for poor handling of economic issues.  It was dissolved on February 10, 
1938 by King Carol in favor of his own royal dictatorship—however flawed, democracy was 
officially over in Greater Romania. Carol‘s royal dictatorship set out to increase central control 
at the expense of regional autonomy (new administrative reorganization of the country into ten 
regions and establishment of military control where civilian rule had existed) and to establish 
usable myths of legitimacy designed to win favor for his dictatorship with the populace.  Not 
surprisingly, these myths focused on themes that that resonated with the public and had served 
former governments: family, church, work, and an organic national community (now with the 
king fully at its helm).
170
  The nation, people were taught, was an organic rather than a civic or 
even a historic entity bound by ―blood community‖ and serving the interests of the ―dominant 
nation.‖171  King Carol continued the Romania for Romanians policy of the previous regime, 
closing down on February 5, for example, the last remaining Russian-language dailies in 
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Bessarabia.
172
  Carol was an astute political player who understood the mood in the country: 
before taking over power he gave an interview for the British Daily Herald in which he 
explained that the Romanian state cannot stand idle as foreign Jews ―flood into our villages.‖173  
The descent into social isolation and political marginalization for Jews in Romanian society 
during the latter half of the 1930s served to confirm that Jewish political activism in the interwar 
years, as Ezra Mendelssohn has aptly called it, remained a ―dilemma of the powerless.‖174  The 
idea of Romania for Romanians remained powerful throughout the political turmoil of the next 
years leading to war: the Romanian extermination of the Jews in Bessarabia undertaken by the 
regime of Marshal Antonescu beginning in 1941 was aimed at making Bessarabia into a model 
province of pure Romanian blood.
175
  Cleansed of foreign elements, Bessarabia (and Bukovina) 
would stand as an example for the rest of the country to follow.  Fortunately at least for the Jews 
of the Old Kingdom, the plan never got beyond the new territories under Romanian control.  For 
the Jews of Bessarabia, Bukovina, and Transnistria, however, Antonescu‘s efforts to create racial 
purity was the greatest of tragedies.  
 
Conclusion 
Jewish national sentiment strengthened as a result of anti-Semitic Romanian state policies 
over the course of the interwar years, particularly after the passage of the Mârzescu Law in 1924 
which made Jewish nativization procedures toward citizenship and the rights derived therein 
contingent on individual petition and thus in violation of the minorities rights treaties that 
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Romania had signed in St. Germaine and Trianon.  Very inexperienced collectively in terms of 
modern democratic politics, Bessarabian Jews over the course of the 1920s learned to express 
their will through political organization.  Their political expressions were focused in the realm of 
communal reform, particularly on the well-publicized divisions over modernization and 
democratization of the kehillot, or communal governments, as exemplified well by the battles at 
the Chişinău kehilla.  These calls for modernization and reform triumphed do a large extent: 
reforming voices, led by Zionists, successfully challenged the control of traditional politics at the 
communal level all over Bessarabia.  This was due in part to the interagency and obstinacy of the 
traditional religious leaders, but also very influential were national political and economic 
realities. 
Specifically, divisions occurred not only within communal organizations but also 
between the leaders of the Jewries from the newly acquired territories, such as Bessarabia, and 
the leadership of the Old Kingdom Jews in Bucharest.  Their differences, in many ways 
representative of the differences between the ―Western Jews‖ and the ostjuden, clearly differed 
on the question of kehilot reform in the debate concerning the legal status of Jewish 
communities. Assimilated Bucharest Jews were generally unconcerned with gaining legal status 
for the kehilot, which they saw as transitional and detrimental to broader Jewish acceptance in a 
modern state that they hoped Romania would become (and Romanian Jews would be a part of).  
Jewish leaders in the new territories, particularly in Bessarabia, saw the kehilot as protectors and 
preservers of Jewish culture, religion, and identity, and insisted on recognition of Jewish 
minority rights (not just individual Jewish civil rights) in effort to protect their autonomy. This 
difference was most visible in conflict over the Law of Cults, promulgated in 1928.  After this, 
given the greater political freedoms in the country at the end of the decade, political expression 
219 
 
in the new territories broke with the hitherto de facto Jewish leaders, the URJ, in Bucharest and 
moved in a nationalist direction, forming the Jewish National Party, the JNP.  In breaking from 
the more-integrationist leaning Bucharest Jewry, Bessarabian Jews were able to preserve and 
democratize their kehilot.   
Broader national politics undermined Bessarabian Jewish attempts at autonomy and 
political rights in the 1930s, however.  Here, the year 1933 was a turning point, because dialogue 
between Jewish leaders all over the country of all persuasions were soured by the direction of 
Romanian foreign and especially economic policy generally in favor of Nazi Germany, and by 
the harsh and undemocratic defeat of all Jewish political interests during the 1933 parliamentary 
elections.  Jewish political isolation and the steady rise of the extreme right that gained 
popularity because of the drastic problems facing the country, fueled not only fear and despair 
among Bessarabian Jewish adults, but also Zionist enthusiasm among the Jewish youth.  Before 
Jews eventually found common ground in marginalization by the late 1930s, divisions on all 
questions of Jewish life remained strong.  All generations shared, however, a general turning 
toward internal Jewish matters as the hopes for productive political dialogue with Romanian 
society plummeted.     
Yet, while the interwar history of Jews in Romania has been written through the trope of 
tragedy by looking from the Holocaust backward, we should remember that interwar Jewish 
policies were at one time hugely positive and infused with cultural creativity for securing an 
acceptable solution to the Jewish Question.
176
  This experience differed markedly from that of 
their co-religionists across the Dniester River in what became after 1924 the Moldovan 
Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, or MASSR.  Precisely because Jews were very 
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effectively co-opted into the state ideology and given tremendous opportunity to develop, 
implement, and even shape Soviet policies, it is not possible to speak of Jewish political isolation 
in Soviet society—at least not until the late 1940s.  Yet, there was a tremendous price to pay for 
inclusion, and just as in the Romanian case, certain aspects of regime ideology—its leaders‘ 
understanding of modernity—were non-negotiable.       
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Chapter 4 
Jews in Transnistria: Against the Grain 
 
Life for Jews in Transnistria across the Dniester River took on a drastically different turn 
from their co-religionists in Bessarabia following the imposition of Soviet power after 1918.  
Soviet ideology and regime goals created space for thousands of Jews to actively enter Soviet 
life and participate in building socialism.  Yet, Soviet policies toward the Jews, as well as toward 
other minority groups, were hardly consistent throughout the interwar years.  In the two areas 
that embodied the main thrust of Soviet efforts at cultural and social transformation of Jews from 
the former Pale of Settlement, agricultural resettlement and socialist education in Yiddish, 
significant policy changes over the course of the interwar years resulted in spotty and 
unsatisfactory results that in the end were completely overshadowed by voluntary assimilation 
into urban life and mass Russian-speaking Soviet culture.  This chapter examines in depth these 
policies and their impact on Jews in the MASSR.  In truth, these changes were already occurring 
quite rapidly in the years before the revolution, but they notably picked up pace with the brutal 
economic displacement affecting so many people, including Jews, caused by Soviet cultural and 
economic policies.   
The Soviet-Jewish experience was markedly different from the nationalist regimes of 
Eastern Europe in that divisions existing and widening among Jews since the outset of the 
growth of modern, Western liberalism were successfully exploited—the path to power and the 
opportunity to modernize their co-religionists proved enticing to many while the ability to join an 
officially atheist mainstream society to avoid discrimination proved liberating for many others.  
Unlike in Bessarabia, where Jews were more clearly on the receiving end of discrimination by 
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the state, in Transnistria Jews were victims of discrimination and representatives of the 
discriminating state.  If Jews in Bessarabia needed a decade to adjust to their new ruling regime, 
at least they were very familiar with the terms of its discrimination, which seemed in most 
tangible ways, certainly from an everyday perspective, to continue the anti-Semitic legacy of the 
Russian imperial government.  In the interwar Soviet Union, however, things were radically 
different from the vantage point of common people: they were no longer a problem because they 
were Jews, but only if they were worshiping Jews, and worship was something they could stop 
doing.  The Jewish institutions of the 1920s were ―intentionally transitional,‖ that is designed to 
bring Jews up to speed with Soviet culture so that they could then take part in it directly, without 
the need for Yiddish-language schools or the Evsektsiia (the Jewish sections of the communist 
party) as a crutch.
1
  Especially by the 1930s when Jewish institutions were discontinued, 
Transnistrian Jewry was headed in a vastly different direction than Bessarabian Jews.   
The solidification of Soviet power in Transnistria was by no means established through 
repression alone.  The appeal of the Soviet vision of modernity was inculcated through 
progressive policies of social engineering.  The interwar years were the heyday of policies 
designed to improve the collective body of society—and the terms of this improvement, as many 
scholars have shown, were increasingly racial in their understanding.
2
  Soviet planners also 
believed in racial differences, but they believed that these differences could be overcome through 
socialist ideology that could liberate and bring up backward peoples.
3
  Perhaps no clearer 
                                                 
1
 Anna Shternshis, Soviet and Kosher: Jewish Popular Culture in the Soviet Union, 1923-1939 (Bloomington, 
2006), introduction, xvi.  The intentionality of Evsektsiia activists varied, many were committed to Jewish goals 
within the Soviet Union; others understood that they were expediting complete Jewish assimilation.  On the broader 
Soviet level also, there remains debate over the real concern for minority issues versus the use of those categories by 
the communist leaders to facilitate their breakdown and the state‘s control over them.  In the MASSR, many Jewish 
communists desired modernization and transformation of the Jewish street, but not its complete disappearance.  
2
 Marius Turda, ―The Nation as Object: Race, Blood, and Biopolitics in Interwar Romania,‖ Slavic Review 66, no. 
3(Fall 2007), 413. 
3
 See Yuri Slezkine, Arctic Mirrors: Russia and the Small Peoples of the North (Ithaca & London, 1994).  
223 
 
example of the difference between the nationalistic regimes of interwar Eastern Europe and the 
Soviet Union exists than that of the inclusion versus exclusion of the national minorities 
(especially Jews) in state-sponsored modernizing policies, often precisely because in states such 
as Romania Jews were placed outside the racially-imagined nation, which was based on 
Romanian intellectuals‘ construction of blood and racial ties as the basis for that nation.4  Quite 
simply, in Romanian Bessarabia Jews were excluded from policy decisions concerning them, 
while in Soviet Transnistria they were at least involved in the process.   
Across revolutionary Russia Jewish communists engaged in heated debates with Jews of 
various other political persuasions and cultural beliefs for the hearts and minds of ―their masses‖ 
precisely because they believed that Soviet bureaucracy and ideology could solve, finally, the 
Jewish Question, i.e. create a society in which Jews would be accepted as equals, free from 
discrimination.  Such views were of course the core of the Haskalah and later Jewish 
participation in the Russian revolutionary movement, but there was no significant historical 
precedent in gravitating toward Bolshevism specifically as savior: the pre-revolutionary 
Komfarbund (Jewish Communist Party) was profoundly weak with very little support among 
Russia‘s Jews before the revolution, even though the radical left taken more broadly was of 
course attractive to Jews.  Yet in the years immediately after the Bolshevik seizure of power it 
became, with the support of the Communist Party, the most powerful Jewish force for pro-
regime change of traditional Jewish life.   
The Komfarbund was incorporated into the Communist Party and organized politically as 
the Evsektsiia.  As David Shneer points out, the policies pursued by the state and party to create a 
Soviet-Jewish culture were complex, multivalent, and sometimes conflicting—one cannot focus 
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simply on the Evsektsiia as the mover of state ideology.
5
  Nevertheless, it was the Evsektsiia 
members that were often seen as implementing state policies that undermined Jewish culture, and 
as doing so quite enthusiastically; it was a popularly held belief within Jewish society that the 
Evsektsiia members were ―more communist than the Communists.‖6  The aggressive anti-
traditionalism of pro-Soviet Jews resulted from a profound frustration among the secular, 
progressive Jewish youth with little economic opportunity at home, where religious Jewish 
culture and traditional rabbinic authority still dominated.  This generation wanted out of the 
ghetto and grew increasingly frustrated with their traditional co-religionists who seemed to them 
ever more backward.  This backwardness of tradition only grew the more they internalized the 
universalist radicalism of the Russian revolutionary left: their relationship to their own Judaism 
became characterized by self-hatred.  The attack on Jewish tradition cannot be understood 
otherwise, including in the MASSR.  According to Sander L. Gilman, self-hatred arises when a 
peripheral group, be it social, religious, and/or ethnic, attempts to find acceptance from a 
dominant one, but is rebuked at least on some level.  In making the rebuke, the dominant group 
focuses on the points of difference between itself and the peripheral group vying for acceptance 
in order to maintain that group‘s status as an ―Other.‖  In attempting to win acceptance, some 
members of the peripheral group inevitably come to identify with the dominant group and begin 
to vilify and criticize those aspects of their own group that they see as the source of difference, as 
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the reason for their group‘s being labeled as Other.  As Gilman succinctly argues, this project is 
inherently flawed: 
Thus outsiders hear an answer from their fantasy: become like us—abandon your difference—and you may 
be one with us.  On the other hand is the hidden qualification of the internalized reference group, the 
conservative curse: The more you are like me, the more I know the true value of my power, which you 
wish to share, and the more I am aware that you are but a shoddy counterfeit, an outsider.
7
 
 
In revolutionary Russia, Bolsheviks sought to establish a vision of modern order that left 
room for transcending ethnic and national difference through socialism: Jews were encouraged to 
join and rebuke their co-religionists that refused to join with them.  The non-joiners in 
Transnistria responded to modern state construction and its sweeping transformative power with 
complex combinations of resistance and accommodation that were taking place in Bessarabia 
and other parts of Eastern and Central Europe.  In fact, the collective responses in Transnistria 
and Bessarabia, given the amount of cross-border contact between the Jews, could not be entirely 
separated from each other in the interwar years.  Nevertheless, the direction of Jewish life in 
Soviet territory underwent tremendous change different from that of interwar Eastern and Central 
Europe under the new nationalist regimes created in 1919 in Paris.  The growing influence of 
Soviet communism in local Jewish affairs and circumstances in Transnistria, particularly after 
the end of imperial affirmative action policies by the 1930s,
8
 made the maintenance of any type 
of communal contact across the Dniester border increasingly difficult: despite continued border 
crossings, one community was slowly pulled apart into two.  Even more importantly, the 
presence of an inclusive, modernizing state provided opportunities for some Jews while leaving 
out others.  Jewish divisions grew severe, more serious than in Bessarabia, and served to assist 
the Soviet state in undermining traditional Jewish society.  
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Dniester Jews‘ fate throughout the interwar years was determined not only by the success 
of Communist Party polices, however, but also by their failure; the result of the MASSR‘s 
distance from the center of Soviet power and their proximity to a contested border.  Much of this 
chapter deals with the main policy directions of Soviet state toward incorporating Jews: 
agricultural re-settlement and socialist re-education in Yiddish.  But these policies had limited 
success.  The failure of state policies, or rather the limits of authoritarianism, left options 
available to Dniester Jews—fight to preserve tradition despite the potential bureaucratic wrath of 
the state; flee across the border into Romania; or move to a large city and get a job.  
Transnistrian Jews were also enlisted in the cross-border propaganda initiative to get back 
Bessarabia, which left another small opportunity for some.  This chapter will examine the 
problems with the implementation of Soviet policies. 
Despite the obvious differences in state ideologies between the Soviet Union and 
Romania (or Poland, or Yugoslavia, for that matter), Transnistrian Jews reacted in many 
important ways similarly to their co-religionists across the ideological and political boundary.  
They attempted as much possible to maintain communal cohesion or at least Jewish links that 
included, for example, capitalist ventures and collective self-help efforts; and they continued to 
fight for Jewish cultural autonomy within the Soviet system.  Still, greater space for Jewish 
participation in Bolshevik culture led to widening rifts: many participated in the efforts of the 
Evsektsiia ―to create modern Jews,‖ that is, in accordance with communist ideology, to use 
Soviet state and party institutions to lead the traditional Jewish masses away from their petty 
capitalist economic past toward a muscular future as productive and physically strong workers 
and farmers.  The latter in particular was not unlike what Zionists were attempting to do across 
the Dniester. 
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Establishment of Soviet Order, or Propaganda across the Border 
As in much of the former Pale of Settlement, the end of the First World War did not bring 
about a cessation of violence on the left bank of the Dniester.  In the years that followed, civil 
war raged between Reds and Whites, and together with the harsh Bolshevik policy of War 
Communism made survival itself a tremendous struggle.  For Jews this struggle was typically 
much more difficult, for in addition to problems of law and order and sustenance faced by many, 
Jews were plagued with the additional violence of pogroms, which destroyed many communities 
across Transnistria.  The people of these regions, like many of those of the borderland regions 
between the Russian, German, and Austro-Hungarian historical spheres of influence, suffered 
from continuously shifting front lines as armies moved back and forth across the land and spelled 
disaster for locals.  In many cases, for Jews this was made worse when other locals sought to 
settle old scores and use the invading armies to remove Jewish competitors.
9
  Spontaneous 
violence in the countryside from roaming armed bands of anti-Bolshevik, Ukrainian nationalist 
gangs that terrorized and murdered Jewish villagers lasted well into the mid-1920s, by when tens 
of thousands of Jews fled into Romanian Bessarabia to escape the violence.  Despite the 
problems of mounting discrimination faced by Jews in Romania, during the chaotic post-war 
years Jews in Soviet-controlled Transnistria looked across the Dniester with longing for the 
relative peace that arrived with Romanian military occupation.  Many attempted to flee across 
the border, a fact that would remain a problem for both states because control of mobility was an 
essential aspect of their coercive power. 
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The violence not only undermined stability, but economic circumstances as well.  At the 
end of 1924, party officials described the MASSR Jewish population as ―desperately poor.‖10  
Nor would this change significantly: in 1930, villages with the highest concentrations of Jews 
also had the highest number of households that were classified as poor.
11
  The young Soviet 
government struggled to gain control over this borderland in the most basic administrative sense, 
there was little that could be done for Jewish pogrom victims.
12
  By 1924, the Soviet economy 
had improved significantly after the extreme conditions of War Communism.  The Party‘s 
ideological firmness toward less harmful unwanted classes such as the Jewish kustars (artisans) 
gave way to a more gradualist approach toward their assimilation into the proletariat championed 
by Nikolai Bukharin, who was at the apex of his influence within the party during the early-
middle 1920s.
13
  Yet on the ground in this region of peripheral Bolshevik power, insecurity 
among many in the Evsektsiia led to zealous enforcement of Soviet economic structures during 
these years as well.   
Among the greatest problems facing the Bolsheviks was the lack of trusted, competent 
and literate cadres to implement their policies.  Applications to join the party were indicative of 
the problem faced: on top of the front page of party applications used in Balta is a bold note ―if 
you cannot read or write, don‘t be shy: tell your party representative and he will fill out the form 
for you.‖ 14  After 1921, the transition from War Communism to NEP in a region where law and 
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order were far from the norm was difficult: the local administration was rife with abuse by 
opportunistic state and party officials far from the Bolshevik centers of power.  For example, a 
secret circular from Odessa Gubkom secretary M. Khataevich from November 6, 1923 expressed 
deep concern for the ongoing problem of communists abusing their positions for personal gain.  
This is described as the vilest abuse of the people, for which the accused were answerable to the 
party, as only through the strictest control of spending could the party hope to survive this very 
difficult position they found themselves in.  All party members in personal possession of horses, 
carts, or cars were immediately asked to give them up to the state and use them only when 
necessary for state business.  Party members were asked to remember the peasants and workers, 
who should not have to spend all their time working for bread because they would not have any 
time left for party work.  State money must be spent rebuilding damaged dwellings, not on 
equipping them with all sorts of luxuries.  The party must be made aware of all excesses, as must 
the non-party population at large, including the peasants:  ―We must watch out for the negative 
side of NEP,‖ Khataevich warned his fellow party members.15   
By early 1924, a much greater handle had been gained over the borderland than in 
previous years, although new challenges surfaced constantly.  The struggle to create an adequate 
supply of literate, dedicated cadres—something that was an issue for the state in general—
remained a particular problem in the MASSR after its founding in October 1924 as part of the 
Communist Party policy that began that year known as korenizatsiia, or nativization: the 
establishment of political and cultural institutions in the minority republics in their native 
                                                                                                                                                             
they were doing during the Denikin and Wrangel civil wars, were they repressed during the civil war, did they serve 
in the Tsarist Army, especially if he fought against the revolutionaries, and so forth.  Also general questions of 
health were asked, as well as languages known, and separately if he spoke Russian.  AOSPRM, f. 3, op. 1, d. 1, l. 3. 
15
 AOSPRM, f. 3, op. 1, d. 7, l. 2.  
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languages.
16
  Additionally, local party members were concerned about the reach of the party‘s 
message to the region‘s majority rural population, where it was feared even party members were 
isolated from party information.
17
  At the end of 1924, the party numbered only 680 members 
among a population of over half a million in the MASSR, with 400 of this number located in 
urban centers despite the overall population being overwhelmingly rural.
18
  The need to recruit, 
as well as to ―increase culture‖ and facilitate ―Sovietizing‖ the peasants was already on the table 
at local party meetings before the formation of the MASSR.
19
  This was especially the case for 
the Moldovans, who were generally understood to have been victims of not only of the Russian 
imperialists, but of other nationalities as well.
20
  
Despite the pro-Moldovan rhetoric, however, the primary purpose of the MASSR was to 
get back Bessarabia.  From the outset of the new autonomous government, there was a strong, 
almost mystical, revolutionary sense of mission directed at regaining Bessarabia from the 
―Romanian bourgeois occupiers‖ in addition to the shared goals of building communism.  
Members at the first All-Moldovan Party Conference, which opened on December 18, 1924, 
some of whom were Jews from Bessarabia, were moved by a sense of tragedy of exile and 
longing not unlike that already understood by Jews: ―as we meet here in such meager conditions, 
let us remember that there are better buildings for our meeting in Kishinev, on the other side of 
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 AOSPRM, f. 3, op. 1, d. 7, l. 7. Terry Martin calls Soviet policies toward the nationalities part of a administering 
an ―affirmative action empire‖: The Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923-
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 AOSPRM, f. 49, op.1, d. 6, l. 19. In addition, there were issues with the ‗Moldovaness‖ of the party members: 
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the Dniester.‖21  Members heartily welcomed representatives from the public (but state 
controlled) organization MOPR (International Aid Organization for Revolutionary Fighters) in 
combating the ―oligarchic bourgeois‖ Romanian state.22  In contrast to military administrators in 
Bessarabia, whose function was to maintain control of the province and thwart Soviet revisionist 
efforts, the very essence of an MASSR government (especially at the outset) was transnational—
looking towards Bessarabia as the homeland of the Moldovans that one day would be re-united  
Figure 9: ―Long Live Revolutionary Bessarabia United with MASSR! We Demand Bread and Work! We Demand 
an 8-hour Work Day!‖ reads the placard.  Members of the revolutionary underground in the MASSR, circa 1925, 
pose for a photograph.  As this is a photograph from the Siguranţa collection, the numbers on the individuals 
indicate that Siguranţa agents have knowledge of their identity, indicating likely arrest.  ANRM photograph 
collection, #34701.  
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 AOSPRM, f. 49, op.1, d. 6, l. 2. This was the opening statement at the meeting by Odessa Gubkom President 
Khvylia.  
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 AOSPRM, f. 49, op. 1, d. 6, l. l.   
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under Soviet communism.  In the interwar years, MOPR was an important agency for furthering 
Soviet revisionist aims in Bessarabia, and Jews were very active members of it.  The Tiraspol 
branch of MOPR, for example, was almost 25% Jewish by membership, a significant over-
representation in terms of the general town population.
23
 
In contrast to the Romanian view described previously, the official Soviet view of 
Moldovans, also espoused by Bessarabian Jew and high-ranking member of the Ukrainian 
Communist Party (CP) in Kharkov, Comrade Badeev,
24
 was that they constituted a part of ―the 
Romanian race,‖ but ―as Romanian culture matured under French influence…the Moldovan 
branch matured under the Slavic, and particularly Russian, influence.‖25  For Soviet planners, 
this division became doubly evident after the occupation of Bessarabia by the Romanian Army.  
Very much products of intellectual currents of the day, Soviet planners understood racial 
differences to be very real.  They used these differences to underpin the construction of national 
differences suitable to political goals.  The differences between Moldovans and Romanians 
included racial characteristics, including different cranial structures and even different styles of 
walking and moving.
26
  Soviet understanding of racial difference was just as invested in a state-
organized and readily decipherable racial order, but Marxist understanding of historical process 
made the immutability of racial hierarchy impossible for Bolsheviks: racial characteristics were 
perhaps a starting point, but change and self-improvement through socialism was always 
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 AOSPRM, f. 32, op. 1, d. 4, l. 5. 
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 Badeev‘s real name was Iosif Isaakovich Suslik.  He joined the Bolshevik party in 1917 before the October 
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possible, at least theoretically.  When racial categories were assigned as immutable, it was 
usually done as punishment for rebellion, as with the Cossacks during the Civil War and the 
Ingush, Chechens, Germans and Crimean Tatars during WWII.
27
  Jews were understood also to 
be part of a different race, one that would now be part of the wide brotherhood of socialist 
nations, but the Jewish homeland was clearly not in Moldova, so Jewish korenizatsiia policies 
would be effectively moved to Birobidzhan and  end in the MASSR by the end of the decade. 
In addition, newly appointed bureaucrats representing Soviet power focused on problems 
in Bessarabia through an economic lens: Bessarabia used to export agricultural products to an 
international market through Odessa and import industrial goods.  Now cut off from Odessa, 
industry suffered greatly as had agricultural exports.  This, together with the ―class hatreds 
between the Bessarabian proletariat and Romanian boyars‖ had led to a ―potentially 
revolutionary situation in Bessarabia,‖ according to Comrade Badeev.28  Such a situation could 
not be remedied by the selection of ―Moscow Romanians and Bessarabians‖ to the MASSR 
Revolutionary Committee and Party Bureau, who ―posed a problem for our work.‖  Badeev 
argued that ―in this situation, it is extremely necessary to appoint local Bessarabians who know 
local circumstances and understand the Soviet system to positions of influence in the 
MASSR…particularly in working with members of the Romanian Communist Party.‖29   
Badeev‘s recommendation was influential and largely heeded; in fact he would soon 
become the first chair of the MASSR Central Executive Committee (TsIK), the highest ranking 
communist bureaucrat in the autonomous republic.  The fact that within months of its creation, 
the MASSR government was headed by a Bessarabian Jew speaks volumes about the difference 
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between Romanian and Soviet policies in the region, perhaps even more so because of the desire 
on the part of the Soviets to trust and rely on local cadres—which stood in sharp contrast to the 
Romanian political practice of importing ethnic Romanian outsiders to govern Bessarabia.  Many 
educated revolutionaries fled from Bessarabia in the wake of Romanian occupation; some of 
these attained positions of authority in the Soviet government.  Not surprisingly, many of those 
most interested in overturning Romanian rule in Bessarabia were national minorities—most 
sensitive to Romanian chauvinism as ruling ideology—particularly Russians and Jews among 
whom levels of literacy, familiarity with urban settings, contacts, and willingness to embrace a 
regime that welcomed and empowered them made them invaluable local purveyors of Soviet 
policies across the border.
30
  It is also logical that during these early years, the recruitment of 
Jews into the party was important, thus explaining in large part the particular attention paid to 
Jewish concerns on par with (if not often above) issues concerning other minorities in local 
natsmen (national minorities) and agitprop (agitation and propaganda) meetings.
31
  
Jewish questions dominated discussions at local party meetings during the early years of 
the MASSR just as Jews remained a very prominent element of the urban landscape in 
Transnistria.  Increasing the circulation of Der Emes (Pravda in Yiddish) was discussed 
constantly and specifically as of paramount importance to Jewish workers‘ enlightenment, and 
Jewish education took up the overwhelming majority of discussion time at local party 
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meetings—only the need to increase education in Polish came remotely close.32  Indeed, so many 
of the obkom natsmen members were Jews at the outset of the MASSR regional government that 
some had to be reminded that they wielded great responsibilities not only over Transnistrian 
Jews but over other national minorities and bureaucratic and cultural goals as well.
33
  This would 
change by the late 1920s and soon thereafter a specific focus on Jewish matters would be 
strongly de-emphasized.  Nevertheless, not every Jewish communist in a position of local or 
regional authority was a zealous defender of Bolshevik culture—abuse of power took place and 
contributed to perceptions among some Ukrainians and Moldovans that Soviet power served 
Jewish interests and undermined their own. 
In the towns, where Jews often formed the largest ethnic group, there were specific goals 
for the Jewish sections for inculcating their co-religionists in Soviet culture and ideology.  An 
important means of Sovietization (as well as a marker of its progress) was the circulation of the 
Yiddish-language press, which was seen by state and party activists as a primary instrument of 
modernizing Jews in a socialist direction away from their petty bourgeois past.
 34
   The Evsektsiia 
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always strove to increase the circulation of communist newspapers in Yiddish, particularly the 
central organ of power, Der Emes, but with only moderate degrees of success.
35
  Some success 
was attained in the MASSR, although the numbers were still disappointing to Evsektsiia 
activists.
36   
 In the increasingly insecure years toward the late 1920s, correspondence between the 
local Evsektsia and the central bureaus of both the Ukrainian and Russian Jewish Sections shows 
not only that considerable attention was given to the need to increase the circulation of Soviet 
Jewish newspapers, but also that the local sections were under significant pressure to show 
results that underscored the success of the publication campaign.  The Jewish Section Central 
Bureau in Moscow on October 27, 1927 condemned as impermissible the failure to increase the 
circulation of Der Emes in the MASSR, the ―central Communist newspaper in Yiddish.‖  The 
directive purported that there were far too many towns and villages that still failed to receive this 
newspaper.
37
  The tone of the directives from center to periphery were in the typically polemic 
Soviet style.38  With growing ire, central directives demanded immediate recommendations for 
action by the local Evsektsiia against any slowdown in literacy expansion.  Furthermore, lists of 
                                                                                                                                                             
political enlightenment, conducting a count of workers‘ clubs and associations with significant numbers of Jewish 
workers; ensuring the enforcement of work in Yiddish by local unions; attaching workers to Jewish agencies and 
enterprises to feel out cultural work in Yiddish; to begin putting Yiddish literature in right direction, measured by 
attaining in the near future a circulation of 1000 for the newspaper Der Emes; to regulate the work of urban worker-
correspondents for Der Emes, and begin placing of correspondents in rural areas, AOSPRM, f. 49, op. 1, d. 46, l. 1. 
35
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enterprises employing at least ten Jews, including addresses, were demanded so that Jews may be 
―grabbed‖ (in the cultural sense) at their place of work.  The campaign to increase communist 
newspapers in Yiddish dovetailed with the Soviet desire to implement order and control in the 
borderlands: Jews were useful and thus important to the overall project.  But like with other 
social and cultural spheres, this emphasis changed by the 1930s: on August 15, 1934, an angry 
letter from Der Shtern‘s central publishers in Kharkov was carried in the all-Ukraine Yiddish 
daily criticizing the Tiraspol raikom for not increasing the circulation of the Soviet press in ―the 
minorities‘ languages.‖39  Such letters were numerous in previous years, but were addressed to 
the needs of the Jews and Yiddish newspapers specifically; this was no longer the case.  
Increasing Yiddish newspaper circulation was now solely about the interests of modernization, 
no longer Jewish national interests (in the borderlands—it was doubtful that it was ever a goal 
for Moscow). 
 
Problems at the Periphery, or Resisting the Reach 
The Sovietization of Transnistrian Jews of course involved all state and party organs, as 
well as those under the obkom committees, not just the Evsektsiia or the press.  Clearly, the 
consolidation of Soviet authority and the establishment of its mechanisms of control depended in 
large measure, in contrast to the way Romanian control of was established in Bessarabia, on the 
integration of Jews and their active participation in internalizing and espousing socialist values 
and culture.  Numerically speaking, however, this did not include, at least not at the outset of 
Soviet power, most Jews but rather only a minority.  In terms that concerned the region‘s lower-
class Jews, the consolidation of Jewish communal resources and communist re-education was 
well under way in Transnistria already before 1924.  A minority group of mostly urban, educated 
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Jews espoused revolutionary ideology and used Soviet power to force their ‗backward‘ co-
religionists into the modern era, as they saw it.   
But to the masses of poor and struggling Jews things looked different.  Very quickly, 
traditional Jewish life in the region was attacked with new ideas that challenged its very 
existence.  The Jewish section of the Balta okrugkom Natsmen bureau, for example, had by 1923 
converted the main Balta synagogue into the Jewish Workers‘ Auditorium.40  In Tiraspol, the 
building of the old synagogue became the home of the artisan and trade cooperative 
―Moldcoopinsoyuz,‖ used also as meetings ground for the invalid cooperative.41  The choral 
synagogue of Birzuli became the Jewish Workers‘ Club, where bureau chair Rabinovich led 
weekly lectures in party ideology, and two other members led workers‘ group readings of Der 
Emes and another on profgramota (professional literacy).
42
  For the majority of everyday Jews in 
this devastated borderland, Soviet-Jewish culture was imposed by the state and its ‗evseks.‘   
Representing the state but with a modernizing agenda of their own, Evsektsiia activists 
re-organized significantly the local Jewish economy.  They took over the reins of the existing 
Jewish artisans‘ credit cooperative by organizing a party artisans‘ club to provide a state-
supported credit system for working artisans.
43
  In Tiraspol, for example, the state artisanal artel 
―Kotovsky,‖ became part of the state-sponsored Vsemoldpromsoyuz (All-Moldovan Industrial 
Union).  It was composed of about 60 local tailors, overwhelmingly Jewish, organized into 7 
divisions with locations around Tiraspol.  Only the head of the artel, a Mrs. Frimerman, was a 
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party member.
44
  Organizing labor into artels not only served to destroy as quickly as possible 
the traditional Jewish artisanal collectives, which until the 1920s remained organized into kasses 
just like in Bessarabia, but also made Jewish workers more accessible to party propaganda.   
While there were certainly some Jews attracted to Bolshevism, it appears that most were 
not interested.  In Jewish communities, Jews that were willing to work with party 
representatives, often to their personal benefit, were not well regarded.  Indeed, it seems 
communal divisions were certainly a factor in the local spread of Soviet power:  many Jews who 
remained in Transnistrian towns and became members of state-sponsored artels were often not 
the best examples of law abiding citizens, nor were they the best educated or the best workers, 
but were able to get ahead by relying on support from the artel.  An M. Shepsman from 
Gershunovka, a shoemaker by trade, served in the Tsarist and then the Red Army from 1919-21; 
he worked as a journeyman cobbler in numerous places around Transnistria from 1921-25 and 
then became president of the Tiraspol artisans‘ union.  In 1927 he was promoted to run the 
artisan artel ―kustpishchevik,‖ but was fired in 1929 for graft so serious that the artel went into 
bankruptcy, its membership falling from 125 to 8!
45
  Another artel member, Avrahm Kremer 
from Tiraspol, was barely literate, working throughout the years of NEP as an individual artisan 
when he was sued three times for ―producing poor quality products.‖  Nevertheless, in 1928 he 
successfully joined the Tiraspol tanners‘ artel and in 1931 successfully submitted his candidature 
for the communist party (likely due to the great local need for new members after a local party 
cleansing operation) despite a history of drunkenness.
46
  Members such as these do not speak 
highly of the artels in general, something that local people were very well aware of as an 
indication of the broader problems of the Soviet economic system. 
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Political re-education for workers, as Evsektsiia activists called it, was of course also very 
important.  A new school for Jewish political education in Yiddish was being opened in Balta, 
where enrollment was up to 60 and rising by 1924, due to the high regard for party ideology 
among Balta Jews (official), or rather the complete lack of educational opportunities in the 
otherwise decimated local economy (actual).  Weekly meetings of the Evsektsiia took place on 
Saturday afternoon, for obvious reasons of anti-religious zealotry.
47
  Significant attention was 
paid the poor and destitute (particularly the Committee of Dispossessed Settlers, or KNS), and 
especially women and demilitarized Red Army soldiers.  Yet, throughout hundreds of hours of 
meetings, there remained a blaring silence, at least on the record, about the unemployed artisans 
and traders—the lishentsy, a fact that by all indications greatly angered the local Jews.48  Nor 
were the concerns of those on the agenda list always satisfied, either, as letters from disgruntled 
unemployed army officers from autumn 1924 attest, for example.
49
  Jews in the MASSR were 
rapidly and convincingly alienated by a bureaucracy that, while claiming to represent their co-
religionists best interests, seemed increasingly to favor state interests against their own. 
All these revolutionary changes led many on the Jewish street to view much more 
skeptically the aims of the Jewish communists, and many tried as much as possible to resist the 
changes.  In fact, despite the willingness of Soviet planners to rely on local cadres much more 
effectively than in Romania, numerous elements of Soviet modernization were ill-fitted for the 
local reality and created great resentment among MASSR Jews (and non-Jews).  Among Jewish 
communists, there was early on criticism of party platforms that did not address the Jewish 
reality.  Jewish communists participated in carrying out the directive to ―Face the Village,‘ for 
example (make carrying the message of socialist culture to rural areas a priority)—but the Jewish 
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peasants were for the most part not in the village in the MASSR, but in the small market town.  
Some local committee members called the smychka (union) between workers and peasants that 
they were supposed to be creating a razmychka (discord, or disunity) in the Jewish case: Zionism 
remained in the towns unaddressed while enthusiastic Jewish Komsomol activists and pioneers 
were rejected by traditionally anti-Semitic local peasants.  One angry letter from a Jewish activist 
asserted that Soviet policy was lost in unrealistic idealism inapplicable to the local reality:  
And so the Jewish Komsomol members stand with their faces only to the village, and in the town there is 
such hatred, that a long time will be required to smoke out the air poisoned with it, and the result will be to 
stand in the same pose—toward the village with the face, toward the town with the ass!
50
   
In some cases efforts to streamline state support for Jewish re-settlement only hurt 
already ongoing efforts through the creation of another level of bureaucratic control.
51
  Jewish 
communists functioned not only as the force of secular modernization and the destruction of 
tradition, they were also supposed to bring class justice to their co-religionists.  Some members 
of party committees and state bureaucracies expressed concern, however, that Soviet policies 
aimed at helping the formerly exploited were only deepening the exploitation and alienation 
among the Jewish poor.  Strong expressions of this concern became increasingly problematic 
over the course of the 1920s but soon thereafter stopped altogether.  In addition, Jewish 
communists not only in the MASSR underestimated the resistance to Soviet policies that would 
come from popular antisemitism, and, for that matter, that some Soviet policies would create 
more anti-Jewish sentiment rather than less.  There were many examples.  When possible, Jews 
were excluded from membership in the KNS, which made it more difficult for many that fled 
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their homes and resettled internally to qualify for state aid.
52
  In Dubassari, where there was a 
successful tradition of Jewish tobacco farming, many Jews that signed up to receive land were 
turned down under the premise that they were engaged in industry or were ―large scale tobacco 
traders‖.53  In the northern Kamenka raion, Jews were being blocked from joining collective 
farms for the same reason.
54
   
Thus, despite the focus on including Jews in the Soviet project, things did not always go 
smoothly on the ground, especially in peripheral, borderland areas like the MASSR where there 
were other concerns and problems with cadres and institutional reach.  The establishment of 
Soviet control, tantamount to a radical overturning of autonomous cultural and political life in 
favor of a narrow class-oriented, modernist world vision, was not achieved without tremendous 
resistance from the displaced, especially in the borderlands.  The MASSR was no exception; the 
party was always concerned with several autonomous formations.  As late as March 1925, 
several groups of youth continued to meet in Menshevik reading circles and circulate an 
underground newspaper, despite consistent arrests and exile of circle members.  Although much 
better than a few years earlier, banditism remained a serious issue: the Mosocw-Balta train was 
twice crashed and robbed in 1924, once in May and again in August.  Banditry and fear of 
inadequately secure control in Tiraspol were important reasons for locating the republic‘s capital 
in Balta until 1929, farther inland with better infrastructural connections with the rest of 
Ukraine.
55
  Religion also remained a concern for the new atheist state‘s agents, especially the 
Tikhonovite movement.
56
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Without question the greatest local problem for the party by its members‘ own admission, 
however, was Zionism.  Combating Zionism was not seriously undertaken until 1924 in the 
region, by when Zionist organizations had achieved considerable entrenchment despite official 
illegality.  As in many other parts of the Soviet Union, but perhaps nowhere as intensely as in the 
Odessa gubernia, party cells and police agents organized intense raids on Zionist centers 
throughout 1924, particularly in Odessa itself.  Zionism was effectively crushed by violent police 
action in one of its heartlands, including in the MASSR, although it never really died as an 
underground movement.
57
  Party members understood that Zionist sentiment was fueled in part 
by the extremely difficult economic situation of the Jewish craftsmen (even if this problem was 
silenced in other reporting), but also by proximity to Romanian Bessarabia where Zionism was 
legal and interested in helping co-religionists across the Dniester.  In October 1924, state and 
party officials in the newly created MASSR received circulars describing in detail the Soviet 
government‘s position on Zionism.  Not surprisingly, in order to bolster the legitimacy of 
communism among Jews, considerable attention was given to circumstances in Eastern Europe 
and especially Romania, where many local Jewish communists had friends and family.  In the 
desperate struggle for cadres, the appeal of Zionism had to be destroyed and no accusation was 
too outlandish: 
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Everywhere where Zionism acts as the guardian of the Jewish masses, it betrays their interests in 
the most shameful way.  The ―Hebrew‖ politics of the Zionists leads to the persecution of Yiddish 
in all the capitalist countries of Europe.  In Poland, the Zionists cooperate with the reactionary 
szlachta in their persecution of the Jewish language (Yiddish).  Despite Jewish suffering in 
Poland, Romania and all of Eastern Europe, the Zionists don‘t go further than complaining to the 
League of Nations.  When Ukrainians, Belorussians and other minorities under Polish domination 
have turned to the Soviet Union, seeing therein their only salvation, the Zionists continue their 
pathetic attempts to undermine Soviet power, spying for and supporting the efforts of the Polish 
secret police.  Jabotinsky signs a peace treaty with Petliura.  The Zionists in their press in Romania 
rehabilitate the Romanian government despite the fact that it organized Jewish pogroms, and acted 
against the self-determination of Bessarabia.
58
 
 Self-determination for Bessarabia as far as Soviet policy makers were concerned meant 
allowing Bessarabians to decide by plebiscite to join the Soviet Union, which Romanian military 
administrators flatly refused despite Soviet demands particularly at the League of Nations all 
throughout the 1920s.
59
  Official demands at the international level (Bucharest and Moscow did 
not have formal diplomatic relations until 1934) were of course not the only avenue pursued: 
Soviet efforts to export pro-Soviet propaganda in effort to foment a communist revolution in 
Bessarabia were well known to residents on both sides of the Dniester.  If some Jewish 
communists remained ambivalent about the impact of Soviet policies upon the Jewish street, they 
kept quiet because of their general desire for modernization together with their fear of being 
accused of incompetence or disloyalty and losing power.  By way of comparison, there was no 
ambiguity about Bessarabia: their real desire to wrest Bessarabia from Romanian control 
coincided with Soviet policies.  Jewish communists proved to be effective propagandists, many 
leading in the Soviet-propelled campaign at great personal risk to export communism into 
Bessarabia and overturn Romanian control of the province.   
 Jews, many of whom had fled Bessarabia in the wake of Romanian annexation, were very 
active not only in MOPR but also in the ―Society of Bessarabians,‖ formed to export 
revolutionary ideals across the Dniester.  Within raipartkoms in the MASSR, special party 
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sections of the society were formed in every location where at least 10 ―Bessarabians‖ were 
residents.  The fulcrum of their propaganda plan was to spread the anti-Romanian newspaper 
Krasnaia Bessarabia into the Romanian-held province, thereby igniting a wave of resentment 
and resistance through other publications and acts of sabotage, thereby sparking an uprising 
against Romanian military rule.
60
  After Mussolini came to power in Italy in 1922, the society‘s 
propaganda purported to link Romania with fascism, adding an additional element of outrage and 
urgency to their call to get back Bessarabia.
61
  While not necessarily true for membership at the 
society‘s headquarters in Moscow, on the field in the MASSR, an increasingly large proportion 
of the society‘s members were Jews—many of whom had personal reasons for exporting 
communism and undermining Romanian rule in Bessarabia.
62
   
 
Changes at the Center  
By the second half of 1927, signs of significant change in Bolshevik policies were in the 
air.  Economic mismanagement during the second half of NEP resulted in significant shortages 
of grain for the urban centers by the winter of 1927/28, the so-called ―grain crisis.‖63  The 
resulting revolution of Stalin that ended NEP, implemented forced collectivization and the 
liquidation of the kulaks, and branded as ―right deviations‖ the arguments of those who espoused 
gradual economic transformation and the continuance of the smychka between peasants and 
workers (instead of break-neck collectivization and industrialization), had a tremendous impact 
on Soviet nationalities policies as well.  While Soviet leaders did genuinely attempt to institute 
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nativization campaigns across the Russian periphery, this policy was never a core Bolshevik 
value the way modernization and industrialization were.  As a result, successful korenizatisia 
was dependent on local factors, which came to mean that outside of Georgia and Armenia, 
nativization failed.
64
  This was the case in the MASSR.  By 1927 the policy of the center was 
clearly changing as the enthusiasm for the nativization campaign during previous years was 
dwindling  and the Party questioned the nationalities policies it had formulated in 1923: 
 In articles published in Bolshevik in 1928 emphasis was placed on the necessity of subordinating 
national rights to socialist demands.  Local nationalism was described as a growing danger which 
had become more troublesome than Russian chauvinism and could no longer be explained away as 
simple reaction to Tsarist oppression.  Even within the All-Union Central Committee it was urged 
that, in view of the new socialist centralization in the USSR, the national question was no longer 
of importance and that, consequently, the Party should place emphasis on the building of a single 
socialist culture rather than numerous local national cultures.  The slogan, ―the right of nations to 
self-determination‖ was attacked on the grounds that it had lost its pre-revolutionary importance 
and had become a counter-revolutionary motto threatening the unity of the Soviet Union.
65
  
 In such an atmosphere, the Yiddishization campaign of the Evsektsiia was immediately 
affected as well.  Reflecting the general mood in the Party as a whole, the Evsektsiia leadership 
began an intense campaign of samokritika (self-criticism) in order to defend itself from charges 
of deviation, feared or real.  Nationalism, national nihilism, chauvinism, latent Bundism, 
disorganization, passivity, right and left deviations of all sorts, ―pessimism‖ in literature, 
falsification of history, autonomism, territorialism, ―organizational fetishism‖—this was the 
Evsektsiia catalogue of errors.‖66  The policy that would most affect the Jewish communists, 
however, was the charge of right deviation, as previously supported campaigns for agricultural 
re-settlement and Jewish national-cultural and territorial autonomy led to the Evsektsiia being 
blamed for not understanding the class nature of antisemitism and contributing to it with Jewish 
chauvinism.  In order to regain favor from Party leaders, the Evsektsiia struggled feverishly 
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against these charges, which meant that constructive activity was largely paralyzed and land 
settlement in some cases reversed.  While both antisemitism and Jewish chauvinism were 
considered deviations, the Evsektsiia was much more active against Jewish chauvinism in order 
to show its super-orthodoxy in a time of great uncertainty than against antisemitism.
67
    
Communication from center to periphery began to display this sense of insecurity within 
the Evsektsiia.  In addition to the importance placed on creating a Yiddish-language press that 
would underscore Soviet values, the Evsektsiia always gave considerable attention to the training 
of ―Jewish cultural workers‖ (propagandists) who spread the ethos of revolutionary culture 
among the Jewish people.  Not enough was being done to support Jewish cultural workers in the 
MASSR and they possessed insufficient literature in ―the language of their origins,‖ according to 
the view from Kiev.  In 1929, the MASSR Jewish Section was notified of an important session at 
the Main Bureau in Kiev concerning the work of activists from ―Rabotpros‖ (work 
enlightenment) among Jewish cultural workers.  The importance of Jewish cultural workers was 
underscored, because only through educating the masses in Yiddish could all Jews be reached.  
The spread of ideals of proletarianism and communism was weak among Jews, the MASSR 
Narkompros was informed, and they are ―occasionally resistant to communist ideology, 
especially due to the continued influence of clerical-nepmen elements on the Jewish population 
and the spread of petty bourgeois chauvinism.‖68  Foreshadowing the policies of the 1930s, the 
resolution argued that the ranks of Jewish cultural workers had to be more closely reviewed and 
occasionally ―cleansed‖ to make room for new, better-qualified teachers.69  Such concerns in the 
Evsektsiia with cleansing its own staff was understandable in 1929, given that several Ukrainian 
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party members had not long before been accused of Ukrainian national chauvinism and arrested.  
The Jewish communists were desperate to show that they could regulate their own business, yet 
the Evsektsiia activists did not have a clear sense of the new direction Stalin was taking the party.  
Evsektsiia members from the Central and Main Bureaus were summoned to Moscow in January 
1930, and by all accounts were surprised when the Central Committee declared the dissolution of 
the Evsektsiia several days later. 
 After the dissolution of the Evsektsiia, most Jewish communist cells dedicated to creating 
Soviet-Jewish culture and solving once and for all the Jewish Question were put to work toward 
other directives, since Sovietizing the Jews was now deemed complete: Jews would be able to 
produce purely Soviet culture in Yiddish.
70
  In the MASSR, Jews would now work exclusively 
on the Moldovan Question.  From the founding of the autonomous republic, Jews had been 
involved in constructing the Moldovan nation, something that during the 1920s was not only a 
policy directive from Moscow but reflected a real desire among local intellectuals to ―liberate the 
Moldovans from the oppression of Bucharest landlord-capitalism.‖71   
In the 1930s, even as Yiddish language publications continued, Jewish intellectuals were 
encouraged to change focus and play a part in determining the future for Moldovans.  The Jewish 
Question, after all, was solved: the Jewish homeland had been created within the Soviet Union, 
in Birobidzhan.  Focusing on Jewish issues in ―Moldovan space‖ could no longer be justified.  
Jews participated in debates on cultural issues on the pages of Plugarul roş (The Red 
Ploughman) and Moldova Literară (Literary Moldova).  Jewish service to the socialist cause was 
valuable in enforcing the party line as well: quite often, Jews (and also Russians) were trusted 
over Moldovans to remain loyal to Moldovan national construction.  For example, a trial took 
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place in Tiraspol on November 18, 1933 in which an ethnic Moldovan communist was charged 
for writing an article criticizing the policy of constructing a separate Moldovan nation.  The trial 
was decided by three presiding party members—comrades Garmel‘, Drukman and 
Abramovich—all Jews.72  While this can be interpreted as the party‘s blindness to national 
differences in pursuit of the socialist cause, more likely Jews were more trusted.  Many Jewish 
communists certainly understood that maintaining the party line was in their interest.  Their 
service to the party was not well received, however, by a local population that typically remained 
anti-Semitic and in the wake of forced collectivization grew to hate and fear the Soviet state.  
News of such events trickled across the border into Bessarabia as well, where it served to 
increase the anti-Jewish sentiment of Romanian authorities as well as popular antisemitism 
through exaggerated rumors of Moldovan suffering in the Jewish-controlled MASSR. 
Figure 10: Leonid Korneanu and Liviu Deleanu, both Jews and both leading writers specializing in Moldovan 
cultural construction and the fundamental, immutable difference between Moldovans and Romanians.  Korneanu 
was a journalist who wrote mainly for Moldova Literară; Deleanu was a poet who wrote in Moldovan and Russian. 
73 
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 Yet, the preponderance of Jews in the state and party bureaucracy in the MASSR was by 
the mid-1930s decreasing.  State efforts to make the autonomous republic truly representative of 
Moldovans was becoming a reality, and after a decade of intensive (if often corrupt and 
incompetent) efforts to train a new generation of cadres, there was a visible impact after 1934.  
The bureaucracy in place was still allowing a higher percentage of Jews into positions of 
authority than their proportion of the population, but this was changing: in 1934, of 48 students 
that attended the Communist Party Evening School of Tiraspol, 11 were Jews.
74
  Only three 
years later, of a list of 78 candidates from the MASSR for Supreme Soviet elections, there were 
only 3 Jews on the list.
75
  The vydvyzhentsy in the MASSR tended to be more heavily chosen 
from Moldovans in particular, but clearly from among non-Jews in general.
76
  The 
preponderance of Jews remained in education, however, and in MOPR as well.  Right up to the 
Red Army‘s entrance into Bessarabia in 1939, Jews remained committed to regaining their 
imagined homeland.  In December 1937, for example, the Tiraspol branch of the MOPR 
organization remained heavily Jewish, many of whom demanded the Tiraspol raikom give 
greater attention and support to MOPR‘s efforts to help struggling revolutionaries in Bessarabia 
as well as aid to victims of Romanian fascism and workers for revolution.  MOPR remained very 
popular among Jewish pioneers and members of the Komsomol as well.
77
 
 Taken together, radical changes swept across the borderland region of Transnistria in the 
years after the violence of war and revolution.  Soviet policy ambitions created room for Jews to 
participate in building socialism, thus providing many with the opportunity to join an exciting 
revolutionary movement against tradition.  This window of openness to Jewish input on a mass 
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level was short, however, effectively closing by the end of the decade.  Jews remained in many 
places of power, but they would no longer be trusted to effect changes specifically for their own 
co-religionists, rather they would implement broad policies for everyone as members of the 
communist party and state.  Yet during this short window, Jewish traditional society had been 
undermined to a far greater degree than across the border in Bessarabia.  Together with Soviet 
economic policies that deprived many traditional Jews of their livelihood, sufficient pressure was 
produced on communities in Balta, Tiraspol, Birzuli, and Rybnitsa to convince many Jews that 
fleeing across the Dniester into Romanian Bessarabia was a valid alternative, chosen by at least a 
few hundred Jews every year even after the violence of the revolutionary and civil war years was 
over.  Furthermore, the location of the MASSR and the aggressive policy of Moscow toward 
Bessarabia throughout the 1920s especially provided an opportunity for many Jews to participate 
in the effort to recapture Bessarabia, which not only proved unsuccessful until 1939 but did 
much to undermine an already precarious position of Jews in the eyes of Romanian leaders and 
especially local security police.  The activism of Jews in the Bessarabian movement remained 
throughout the 1930s even though many of the participants were concerned about the direction of 
traditional Jewish life in Transnistria.  Despite the political divide, the fate of Jews on both sides 
of the Dniester remained linked.   
In order to understand more closely the specific points of this link, but especially to 
appreciate how the problems and issues of Jewish life on the Soviet side of the border differed 
from Romanian Bessarabia, the next sections will turn to two specific political and cultural 
directions in Soviet-Jewish life in the 1920s and 1930s: agricultural resettlement and state-
sponsored education in Yiddish.  A fundamentally important issue for these examples is the 
position of the state toward Jewish life and society on either side of the Dniester.  Whatever the 
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outcome, Soviet policy makers took a constructive, interventionist approach toward Jewish 
agricultural re-settlement and education as a means of modernization, social engineering to speed 
backward Jews social evolution toward revolutionary consciousness.  Such ideas were by no 
means limited to theorists in Moscow and Kiev, they found interest among Jews in Bessarabia 
and much of Eastern Europe, although such ideas to ―normalize‖ the Jew by making him 
muscular and modern—fluent in ideas and languages of his neighbors, were not among the 
interests of the newly independent, nationalist states of interwar Eastern Europe.  Rather 
modernization would be conducted, unlike in the Soviet Union, by Jews themselves: agricultural 
resettlement was a central component of most Zionist ideologies, especially on the left.  
Educational reform was also a central issue of Jewish life during these years that divided Jewish 
thinking deeply.  In the MASSR the state took the lead even as it allowed Jews to join in the 
policy implementation.  
 
Policy Options for “Normalizing” Jews: Agricultural Re-settlement  
The chief manifestation of the path toward indigenization for the Evsektsiia was the 
revival of Jewish national ideas. Because so many Jews joined the Communist party after 1921 
when the last autonomous Jewish parties closed, Evsektsiia conferences, particularly at the Main 
Bureau level in Minsk and Kharkov, became home to heated debates over the issue of Jewish 
national identity.  What became clear to many Evsektsiia activists, particularly the new members 
who may have joined out of opportunism and were not eager to see the end of Jewish tradition, 
was that industrialization, although nothing like the rate it would reach in the 1930s, was already 
highly successful in fostering Jewish assimilation into a broader concept of a Soviet people, 
which for all practical purposes for Jews meant Russification.  Agricultural re-settlement became 
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the means by which ―economic rehabilitation and productivization‖ of the Jewish masses could 
be accomplished without completely forgoing their national and cultural identity.
78
  Nativization 
policies of the mid-1920s would permit the combating of Jewish backwardness without the loss 
of Jewish identity, which appealed to many Jewish communists.
79
 
The Jewish desire to resettle their co-religionists on agricultural land was not new and the 
Jewish Communists were not the first to propose it, but with a proletarian ethos behind them in a 
Bolshevik-controlled government, many among them believed that the Jewish Question could 
finally be solved in a positive way.  As Jonathan Dekel-Chen has showed, the communists 
proved willing to work with American Jewish groups, which provided many with hope of Soviet 
openness and support.
80
  In distant Transnistria like in other parts of the former Pale, this 
backwardness was stupefying from the Soviet as well as the American perspective, as the 
language of social engineering, though with differences, was very popular in both states at the 
time.
81
  Enlightenment workers‘ reports about the state of Jewish life attested to their level of 
shock at what they interpreted as complete religious backwardness.
82
  State and party 
representatives viewed the ―close and separate groups‖ in which Jews lived in the MASSR, 
together with their efforts to ―preserve their tradition, culture and language, including not only 
the jargon but ancient Hebrew as well,‖ as something to be overcome.83   
                                                 
78
 Gitelman, Jewish Nationality and Soviet Politics, 384. 
79
 Since the reign of Alexander I Russia had permitted and sometimes encouraged the agricultural re-settlement of 
Jews, especially to the lands of New Russia in the Ukrainian south, particularly Odessa and Kherson.  The Jewish 
Colonization Agency (ICA) became involved in subsidizing some Jewish re-settlement after 1890.  By 1900, there 
were tens of thousands of Jews in the Pale living by agricultural labor, despite state policies remaining on the books 
that made Jewish agriculture difficult, especially after 1881.  See Dekel-Chen, Farming the Red Land, 5-6. 
80
 The Joint, for example, arrived in the Soviet Union in 1921 as part of Herbert Hoover‘s American Relief 
Administration (ADA), Dekel-Chen, Farming the Red Land, 29. 
81
 Dekel-Chen, Farming the Red Land, 27-28. 
82
 The Jews of Savrani, for example, who comprised nearly 68% of the town‘s population and  were employed in 
petty trade and artisanry, and were described as being ―steeped in religious fanaticism‖ according to the 1926 
census, AOSPRM, f. 49, op.1, d. 24, l. 5. 
83
 AOSPRM, f. 49, op.1, d. 24, l. 4. 
254 
 
In attempting to remedy such backwardness, particularly a Jewish concentration in 
―economically backward fields,‖ Bolshevik leaders were axiomatically against antisemitism, 
since they purported to themselves replace an anti-Semitic tsarist regime.  Yet Bolshevik 
economic policies such as closing down the shops of tens of thousands of independent Jewish 
artisans and merchants in Transnistria in favor of state-run cooperatives, and attacking petite-
bourgeois elements as lishentsy (thereby depriving thousands of electoral and economic rights), 
were tremendously damaging to the Jewish laboring masses who were overwhelmingly over-
represented in such fields.
84
  Some of these Jews, particularly the literate who were highly in 
demand in this borderland, joined the ranks of the Communist Party and state as administrators.  
Many other Jewish families were re-settled as agricultural colonizers mostly inside Ukraine but 
also later in the Jewish Autonomous Republic of Birobidzhan in the Soviet Far East.  Many 
starved to death, however, particularly in the early 1930s, as state policies took away their 
traditional livelihoods and failed to offer a credible alternative.   
Such policies bred resentment among the same Jews that were supposed to form the basis 
for Soviet-Jewish culture.  A worker state needed to impose strict and legible class classification 
on the populace, but the reality on the ground could never be molded easily into the ideological 
blueprint.  Many Jews in the MASSR who were dedicated to the revolution were made destitute 
by it, and their cases embittered many of their co-religionists to the policies of the modernizing 
Jewish communists.  One potent example is Kilman Rafulevich, a miller of substantial means in 
his town of Rashkovo before the revolution who lost his property and was classified as lishenets.  
He protested vehemently to the MASSR natsmen bureau: 
The heavy wounds that we Jews suffered from Tsarism cannot be made better or forgotten.  We 
still remember the ‗Jewish Question,‘ the ‗temporary regulations,‘ the Belisovskii process in the 
Pale of Settlement, the bloody pogroms, etc.  The question remains, could I, a Jew having suffered 
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the well-known Trotianetskoi rezni, where in a single day they cut up 500 innocent Jewish people 
among whom my brothers and my loving, innocent, honest and decent-hearted father whose 
bandit-decapitated head I buried in a mass grave with my own two hands…could I after all this be 
an enemy of the revolution, or the idea of Bolshevism, which attempts to and has managed, even if 
incompletely, tear out the deep roots of antisemitism and destroy the bloody Jewish pogroms?  I 
was willing to give up my two-storied house so the building could be used by the party committee; 
I did not complain when all my mills, my livelihood was taken.  But when the last coat and pillow 
was taken from my hysterical, epileptic daughter, this was too much.  Now my family starves, yet 
every time I leave the house people point their fingers at me call me ‗lishenets‘ and ‗chastnik,‘ 
even though I have nothing and believe in the revolution.  Could this be fair?
85
 
Bolsheviks desired to remedy this situation, in part because they feared pushing masses 
of Jews toward Zionism, and agricultural re-settlement was an appealing answer.
86
  Furthermore, 
even if many in the Evsektsiia held out hope in a distinct national Jewish space and in preserving 
a unique Jewish national culture, for architects of the nativization campaign the future goal was 
integration—using local languages and cultures to implant the message of Bolshevism among the 
minorities; that is ―national in form, socialist in content.‖87  Popular reactions to re-settlement 
initiatives were mixed: the Jewish poor and uneducated, while at first exhibiting great interest in  
the ―evseks‖ as they called them, rarely trusted them and often could not understand ideas that 
they must have found impractical and long-winded, but they rarely had better alternatives.
88
   
Re-settlement would provide a Soviet alternative to Palestine, providing a counterweight 
to the appeal of Zionism, as well as settling Soviet people on border regions in order to secure 
those regions for the state.  The primary argument for re-settlement among Evsektsiia activists 
themselves was Sovietizing the Jew, but these desires complimented well the already existent 
and much broader Jewish interest in creating a new, modern and muscular Jew, a goal that 
Soviet-Jewish policy makers shared with Zionists (chapter 5).  What would be done was nothing 
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short of remaking the ―superfluous‖ Jewish man, the ―luftmentch‖89 that had always been 
prevented by discrimination from plying normative and normalizing trades and instead being 
limited to those jobs which could most easily be gotten rid of in dire times.  As Salo Baron put it:  
The Jewish Communists were probably influenced by an idealized peasant mystique, the idea that 
agricultural work is one of the most basic, necessary, and ennobling ways of life, that a life close 
to the soil is somehow pure and healthy, and that a communal life is best suited to ridding the Jew 
of his individualistic, petit-bourgeois mentality.  What could be better for a pale Jew of the ghetto, 
emaciated in body and twisted in spirit, than to breathe the invigorating air of the steppes and to 
sink his hands into the rich black soil?‖90 
The re-settlement campaign was felt in the MASSR as well, although results were far 
from immediate.  In order to get government control over spontaneous Jewish resettlement 
already ongoing under the permitted assistance of American Agro-Joint, the party created 
KOMZET, the Committee for Rural Settlement of Jewish Laborers.
91
  The MASSR branch of 
KOMZET was founded between October 1925 and March 1926, although absolutely nothing 
was accomplished during this time.
92
  The head of the group was removed in March, but his 
replacement was not any more active; only in November 1926 was someone appointed who 
moved the organization forward.  By this time a local OZET, the Society for Rural Settlement of 
Jewish Laborers, had also been organized and was envisioned as a public, non-governmental 
organization that would work together with the state-run KOMZET to create interest for 
resettlement among shtetl Jews.
93
  OZET managed to sign up 628 MASSR Jewish families for 
re-settlement within the autonomous region during its first year.  Three categories were created 
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to divide the resettling population based on need, giving more priority to the more needy: 65% 
had assets of between 10 and 100 rubles, 30% around 150 rubles, and 5% about 300 rubles or 
more.94  The campaign also worked to resettle families outside the MASSR, especially in the 
Krivorozhskii okrug, where 155 Jewish families, most of whose breadwinners were employed as 
artisans, bread makers or tobacco workers, were resettled.  Plans for OZET included the 
resettling of another 100 in 1927, with greater numbers in the future.
95
  The OZET campaign 
devised an agitation-information campaign about agricultural resettlement, including meetings, 
conferences, and presentations for Jewish colonists throughout the MASSR.  Albeit with fits and 
starts (425 Jewish families were resettled in 1926 alone, then only 536 in the next 3 years), 
agricultural resettlement of MASSR Jews to available land in Ukraine was proceeding, as far as 
the Evsektsiia, OZET, and other responsible state and party institutions were concerned.  By the 
first all-MASSR conference of Jewish agricultural workers held in Balta on February 25, 1929, 
1500 Jewish families (out of a population of 50,000) had been resettled to individual and 
collective farms within the MASSR, but plenty of serious problems remained (Tables 3 & 4).  
Table 3: Individual Jewish Farms in MASSR, 1929. 
 Total 
Farms 
People Worker 
Able 
No 
buildings 
Home 
only 
Home 
garden 
Less 
than 1 
des. 
1-3 
des. 
3-6 
des. 
6-9 
des. 
9 or 
more 
des. 
Ananev 57 246 136 12 5 40 1 16 27 6 5 
Birzuli 25 111 71 6 3 15 -- 4 17 3 -- 
Balta 7 46 24 -- 3 4 -- 2 4 1 -- 
Krutiansk 1 5 2 1 -- -- -- -- 1 -- -- 
Slobodzia 33 138 77 6 -- 20 3 15 13 1 -- 
Kamenka 164 813 561 54 38 72 53 84 17 4 -- 
Grigoriopl 111 637 332 13 10 86 3 18 58 18 4 
Rybnitsa 173 824 445 42 33 97 17 29 97 24 2 
Tiraspol 37 174 92 20 3 14 2 4 17 11 -- 
Dubassari 192 929 655 27 39 122 41 68 44 7 -- 
Kranyi 
Oknitsy 
150 719 124 42 7 100 -- 15 72 38 17 
TOTALS 950 4546 2819 223 141 570 120 250 367 113 28 
Percentages    23.7% 14.9% 60.6% 13.7% 28.5% 41.8% 12.9% 3.1% 
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Table 4: Jewish Collective Farms in the MASSR, 1929 
Statistics compiled from AOSPRM, f. 49, op. 1, d. 1564, l. 4. 
The agricultural workers conference was attended by members of MoldOZET, 
UkrOZET, the MASSR Central Committee, the obkom natsemen bureau and obkom agitprop 
committee, and boasted over 500 guests, many of them allegedly successful Jewish farmers.
97
 
Yet, despite repeated speeches by Jewish farmers at the conference in praise of state resettlement 
programs, there were clearly serious problems with the campaign that point to the broader issues 
of imposing rapid change on a traditional ethno-religious community.  These Jewish farms, both 
collective and individual, were far from what OZET activists were telling people they were.  
Nearly one quarter of Jewish families resettled to individual farms inside the MASSR had no 
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Region Farms Families People Land 
(Dest) 
Tractors KNS Debt 
(Rubles) 
horse Cow sheep pig Chickens lamb 
Krasnoe 
Oknitsa 
Il‘ich 16 78 160 -- 4 4000 11 -- 120 32 50 -- 
 Krasnyi 
Oknianski 
21 109 343 1 14 5100 18 -- 174 -- 100 -- 
 Filkedi 1 26 85 335 -- 22 ―wild 
organ‖ 
12 13 -- -- 120 -- 
 Filkedi 2 10 30 60 -- n O  d A t A  
 Novaia Zhizn 10 39 86 -- 6 -- 9 -- -- 10 200 -- 
 Drug Ne-
Zamozhnykh 
8 41 102 -- -- -- 14 6 -- 5 200 4 
 Chervonin 
Khlebodar 
4 21 27 -- 1 -- 4 1 -- 1 60 -- 
Rybnitsa Der Shtern 26 126 443 1 3 13,160 17 -- 50 -- -- 1 
Kamenka Lenin 25 148 232 1 13 6100 16 9 72 -- 300 3 
Tiraspol Evreilend 15 68 148 -- -- ―wild 
organ‖96 
7 -- -- -- -- 4 
Ananev Evrei 
Khleborob 
12 44 92 -- 11 1789 18 12 -- 3 180 -- 
Krutiansk AMSSR 13 52 77 -- 9 3502 13 -- -- -- -- -- 
Birzuli Zemiadelets 14 55 139 -- 7 -- 13 19 -- 15 200 4 
Grigoriopl Naie Lebn 10 50 70 -- -- 3600 n o D a T a 
 Novoi Mir 11 55 75 -- n O  d A t A  
TOTALS  219 1457 2294 3 90  144 51 416 66 1410 13 
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home or buildings whatsoever on the land that had been granted them.  In the overwhelming 
majority of cases this meant, not surprisingly, that the family had not actually moved there.  In a 
few cases, it meant they had been forced to move there and were relying on the kindness of 
strangers.  Successful individual farms were comprised to a large extent of Jews that had been 
farmers before the revolution, fully 36.4%, meaning that resettlement was not sufficiently 
helping those that most needed aid—the unemployed and bureaucratically ostracized lishentsy.98   
OZET workers preferred that Jews resettle into collective farms rather than individual 
ones, because they believed collectivization to be a better way to move large numbers of 
unemployed déclassé Jews from the shtetls into productive labor, and that collective farms gave 
2-3 times the crop yield of individual farms because of greater mechanization. 
99
  All but three of 
MASSR collective farms, however, had no mechanization whatsoever, and those three had one 
tractor per farm, or on average one tractor per 25 families.  There was not an effective credit 
system in place to allow Jewish farmers to acquire farming assets, unlike the natively-grown 
Jewish credit system that was functioning fairly well in Bessarabia.
100
  Nevertheless, in the final 
year before Stalin‘s forced collectivization, Jewish agriculture in the MASSR was already 13% 
collectivized by narkomzem statistics, and OZET resettlement activists, in accordance with party 
instructions, were strongly pushing for collectivization along with agricultural resettlement.
101
  
Another serious problem that would surface during the famine was not reflected at all as a 
concern of OZET statistics, namely that fulfilling resettlement quotas was more easily achieved 
if diversity of crops was avoided: with the exception of Dubassari okrug, where a tradition of 
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successful Jewish tobacco farming was still surviving, throughout the rest of the MASSR 85% of 
resettled Jews grew nothing but wheat and rye for bread.
102
 
 Furthermore, these collective farms were, by all accounts, as inhospitable as individual 
tracts of land.  Directives from the obkom to the raikom level reveal grave concerns that most 
people in the Jewish kolkhozes desperately lacked food.  Settlers at the Der Shtern kolkhoz in 
Rybnitsa raion were reported scavenging for food in their neighbors‘ yards, with starvation 
common.
103
  Many farms lacked tools for farming and many resettled Jews were not properly 
trained, remaining idle in terms of labor.  In addition, simply moving people to a collective farm 
hardly created a collective spirit—OZET criticisms consistently reflected concern that farmers 
were not willing to depend on their co-members for their general welfare and continued to 
display, according to a report from 1930, ―kulak tendencies.‖  In Der Shtern, for example, some 
more enterprising family heads were arrested in 1930 for selling grain illegally for profit, even as 
starvation was spreading through the kolkhoz.
104
  In another case, OZET activists condemned 
members of Der Shtern for not consuming the pigs granted to their kolkhoz but instead trying to 
sell them to neighboring Ukrainian peasants.
105
  There were many health problems resulting from 
a generally unhygienic environment, with no medical attention available.  In addition, issues 
arising from the lack of day care for young children persisted, often compromising the 
availability of women in particular for work in the fields.
106
  By the late 1920s, members of the 
Evsektsiia were criticizing KOMZET and OZET for their careless zeal in moving Jews to farms, 
sometimes even destroying viable farming communities in the process, although the Evsektsiia 
activists were under normal circumstances apt to jealousy toward KOMZET as challenging their 
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role as institutional leaders of the Jewish population, which arguably happened even before the 
Evsektsiia were dissolved in 1930.
107
  By the end of 1930, however, these criticisms were 
drowned out by the much greater problems caused by general forced collectivization under 
Stalin.  The massive bureaucratic strain together with the change of focus away from nationality 
issues could hardly have meant more attention to Jewish collectives founded under nativization, 
especially after the closure of the Evsektsiia.  It seems that the fate of many such collectives, 
such as Der Shtern in Rybnitsa raion, was to slowly atrophy as functional agricultural units until 
enough people left that they were closed down.  In 1934, for example, four families were kicked 
out of the collective for refusing to work while another five managed to leave on their own.
108
   
 In any case, no more OZET resettling was taking place within the autonomous republic 
by 1929.  Most Jews were being moved to the Primorsky okrug in the Kherson oblast of Ukraine.  
Officially this was because no more land was available, but in reality the reasons were more 
complicated and indicative of the problems in implementing policies based on ideology that was 
not necessarily reflective of realities, both demographic and economic.  Problems had much to 
do with the dedication of resettled Jews to farming.  Too many Jews, OZET workers often 
complained, rented their land to local farmers either for money, or once this was attacked by 
OZET and party officials in 1929, for produce or other goods.
109
  Again, only Dubassari had 
significant cases of successful Jewish farmers renting additional land from local peasants in 
order to boost their agricultural output of tobacco.  In most cases, ―renting‖ involved Jews that 
received land from OZET renting it to neighboring peasants because they had no idea how to 
farm it, or had no intention of leaving their community in order to relocate to open farmland 
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surrounded by Ukrainian peasants, for obvious reasons.  OZET activists referred with much 
anger to such Jews that had as they saw it ―one foot in the shtetl and one on the land.‖  In 
numerous cases OZET workers found to their disbelief that Jews granted land by the state ―did 
not know where their land was,‖ ―treated it like an accidental gift‖ or displayed the wrong 
mindset in desiring to remain in the shtetls rather than moving to collective farms.  Such attitudes 
were causing many peasants, OZET activists worried, to believe that ―Jews are lazy and don‘t 
know how to toil.‖  Rather than delving more deeply into the limitations of a process that turned 
land over to Jews who sometimes neither wanted it nor knew how to farm it, activists insisted on 
the need to ―disabuse them of their outdated perspectives.‖110   
Jewish activists in KOMZET and the Evsektsiia were no doubt harsh partly because they 
were under great pressure themselves.  Party leaders very early on determined to use the 
controlled press as a powerful took of legitimacy by turning potential criticism away from its 
often failing policies toward the cadres implementing them.  For example, in July 1925, an 
article in Der Emes blamed local Jewish cadres for a resettlement mix up:  
It is not easy to get land in the former Podol‘ gubernia, now part of Moldova, but a collective of 28 
families, 22 of them Jewish, managed to do just that.  They received land, were extended sufficient credits 
by Gosbank to begin [farming], and then invested several months of labor since March.  Now they are told 
by the Kamenka raipartkom that they will have to leave the land because it belongs to the Rybnitsa sugar 
plant…How can this be?  Where was the raipartkom three months ago when the families started their 
labors?  We ask the comrades at the Moldovan Jewish section to investigate this matter.
111
  
Many Jewish collective farms that were formed without proper capital and had no means 
to attain it without adequate credit were forced to rent out parts of their collective land to 
peasants in exchange for livestock or other necessities.  In many cases, this strained relations 
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with local peasants, particularly when the collective farm failed to turn around due to 
inexperience, despite the borrowed assets.  Peasants often maintained that Jews had no business 
farming, and sometimes violently opposed their establishing collective farms, such as those from 
the town of Marderovka who attacked the farm Nae Lebn in 1929.
112
  In truth, many of these 
farms never became viable (despite the continuous efforts of Tiraspol-based Moldova 
Narkomzen to train Jews intensely to become successful Kolkhoz directors) until the mid to late 
1930s, when they were either dissolved altogether or became open to non-Jews.
113
   
OZET, like many other state agencies, had quotas to fulfill, in this case for resettled Jews; 
they were not very responsive to Jewish complaints after resettlement.  In fact, there is plenty of 
evidence that the OZET drive to fulfill its resettlement quota contributed to the resettlement of 
inept farmers.  Families were normally required to contribute at least 10 rubles toward their own 
resettlement, but many unemployed artisans could not collect this sum.  OZET offered them 
subsidies, permitting resettlement without any family contribution.  Thus, quite often only the 
completely destitute found OZET incentives appealing: total state support was requested for all 
interested families in a given district often.
114
   
This was the intention, of course.  Agricultural resettlement was envisioned as an 
important means of helping the huge numbers of Jewish lishentsy created by Soviet economic 
policies.  In Transnistria, there is evidence that a significant number of economically undermined 
Jews received assistance through land resettlement: some 1500 families out of a total MASSR 
Jewish population of about 50,000 were moved.  Yet this was far from sufficient, and in certain 
devastated portions of the region, it helped so few Jews as to fail to overcome a perception of the 
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Jewish street of being the proverbial drop in the bucket.  In Rybnitsa raion, for example, the 
number of Jews resettled was in the dozens, while the number of families made destitute after 
1918 ran in the hundreds.
115
  Agricultural resettlement was of course not the only option 
available: in some cases natsmen workers sought to find factory work for displaced Jewish 
artisans.  But here also, the results were minimal—most Jews either moved away and integrated 
into the workforce on their own or they starved. 
 In the years after collectivization, in fact, they were much more likely to starve.  In May 
1933 MoldOZET received a desperate and angry letter from KOMZET inspector Shoihet 
concerning the state of Jewish resettlement and the general condition of Jews in Ananeev raion 
during the famine.
116
  He wrote that he arrived from Tiraspol and found hardly anyone at OZET 
in Ananeev, only one dedicated woman, a comrade Tulchiner, who had outfitted and sent five 
families to Crimea for resettlement.  He arrived at night and went out to look around at first light 
in the Jewish village of Valagotsulo, where he found  
people lying around in the streets, swollen and dying of hunger.  Every day somebody dies of hunger.  Only 
about 60 Jewish families are left, about 25 of them survive because they are government servants, and 
another 10 families scrape by, while the remaining 25 families are starving.  There can hardly be realistic 
talk of resettlement, as these people have no energy.  Those recently earmarked for resettlement have died 
either of hunger or tuberculosis.  One man‘s family, a Iankl Tsisis, died this morning.  The Jews have been 
overwhelmed by the bureaucracy involved with registering for resettlement and many have given up 
because far too few have been effectively resettled.  The Jews I talked to said that they have no hope, even 
if the process of resettlement gets under way, they‘ll die before they get there. Today, through my own 
efforts, six more families have been signed up for resettlement, but by the looks of them, only three will be 
able to survive the trip.  No other families will resettle from here, and this mission is over.  I want to leave 
today but the three families that can make the trip will not let me leave until the issue of outfitting them for 
the trip is settled: I hope this can be done by the evening so that I can go to Balta and leave this horror 
(kashmar)...I was at the Jewish school today, where the children were not fed.  When they learned there 
was no food, many simply left school, while some others sat in their chairs and slept as the lecture went on.  
This is likely the picture in other schools as well.  In the center of town there is a children‘s home for the 
poorest families, where the kids are fed 50 grams of bread and a cup of sweetened tea for breakfast, 50 
grams of bread for lunch, and 50 grams of bread and the same tea for dinner.  That is it.  I was at the 
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playground and ―found there not children playing, but tiny old people lying around in semi-
consciousness.‖117 
 
Shoihet went on to blame the authorities for failing to help this village: there is no representative 
from the raion authorities, he apparently left, and the Ananeev raion OZET has not given any 
assistance to the local OZET representatives, which has completely disintegrated except for 
comrade Tulchiner.  She has not been given sufficient funds for re-settlement, nor received 
proper information about how the settlers are to be outfitted, including payment for the journey 
and 3 rubles per person in cash.  Last week, a family was sent off entirely on their own financial 
support.  This is entirely the fault of the MoldOZET committee, Shoihet underlined, and it must 
be discussed upon his return to Tiraspol.
118
  The mission of resettlement survived the famine in 
the MASSR, but the numbers resettled were insignificant, never approaching the numbers 
discussed in meetings or continuously stated to poor Jews during the height of the campaign. 
But what also bothered Jews of the devastated shtetls was what many of them considered 
an overly idealistic and thus unrealistic perspective on the part of the OZET bureaucrats 
regarding popular antisemitism, something that after the violence of the civil war years the 
Jewish street was very sensitive to.  Indeed, throughout the resettlement cases, the ability of 
bureaucrats from the relevant agencies, both Jews and non-Jews, to close their eyes to the 
realities of popular antisemitism was remarkable.  Only slowly and with resistance, bureaucrats 
and activists were forced to realize that not only were state and party initiatives being slowed by 
popular antisemitism, but that the policies were further straining already difficult inter-ethnic 
relations.  Yet, Soviet policies professed to battle anti-Semitism, so how could this be?  For 
many Jewish state and party activists faith in the revolution served as a veil that clouded their 
perception of reality—something of a continuation of traditional liberal hopes of Jewish 
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acceptance that, just like among pre-revolutionary Haskalah proponents, were marred by 
significant sentiment of Jewish self-hatred.  Nevertheless, there was increased attention given to 
combating antisemitism: in the minds of state and party policy implementers, popular frustration 
with the perceived wealth of nepmen became mixed with antisemitism because of Jews‘ 
continued preponderance in trade.
119
  But in places of agricultural resettlement like Transnistria 
and southern Ukraine, the conflict with local peasants was also an important part of the issue.  
The perception of this problem grew consistently and was by 1928 a constant topic of 
conversation at agitprop meetings at local and regional levels.
120
  By the end of the 1920s, new 
problems that contributed to rising popular antisemitism had surfaced that were directly 
connected to Soviet policies, especially resettlement.   
On March 28, 1928, antisemitism in the MASSR was discussed at an obkom level OZET 
meeting.  The participants concluded that Jews were still not properly settled on their lands, 
which angered the local peasants who thought that Jews should not have been given land at all, 
particularly if they didn‘t know how to use it.  Members of OZET admitted that there is 
resentment because Jews are perceived to work for Soviet institutions, and anti-Soviet elements 
blame the Jews for policies they do not like, believing that the Jews were working through Soviet 
power to oppress the peasants.  Some reported that conversations heard in villages focused on 
Jewish conspiracy theories—Ukrainians and Moldovans getting exploited while Jews were 
profiting again.
121
  To solve the problem, participants called for more urgent concern for the 
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Jewish lack of desire to farm, including sponsoring assistance programs, including loans, to 
encourage Jews to move from small towns to farms and work the land, and to commit party 
organs to involve déclassé Jewish elements to take up agriculture.  As far as these activists were 
concerned, Jews still had improper class understanding, with far too many still involved in trade.  
Somewhat unusual for the time, some called on the party to purge itself of antisemites in its 
ranks.  Antisemitism was clearly a growing concern for the Evsektsiia, but the fact that its own 
policies were a contributing factor remained a suicidal public admission to some, while many 
others refused to believe that socialist cultural policies could have such negative effects. 
In fact, there were many local examples of Evsektsiia actions exacerbating antisemitism.  
In Birzuli, for example, the state railroad worker union was refusing membership to Jews in 
1929, despite the fact that the town was very heavily Jewish.  In their discussions at the obkom 
natsmen bureau, Jewish communists complained that not enough people have been turned on to 
the work of OZET—that not enough people know about the ―new Jew.‖  By implication, if 
people knew about new Jews, they would hire them, i.e, Jews would be accepted once they 
relinquished their particularity.  Many in OZET believed, or at least pursued policies that 
reflected a belief, that once Jews became established as successful farmers, they would be 
accepted by neighboring peasants as brothers.
122
   
The reality could not have been further from the truth, although it was not until 1928 that 
Jewish communists in the Transnistrian borderland began taking serious note of the problem.  At 
a Rybnitsa raion agitprop meeting, members expressed deep concern with rising antisemitism in 
the countryside, which they viewed as ―isskrivlenie kursa partii I Sovvlasti‖ (twisting the 
direction of the party and the Soviet government), and determined to appoint the finest people to 
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tackle the problem.
123
  There was little time to address the issue, however, and it soon outlasted 
the ―evseks:‖ in the 1930s in rural Transnistria, most collectivized Jews left their non-viable 
farms went to join the industrial labor force.  In part, this was because they never developed a 
real interest in farming, but also very important was the fierce resistance to them joining 
kolkhozes (and sovkhozes—the state collective farms) or taking up farming at all among 
Ukraininan and Moldovan peasants in general.
124
  One of the impetuses for maintaining Jewish 
collective farms even when they were terribly unproductive (in 1934, only 12% of the grain 
quota for Jewish collective farms in the MASSR was fulfilled, lower than the overall average)
125
 
was antisemitism—it was very problematic to place Jews in collective farms with Ukrainians 
and/or Moldovans.   
Things were getting bad enough to attract oblast level policy attention: the obkom review 
on March 2, 1929 of the raion-level election results noted, among other issues, the interference 
with voting because of ―class warfare with minorities‖ in the villages, a veiled reference to anti-
Jewish violence.  It was primarily Soviet policies toward Jews that disturbed the traditional status 
quo and bred additional resentment by attempting to move large numbers of a largely urban 
minority into rural settings; other minorities in the area, most notably Germans and Bulgarians, 
were already overwhelmingly rural.  Some groups in rural areas were accused of using 
nationality and religion as a means of constructing ―a united front under the control of the 
wealthy and the priests,‖ and of using antisemitism to turn Jews away for nationalistic reasons.  
With this came the accusation that such wealthy and religious elements were causing fissures 
between groups in nationally-mixed villages. 
126
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Nevertheless, a continued dearth of competent party bureaucrats caused problematic and 
deteriorating circumstances because decisions often continued to be made without credible 
consideration being given to local circumstances or popular sentiment.  By way of example, the 
kolkhoz ―Red Gardener,‖ formed of mostly ethnic Moldovan villagers from the village of Suklei 
outside Tiraspol, was assigned a new party cell in December 1933 in order to speed-up 
collectivization because only 40% of the villagers by that point had been collectivized.  Despite 
the ethnic composition of the kolkhoz, the party cell members included two Moldovans, four 
Ukrainians and a Jew, all of whom were not well received, especially the latter.
127
  The decision 
was a particularly bad one in the case of Suklei because during the harvest months of 1933, when 
famine swept through much of Transnistria in the wake of forced collectivization, a Jew named 
Neiman, considered an exemplary udarnik by the local party cell, had been appointed to guard 
the kolkhoz grain storage to prevent hungry peasants from carrying off grain designated for 
shipment to Tiraspol.  Neiman was attacked by Moldovan villagers desperate for grain and 
beaten almost to death—they were not at all pleased to see another Jew appointed to the kolkhoz 
party cell a few months later.
128
  The absurdity of such cases, of which there were many, seemed 
to escape bureaucrats making such decisions on the basis of other concerns. 
After the dissolution of the Evsektsiia in 1930 and the end of indigenization, the focus of 
Jewish resettlement policies changed together with other aspects of cultural enlightenment.  The 
OZET organization was maintained but its focus changed significantly, as seen from instructions 
for its policy directions received from Kiev during MoldOZET elections in 1934.  Moldovan 
OZET cells were informed that they were now to gear themselves toward promoting socialist 
internationalism (in their case meaning Bessarabia specifically) while combating Jewish 
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nationalism, a clear turn away from policies of the 20s.  The work of resettlement would now 
push the idea of the Birobidzhan Autonomous Jewish Oblast as a symbol of the correctness of 
Soviet nationalities policies: Jews should be re-settled there and no longer among Moldovan or 
Ukrainian villagers (or Bulgarian or German ones).  At the same time, the members of OZET 
would be expected to become active participants in all levels of socialist construction (read: the 
specific project of Jewish agricultural resettlement would be watered down and workers 
committed to it would turn towards other social and cultural projects).  The specific instructions 
for the raion-level electoral campaign for OZET underscored this point—cells were to work 
closely with rural communities to attract new members, i.e. OZET would slowly cease to be an 
exclusively Jewish organization and be used for agricultural modernization more broadly.
129
  
With the specific aims of Jewish national interests ended, Jewish institutions were being folded 
into the broader state bureaucracy geared toward non-Jewish interests, most clearly expressed 
through the instruction that OZET cells open up to allow non-Jews to be entered into the 
organization.  Furthermore, the main goals of OZET no longer mentioned agricultural 
resettlement in Ukraine at all; it was now to spread the nationalities policy of the party.  The sub-
goals under this were to spread Soviet nationalities policy toward the Jews specifically and to 
push re-settlement to Birobidzhan.
130
   
Agricultural resettlement for Jews from the MASSR thus had ambiguous results.  Clearly, 
the fundamental notion of moving Jews to rural areas to take up farming proved untenable as it 
was not a feasible solution to the Jewish problem in the post-WWI Soviet-controlled former 
Pale.  It was demographically anti-modern and was for the country as a whole largely abandoned 
by the 1930s in favor of breakneck industrialization.  This remained true even if the state goals 
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expressed were built on visions of self-improvement, muscularity and productivity.  More than 
any other sphere of Jewish life and politics, the agricultural resettlement experiment pointed 
clearly to the ephemeral nature of Jewish national interests as purported by Jewish communists, 
as well as the marriage between supporters of radical Jewish change and Marxism-Leninism: by 
the 1930s, Jews in Transnistria were no longer as necessary for the stability of state and party 
control and dominance, therefore Jewish national goals and interests were no longer compatible 
with those of the Communist Party.  Those Jews willing to go along with the new platform 
would be folded into the broader state project; those that were not had a more difficult and 
sometimes dangerous path, but many were able to quietly assimilate part or all or their Jewish 
identity to norms of Soviet citizenry.              
 
Normalization through Re-education: the State Yiddish Schooling Campaign 
Unlike agricultural settlement on the land, a focus on compulsory state education in 
Yiddish was more in line with Soviet values and thus survived intact Stalin‘s revolution from 
above.  Prior to this, in the 1920s, as part of the general party directives which stipulated that 
soviets, courts, and party cells in Ukraine and Belarus should conduct their business in Ukrainian 
and Belorussian respectively, Jews were to conduct their business in Yiddish.  This arrangement 
was meant to further the Stalinist conception of socialist in content and national in form, because 
local soviets in Yiddish were not meant to foster national diversity but to Bolshevize the national 
minorities.  Yiddish was not an immediate or obvious choice but was eventually made the 
language of Soviet Jewish culture:  Soviet Jewish scholars, writers, and other cultural activists 
went about transforming Jewish culture by creating a usable Jewish past that fit the socialist 
present, reforming the ―wild‖ vernacular of Yiddish into a modern language worthy of high 
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culture, and transforming traditional, religious Jews into secular Soviet citizens.
131
  This change 
in policy was very important for the Evsektsiia in taking greater responsibility for the Jewish 
masses.
132
 
Indeed, the Yiddishization drive, besides being part of the overall Soviet campaign 
against illiteracy, took on dimensions of its own.  As already mentioned, Jews were an atypical 
minority because of their relatively high levels of literacy and urbanization.  Together with their 
unusual geographic distribution, Jews were more apt to assimilate directly into Russian or 
Ukrainian language schools and/or institutions, which in fact many chose to do.  The Evsektsiia’s 
insistence of Yiddish was first of all tied to its own political and bureaucratic survival (after all, 
if Yiddish was not necessary for Bolshevizing the Jews, then what was the point of the 
Evsektsiia?), and secondly to maintain Jewish identity around the only aspect of Judaism 
permissible to express in an atheist, proletariat state: the Yiddish language.  In addition, 
Ukrainian communists favored the Yiddishization campaign, because they knew that Jews were 
assimilating into Russian language and culture and did not want to increase the numbers of 
cultural Russians in Ukrainian urban areas.
133
  The Evsektsiia’s program for Jewish education 
was thus focused on secularizing and modernizing the Jewish population of the former Pale of 
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Settlement through Yiddishization.  The Evsektsiia activists, in line with the general goals of the 
Soviet literacy campaign of the mid-1920s, were also concerned with literacy as it was intricately 
linked to Soviet conceptions of modernization.
134
   
At the creation of the MASSR in 1924, local party officials were very concerned about 
the level of enlightenment among the local population, especially the Moldovans—on whose 
account the autonomous region was after all created.  In Badeev‘s description of local 
circumstances before those assembled for the first All-Moldovan Party Conference, the 
Ukrainians, Russians and Jews were described as being ahead while the Moldovans and women 
were behind.  This would not be the last time the feminization of backwardness was given a 
Moldovan face by communist officials.
135
  The feminization of Moldovans (and in some cases 
and for other reasons, Jews) would be repeated often by Soviet policy makers in their effort to 
make the local population legible by markers of socialist progress.  For most Jewish communists, 
such as the Evsektsiia activists and youth in the komsomol, such sex-oriented paradigms went 
hand in hand with their own modernization narrative: they were trying, as they saw it, to create a 
new physical and muscular Jewish male and leave behind the stunted, bookish and weak (i.e. 
feminine) traditional shtetl Jew. 
In terms of the implementation of Soviet educational directives—the MASSR was doing 
abysmally poorly, Badeev noted, with most teachers significantly lacking competence, let alone 
pupils.
136
  In Rybnitsa raion, of 108 teachers reviewed by the executive committee (raieksekom) 
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as late as 1929, over 90 received very poor marks—not only for their low pedagogical 
effectiveness, but also for their social and party activism and their ―lack of faith in socialism.‖  
Many among the Moldovans and Ukrainians in particular had questionable pasts (son of a White 
Army officer, daughter of a priest, father killed for serving with Denikin, etc.)
137
  Jews—
particularly young teachers that had served as Komsomolists—received among the highest marks 
and were actively promoted into the ranks of local teachers.
138
  Thus the contradiction: even as 
the Evsektsiia promoted a secular Yiddish-language education system for Jews, there was 
growing opportunity for Jews to work in Russian and Ukrainian schools because of the great 
dearth of qualified pedagogues from the party‘s perspective.  The demographic reality in the 
Transnistrian borderland served to undermine the implementation of Soviet affirmative action 
policies in the Jewish case. 
In addition, implementing Soviet-Jewish education in the MASSR proved incredibly 
difficult because conducting propaganda work among minorities that lived in close proximity to 
each other and were often intermixed was impractical.  In a region that may have been 
predominantly Ukrainian, for example, some 10 separate minority groups lived in adjoining 
villages, which made much more difficult the prospect of obtaining some positive impact from 
cultural work in the groups‘ native languages.  Because of an extreme lack of qualified 
personnel, a tremendous shortage of funds and considerable resistance from Jewish parents, the 
Evshkoly (Soviet Jewish schools) encountered considerable problems from the moment of the 
formation of MASSR‘s Jewish education bureau.139  Inspector of National Minorities of the 
People‘s Commissariat for Enlightenment in the MASSR, Comrade Trakhtenbroit, complained 
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that cultural work among the national groups was completely unregulated and hardly monitored: 
it was ―disastrous.‖140   
Budgetary problems significantly limited the ability of Narkompros to implement 
changes in the schools.
141
  While progress seems to have been made, with 81% of the schools 
that were ordered by Narkompros for MASSR national minorities only three years earlier 
apparently functioning by the end of 1927, these were generally not new schools but existing 
schools converted to a Soviet curriculum.  For a bureaucracy strapped for funds, buildings seized 
from closed Hebrew schools and re-opened as Evshkoly were preferable to building new schools.  
Like elsewhere, in the MASSR Evshkoly were mostly refurbished former Talmud-Torah 
schools.
142
  Such school buildings were often entirely inadequate for schooling.  Four Evshkoly 
in the MASSR did not have their own school buildings and their students shared buildings with 
Ukrainian and former Jewish religious schools (!), where Jewish students were often forced to 
attend during the evening shift.  During the1926/27 academic year, Narkompros issued 6000 
rubles for the construction of a Evshkola in Krytiansko, for example, where the school previously 
had met in the Ukrainian school building.
143
  Because of the problems caused by this type of 
mixing of traditions at the schools caused by a lack of funds, Jewish parents were more than 
willing to send their children to Russian-language state schools.  The Jewish impetus for this 
education was community driven largely by parents who increasingly saw no future for their 
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children with a Yiddish education, as opposed to some other minorities for whom it was driven 
by pressure from state culture workers.
144
   
 Among other challenges, the Evshkoly were plagued by shortages of all kinds, including 
books, furniture, and as already mentioned, buildings.  This was not unlike the general situation 
facing the Evsektsiia activists, and indeed, all of Soviet society, particularly in the early years of 
Soviet power.  But the worst shortfall in the MASSR was of trusted, Soviet-educated cadres who 
specialized in the fields in question.
145
 Books, apparently almost completely unavailable in the 
early years of the Evshkoly, continued to remain a problem.  In 1926/27, political enlightenment 
workers delivered 12,923 books in the MASSR, of which 13% were for the national minorities, 
including 5.7% of the overall total for Jews.
146
  Furnishings in the national schools were 
seriously inadequate: in some Jewish schools no benches were available, instead long tables were 
used which were reminiscent of those used in heders.
147
  Things never really improved in this 
respect: teachers in Rybnitsa complained about the incredibly poor conditions of Evshkoly in late 
summer 1928, not long before Evshkoly began to lose state backing.
148
  Thus, in physical terms, 
education must have seemed to have changed little for a great many Jewish children despite the 
radically new ideological vision of the Soviet policy makers.  In many cases, the continuance of 
an atmosphere that failed to break in any notable way for local families from pre-revolutionary 
circumstances allowed families to proceed with tradition: the revolution did not reach far-flung 
areas for years.   
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The Yiddishization drive was also plagued by bureaucratic incompetence, particularly in 
the alienation of Jewish parents due to the excessive zeal of the Jewish communists.  The politics 
of Evsektsiia activists were geared to grab (okvhatit‘) children, as they forced Tarbut schools 
closed one by one and physically prevented children from attending them at other times.  This 
zealotry cannot be understood without the context of the modern state into which activists were 
attempting to mold their co-religionists: the new modern Jew could not be created without 
attacking Jewish backwardness.
149
  Activists in the countryside, often poorly trained, sometimes 
performed the anti-religious activist part of their job with excessive vigor and cruelty as well.  
Such zealotry from Evsektsiia activists earned criticism from within.  M. Kiper, a member of the 
Ukrainian Evsektsiia Central Bureau, wrote in the June 28, 1927 edition of Der Shtern:  
It was not clear to all cultured activists that Yiddish is not an end in itself but a means to ease the 
cultural development of the Yiddish speaking masses.  This led to the tendency to drag all Jewish 
children into Yiddish schools by force…Gross distortions occurred in some cities where people 
who do not need Yiddish schools were forced—by the use of terror—to attend them.150 
Moishe Altschuler of the Minsk Main Bureau wrote scathingly in Kommunistishe fon: ―We are 
not a party of Sabbath desecrators—we are a revolutionary Marxist party…‖151  In the Russian 
language press also, reports were carried of Jewish parents wanting to send their children to 
Russian schools only to be barred from doing so by over-zealous cultural activists who insisted 
that children attend Jewish schools opened for them.
152
   Nora Levin has argued that obnoxious 
and desperate measures against traditional Judaism by the Evsektsiia backfired, sparking 
vehement and often violent resistance that not only was partly responsible for the scaling back of 
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attacks by the late twenties but also caused the deepening of rifts dating from pre-revolutionary 
times within the Jewish community, typically along generational lines.
153
  In March 1924, the 
Moscow Central Bureau issued instructions that Jewish communists were to stop alienating the 
petit-bourgeois elements of the Jewish population and focus instead on neutralizing them.
154
  
 Thus, many parents chose to send their children to Russian-language schools rather than 
the Evshkoly, or attempted to educate their children in the traditional Hebrew manner 
clandestinely either in their own homes or collectively with other parents in some agreed-upon 
location.  Jewish parents generally found the Evshkoly unattractive.  Most ended at the 4
th
 or 5
th
 
grade, while many Jewish parents wanted to send their children to 7-year-schools.  In addition, 
there was limited education available in Yiddish after this.
155
  Furthermore, parents who sought 
greater socio-economic opportunities for their children realized that Jewish schools in Yiddish 
were impractical because they did not properly prepare their children for a workplace that was 
almost exclusively conducted in Russian or Ukrainian.  On the other hand, Jews for whom 
religious tradition was centrally important the Yiddish state schools were obnoxiously anti-
religious, attacking Hebraic culture and Jewish religion more intensely than Russian or 
Ukrainian schools did precisely because the curriculum was designed specifically to reform 
―backward Jews.‖  Such a policy ―made the Yiddish school unattractive to precisely those 
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elements who were most interested in the preservation of Jewish national identity.‖ 156    Soviet 
policies in fact helped keep Tarbut schools popular, even though they were difficult to support 
financially for mostly poor communities.
157
  Hebrew also survived for some years as an elective 
in secondary schools, although it was deemed a ―dead language‖ in the Soviet Union and 
unacceptable for primary education.
158
  Evsketsiia activists complained that in some places 
where the Soviet school system was unable to reach, Jewish children still attended heders.  
Perhaps the lack of qualified teachers for the Evshkoly was the greatest deficiency of all: 
MASSR Evshkoly routinely failed to meet Narkompros standards mostly due to a complete lack 
of qualified teachers on the market.  In order to try to improve the teaching effectiveness of 
national minority teachers, Narkompros sent teachers during the summers on training programs.  
Many of the minorities‘ teachers sent from the MASSR, for example, were teachers in the 
Evshkoly 159   
Despite such overwhelming problems, Evshkoly were nonetheless in some cases chosen 
by Jewish families because of the entrenched popular antisemitism that Jewish pupils and parents 
faced in the Russian and Ukrainian language schools.  Given the legacy of Tsarist anti-Jewish 
discrimination and especially the unprecedented violence of the civil war years
160
, Jewish 
officials were incredibly sensitive to manifestations of antisemitism that threatened to undermine 
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Soviet policies, but under the circumstances of bureaucratic scarcity during the interwar years 
they were unable to adequately address this issue and popular antisemitism remained the rule 
rather than the exception—very much as had been the case in the pre-revolutionary Russian 
Empire.  In defending the equality and rights of Jews, the state purported to uphold values that 
were alien for mostly illiterate peasants.  In the Evshkoly, Yiddish for Jews was part of state-wide 
nativization policy during these years, but in reality Evshkoly attracted many because they often 
were at least less painful than integration: in the Tiraspol seven-year-school 180 of 400 pupils 
were Jews in 1925, but none of the 8 teachers were Jewish.  One teacher routinely taught his 
class how Jews perform ritual murder, complete with demonstrations, until he was eventually 
replaced.
161
 
Nevertheless, in the MASSR as elsewhere, many Jewish parents, particularly from urban 
―sophisticated‖ groups, sent their children to Ukrainian and Russian schools because of the lack 
of long-term opportunities offered by Jewish schools.  The level of linguistic assimilation was 
already considerable in the province: ―evseks‖ noted that some Jewish children were completely 
unable to speak ―their native language,‖ having been brought up in either Russian or 
Ukrainian.
162
  Leaders in the Evsektsiia strove to overturn this reality in order to implement 
Soviet korenizatsiia policies; linguistic assimilation directly into Russian or Ukrainian served to 
undermine their usefulness and was deemed (counter-intuitively) not good for inculcating 
socialist values.  In an effort to maintain and enforce Soviet national order, the Jews would have 
to be taught Yiddish and learn to be Jews in the acceptable manner.  Influenced by arguments 
from Evsektsiia members, in 1925 the MASSR narkompros made mandatory the opening of at 
least one seven-year school for every thirty four-year schools in operation in the autonomous 
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republic.
163
  This meant opening many new seven-year schools, since standard pre-revolutionary 
rural education, when it was available, tended to be limited to the elementary level.
164
  By 1927, 
seven-year Jewish schools had been opened at 133% of the quota set by narkompros for such 
schools (based on the number of elementary schools), compared to 100% for Germans and 
Russians and only 54% for Ukrainians and only 23% for Moldovans.  While often not successful 
in inspiring socialist ethos within their traditional co-religionists, the Evsektsiia activists did 
apparently contribute to Jews becoming immersed in a school curriculum that promised to 
inculcate Bolshevik values into their children, often because parents had no alternative available 
to the Evshkoly. 
 The Evshkoly thus did indeed show increased enrollment through the middle-to late 
1920s despite the reservations noted above.  In the MASSR in 1924/25 42% of Jewish children 
were attending Evshkoly; in 1925/26 the number had risen to 50%, and in 1926/27 to 55%. These 
figures in the MASSR closely paralleled those available for Belarus, which in the same years 
was 41.6%, 44.5%, and 47.9%, respectively.
165
  The percent of all Jewish children going to 
Evshkoly went up from 42% to 55% in three years, although this figure was still too low for the 
activists who lamented that 45% of Jewish children were being educated in a non-native 
language in Russian or Ukrainian language schools.
166
    Unfortunately, it was the children of 
poor, déclassé families—the lishentsy, mostly in urban areas—who found themselves at 
Evshkoly because better off parents, such as public servants, found ways to send their children to 
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Russian or Ukrainian language schools.  The Evshkoly across much of the former Pale were thus 
attended by up to 85% pupils classified as belonging to various déclassé poor elements.
167
  At the 
community level, such circumstances did much to further divide Jews in the MASSR.  
In addition to four and seven year Evshkoly, the MASSR was home to various 
professional, technical and literacy schools meant to increase the skills of the national minorities 
and increase their rate of literacy.  Two artisan training schools were opened in the early 1920s 
and one Evproftekhshkola (Jewish Professional Technical School).  These schools took 14 to 15 
year olds and trained them for two to three years for a specific trade.  In Balta in 1927 60% of all 
students in the general Proftekhshkol were Jews, and Jews represented 39% of such students 
across the entire MASSR—clear evidence of the preponderance of Jews in artisan and technical 
fields, as well as in urban centers.  The likbez or adult literacy school was another important 
Soviet re-education institution.
168
  By the mid-1920s there were 216 such schools across the 
MASSR, 15 of which were Jewish, 6 German, 2 Bulgarian (although these courses were taught 
in Russian for lack of books in Bulgarian) and 2 Polish.  The total of Jewish students in such 
schools was 650 in 1927, proportional to their numbers in the professional technical schools.
 169
  
While these numbers reflect quite directly the minority population in the autonomous republic, 
they also again underscore the desire of the Soviet government to encourage education in 
minority languages, at least during the nativization campaign.    
But just like with questions of agricultural re-settlement, the state focus on education as a 
means for promoting minority national culture ended by the early 1930s, replaced on the one 
hand by greater interest in the dominant language and culture, especially Russian, and on the 
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other in the folding in of previously promoted national interests into the broader socialist 
direction.  The MASSR was a special case because Moscow remained focused on Moldovans as 
different from Romanians for propaganda purposes.  Even in choosing a dialect upon which to 
―build‖ the Moldovan language, linguists chose the dialect of central Bessarabia in order to make 
it intelligible to peasants on both sides of the Dniester, in expectation of the Soviet takeover of 
Bessarabia, or in Soviet parlance: the national liberation of all Moldovans.
170
  Thus, the state 
focus would clearly be on creating Moldovan national culture—something that had to be done 
from scratch—and local minorities, such as the Jews, would need to focus on the real historical 
victims, the Moldovans.  The prvious stress placed on Jewish problems specifically could no 
longer be justified, and Jews in the local state and party administrations were instructed to direct 
their energies elsewhere.  
The focus on socialist education primarily in Yiddish for Jews was thus over by the early 
1930s, and given the ambivalent attitude toward the project on the Jewish street, it was not 
surprising that the Evshkola as an institution went into rapid decline.  Without state backing that 
ensured enrollment of Jewish pupils throughout the 1930s, Jewish parents that were able to send 
their children to other schools did so.  By 1937/38 in Tiraspol, for example, only one Yiddish-
language school remained where there had earlier been many more.  Its 407 pupils (for a Jewish 
population of some 20,000) reflected a below average level of interest in their studies: according 
to the school inspector fully 23% of the student body received unsatisfactory grades.
171
  The 
inspector blamed the problem on the lack of effective administration because the old school 
director was arrested last year by the NKVD.  The new director admitted that Jewish parents 
desired more teaching in Russian, in fact he noted that this was the reason many sought to send 
                                                 
170
 Charles King, The Moldovans, 65. 
171
 AOSPRM, f. 32, op. 2, d. 626, l. 56-58. 
284 
 
their children to other schools.  Furthermore, much of the education was in fact being done in 
other languages: in terms of annual hours in the classroom, 1480 were spent in Yiddish, 1100 in 
Ukrainian and 1020 in Russian (no teaching took place in Moldovan at the Tiraspol Evshkola).  
Many subjects were never taught in Yiddish, such as astronomy, geography and physics that 
lacked instructional texts in Yiddish and required teachers to use texts in other languages.  The 
Tiraspol Evshkola certainly was also an example of the policy changes underway in other ways: 
many teachers at the school were serving in other capacities as well.  Mrs. Shitsman, for 
example, the math and physics teacher, doubled as a leading local bezbozhnik (League of the 
Militant Godless), while the biology teacher, Mr. Koifman, led OZET propaganda circles.
172
   
Part of the issue in Transnistria was that Jews were more broadly using education to 
migrate out of the MASSR, not merely in order to avoid the Evshkola.  The two principal 
institutions of higher education in the autonomous republic, the Tiraspol State Institute and the 
Worker Faculty (Rabfak), which both were in some years during the early and mid-1920s close 
to majority Jewish, graduated only 19 Jews out of a combined total of 349 students in 1937/38.
173
  
This was paralleled at the Tiraspol Pedagogical Institute, whose graduates in 1978/38 included 
14 Jews out of a total of 301, again a huge drop from the numerical over-representation of Jews 
in the previous decade.
174
  What these enrollment numbers indicate can be corroborated by other 
institutions and spheres of Jewish life: in this Soviet periphery, state-sponsored Jewish identity 
had largely failed.   
The Romanian Army‘s re-occupation of Bessarabia and Transnistria in 1941 meant the 
final nail in the coffin of the Evshkoly.  Rybnitsa raion, for example, was governed a Colonel 
Korbu Popescu, who served as raion prefect.  Popescu quickly changed the curriculum of all 
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Rybnitsa schools to champion the spread of Romanian culture.  His administration gave their 
greatest precedence toward former Soviet Moldovan schools, but most Ukrainian schools were 
reformed in this way also, while remaining Evshkoly were closed.  A committee composed of 
Romanian nationals was created to oversee education, and they replaced most local teachers and 
administrators with those sent from Romania, just as had been done more than 20 years before in 
Bessarabia.  Children learned to sing patriotic Romanian songs and perform national dances, 
together with strong doses of anti-Soviet messages in stories and placards that adorned the inside 
of classrooms as well as the streets of Transnistrian towns.  Jewish children did not witness the 
educational changes first hand, however, since they were sent to concentration camps along with 
their parents where the overwhelming majority were killed.
175
  By the time the Red Army 
occupied the territory in 1944 (the second time—this time for 45 years), Soviet statisticians 
noted the local educational system carefully, together with the complete absence of Evshkoly.   In 
Rybnitsa raion, again as example, 42 functioning schools (of 51) included 21 Moldovan schools, 
19 Ukrainian schools and 2 Russian ones.
176
     
In the final analysis, the efforts of the Evsektsiia to reform Jewish education met with 
limited success.  While traditional Jewish education was primarily elementary and religious for 
most children, with a few talented youngsters going on to study at yeshivas, new secular state 
schools for Jews were aimed at institutionalizing professional training and inculcating socialist 
modernity.  Whereas traditionally Jewish apprentices would study with their artisan teachers, the 
technical schools sought to standardize artisan education, to control its quality and material, as 
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well as to have more say over who studied what.  Thus, the state sought to limit professional and 
cultural choices of residents to those deemed favorable to state construction and Soviet cultural 
creation.  While by the twentieth century modern secular ideals could increasingly be found in 
traditional heders, the Soviet national schools constituted a radical break with the past.  Religious 
education was all at once and completely disavowed.  The source of Jewish identity in Eastern 
Europe for centuries, Jewish traditional education was militantly attacked by the Evsektsiia, 
offering instead to rally Jewish identity around the Yiddish language and a proletarian ethos.  As 
seen from their efforts to reform education, and parental resistance to these efforts, results were 
mixed.  While the institutional framework of Jewish life was irrevocably altered along Evsektsiia 
plans, their notion of secular-Yiddish-Soviet identity for Jews was not accepted as they desired. 
When compared to the educational policies of the Romanian crown across the Dniester, 
the Evshkola in the MASSR was quite a different beast.  Unlike Bessarabian Jews, who had to 
constantly fight what proved a losing battle to maintain a separate educational system for Jewish 
pupils, in the Soviet Union it was the state, through mediation by Jewish communists, that 
imposed a specific education program in Yiddish for Jews that remained separate from the state 
curriculum, at least in terms of language.  Much like the general governing philosophy, Soviet 
planners were content to allow Jews to bring reform to the Jewish street, and the evseks were 
committed to Soviet modernization.  Traditional and backward from generations of Russian 
imperial neglect and discrimination, Jews would be ‗uplifted‘ by the Soviet state and brought 
into the socialist fold.  Romanian policy makers, on the other hand, wished to uplift the ethnic 
Romanian peasants at the expense of the Jews (and others).  The Romanian state was intolerant 
to Jewish difference, but as long as they lived in Romania their children should study in 
Romanian—Jewish schools of any kind were an anathema and only grudgingly supported under 
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Western pressure.  Jews encountered anti-Semitic legislation and popular attitudes that made 
attending state schools painful and difficult; and were prevented from higher education whenever 
possible.  Jewish schools were not attacked, however, as they were by Evsektsiia activists in 
Transnistria.  By largely refusing state funding and accreditation to Jewish communal schools, 
many Jewish families had no choice but state-funded Romanian schools.  Romanian policies thus 
forced many Bessarabian Jewish pupils into the very Romanian state schools that did not really 
want them in the first place.   
In the Soviet Union, schools in Yiddish were very much a state initiative.  Yet the often 
overzealous efforts of modernizing Evsektsiia activists pushed many Jewish families to send 
their kids to general state schools in Russian or Ukrainian.  Thus, even though their efforts were 
to recruit rather than to exclude, the results were quite similar in important respects to 
circumstances across the Dniester.  The efforts of Jewish individuals, families, and communities 
on both banks of the Dniester to maintain Jewish communal and religious cohesion, largely in an 
effort to educate their children with some sense of Jewish identity, was a prominent similarity.  
Not surprisingly, the level of assimilation into non-Jewish culture was more common in the 
Soviet case, at least in terms of bureaucratic, communist culture.  Lower-class, popular culture 
remained hostile to the surrounding modern state, just as was the case in Bessarabia.  However, 
in both cases the state policies served to either stifle or sever outright Jewish educational 
autonomy.  Traditional, religious Jewish education suffered much more in the Soviet Union than 
in Greater Romania were it was at least tolerated for most of the interwar era. Romanian 
administrators could not completely ignore the gaze of the international community, lax though it 
often was, and the Soviet policy proved much more adept at drawing in members of national 
communities and offering alternatives that enable the silencing of traditional institutions.  As 
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Mark Mazower has aptly observed, the Soviet state proved much better in the interwar years at 
managing its multitude of national minorities than the East European national governments 
created by Wilsonian principles of national self-determination explicitly for the safe-guarding of 
minority rights.
177
    
 
Conclusion 
Jewish identity was a contestable category during the 1920s in the MASSR, as it was 
throughout the whole of the Soviet Union.  Evsektsiia activists, as agents of the Communist Party 
and representatives of Bolshevik modernity to the Jews, sought to manage several demands.  On 
the one hand, many were recovering from hopes dashed by the liquidation of the Jewish parties 
and struggling with internal questions about allying themselves to the Bolsheviks, while on the 
other, they were excited about the opportunity to reorganize traditional Jewish society that they 
deemed backward and oppressive.  Over-zealotry was common, particularly since many found 
themselves in positions of power for the first time in their lives.  Their actions, which destroyed 
much of traditional Jewish life and forced many Jews toward assimilation into Soviet (really 
Soviet Russian) culture, began to worry them because complete assimilation was not what most 
activists wanted.  Attempts were made do manage Soviet policy such that modernization could 
be conducted while Jewish identity preserved.   
Jewish identity had to change, however, for this to be possible.  Clearly it could no longer 
be religious.  It belonged out of the shtetl and would preferably be relocated to a city, or a Jewish 
collective farm in an autonomous Jewish territory.  It would be Yiddish-speaking, never Hebrew, 
and through Yiddish teaching by trusted Soviet cadres, Jews would also be re-educated into 
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modern, Soviet Jews.  Such Jews were imagined as proletarians, as farmers and workers, not as 
the stooped, pale shtetl peddlers or kustars that represented to these activists everything wrong 
with Judaism, as seen through their own eyes and (as they imagined) the eyes of those non-
Jewish officials whose acceptance they sought.  At times the Communist Party gave their plans 
support, at others it undermined them.  At times it gave them considerable free reign to 
Bolshevize the Jews on their behalf, at others it reined them in.  In the end it determined that they 
were not to be trusted to implement what the Party wanted anymore.  The activists were 
surprised by this because they misunderstood that the Party saw them as a temporary necessity to 
destroy traditional Jewish life and modernize the Jewish people, not as an agency that could 
justify its permanence through the successful accomplishment of its mission.    
But the biggest failure of the Evsektsiia activists was clearly their failure to sell their 
vision of Jewish identity to their own people, the people on whose Bolshevization the 
Evsektsiia’s own bureaucratic existence depended.  Most Jews of the former Pale rejected the 
Evsektsiia’s notion of an atheist, Yiddish-speaking, proletarian identity, preferring to pick and 
choose between these and other values.  For some, Yiddish was unappealing, because it was a 
still considered only a jargon and impractical since the path toward career opportunities, as well 
as to the wonders of Russian culture, both largely closed before, were now open but would 
require Russian anyway.  Many wanted to leave the Jewish villages and the rabbis behind and 
move to the cities, but to take something of Jewish tradition with them.  This was typically 
religious and Hebraist rather than atheist and Yiddishist, however.  Some wanted to leave 
Judaism behind altogether, and Evsektsiia ideas didn‘t appeal to them.    Many were horrified by 
the destruction of Jewish traditional life and terribly affronted by the zealousness of the Jewish 
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communists.  Many were without rights as lishentsy, and could not but stay in traditional 
settings.   
Whatever the reasons, the Jewish community went in many directions, but not 
sufficiently in the direction that the Evsektsiia activists desired to call their work successful.  
Ultimately, their tenure proved too short.  The interwar period overall saw the tremendous influx 
of Jews into all aspects of Soviet life, a fact that seemed to promise the creation of a new 
identity, the Soviet Jewish citizen, even if this meant the end of a traditional Jewish identity.  
While this promise would prove to be short-lived, the interwar period held the promise of a 
bright future of Jewish inclusion into Soviet society.  In the final analysis, lower-class Jews made 
their own choices as much as possible.  In Bessarabia Jews resisted Romanian chauvinism, 
fought to preserve cultural autonomy through Jewish nationalist visions while accommodating 
modern expressions of collective political identity and desire.  In Transnistria, most Jews resisted 
Soviet-Jewish identity as presented by the Evsektsiia and instead accommodated notions of 
Soviet modernity with varying degrees of Jewish tradition.   
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Chapter 5 
Jewish Politics and Identity across the Divide: Dreams in Common 
 
Jewish life and culture transpired in the Dniester borderland region to a significant extent 
framed by events and forces that could not be limited to national realities alone.  It was not only 
that thousands of refugees traversed the Dniester River border and forced each regime 
(particularly the Romanian one) to deal with the reality of their plight.  It was also the Soviet 
desire to get back Bessarabia that created opportunity for Jews to work toward this end, and for 
the Romanian state created additional incentive to label all Jews as pro-Soviet communists and 
implement discriminatory policies accordingly.  But beyond national politics, Jews, Russians, 
Ukrainians, and others ethnic groups continued to manifest languages, customs, interests, 
political activism, and belief systems that transcended national borders and remained connected 
to values and memories that spanned beyond the immediate national project they found 
themselves in.  Cataclysmic historical events like the Great War and the Russian Revolution 
which created a new Europe divided between communism and liberal nationalism could not 
destroy, at least not immediately, memory of multi-ethnicity and autonomy in multi-confessional 
empires even while living in East European nation states striving for racial order and national 
legibility, nor could it erase memories of religion and traditional community in a Soviet state 
striving for unified, socialist futurism.   
As Michael Stanislawski has noted, perhaps too much attention has been given to the 
history of nations because many young historians, their eyes opened wide by the ideas of 
national construction set forth most famously by Benedict Anderson, Ernest Gellner and Eric 
Hobsbawm, now look upon nations as something created by nationalism: not ancient and 
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primordial but rather very modern, indeed perhaps the single most defining characteristic of 
modernity.
1
  In truth, this was never a one way road because nationalism itself was created by 
nations—meaning that national intellectual elites worked hard to establish the founding national 
myths of their nations by indoctrinating wider elements of the populace in their national ―truth.‖2 
The interwar years marked the high point of this historical process in Eastern Europe, very much 
part of the broader trends of social engineering that pervaded society during these years.  Modern 
citizens would not only be made more educated, urban and wage-earning, devoted to self-
improvement, cleanliness and health, and their civic obligations—in essence ―gardened‖ 
subjects—they would also become bold believers in the national cause of their society.  This 
fundamental principle was the same in Romania and the Soviet Union despite the vast difference 
in collective causes, and those who failed to accept and perform the unifying national culture or 
where defined as standing outside it were left to suffer the consequences.    
For Jews nationalism was more complex for obvious reasons: they had no unified 
territory to call their own other than the historical homeland of Eretz Israel, which at the time 
was not only ruled by others (which was true in all cases of imagined homelands in Eastern 
Europe) but it was almost entirely populated by others as well.  Zionism was a logical outcome 
of European Jewry‘s internalization of the European discourse of nationalism (but not the only 
one)—Theodor Herzl wanted an end to discrimination through ―normalizing‖ the Jews, and what 
better way to accomplish this than to give them a land of their own just like all other European 
peoples possessed?
3
  The response slowly gained popularity from the first decade of the 
twentieth century; in the interwar years Zionism made much quicker strides because it made 
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more sense after the Balfour Declaration in 1917 seemed to open Palestine for Jewish settlement 
and the estrangement of Jews in the newly-constituted national homelands across Eastern and 
Central Europe made the multi-ethnic empires of the past a nostalgic Jewish memory.
4
   
Socialism was another path out of discrimination and antisemitism for Jewish thinkers, 
workers and reformers, and like in the case of nationalism, Jews had a special relationship with 
socialism.  Yuri Slezkine argues that among many reasons why Jews were so attracted to 
communism in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was simply because Judaism is 
inherently close to Marxist idealism.  Building on the philosophy of Russian émigré thinker 
Nikolai Berdiaev, who argued that socialism ―is a form of Jewish religious chiliasm,‖ Slezkine 
writes: ―Add to this fact that Jewish liberty and immortality are collective, not individual, and 
that this collective redemption is to occur in this world, as a result of both daily struggle and 
predestination, and you have Marxism.‖5  The argument that communism replaced Judaism as 
the religion of 20
th
 century ethnic Jews has earned Slezkine perhaps more criticism than any 
other.  Yet for Slezkine, the entire discussion highlighted a bigger question—why are Western 
historians of modern Jewry still loath to write about the undeniably special connection between 
Jews and communism in 20
th
 century Europe?  The interwar Bessarabian case shows that the 
Jewish romance with communism was not particularly special from other alternatives available 
to Jews: communism was a tool to address local concerns and a reflection of local discriminatory 
circumstances.  Jews were over-represented in the Bessarabian communist movement compared 
to other people, but overall only a tiny minority of the Jewish population in the province were 
communist activists.  Jews were not nearly as predisposed to communism as communism was 
used as a broad label of Jewish disloyalty and anti-national agitation to silence Jewish aspirations 
                                                 
4
 As a popular example, see the treatment of the place of Jews in Imperial versus post-Trianon Hungary in Iśtvan 
Szabo‘s film Sunshine.  
5
 Yuri Slezkine, The Jewish Century (Princeton, 2004), 91-92. 
294 
 
for autonomy and resistance to a specific, ethno-national identity being exported from Bucharest 
that was indigestible to minorities generally, especially Jews.  For many Jews on the left, 
communism was a path of resistance against discriminatory treatment in Greater Romania.   
In Soviet Transnistria, Jews were attracted to communism for different reasons, but what 
was similar to the Bessarabian case was similar more broadly to Jewish politics across Europe, 
including with the aspirations of Zionists.  In that sense, the attraction was very much a reflection 
of modernist values across the West at the time.  What was really appealing about both 
movements was the dynamism of progress through rational, self-improvement, not only of the 
individual but of the imagined collective.  The possibility of improvement and most importantly, 
empowerment, promised finally the possibility for Jewish normalcy free from discrimination, 
hatred, suffering, isolation, and religious backwardness.  Jews would finally be able to belong to 
a modern, progressive, rational order constructed either on a political order of nations or of 
equals in a socialist utopia without states or classes.  These common dreams clearly saw beyond 
international borders: in the Zionist case Jews would come together from across all borders to 
form a state of their own (with borders, of course) while in the socialist case there would be no 
borders at all.  Furthermore, the dynamism envisioned for both movements was one of action and 
power, of overcoming obstacles, and thus it was focused on the masculine.  In both Zionism and 
communism is visible the need to become masculine, through physical work, in order to shed the 
―female‖ stunted helplessness of the Jewish past.  In the last two decades of the nineteenth 
century, European science had, including in Russia, put together considerable ―evidence‖ that 
coded Jews as exhibiting ―female‖ traits, such as hysteria, small chest sizes that made them unfit 
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for military service, and other degenerative states.
6
  The radically opposed state political values 
of Romanian nationalism and Soviet communism could not completely erase these 
commonalities; they transcended the new political border between the two states. 
Yet there were other important differences on opposite sides of the Dniester that would 
weigh heavily on Dniester Jewry.  The ideals of Bolshevik leaders were not theirs alone, but 
rather represented broadly-held ideals of much wider revolutionary sentiment not only in Russia 
but throughout Europe in the immediate post-WWI years.  This was a deeply contradictory time 
for European society, as many scholars have made clear.  As prominent politicians gathered in 
Versailles to make peace and ―return to normalcy,‖ younger generations seethed under a political 
system that seemed to them old, anti-idealistic, and worst of all, unjust.  Revolutionary violence 
erupted practically all over Europe.  In Germany and Hungary in particular, communist coups 
either succeeded or came very close to succeeding.  Yet it was only in Russia where revolution 
triumphed and ushered in a period of what Richard Stites has called revolutionary iconoclasm, 
―when various kinds of people, exhibiting various levels of consciousness, began ‗living the 
revolution‘ by renouncing the old and trying out the new.‖7  In terms of the Jewish Question, 
Bolsheviks shared numerous important ideas with Zionists particularly on the matter of turning 
violently away from the old and bolting headlong into the new, even as they fiercely fought to 
crush Zionism as a matter of power and control.  This chapter will examine more closely these 
revolutionary dreams on both sides of the Dniester and compare them. 
 It must of course be mentioned that not all Jews partook in such dreams; many in fact 
wanted no part in modern ideologies or political and cultural activism.  For these, who of course 
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tended to be older and more devout, the desire for the preservation of their religious and cultural 
traditions and ways of organization, which some scholars have called autonomism or 
territorialism, took place on both sides of the Dniester River.  Their circumstances were greatly 
influenced by the political regime overhead.  In Bessarabia, autonomism was primarily focused 
on Yiddish language and cultural preservation, focused on rearing the next generation of Jews 
with the culture of their parents through language courses, libraries and reading rooms, and their 
own youth groups.  The movement was associated with a particular cultural organization called 
the Yiddish Cultural League.  In Soviet Transnistria, no such freedoms were possible, as any 
definition of Judaism that contradicted the state definition was not permitted.  Autonomism is 
thus much harder to find; one has to search between the lines for underground meetings of 
parents and friends, of illegal economic formations, of attempts to maintain communal 
allegiances even if in secret in order to help each other and preserve cultural traditions.  In short, 
Jewish autonomism in Soviet Transnistria is resistance to socialist culture, and as such to Soviet 
power.  The similarities of autonomism in both cases are similar in many of the same ways that 
the dreams of socialism and Zionism were similar, and thus deserve inclusion in the chapter.  
 
The New Masculine Jew 
Herzl‘s Zionism initially took shape in a culture of rising racial antisemitism that made 
the possibility of winning acceptance by becoming ‗civilized,‘ the central idea of the Haskalah, 
no longer tenable for Jews.  Proponents of the Haskalah, beginning with Mendelssohn in the late 
eighteenth century, responded to the views of liberal European Christians such as Wilhelm 
Dohm, who argued that the Jews‘ primitive and Oriental way of life was the result of their 
backward Talmudism and oppression at the hands of Christian society.  If they could be ―re-
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educated‖ and ―civilized,‖ they would be ready, able and willing to drop their backward life and 
join European civilization.  The Romanticism of the early nineteenth century co-existed with a 
revival in interest in the classic era, with its typically positive view of the ancient Israelites as 
heroic warriors.  Civilization, even if non-Jewish, would return the Jews to the heroism of their 
ancestors.  Such was the view, for example, in Nicholas I‘s Minister of Enlightenment Sergei 
Uvarov, who enlisted the efforts of the young maskil (Haskalah proponent) Max Lilienthal to 
spread modernity among the Russian Jews through the ―new schools.‖8  Toward the end of the 
nineteenth century, however, racist theories had eclipsed the liberal definition of Judaism, 
reworking it into something biological and immutable, which largely undermined the efforts of 
liberals.
9
  While long seen as the exception to the West European preoccupation with racial 
categories, Russian scientists and politicians did in fact assign immutable characteristics to race 
in the fin-de-Siècle Empire.
10
  Romanian rulers even earlier considered Jews as outside the 
national polity, the total number of Jews that were naturalized between 1878 and 1913 was 529, 
out of thousands of applications.  Jews were clearly seen as foreigners in not only cultural or 
religious terms, and all legislation reflected this status for them even if they were born and lived 
all their lives in Romania.
11
  Scientifically-grounded, racial definitions of difference in Romania 
spread only after WWI. 
Self-criticism had existed among Jews since the medieval period, according to Sander L. 
Gilman, but it turned into self-hatred in the modern period, largely due to the transformation of 
antisemitism in the late nineteenth century from religious and economic to racial.
12
  With the 
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spread of enlightenment rationalism and modernist positivism during the nineteenth century, 
most notably the belief in linear progress as something that is monopolized by Europeans, and 
increasingly, at least in German historiography, by Aryans, outsiders came to be seen as outside 
history: having no worthwhile civilization of their own.  This was not the first time in history that 
such divisions were deliberately drawn, for example the Romans saw themselves as bringers of 
history and progress to the peoples they conquered also.  But the modernist project brought with 
it new and historically unique meanings.  With the intensely modern emphasis on scientific 
differentiation of races, emplotment on less than the top rung of the socio-cultural evolutionary 
ladder gained a sinisterly irrefutable and irreversible character.   
Some German cultural and intellectual elites, such as Richard Wagner and Heinrich von 
Treitschke, clearly, deliberately, and usually vehemently placed Jews outside the German nation 
as unable to understand, share in, or contribute to the special Aryan project of civilization.  
German Jews, many of whom were culturally, linguistically, economically, intellectually, and 
increasingly even religiously assimilated within the German whole by the turn of the twentieth 
century,
13
 and had earlier internalized German animosity toward Jewish difference, also ardently 
strove to denounce the imaginary construction of Jewish Otherness, the Ostjud or East European 
Jew.  In the minds of modernized, secularized liberal Jews of the West, the Ostjud was the 
embodiment of the Jewish difference that they desired to shed.  In doing so, they used the 
language of their detractors and internalized the categories of modernist discourse, which was 
characterized by the division of the world into definite, value-laden binary oppositions: 
good/bad, white/black, rational/hysteric, scientific/mystical, male/female, public/private, and 
Aryan/Jew.  Thinking in unambiguous binary opposites in order to make clear and definite sense 
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of an opaque world in fact linked revolutionary Russia to Europe.  Sheila Fitzpatrick has argued 
that in the 1920s, the Bolsheviks tended to think within the frames of binary opposites: 
thesis/antithesis, proletarian/bourgeois, revolutionary/counterrevolutionary, ally/enemy.
14
  The 
language of the Evsektsiia activists used such polarities as well in condemning Hebrew culture as 
Zionist and bourgeois, for example.  The classifiers, white, Christian (at least outside the Soviet 
experiment), European males, desired to see the world in these terms, and they were increasingly 
threatened when the objects of their classification spilled out from their constructed definitions 
or especially when they resisted internalizing their given labels. 
Perhaps no better single work brings out these binaries better than the influential, 
misogynist, Jew-hating book Sex and Character written by Otto Weininger, a young Viennese 
Jew who converted to Protestantism on the day he was awarded a PhD in 1903, only to commit 
suicide later the same year.
15
  Weininger set out to emplot men and women on a linear plane 
between the ideal male (M) and ideal female (F).  While allowing that individual men and 
women fit between the two poles, with varying levels of femininity and masculinity, he stridently 
argued that psychologically and biologically, men are far superior to women by virtue of the very 
definition of masculinity, which he saw as virile and life-giving.  Women, in fact, have no 
intrinsic value of their own for Weininger, other than as objects of male sexual desire: 
When man became sexual he formed woman.  That woman is at all has happened simply because man has 
accepted his sexuality.  Woman is merely the result of this affirmation; she is sexuality itself.  Woman‘s 
existence is dependent on man; when man, as man, in contradistinction to woman, is sexual, he is giving 
woman form, calling her into existence.  Therefore woman‘s one object must be to keep man sexual.  She 
desires man as Phallus, and for this she is the advocate of pairing.  She is incapable of making use of any 
creature except as a means to an end, the end being pairing; and she has but one purpose, that of continuing 
the guilt of man, for she would disappear the moment he had overcome his sexuality.
16
 
                                                 
14
 Sheila Fitzpatrick, The Cultural Front: Power and Culture in Revolutionary Russia (Ithaca and London, 1992), 2.  
15
 Barbara Hyams and Nancy A Harrowitz, ―A Critical Introduction to the History of Weininger Reception,‖ in Jews 
and Gender: Responses to Otto Weininger (Philadelphia, 1995), 3. 
16
 Otto Weininger, Sex and Character, trans. from 6th German edition (London, 1906), 299. 
300 
 
Given this view, it is not surprising that Weininger argued that ―the woman of the highest 
standard is immeasurably worse that a man of the lowest standard [302].‖   
 In a manner similar to this binary construction of gender, Weininger set up a similar scale 
for race, placing the Aryan in the role of the male and a Jew in the role of a female.  Similarly 
then, we see that ―the most manly Jew is more feminine than the least manly Aryan [306].‖  
Deeply threatened by modern urban life, sexuality, and mysticism, Weininger believed that 
Judaism has gained its greatest strength in the modern world, since ―asceticism seems lost, 
sexuality and paring are accepted.  Our age is not only the most Jewish but the most feminine 
[329].‖  This view of the degradation of society as a result of modern moral decay was a 
common one among Weininger‘s contemporaries, a view perhaps most clearly put forth by the 
publication in 1895 of Max Nordau‘s Degeneration, in which the author described in great detail 
how the degeneration of European elites had made them unfit for normal life or especially 
leadership.  While Nordau himself moved toward believing that modern European life demanded 
as a solution for Jews what he called a ―muscular Judaism,‖ or as Stanislawski put it ―his 
Zionism went from Heine to Bar Kochba,‖17 the broader belief was that because society, despite 
the marvels of scientific, technological and medical progress, was morally and spiritually 
degenerating it needed urgently to ―weed out‖ its corrupting elements, such as Judaism.  The 
search for purity as a means toward achieving the envisioned goal, whatever that goal may be, is 
a distinct quality of the modern condition.  Weininger certainly identified with this perspective.  
For him, Christ was the greatest man (Wagner was second) because he overcame his original sin, 
his Judaism.  Thus, mankind‘s only salvation is to be as strong as Christ in choosing between 
Christianity and Judaism (again with the binary opposites); in having the strength to not choose 
Judaism [329-330].     
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 Equating Judaism with femininity was not by any means unique to Weininger.  In his 
review of the changing notions of gender from traditional-rabbinical Ashkenazi culture to 
modern attempts at assimilation, Daniel Boyarin argues that modern efforts at acceptance on the 
part of Westernized secular Jews marked the end of an independent Jewish world view and, at 
least in part, its subjugation to western values.  As Boyarin traces Western Christian views of the 
Jew as feminine, weak, and/or queer through the centuries, he argues that the rabbis‘ 
construction of Jewish identity was not simply the unavoidable result of being on the receiving 
end of the dominating Christian discourse about the Jew, but rather a conscious and deliberate 
construction of an alternate system of Jewish values designed to resist assimilation, or anti-heroic 
rather than unheroic: 
For traditional Jewry there were both alternate civilities, Edelkayt, an alternative paradigm of ―manliness‖ 
that could be summed up in the relatively modern term mentsh.  Edelkayt, which means ―nobility,‖ was a 
counter-ideal to many of the markers of the noble in romantic culture, in that its primary determinants 
within the culture were delicacy and gentleness, not bravery and courtliness.
18
   
Boyarin argues that the modern era marks the effective colonization of Ashkenazi 
Jewry by Western cultural norms and values after centuries of effective resistance.  Jews 
internalized the invention of heterosexuality, the modernist insistence that men must only have 
sexual relations with the opposite sex, in character with modern strict understanding of sex as a 
reproductive phenomenon and homosexuality as threateningly deviant behavior.  In internalizing 
Western notions of heterosexuality and masculinity, Jews began to construct the modern Jewish 
male, infused with manly ideals developed by European Christian culture and in direct 
opposition to rabbinic masculine ideals.  This was not without a sense of urgency, for as Boyarin 
notes in his discussion of Freud, being labeled a Jew in fin-de-siécle Vienna was tantamount to 
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being labeled queer, which, in a bourgeois era of strict heterosexuality, meant symbolic 
castration: 
Since within this culture, male hysteria and homosexuality are both symptoms and products of gender 
inversion, there is a slippage between them: the Jew was queer and hysterical—and therefore, not a man.  
In response, the normatively straight Jewish man was invented to replace the bent Ostjud—and his 
hysteria—his alternative gendering, was the first victim…The Oedipus complex is Freud‘s family romance 
of escape from Jewish queerdom into gentile, phallic heterosexuality.
19
 
For Boyarin, Zionism represents the highest state of internalization of the Christian 
worldview, rather than resisting and/or triumphing over it.  Zionism, other than being Herzl‘s 
internalization of modernist discourse which held that nations must have territory to be ―normal,‖ 
was also an attempt to make Jews into whites (Europeans rather than Orientals) by imbuing them 
with land to colonize.  Boyarin argues that ―Zionism is thus the ultimate version of that practice 
dubbed colonial mimicry by Homi Bhabha.‖20  While it is very problematic to argue in support 
or against Zionism as a whole by confronting only Herzelian Zionism as Boyarin does
 
,
21
 there is 
little doubt that Zionism was in many ways a product of the modernist project within fin-de-
siécle European Judaism, or that it had its greatest impact on the Ostjuden rather than on the 
Westernized Jews amidst whom Herzl lived and developed his theories.  The impact can most 
readily be seen in the efforts, for example, of young Bessarabian Jews to infuse physicality and 
masculinity into their erstwhile ―feminized‖ culture, at least as they imagined it.  Gymnastics, 
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agriculture and physical labor, as well as proud Jewish nationalism, were very much expressions 
of the ideals of hyper-masculinity in fin de siècle Europe. 
But if these traits were to hold the keys to a new, modern, masculine, ―non-degenerate‖ 
Jew, again Zionism was clearly not the only method available for his construction.  Socialism, 
which is normally seen as an opposite of Zionism, had the potential, in the minds of many Jewish 
writers in the early years of the Soviet Union, to address many of the same issues that pre-
revolutionary Jewish thinkers had sought to solve.  Jewish self-hatred, especially for the 
traditional rabbinic upbringing that many from the first generation of Soviet Jewish writers and 
bureaucrats had undergone, was readily prevalent in Jewish young people that wanted socialist 
revolution as it was in those that demanded the creation of a Zionist state.  Faith in revolutionary 
ideology as a means of creating the masculine Jew was just as important as it was for creating a 
Zionist settler capable of successfully undertaking aliyah, particularly as scholars have shown 
that Soviet ideology in general was very masculine in its ethos, not just for Jews.
22
  In this way, 
Jewish participation in the Komsomol (Young Communists‘ League) in Transnistria, and 
Zionism and the communist underground in Bessarabia, all shared important traits, at least when 
it came to the construction of a masculine, Jewish male able to tackle the demanding and 
difficult challenges of the day.  Resistance to such new ideals, usually by older and more devout 
Jews, was also an expression of their dreams—a rejection of a newly imagined Jewry. 
 
Zionism and Jewish Masculinity in Bessarabia  
No aspect of Jewish life better demonstrates the desire for a particular kind of modern 
Jewry that broke with the past than Zionism.  Comparing Soviet and Romanian attitudes toward 
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Zionism has typically focused on the chasm of difference, noting Romanian support for the 
movement in order to get rid of the country‘s Jews while focusing on the Soviet intolerance for it 
as bourgeois nationalism.
23
  In fact, Zionism was tolerated but carefully watched in Greater 
Romania, never really trusted.  The Romanian Siguranţa consistently attended various Zionist 
organizational meetings, rallies, and fundraisers over the course of the interwar years.  Their 
reporting generally indicated the same perspective—they did not consider Jewish nationalist 
aspiration a threat to state security, but they suspected Zionists very often of communism as well, 
especially the socialist-Zionist Paolei Tsiyon, which was certainly seen as a threat because of its 
ideological connections with Soviet communism and therefore, its members were assumed to 
harbor intentions to help the Bolsheviks re-annex Bessarabia.
24
   
On the other side of the Dniester, however, Zionism was indeed viciously attacked by 
Soviet policy makers who successfully utilized the secular, pro-Yiddish intelligentsia to root out 
Zionist supporters on the state‘s behalf.  This process depended on the extent of Soviet power, 
however; on the Soviet side of the Dniester borderland, far from Soviet centers of power, 
Zionism was not significantly controlled until the mid-1920s, albeit even then not completely.  
For Romania in particular, policies pursued toward Jewish national movements were not without 
problems, especially because Zionist sentiments varied greatly from left to right and could not be 
so easily placed in neat boxes for easy categorization.  Given the tremendous economic, cultural 
and existential pressures of interwar Dniester Jewry, it is not surprising that Jewish communal 
institutions around a central religious leadership began to not only fray around the edges but 
come apart completely.  In Transnistria the state dismantled the kehilot; in Bessarabia the state 
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tolerated and even sometimes gave minimal support to them.  There was a price to pay, however: 
young Zionists in interwar Romanian Bessarabia, increasingly surrounded by state 
discrimination and rising anti-Jewish violence from Romanian-speaking youth, perceived 
traditional institutions and their leaders as part of the problem because of their ineffective 
response to the threat.     
Already the most wide-spread and influential force in Jewish communal life prior to 
Romanian annexation of Bessarabia, Zionism continued to grow in interwar years to become by 
far the greatest mover of collective Jewish political will by the 1930s.  As relations between 
Bessarabian Jews and Romanian administrators grew more problematic after the mid-1920s but 
especially by the early 1930s, radicalism within the Zionist movements, especially but by no 
means only among the youth, grew.  This fact was also a reflection of the parting of ways 
between regional Jewish elites in the newly acquired territories and the national Jewish 
leadership in Bucharest: Zionism reflected in part a proud and resurgent insistence on defense of 
Jewish values against anti-Semitic Romanianization policies.   
Circumstances were made worse by the assimilationist tendencies of the Bucharest 
Jewish elite, or at least this is what it looked like from the peripheries.  In fact there was a strong 
Zionist movement in the Old Kingdom as well that existed even before WWI.
25
  The earliest 
such organization was founded in 1909 in Focşani and Galaţi, which by 1914 had spread to other 
parts of Moldova and called itself ―Hasmonean.‖  The Hasmonean manifesto, published in 1914, 
reveals their connection with ideas emanating from Central Europe before the Great War but 
would not become widely accepted in Bessarabia, beyond the student population, for another 15 
years: ―Judaism pays today with mountains of cadavers—the price of its acceptance by other 
nations.  We were treated with hate, and we had to make great sacrifices.  The Jewish students 
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protest against those who tried to spread this terrible lie that the Jews are only a religion and not 
a nation.‖26  This was similar language voiced in Evreiskaia Tribuna in 1929.  Bessarabian 
Zionism was born in Tsarist Russia, but it was raised in a borderland setting between the 
movements of Jewish nationalism and self-defense of the former Pale of Settlement (centered 
until 1924 in Odessa) on the one hand, and the Zionist movements in Romania (including 
Transylvania, Bukovina and the Old Kingdom) on the other. 
The structure of formal Zionism in Bessarabia reveals much about its development and 
connection to broader Jewish life, as well as the particular context of Zionism in Romanian 
Bessarabia because of its proximity to a contested and sensitive border.  A central Zionist 
organization for the entire country, called the Zionist Federation, was legally registered and 
recognized under the new government on August 30, 1918.  Several autonomous branches were 
established throughout the country, including one in Chişinău for Bessarabian Jewry.  Under its 
umbrella all variations of Zionist thinking were represented, from the Paolei-Tsiyon and Zeiri-
Zion on the left, the Algemeine Zionists at the center, to the Revisionists on the right.
27
  
Moreover, from under its umbrella grew Zionist youth organizations of all political persuasions 
as well, from Gordonia, Hashomer Hatzair, Hehalutz, and Mercaz on the left to Betar, Hacoah 
and Brit-Trumpeldor on the right.  The Bessarabian federation was led initially by Jacob 
Bernstein-Kogan, but then for most of the interwar years by Solomon Berliand, a wealthy 
tobacco merchant born in central Ukraine in 1868.
28
  Zionist Federation leaders managed the 
Jewish National Fund, Keren-Kaemet, and maintained branches in nearly all Bessarabian towns 
with a significant Jewish population.  The central Chişinău branch also maintained a Palestinian 
Office, which was founded in 1918 to assist Jews with all matters concerning legal emigration to 
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Palestine.
29
  The American JDC was generous in supporting these Jewish agencies, particularly 
after 1930.
30
  Also under the purview and financial support of the Zionist organization was the 
Popular Jewish University, founded by lawyer and newspaper editor Michael Landau in 1925.  It 
was not recognized by the Romanian Ministry of Education nor supported financially; rather it 
was funded entirely through Jewish communal fundraising and the JDC.  It aimed at instructing 
Jews in knowledge needed to make aliyah, or emigrate to Palestine.  Over the course of the 
interwar years, as new and younger members became active in Zionism, the central organization 
also undertook to support, at least in part, many Zionist youth groups described below.  Finally, 
the religious Zionist organization Mizrahi, which sought to ensure that settlements in Palestine 
would remain Orthodox, was also affiliated with the central Zionist organization and maintained 
close links with Rabbi Tsirelson and Aguda.
31
  
Importantly, Tarbut was registered as part of the Zionist Federation and drew financial 
support from it.  Initially the largest part of the federation, Tarbut had focused on Jewish 
education in Hebrew as a means of preserving Jewish culture for decades in the Pale of 
Settlement, even though it was registered with the Romanian government only in 1923.
32
  Tarbut 
organizers ran Jewish kindergartens and schools for children as well as higher and specialized 
training schools for young adults in Romanian Bessarabia; it also maintained a cultural section 
that ran some Jewish theaters, organized art expositions, Jewish sporting clubs, excursions and 
conferences, libraries and free places for children to play.
33
  Its focus on Hebrew language and 
culture increasingly linked its leaders and their goals with those of the Zionist movement, which 
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in Bessarabia as elsewhere was not only dedicated to helping Jews make aliyah but at least until 
the mid-1930s also to strengthen Jewish national culture across Eastern Europe.  Tarbut affiliates 
went up all over Bessarabia; in Chişinău alone, Tarbut ran 12 Jewish grade schools, 2 high 
schools, and a professional training school in 1924; outside the capital its schools enrolled about 
2500 pupils that year.
34
   
Much of the financial support for Tarbut‘s sporting clubs came from the youth sports 
organization Maccabbee, which was a Romania-wide organization initially registered separately 
from the Zionist Federation.  Taken from the Hasmonean revolutionary hero Judah Maccabbee, 
whose name not accidentally means ―the Power,‖ Maccabbee never succeeded in gaining legality 
in Tsarist Bessarabia as it was considered subversive.
35
  It was recognized soon after Romanian 
occupation, however, on April 30, 1918, adding to the general sense of hope among Bessarabian 
Jews for better circumstances after the end of Tsarism.  With its central office in Bucharest, 
Maccabbee opened affiliates all over the country, including sixteen in Bessarabia alone.
36
  As the 
best-established Zionist youth group in much of interwar Eastern Europe, not just Bessarabia, 
Maccabbee had by 1918 a considerable international fund-raising machine in place which 
allowed its leaders to influence youth politics beyond its own organization.  According to its own 
guidelines, Maccabbee was dedicated to ―the physical revival of the popular masses through the 
spread of physical exercises to develop the body and fortify the health.‖ 37   
This goal of physical revival was of central importance to the cause of constructing a new 
Jew, and was shared by all Zionist youth groups, the range of which during the 1920s was truly 
impressive and by all indications bewildered the Siguranţa.  The goal of physical labor in 
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connection with a romanticized, utopian socialist organization of settlement in Palestine, in direct 
contrast to the physically weakening, misshapen petty capitalism of Jewish merchants and 
artisans, was a central goal of the Zionist left, especially the Marxist-leaning Poalei-Tsiyon.  One 
of the older Zionist formations with roots in the Jewish Pale to Ber Borochov during fin-de-
siècle revolutionary movements, Poalei was centered in interwar Romania in Bukovina where 
they published their newsletter Arbeiter Tsaytung, and to a lesser extent in Bessarabia, where its 
focus on Yiddish as the future language of Jewish Palestine rather than Hebrew appealed to 
many.
38
  Much of the Bessarabian Siguranţa understood the group as a communist formation 
outright and shut it down as early as autumn 1919.
39
  While Poalei continued to function to a 
limited extent underground, especially in Hotin and Edineţ, most of its members migrated to 
other Zionist groups, especially Zeiri-Zion, Mercaz and Gordonia.
40
  As members of those 
groups, they took their focus on creating strong Jewish workers by organizing exercise and 
sporting events.  The proliferation of Poalei-Tsiyon members, who were suspected of 
communism, throughout many Zionist youth groups in Bessarabia was an important reason why 
Siguranţa suspicions remained.41  
One of the youth groups most suspected of becoming a home for Poalei refugees was 
Hehalutz, which focused in its program on specialized training for Jewish young people in direct 
preparation for aliyah.  Particular attention was paid to agricultural pursuits, to which end 
Hehalutz operated two farms and a voluntary labor camp in Bessarabia for education, practice 
and demonstration of farming techniques.  Here, as part of their training, Jewish youth 
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volunteered their labor to bring in revenue for the organization.  Located four miles outside the 
city of Bălţi, this camp housed about 40 youths in training and was called, again not by accident, 
Masada.  It was administered together with Mercaz, another Zionist group with branches in Bălţi 
and Chişinău.42   
Figure 11: Flags of Zionist youth groups in Chisinaul; top left: Mercaz; bottom left: Iavne; center: 
Maccabbee; top right: Hacoah; bottom right: Brit-Trumeldor. Taken from ANRM, f. 680, op. 1, d. 3406, l. 668.   
 
The training provided by Hehalutz was not limited only to agriculture, although it was the 
focus.  It also placed Jewish young people (over the age of 18) in industrial settings, which in 
Bessarabia typically meant artisanal training since there were very few factories.  By way of 
contrast, the group Gordonia was focused exclusively on agricultural training.  Gordonia was 
created in 1928 in Cernauţi (Czernowitz) through the fusion of two existing Zionist youth 
groups, Hahaver and Hatekhia, and was geared particularly toward teaching its agricultural 
settlers the discipline of the Kibbutz system in Palestine, meaning that it was deeply communal 
and socialist utopian in its political orientation.  Gordonia spread to Bessarabia and quickly 
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achieved phenomenal success: within two years, over 75% of the group‘s members in the entire 
country were in Bessarabia.
43
 
For younger children who would later join Gordonia and Mercaz but especially Hehalutz, 
Hashomer Hatzair was founded in Bessarabia in 1923 aiming to strengthen Jewish young people 
up to age 14 through physical exercises and outdoor activities. In important ways it was not 
unlike the boy scouts or the Young Pioneers in the Soviet Union that prepared children for the 
Komsomol, something that reporting Siguranţa agents consistently noted.44  The platform of 
Hatzair was in fact based on the boy scouts; the boys were indoctrinated in the values of truth, 
nature, strength and physicality, loyalty to nation and people, and very importantly self-
improvement, both physical and spiritual.
45
  While the aim of the organization was to direct their 
physical strength and training toward preparation for aliyah, it also was desired to serve as the 
regeneration of the Jewish people in general, and to that end its leaders taught Jewish kids to 
fight back if accosted.  The Marxist origins of the Hatzair also of course influenced the direction 
of its training activities, which earned it consistent suspicion from the authorities, particularly 
because of its popularity and rapid growth to thousands of members by 1930.
46
  Hatzair was seen 
as against Romanian state interests because the national loyalty it sought to indoctrinate was of 
course toward the Jewish people rather than the Romanian state.  For example, on June 17, 1934 
Chişinău Hatzair members organized an end-of-school year outing for 600-700 Jewish children 
that included movies and programs about Palestine at the Express Theater downtown, including 
the picture ―Halutsim.‖  Siguranţa agents reported this with concern.47  Hatzair was furthermore 
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suspected of communist ties because of its similarity and thus alleged connection to the Young 
Pioneers.  Siguranţa agents reported of alleged connections with communists across the Dniester 
until Hatzair in Benderi was forced to shut down by general order on November 19, 1926.
48
  
Other chapters of the group, most notably in Bălţi, kept functioning.49   
Figure 12: A page from the Zionist newsletter of Karnei published in Jerusalem, July 1934.  This copy was 
circulated by Hashomer Hatzair in Bessarabia (one of 400 Siguranţa confiscated copies), and shows Jewish children, 
some of them newly-arrived refugees from Germany (top picture caption) working hard to build the Jewish state. 
50
 
Focus on Jewish pride and strength encouraged a new generation of Jews to refuse to 
tolerate abuse the way their parents had, as they saw it, and sometimes this new attitude led to 
conflict.  Particularly well known for refusing to shy away from conflict as an expression of 
masculine pride in Bessarabia were the members of Hehalutz, who saw it as their duty to protect 
Jewish workers, particularly those planning to emigrate to Eretz Israel.  In addition, the leader of 
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the group was not a local Jew, but an educated young Zionist from Galicia named Samson 
Schechter, who held a PhD in philosophy from Czernowitz University of the pre-1918 Austro-
Hungarian Empire.  Schechter‘s contacts with and travel to Bukovina added to Siguranţa 
suspicions about him and Hehalutz.51  Jewish parents were shocked and frightened, although 
perhaps some were also proud, when they read on January 13, 1927 that Jewish youth from 
Hehalutz beat up some right-wing anti-Semitic activists in the primarily Jewish town of 
Călărăşi.52  On another occasion, Hehalutz youth boarded a train in Bucharest and got into a 
large brawl, sending one Romanian young man to the hospital.
53
  Reports of these incidents 
quickly led to increased supervision over all Jewish youth groups by the Siguranţa on April 19, 
1927, particularly in Călărăşi, in response to what police called ―provocative Jewish 
movements.‖54  In fact, beginning in the second half of the 1920s, there was a much higher rate 
of conflict being consistently reported between Jewish and non-Jewish youths.   
Such expressions of Jewish identity of course concerned the Siguranţa, and not only 
Hehalutz continued to experience raids and arrests for the rest of the interwar years, with many 
agents reporting without doubt that these kids are really communists for whom Zionism only 
served as a ―mask.‖  In fact such suspicions began immediately, in 1918, but grew notably after 
1927.
55
  Like for Hatzair, circumstances were particularly difficult in Benderi because its 
location on the Dniester assured assumptions about its ties to the Komsomol across the river in 
Tiraspol.
56
  Hehalutz also ran into problems because its leader, Dr. Schechter, sometimes 
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appealed for Jewish aid to the UK, citing as the need the abusive and anti-Semitic tendencies of 
the Romanian administration.  The Interior Ministry and Siguranţa agents not only took odds 
with this because they sought to preserve an image of Romania as a modern, democratic state but 
because they feared excessive attention to Jewish problems in Bessarabia would serve as fodder 
for the Soviet propaganda machine.
57
  In fact, this was a persistent problem and not only as far as 
Zionist youth groups were concerned: Jewish international complaints were a source of ire for 
Romanian officials.  By the late 1920s, considerable international Jewish attention was focused 
on Bessarabia in response to the growing awareness of the economic and political plight of the 
province‘s Jewish population, despite efforts by authorities to keep things quiet.  The arrival in 
Bessarabian towns of Zionist dignitaries such as Naum Sokolov in 1931 were huge events, with 
their arrival at train stations typically attracting a massive turnout of local Jews that mobbed the 
visitor, as well as massive police presence.
58
  There was little sympathy for the Jewish youth 
perspective: Romanian police reports explained to superiors that Jews want to emigrate because 
they wished to avoid military service for the Romanian state, and because many wished to live 
on international Jewish money from wealthy American Jews.
59
   
Although it would initially seem that Siguranţa agents and young Zionists could agree on 
their shared desire for the Jews to leave Romania, there was still a serious problem: much of 
interwar Zionism, particularly among the youth, was utopian and deeply socialist in its 
understanding of a Jewish future, while the Romanian secret police had, broadly speaking, zero 
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tolerance for political ideologies on the left, especially from ethnic minorities and particularly 
Jews.  The assumed Jewish connection to communism, especially to Soviet-inspired, anti-
Romanian activism, was at the end of the day not something the security agents could overcome: 
―they [Jews] are infected by the sickness of socialism and communism‖ according to one report, 
and ―this territory is influenced by their part in the Russian Revolution,‖ purported another.60    
Additional damage was done by intermittent false reporting by Siguranţa agents that were 
particularly ill-disposed toward Jews.  In 1920, an agent in Bessarabia submitted a report to 
superiors in which he claimed that Maccabbee, together with the Bund, the illegal Paolei-Tsiyon, 
Tarbut, the Yiddish Cultural League and Aguda, together with ―other Jewish formations,‖ had 
formed an underground, international revolutionary organization called ―Comverbund‖61 
centered in Odessa that desire to defend the rights and national interests of Jews by seeking a 
separate, Jewish nation-state across Bessarabia and Podolia.  Worst of all, the future government 
of this new nation-state would be, of course, communist!  More than ten years later, this report 
was part of the highest level regional briefing that the Bessarabian Siguranţa put together for 
superiors at the Ministry of Interior.  It summarized the central Zionist organization in 1931 thus:  
All the clubs, reading groups, libraries and other organizations of the Zionist organization are frequented in 
the majority by Jewish youth.  There they find supervision from mature adults enjoying good standing and 
all liberties, with whom they discuss questions of politics and clandestine organizations and are 
indoctrinated in a social life leaning toward the left with the final result that they aid communist 
formations.  There have been many arrested Jewish young people in Bessarabia for instructing pupils in 
large conferences in acts that spread intrigue across Bessarabia.
62
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Thus, all Jewish youth groups in Bessarabia were closely scrutinized and never trusted 
despite legal recognition.  Maccabbee, for example, was initially granted freedom to assemble, 
but after a March 1920 parade through downtown Chişinău that included singing Jewish songs 
and the carrying of a Zionist flag, Maccabbee was permitted to meet and conduct operations only 
if they announced their activities to the police in advance, including submitting a full proposal 
and having it subjected to police censorship.
63
  Some of Maccabbee‘s founding members were 
considered anti-Romanian by the authorities, especially Kogan-Bernstein, who was considered to 
be ―in the service of the Bolsheviks.‖  In reporting on this Zionist leader, Siguranţa intentions 
were laid perhaps most bare on the question of Zionism: ―In the interests of state security, 
because there are many anti-Romanian, revolutionary and communist feelings [among Jews], we 
have to allow them to emigrate and give them all possibility to leave the country—this is in the 
general interest.‖64  Many Siguranţa reports warned superiors in the Interior Ministry that 
Maccabbee was supported by funds from ―across the Nistru,‖ which was generally interpreted 
synonymously with ―enemies of the nation.‖  They consistently stressed the need for ―clever 
agents‖ able to understand ―Jewish.‖65   
Nevertheless, during the early 1920s the security police generally did not interfere with 
Maccabbee events if they were preceded by proper notification.  Maccabbee was not (at least 
initially) intended as a political organization but rather as a youth sporting club—in many 
Romanian schools where Jewish kids were isolated and often ostracized, Maccabbee was a 
means for them to unite and allow them to compete athletically as Jews, and to exhibit Jewish 
pride.  This naturally nurtured a sense of Jewish national difference and pride into adulthood, as 
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was intended, instead of a sense of Jewish religious separation as previously.  Leaders of 
Maccabbee would come to schools where the group did not yet exist and attempt to raise a 
chapter there.  They were willing and usually did work hand in hand with other Jewish youth 
organizations if they were already established.  Maccabbee leaders attempted to direct youth 
activities toward teaching Jewish kids various exercises designed to ―strengthen the body and 
fortify the health.‖66  Gymnastics competitions were very popular, including both among Zionist 
groups themselves and against other schools or athletic clubs. 
Zionist youth activity both increased and grew more radical over the course of the 1920s.  
First, new organizations, such as the Society for Zionist Students, came into existence.  This 
group was organized in the Old Kingdom 1931 and opened a chapter in Chişinău, even though 
there was no institution of higher education in Bessarabia other than a theological department of 
Iaşi University.  Nevertheless, the group worked to include Bessarabian Jewish young people to 
organize lectures and conferences about Eretz Israel.  Many of the leaders of the organization, 
like Mordco Bergman and Isaac Coring, were students in Iaşi and travelled consistently to 
Chişinău for meetings and events.  Others, like Iosef Gurving and Isaac Livov, were Bessarabian 
Jews that managed to get into universities abroad, in this case in France, but still tried to 
influence and advise the organization.
67
  Better educated in modern society than many other 
Zionist youth groups, the Zionist students often ran into censorship problems with agents in 
attendance when discussions about politics and contemporary affairs naturally elicited anger 
about antisemitism in Romania. 
Secondly, and more notably, the Union of Zionist Revisionists, or the Zionist right-wing, 
made significant advances especially after 1930.  The Revisionists were initially affiliated with 
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the Zionist Federation in Bessarabia.  However, in the early 30s it split into two branches, the 
new and more radical one, called the New Revisionists, was internationally inspired by Vladimir 
Jabotinsky.  This group was not part of the Federation but rather directly and aggressively 
recruited Jewish young men from all walks of life as long as they agreed with its ideology and 
were willing to undergo its regiment of military discipline.  New Revisionists differed from the 
Zionist mainstream in their vision for Eretz Israel: they also directly challenged British authority 
in Palestine through calls for an autonomous Jewish Palestine free from British control and 
―cleansed‖ of all non-Jews.  They also called for a unified plan of proportioning land for Jewish 
settlers together with a Jewish government (Supreme Council) capable of defending settlers from 
Arab attacks.
68
   
In 1931 the Revisionists were still relatively a small group, numbering about 150 in 
Chişinău and perhaps as many in Bălţi, but they grew quickly afterwards due to the radicalization 
of Romanian antisemitism.
69
  Part of the reason for the growth in popularity was directly linked 
to British policies: tens of thousands of Jews wanted to go, but the number allowed in was tiny 
by comparison.  Romanian Jews as a whole, numbering almost 800,000, were granted 377 
entrance visas in 1932; 1374 in 1933; 1705 in 1934; 3596 in 1935; and 1348 in 1936, after which 
legal emigration ground to a halt.
70
  Under such constraints the message of the Revisionists—just 
go, to hell with British quotas—was very favorable among the more militant Zionists, in fact it 
fed the radicalization of many.  The Revisionists opened their own youth sporting association, 
called Hacoah, whose members expressed dissatisfaction with the centrist political leanings of 
Maccabbee and desired instead stronger, military style disciple and complete allegiance to the 
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Zionist cause.
71
  Its youth dressed in military garb (until forbidden to do so) and marched in 
unison in military fashion whenever together, which was not only under suspicion from the 
Siguranţa but also rubbed most Jews the wrong way.72   
Given the extreme level of politicization in this environment, differences of opinion were 
fierce, especially between the Zionist youth and the religious Jews, as well as among Zionists 
themselves, and violence sometimes erupted.  Extreme division was characteristic even during 
the moments of unity, such as the German economic boycott throughout 1933.  Zionists were 
very active in the anti-German economic blockades that went up all over urban centers in 
Bessarabia in reaction to Nazi discrimination against German Jews.  Zionist youth were 
instrumental in organizing some of the largest demonstrations of protest, such as the one around 
the Express Theater in Chişinău on May 7, 1933 when a crowd of 1500 Jews shut down 
downtown traffic.
73
  Once German Jews began fleeing Germany, some found their way to 
Bessarabia: a Committee for Aiding German-Jewish Refugees was set up in September 1933 as 
part of the Zionist Federation.
74
  But from the Zionist perspective, Orthodox Jews were 
unforgivably lukewarm in their support for the boycott—because of their lack of national 
sentiment, according to the Zionist youth.  One example that greatly upset Zionists was the 
Orthodox Jews‘ much greater expenditure of energy on ensuring Jews kept their stores closed on 
Saturdays than on the boycott.
75
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On the other hand, the actions of some Zionists, such as Maccabbee activists that 
pressured Jewish merchants to not buy German products, also offended.
76
  At the general anti-
German rally organized at the New Market November 13, 1933 by the Zionist Federation, 
Chişinău Hacoah leader Iahinsohn mounted a makeshift podium to speak to the Jewish crowd 
assembled, one of many speakers that evening.  Members of the crowd interrupted his speech, 
however, and began chanting ―down with the Jewish Hitler!‖  When he proceeded speaking, the 
crowd began throwing chairs at him until he was forced off.
77
  Hacoah was particularly 
unpopular with older, devout Jews, who feared their overt acts of national pride would bring 
down repercussions on all Jews.  A similar circumstance took place three days later, when 
Iahinsohn publically thanked local communists for supporting the Jewish boycott.  The audience 
(one assumes the non-communists at least) began booing and throwing things, many calling out 
that the boycott need not lower itself by associating with communists.  Fear of being associated 
with communists, given the Siguranţa record of arrest and torture, was real, but apparently the 
stance of the Hacoah (and the Revisionists in general) was deliberate confrontation.
78
   
There were other reasons why right-wing Zionist groups served to sow discord.  For 
example, Iahinsohn angered the Jewish boycott committee in January 1934 when he wrote to the 
general committee in Warsaw to complain about the ineffectiveness of the Bessarabian boycott 
and asked them to send more committed Zionists.
79
  More seriously, the Jewish National Fund 
consistently ran fundraising events, not only for emigration but also for Jewish institutions in 
Eretz Israel, including for self-defense forces.  During fundraising in the autumn of 1933, several 
fights erupted between Chişinău Jews and the right-wing Zionist youth group Brit-Trumpeldor, 
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which by all accounts attempted to force some Jews storekeepers to give money for the 
formation of a Jewish gendarme battalion in Palestine.
80
  This occurred also in Cetatea Alba 
(Akkerman) in the Bessarabian south, where older Jews felt particularly vulnerable before local 
anti-Semites and were extremely angered by the arrival of the uniformed Jewish group.
81
   
The complex kaleidoscope of Zionist political perspectives was reflected in myriad 
Zionist papers, almost entirely in Yiddish at first but increasingly also in Hebrew, which began 
publication in the early interwar years as a reflection of the new youthful point of view.  These 
usually closed down after a few months or a year or two at best, with the notable exception of 
Michael Landau‘s Unzer Tsayt.82  Zionist dailies not only informed their readers about local 
Jewish events, they in fact focused on international affairs: negotiations in London concerning 
Eretz Israel, circumstances in Palestine, Zionist conferences across Europe and their 
interpretation, thereby indoctrinating its readers with a powerfully Zionist outlook.  The staff of 
Der Yid, for example, not only criticized the British government for not permitting enough Jews 
into Palestine, but also for forcing Jews there to learn English (―after all the Arabs don‘t have to 
learn English‖).  They criticized Talmud Torahs for expecting Jewish refugee children from 
Ukraine to learn in Yiddish (―some jargon‖).83  Many of the Zionist youth groups put out their 
own papers, such as Unzer Veg (Our Path) published by the Zionist Student Society and Erd und 
Arbet (Land and Labor) published by Zeiri-Zion. 
Despite the penchant of the Revisionists to make the news, the Zionist left was far more 
popular with Jewish young people in interwar Bessarabia as a whole.  In most towns of the 
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Bessarabian north especially, left-leaning groups comprised of Zeiri-Zion, Gordonia, and 
Hehalutz very often between 50% and 70% of total Zionist youth movement strength.
84
  The 
appeal of the left was strong for numerous reasons, but in all respects closely tied to local 
circumstances of Romanian Bessarabia and the Dniester borderland.  As part of their imagined 
role as saviors and regenerators of the Jewish community, young Zionists on the left understood 
their role as not only fighting for Jewish emigration and standing up against the anti-Semites, but 
also in helping the Jewish poor and suffering, who were not in short supply in 1930s Bessarabia.  
Zeiri-Zion members were constantly working with Jewish communal organizations like Ezras-
Hoilim, Malbish-Arinim and OZE to help the poor, especially children.
85
  This was an important 
part of the imagined socialist utopia for members of Gordonia, for example.  It is the duty of the 
men in the family to take care of the women and children; the leftist Zionist youth were 
performing their imagined masculinity.   
In fact, the membership numbers indicate that the strength of the Zionist left and right 
was increasing at the expense of the middle, which in the face of tremendous challenges must 
have lost some of Zionism‘s romantic appeal to the more radical interpretations.  It was also a 
reflection of the youth rebellion against the older generation, as the centrist Algemeine Zionists 
was composed much more of older people focused on following world affairs and diplomatic 
efforts to create a Jewish homeland, but much less liable to partake in radical action or 
violence.
86
  They championed the Jewish National Party and remained committed to pushing 
forth a pro-Jewish agenda through democratic politics, even though most understood the serious 
anti-democratic problems plaguing Romanian local and national politics.  By way of comparison, 
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withdrawal from the political arena was an important indication of the growing radicalization of 
the Zionist youth.  By 1933, both the left and the right had given up hope in democracy in 
Romania.  The position of Zeiri-Zion on the 1933 Parliamentary elections were well known by 
Bessarabian Jewish youth: there is no need to take part because none of the parties represent the 
interests of Jewish workers.
87
  Underground sections of Paolei-Tsiyon became much more active 
after the elections despite the constant threat of arrest and torture in order to push for increased 
collections across Bessarabia for the Jewish National Fund.  Together with Zeiri-Zion and two 
other socialist-Zionist groups, Anaga Gilith and Freiheit, they worked to organize a ―workers‘ 
Zion.‖88  Just as was visible in other segments of Jewish life, the rapid intensification of 
antisemitism and marginalization of Jews politically and socially after 1933 led to some 
unification among Zionist youth groups, most notably on the left.  As circumstances grew worse, 
Zionist youth on the left and right became more committed to establishing Palestine and getting 
there by any means necessary. 
Nevertheless, radicalization was not only happening with Zionist youth groups.  By the 
late 1920s, the growth of Zionist sympathies in the Bessarabian Jewish public had grown 
sufficiently to permit a rapid growth of Zionist political and social organizations beyond the 
youth movement that in many cases ran parallel with and sometimes even competed with the 
older, traditional Jewish communal institutions.  Particularly in Bălţi in the north, which was 
something of a Zionist heartland in interwar Bessarabia, many Jewish organizations and interests 
began leaning in an increasingly Zionist direction.  A Zionist women‘s organization was begun 
in 1928 led by wives of the most wealthy and influential Jewish men in Chişinău.  By 1931 the 
group had grown to over 200 members and was very active in fundraising for Palestine and in 
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the local ORT, which ran a school for professional training for Jewish adults.
89
  This group was 
soon followed by the opening of several chapters of WIZO, the international Zionist Women‘s 
movement, and Veref, the women‘s Zionist-Revisionist organization.90   
ORT had existed in Tsarist Russia and focused on developing agricultural knowledge and 
training in industry and crafts as a means of economic amelioration, as well as modernization 
and social engineering.  This was of course directed toward improving Jewish life in Russia, one 
of the principle ideals of the society‘s Jewish elite who founded it in St. Petersburg after 1881.91  
In the 1930s when circumstances in Bessarabia grew dire, many chapters of ORT across the 
region began focusing more on training for settlement.
92
  This took place from above in terms of 
the political direction of the ORT leaders in Bessarabia, and from below, in terms of the greatly 
increased strength of Zionism among young people that turned to ORT for vocational training.  
By 1931, for example, most ORT chapters were already working closely with Hehalutz groups to 
combine spiritual positivism geared toward settlement with physical exertion and professional 
training.
93
  
In years before, the modern Jewish health organization OZE, which cared for the needs of 
the poor and especially children, came into competition with the traditional philanthropic 
societies like Ezras-Ainim (Society for Poor Jews) and Bicur-Hoilim (Society for Sick Jews).  In 
1927, an additional benevolent society was founded with Zionist federation money that sought 
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not only to provide food and medicine to poor Jews and their children, but also to instruct them 
in the development of Jewish national culture and in the virtues of sports and physical activity.
94
  
Increasingly, Zionist principles of social engineering, which were heavily laden with European 
gender coding of modern values, penetrated into wider Jewish culture in this extremely difficult, 
tense and frightening environment.  These principles would allow for the production of better 
Jews—stronger, more physical, athletic and proud—which would make them more capable of 
confronting and triumphing against the anti-Semites. 
  
Autonomism/Territorialism/Yiddishism   
Even as Zionism gained strength throughout the interwar years, it was not the only 
alternative dynamic enough to interest young Jews.  The project of the Yiddish Cultural League, 
the institution in interwar Bessarabia most clearly championing the political ideal of Diaspora 
cultural autonomy and Jewish cultural revival in Yiddish, was brought to life locally mostly by 
Jewish teachers, many of them having been active members of the Bund before the take over of 
Bessarabia by Romania.
95
  This organization, formally established by Gherş Gelişenschi, spread 
rapidly across all of Jewish Bessarabia, becoming an important organization for the collection, 
proliferation and preservation of Yiddish culture.  Police records indicate that by 1930, the 
Yiddish Cultural League (YCL) had 22 local chapters outside Chişinău focused on strengthening 
Jewish culture in Bessarabia rather than looking toward Paestine as homeland and solution to 
Jewish problems.  The JCL serves as strong evidence that many Jews believed that their identity 
was rooted to their place of residence; enough to make them want to fight to preserve a Jewish 
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future there.
96
  Nevertheless, the YCL was subject to the same fate as its founder; suspicion of 
communist and anti-Romanian sympathies leading to the eventual closing of almost all its 
chapters by 1937.  As in the case of Zionism, the Romanian government was not directly 
opposed to Jewish culture or religion, but its representatives in the Siguranţa increasingly viewed 
Jewish culture and religion as political, which carried with it always the suspicion of 
communism. 
Most YCL members had a strong connection to Yiddish culture as a regenerative force 
for the Jewish people as well as a tradition of left-wing political leanings.  YCL leaders were by 
no means anti-Zionist, and in fact Zionism increasingly played a greater role in the organization 
as circumstances in Bessarabia grew worse in the 1930s.  These leaders were, however, 
committed to the idea that Jews must not seek salvation through emigration to Eretz Israel only; 
rather, they should maintain cultural autonomy and work to preserve Jewish tradition in the lands 
where their ancestors had lived for centuries.  Their ideology was informed by many Jewish 
thinkers whose ideas, as well as the socio-economic conditions of the Jews in the Russian Pale, 
had formed the basis of the Bundist movement.
97
  Perhaps the best known Jewish historians of 
the time, Simon Dubnow, explicitly denied the need for a people to have their own land to be 
considered a ―normal‖ nation.  Dubnow argued that the Jews represented a nation on a higher 
plane than the European nations, precisely because they had survived as a distinct people 
spiritually, without land.  Dubnow maintained that Zionism, while a useful idea, could not be 
taken as the only or indeed, even as a realistic solution to the Jewish problem in its entirety, since 
the more than five million Jews in the Pale during his day could not simply all emigrate to 
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Palestine.  Dubnow continued to favor a notion of Jewish cultural autonomy within Russia, and 
YCL leaders looked to implement the same principles in Bessarabia.
98
   
Yet the autonomists understood the Jewish condition to be in a state of crisis as well and 
sought to infuse restorative strength into Jewish identity also.  Jewish national identity could 
survive in the Diaspora if it was sufficiently infused, indeed regenerated, with Yiddish secular 
culture.  In fact, the programs of the various YCL chapters across Bessarabia, especially its 
cultural activities for Jewish youth, show a consistent and close relationship with Zionists.  As 
socio-economic conditions worsened in the 1930s, however, the level of emotion in debates 
escalated and YCL meetings were often marred by arguments between autonomists, socialists 
and Zionists that sometimes led to fist fights.  The YCL remained divided between the pro-
Hebrew proponents of Zionism and the pro-Yiddish proponents of cultural autonomy and 
communism, with the pro-Yiddish Zionists in the middle.
99
   
The YCL was registered with the new Romanian authorities on September 19, 1919.  
According to its statue from 1920, the Yiddish Cultural League sought to develop and spread 
Jewish culture through art, theater, and Jewish schools both for children and adults throughout 
Bessarabia from its center in Chişinău.  It had four separate sections; literature, music, theater, 
and pedagogy, each with its own sectional office that worked under the general direction of the 
local branch‘s central commission.100  In interwar Bessarabia, the YCL became particularly 
known for its libraries, which rapidly spread to most significant Jewish communities in the 
region.  The YCL funded these libraries in part through monthly membership dues and annual 
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charges paid by library visitors, but mostly through communal support and fundraisers and 
donations, although the central branch in Chişinău also received some support from the 
municipal government between 1928 and 1936 when the Jewish community was legally 
recognized and became entitled to state subsidies as a recognized faith under the Law of Cults.
101
  
Most of the visitors to the library were poor Jews, and the price for entrance, at 5 lei per month, 
was cheap, although it was more for the right to check out books.
102
  Its collections of Yiddish-
language volumes was an important source for pedagogy at Yiddish language schools as well, 
and many Jewish primary schools relied on the YCL libraries as book repositories for use in the 
classroom.
103
 Many of the books at YCL libraries were acquired from Yiddish cultural centers 
like Cernauţi, Warsaw, and New York, and often came through cooperation with other Jewish 
associations with broader organizational reach, such as the pro-Hebrew Tarbut.
104
   
YCL libraries functioned as important and multi-purpose centers of Jewish culture in the 
interwar period, providing not only a source of books, but literary clubs for discussion of Jewish 
authors, theatrical performances and debates on Jewish issues and political questions, all in 
Yiddish.  They also doubled as the post-system in many small towns, especially in the north of 
Bessarabia where certain shtetls were almost entirely Jewish.
105
  With the presence of a strong 
network of Tarbut private schools in Hebrew, the YCL became the proponent of Jewish 
education and culture in Yiddish.  In 1922, the YCL was involved in fully or partly supporting a 
Yiddish language school network that had 52 primary schools, from which 38 at that time 
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received state subsidies, altogether serving 6000 children.
106
  Over the interwar years, hundreds 
of plays in Yiddish were presented on premises and/or under organizational auspices of YCL 
chapters.  
While a central branch of the organization was founded in Chişinău in 1919, across 
Bessarabian Jewish communities the YCL represented the organic incorporation of already 
existing local Yiddish cultural institutions.  For example, A Jewish library existed in Soroca 
since the middle of the 19
th
 century, around which toward the end of the 1800s was organized a 
Yiddish literary organization called ―Yiddishe Kunst.‖  In the early 1920s its functions were 
expanded and it was renamed the Yiddish Cultural League when it joined the organization 
founded by Gelişenschi.  This branch of the YCL was built around this strong Jewish library, 
with religious books in Hebrew, various collections in Yiddish, as well as many books and 
journals in Russian, including Marxist literature.  In the 1930s, the library acquired a growing 
collection of Zionist literature, and served not only as a place for reading, but also as a site for 
debates over materials read, especially over questions concerning Jewish nationalism and 
problems of Jewish life in Romania and Eastern Europe more broadly.  Discussions about Jewish 
life in the Soviet Union also took place and where closely observed whenever possible.  
Elsewhere in the Soroca judeţ Jewish libraries and cultural centers existed in Vertizheni, 
Zguritsa, and some other shtetls.
107
   
The YCL received funds from the Jewish communal administration.  Most of its 
members were artisans, low ranked civil servants, store workers and petty merchants.  There was 
also a tiny minority of wage workers (from oil grinders, millers, and small factories for soap), 
since manufacturing in Bessarabia was in its infancy and employed very few people.  Often 
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reading circles would be organized on Saturday after the Sabbath, usually over some new written 
work.  At the Soroca YCL, Yiddish literary classics were very popular topics for discussion, 
including the works of Sholem Aleichem, Mendele Moyher Sforim, Yehuda Leib Peretz, and 
political leftist-radical works.  Works by local writers, although of no great fame, were also 
performed.  Most have not survived.  Zionist youth groups such as Maccabbee also worked with 
the YCL cultural centers.  The YCL organized performances of Yiddish theater and solo artists, 
artistic exhibitions, youth athletic competitions, balls, fundraising evenings, parties and lotteries.   
One of the central aims of the YCL was to ensure the education of the youth in a secular-
national Diaspora direction, and in interwar Bessarabia the YCL was instrumental in maintaining 
a high level of education among the Jewish population compared to that of other ethnic groups, 
particularly in rural areas where state schools were only beginning to make inroads during these 
years and where a significant Jewish population remained.
108
  Among the more famous Jewish 
personalities that performed in Sorocca as well as other towns, especially Chişinău, were Sidi 
Thal, Djini Zlatoi, and Simona Liebovich.  One of Sidi Thal‘s best known works was called Der 
Geiler Sutn (The Yellow Shade), which was very successful in Bessarabia.  There were also 
lectures from local and visiting Jewish communal leaders and personalities on various topics, 
mostly but not exclusively on Jewish life.
109
After 1936, the YCL was forced into inactivity, but 
some of its library continued to function until 1940, when the Soviet regime dismantled them and 
either destroyed or handed out the collections to other libraries.   
Leaders of the Bessarabian autonomist movement were cultural leaders: writers, poets, 
publishers, and teachers.  An illustrative example of a highly active interwar Yiddishist from 
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Bessarabia is Leizer Fishman, the president of the Soroca YCL.  Fishman was a Yiddish teacher 
in the Soroca Talmud-Torah and also wrote for local Yiddish journals; in 1932-33, he edited a 
monthly journal called Vintn (Winds).  He managed to publish several issues of the journal when 
he was then arrested by the Siguranţa and jailed for a few months; after his release he was 
forbidden to publish anything else.  Fishman also directed the Soroca Jewish theater group, 
which was known and respected not only in Bessarabia.  Yiddish troupes under his direction, 
mostly Zionist youth, performed plays based on the stories of Sholem Aleichem, I.L. Peretz, 
Avram Goldfadn and others.  Fishman was also involved in the local Jewish music scene, but 
died at the age of 30 from the flu.
110
  Another and better known example is Zelik Berdichever 
(Figure 13 below), who was born and lived in Bălţi, where he was active in organizing cultural 
events and performances.  Many of his songs and stories were used at gatherings of parents and 
children at the YCL library in Bălţi throughout the 1930s. Although he died at the age of 34 in 
1937, Bessarabian Jews still remember many of the children‘s songs that he wrote in Yiddish.111 
Figure 13: Zelik Berdichver, circa 1930, photo from Letiashchie Teni. 
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Despite the standard assumptions of the Bessarabian Siguranţa that the YCL was part of 
the Bund or even an agent of Bolshevism, the organization was in fact a site for debate about 
Jewish culture of all types.  The ongoing argument over Hebrew versus Yiddish among the YCL 
members attests not only to the strength of Jewish culture in Bessarabia in Hebrew, but also to 
the mixing of national and socialist ideologies
112
 and the persistence of religious concerns among 
members that saw the organization as transcending Bundism to become a champion of 
Yiddishism and Jewish culture in general, as was the primary aim of the organization‘s 
founders.
113
  For example, at a January 27, 1920 meeting of the YCL in Chişinău, local members 
decided to conduct the meeting in Hebrew, and chose to discuss parables from the Talmud 
focused on the lack of necessity for Jews to unite into a nation, focusing rather on communal 
functioning along Talmudist principles in the Diaspora.
114
  Nevertheless, members of the YCL 
were never completely removed from Zionist ideology, and over the course of the interwar years 
many plays, meetings, and lectures organized by the group were increasingly inspired by Zionist 
ideology.  For example, in October 1926, Jewish teacher and locally well-known Zionist Iosif 
Dubovis gave a series of lectures at the Chişinău YCL center; on October 24, 1934, the YCL 
chapter in Cetatea Alba invited Jewish writer L. Malakh, who had recently been to Palestine, to 
speak of his impressions; and in October 1935 the YCL chapter in Bălţi organized a youth 
conference with assistance from the local left-wing Zionist organization ―Dror.‖115 
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Still, leftist ideology remained a strong interest of the YCL leaders, as was true for 
Bessarabian Jewry in general, and throughout the interwar period, YCL members participated in 
and organized demonstrations and conferences in support of the Jewish worker‘s movement.   
For example, on February 14, 1920, about 500 working class Jews from Chişinău attended a 
protest meeting held in the Mayoralty Hall to speak against the exploitation of the working class 
by the bourgeoisie, and in 1924, several members of this organization in Chişinău participated in 
the May Day demonstrations organized that day and were arrested for ―pro-Bolshevism.‖116  The 
YCL became an important voice not only for the underground Bundists with links to parent 
institutions in Bukovina, but also for communists of various persuasions that had been active in 
the Russian revolutionary movement.
117
  It was not, however, absent from calls for Jewish 
national autonomy within Romania of the sort granted to Hungarians and Germans but never 
extended to the Jews.
118
   
The YCL became involved with Jewish political struggles for the Jewish national cause 
when leaders felt necessary.  During the course of 1925, all Jewish groups including the YCL 
protested and demonstrated against the private education law of Education Minister Angelescu, 
which initially deprived the Jews of a right to use their mother tongue for instruction in their own 
private schools by proposing that unlike the other minorities, the mother tongue of the Jews was 
Romanian.
119
  Gelişenschi, having returned from the United States in November 1925 after a 
fund-raising trip for Yiddish schools, immediately began working on an official protest to the 
Romanian government against Angelescu‘s private education law, and sent copies of the protest 
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to American and other foreign colleagues.
120
  The Bund in Cernauţi, led by Dr. Pistiner, sent 
circulars to underground Bundists in Bessarabia and to YCL chapters across the region 
protesting the Angelescu law and calling for all Jews to fight for their national autonomy.
121
   
At the outset of the interwar period, the YCL in Bessarabia was focused on Yiddish 
culture and leftist political aspirations.  Yet, as challenges to the Jewish community, and 
particularly to Jewish education, arose in Greater Romania, the organization moved closer the 
ideology of Jewish national autonomy that remained so strong in the interwar Bund in Poland 
and Lithuania.  As fascism arose in Germany and its support in Romania began to be felt, the 
movement toward Zionism within the YCL was clear, as seen by the increasing number of 
Zionist speakers, discussions and literary evenings.  Indeed, this movement toward calls for 
national autonomy can be seen in Bessarabian Jewry as a whole, of which YCL leaders and 
participants‘ aspirations for Yiddish cultural autonomy was a part.    
 
Underground Communism in Bessarabia 
Another very important expression of Jewish collective desire for the future, and the only 
one that really mattered as far as Siguranţa agents were concerned, was communism.  Despite the 
extremely small size of the illegal Bessarabian communist movement as a whole and of Jewish 
participation in it, especially when compared to cultural, religious or nationalist movements, 
communism, or more exactly Romanian leaders‘ perception of communism as a Jewish disease, 
was very important to understanding the eventual fate of the province‘s Jews.  Jews had 
dominated the illegal communist movement in Bessarabia during the late Russian Empire.  Like 
elsewhere in the Pale of Settlement, the legacy of Jewish revolutionary involvement against 
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Russian autocracy is well documented there.  The province was fertile soil for revolutionary 
activity: it was far from the imperial center and a destination for many political exiles, factors 
that persuaded Lenin to begin publication of the underground newsletter Iskra (The Spark) in 
Kishinev in 1903.  Most of the printers who worked on this newsletter were Jews.
122
   Jews were 
more literate and urban than their Orthodox neighbors and leaned toward leftist ideologies as a 
means of achieving freedom from Tsarist oppression.  The de facto persistence of inequality in 
Romanian Bessarabia convinced many such activists that their cause must continue, with only 
the ruling regime having changed.  Many Jewish youth, deprived of economic and social 
opportunity in the Pale, turned to revolutionary agitation.
123
 
Because communism was forced underground in Romania as a whole in 1924, but in 
Bessarabia specifically as early as November 1918, Bucharest inadvertently directed the local 
communist movement into the arms of the Soviet-controlled Comintern even as it made 
communist activity extremely dangerous and throughout the interwar years attractive only to the 
desperately destitute or the ideologically militant.
124
  Jews had a monopoly on neither of these 
categories, and there were plenty of non-Jews in the communist movement across the whole of 
Romania.  Classified party statistics compiled by Michael Shafir show that across Romania in 
1933, 26.5% of communists were Hungarian and 22.6% were ethnic Romanians; Jews were third 
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with 18% of party membership.
125
  In a country that was 4.2% Jewish this was still a high 
number, and it was even higher in Bessarabia, but communism could not be rightly called an 
entirely Jewish movement.
126
  Yet, with relatively few literate, educated ethnic Moldovans in 
Bessarabian urban centers by 1918, Moldovans were tremendously under-represented in the 
communist movement.  Romanian politicians constructed a national explanation for this: because 
they were in fact Romanian, Romanian-speaking Bessarabians would not partake in a movement 
that by Bucharest‘s definition undermined the sovereignty of their motherland.   
Romanian nation-building propaganda capitalized on this fact: the idea that communism 
was imported into Romania by foreigners was accepted dogma among government and 
intellectual circles in the interwar period.  There were many examples of this thinking; one such 
appeared as an interview with nationally-renown poet and short-term Prime Minister Octavian 
Goga in an article in the democratic Bucharest newspaper Dimineaţa.127  In discussing the threat 
of Bolshevism from Soviet Russia, Goga argued that communism was completely incompatible 
with the Romanian nation culturally, economically, politically, and socially, not least of all 
because the Romanians already fought against Bolsheviks in 1918, and because they have an 
agrarian economy.  The Romanian people had no attraction whatsoever to communism, he 
argued; they have other concerns.  Thus, ―when we talk about the spread of communism in 
Romania, we have to look to those that are foreign in this country and have no sympathy for the 
Romanian situation, a situation of working farmers and petty traders.‖128   
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Soviet policies did nothing to assuage the Romanian perception that communism was 
foreign to the Romanian character and in fact anti-Romanian.  Unlike in Bessarabia, where 
ethnic minorities dominated the communist movement because the Moldovan population was 
overwhelmingly rural and uneducated, in the Old Kingdom there were many ethnic Romanians 
that strongly supported socialism and communism.  After the Russian Revolution, however, they 
had to deal with a direct challenge to their national sentiment as Romanians from world 
communism led by Moscow—the Soviet Union demanded the return of Bessarabia and 
Romanian communists were expected to hold the party line.  This took its toll: at the Third 
Congress of the Comintern that took place in Moscow in June-July 1921, many of the 
representatives from Romania that remained loyal to Moscow were Bessarabian Communists, 
and many of these were Jews.
129
  Two years later, at the Sixth Conference of the Balkan 
Communist Federation held in Moscow in September 1923, the Romanian Communist Party 
further isolated itself from Romanian sentiment by accepting the Comintern position on the 
national question in Romania: the Romanian nation was not, as was proclaimed by the political 
and most of the intellectual establishment, the natural consolidation of the Romanian people into 
their own unitary, national state, but was rather the product of imperialist-capitalist policies in 
the aftermath of WWI.  Bessarabian communists became increasingly crucial to the Romanian 
interwar communist movement in general, transferring their pre-1917 anti-Tsarist revolutionary 
activity toward the interwar Romanian government.
130
  By 1924, Romanian communists had split 
over Bessarabia and the Communist Party was legally banned in Romania.  Moscow‘s demand 
for ideological orthodoxy was made more pronounced with Stalin‘s eventual triumph of 
―socialism in one country:‖ by carefully constructing the perception of the USSR as besieged by 
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capitalism, it became even more necessary for communists abroad to strictly support the interests 
of the communist ―homeland‖ even if they went against their own national interests. 131  As such, 
Romanian communists went against Romanian national sentiment and undermined their own 
political base: those educated enough to make useful cadres.  They opened themselves to 
criticism of being anti-Romanian.  The movement then more readily attracted those that had less 
connection to the Romanian national idea, such as Jews, Russians, Hungarians and Ukrainians.
132
   
Political developments in interwar Romania served to strengthen the real and alleged 
connection between Jews and communism.  Civic and political rights, while guaranteed in the 
minorities‘ protection treaties that the Romanian government signed, remained a problem as 
many Jews in the annexed territories lost their citizenship in 1924 when their status became 
contingent upon individual petition with the Mârzescu Law.
133
  This petition process was made 
complicated, difficult, and riddled with bureaucratic pitfalls that required bribery to settle issues, 
which meant that the poor were unlikely to receive citizenship.
134
  With additional limiting 
provisions, this law and other codes prevented a significant percentage of Jews from the annexed 
territories of having a political voice.  Lack of political rights, coupled with corruption and police 
bias, added to the general popular perception of alienation and hopelessness among Jews, which 
fueled Jewish national movements primarily, but also Jewish participation in the communist 
movement.  For Bucharest, there were also geopolitical concerns that provoked state and police 
bias: there was a need to show that communism was an imported rather than a homegrown 
movement.  If it became known that ‗Bessarabian Romanians‘ were engaged in anti-national 
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activities, Bucharest leaders feared there might be greater international questioning of Romanian 
legitimacy in Bessarabia, particularly sensitive given the virulent Soviet opposition.
135
  
Communism as a Soviet-sponsored and directed import silenced the validity of communism as 
resistance to the abuses of the Romanian government; and a tradition of effectively scapegoating 
foreigners for internal problems there was already in place in the Old Kingdom.
136
  The interwar 
Romanian national narrative that Bessarabians were ethnic Romanians was consistently reflected 
in state statistics, especially the 1930 census, and in police actions.  Soviet propaganda, on the 
other hand, strove to play down Jewish involvement in communism, desiring instead to show 
that Moldovan common people desired Soviet power over Romanian bourgeois exploitation.
137
   
Police bias was built on and compounded by such ethnically constructed categories of 
Romanians and foreigners: while arrests were typical occurrences for all communist members, 
treatment was not equal across ethnic lines.  Generally, the arrested were released fairly soon, 
after questioning and some beatings; the issue was usually decided without court proceedings but 
with bribes.  The attitude toward the Jewish communists was harsher than toward the others, 
however, especially the Moldovans, who were typically released with a slap on the wrist.  A 
police report from October 9, 1929 noted that a group of Moldovans arrested on September 22 in 
the town of Vesterniceni were immediately freed, only to be caught spreading communist 
manifestos on the streets again on September 23.  The report betrays considerable frustration on 
the part of Siguranţa officials with these people since they are ―ethnic Romanians.‖  They had no 
set policy in such cases, apparently, since repression is meant for the foreign communists.
138
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Jews tended to get longer prison sentences when convicted, and often had to fight to 
prove their innocence against heavy institutional and police bias.  Such was the fate of Slioma 
Wexler and Berl Dragabetsky, who on July 8, 1932 were sentenced to Doftana prison for an 
indefinite sentence for ―subverting the public interest by spreading communist propaganda and 
supporting the activities of the organization MOPR, which was known to have international 
communist interests and to work against the security of the Romanian nation.‖  Wexler and 
Dragabetsky were captured during a Siguranţa anti-communist campaign in Cetatea Alba 
(Akkerman) during the first half of 1932.  Police repression often functioned in waves, since 
consistent pressure could not be maintained at high intensity.
139
 
Figure 14: Protesting workers of obviously strong leftist leanings in Bălţi, December 12, 1934: the sign on 
the left reads ―We demand equality for railroad workers;‖ the one the right ―Down with Fascism.‖ Photo from 
ANRM photograph collection, #42722. 
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Figure 15: Jewish communists arrested for underground communist activity; a dubiously democratic trial 
would be followed by typically lengthy sentences in the Doftana penitentiary near Benderi, which specialized in 
―communists.‖ The photo on the left is Sarah Suhaia, a leading figure in the underground communist movement, 
accused of conspiratorial work and sentenced November 16, 1933 to 10 years at the central prison and 100,000 lei 
fine.  ANRM photograph collection, #42026; #42022. 
 
In his semi-biographical novel about the young Jews in the communist underground in 
interwar Bessarabia, Yechiel Schreibman recalls his arrest and captivity by the Siguranţa for 18 
days.
140
  Schreibman was seriously tortured to force him to give away some of his comrades in 
the underground movement.  Most common were beatings, but also some electric shock torture 
was used.  For the Siguranţa, foreigners had corrupted the ethnic Moldovans toward 
communism—they needed to be punished while ―ours‖ were just misguided and needed 
direction.
141
  Bravery for their cause in the face of the potential horrors they faced served as a 
powerful source of comradery and zealotry, especially when martyrdom for fallen comrades was 
incorporated.  The imagery of being at war, which many Bessarabian Jewish communists 
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maintained, and was understood as masculine like warfare itself is held as the business of men, 
even though women were also important revolutionaries. 
Despite Romanian state bias about Jewish involvement with communism, Jews were not 
the only ones inclined toward the communist underground.  As early as August 3, 1918, the 
Siguranţa reported a disturbance at an Orthodox Church organized by opponents of Romanian 
rule in Bessarabia.
142
  Russians and Ukrainians were active in leftist movements, as was 
illustrated in the 1919 Hotin and 1924 Tatar Bunar uprisings, both of which were spearheaded by 
non-Jews.  The latter, which was more serious and was brutally suppressed, was largely a 
reaction among ethnic Ukrainians, Russians and Bulgarians to the policy of the Romanian 
government to settle ethnic Moldovans in southeast Bessarabia to dilute the large non-Moldovan 
presence there, as well as anger over failed harvests and famine.
143
   
Neverthless, Jews were an important presence in the communist movement in Bessarabia.  
For many young Jews that moved from Bessarabian shtetls into towns or cities for the first time, 
there was a pull toward underground communist organizations in part for economic reasons.  
Boris Gitenshtein, who grew up in interwar Chişinău, remembers that Jewish kids from shtetls 
were very interested in getting a higher education and streamed into the main cities, especially 
Bucharest, but local centers as well, such as Chişinău.  Here, things were difficult because a 
slowly growing economy and limits for university placement (numerus clauses) after 1922 made 
opportunities minimal.  Many became attracted to the communist underground because at the 
very least there was the possibility of comrades and sustenance, because they found some 
support from the communist underground, although usually in contacts and knowledge rather 
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than direct economic help.
144
  There was not sufficient funding to support lower-rung party 
members, who had to work to support themselves and their conspiratorial activities, although for 
the higher ups in the organization, there was support.
145
  Schreibman‘s roommate Yankl from 
Vad-Rashkov, with whom he arrived in Cernauţi in 1930, worked 10 hours a day six days a week 
fixing watches, for which he was paid some 20 lei per day; the two of them paid a monthly rent 
of 200 lei for two cots in the corner of an apartment.
146
  Sometimes the entire working-class 
party cell in Bessarabia or Romania would be composed of poor people.
147
  In this way, 
Romanian limitations on Jewish university education and increasing antisemitism only 
strengthened the Jewish interest in communism. 
Beyond any limited economic incentive, the underground movement was primarily 
attractive ideologically and culturally.  Schreibman remembers putting together a play with 
teenage friends at the seminary he attended in Cernauţi, where they performed a play from I.L. 
Peretz, ―The Ancient Boy,‖ and gave the proceeds they collected from local support and 
donations to the MOPR organization.
148
  Jewish culture in Bessarabia and Bukovina was 
intricately intermixed with socialist dreams—Schreibman described the attraction for young 
Jewish men and women to the communist underground through the lens of romance.  
Communist conspiracy was a very attractive: it was a secretive thing to do and was combined, 
importantly, with a tight comradery needed to overcome the harshness of life in the big city, 
especially for those who were outsiders to it.  Schreibman‘s own romanticism increased when he 
began to see the sympathy for socialism among older, established people, such as his landlady, 
and even to some extent his seminary rabbi, who returned to him the leftist propaganda journal 
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Der Roite Schiller, (The Red Schoolboy—which circulated in Bessarabia and Bukovina) that 
Schreibman had been passing out to the other youth, only to tell him that this was not how 
propaganda was done.
149
  Schreibman‘s novels on his years as a communist youth, written in the 
Soviet Union after WWII, must be read with caution.  Yet, strong sympathy for communism 
among Bessarabian Jewish intellectuals—such as Yiddish writers from the ―Bessarabian 
Olympus‖ of Lipcani, expressed in their literary-political journal Shoibn (Windows), as well as 
the numerous cases of a pro-communist message extolled by Jewish teachers in mostly Yiddish 
but also Hebrew language schools—was clear and widespread.   
As the early interwar years unfolded, Jewish involvement in the communist movement 
was thus an important narrative of resistance toward an ethnic Romanian state being imposed 
from Bucharest on the newly acquired territories.  Nevertheless, communism also attracted Jews 
that were attracted to the Soviet promise of national equality and worked to create a Soviet 
Bessarabia.  Many Jewish communists retreated from Bessarabia with Red Army detachments in 
1918 and joined the civilian administration in Soviet Ukraine.  Some went on to achieve high 
status as bureaucrats in the Odessa Gubernia and later in MASSR. Just as they were active in the 
MASSR party committees, Jews, many of them Bessarabian exiles, like Badeev, were active in 
the Soviet propaganda campaign in Bessarabia.
150
  Michael Bruchis, who has closely tracked 
Jewish involvement in Bessarabian communism, maintains that Jewish communists not only led 
the movement; they essentially were the movement, as working class Jewish families from 
Bessarabian ghettos supplied not only the top layer leadership positions but also the street 
soldiers whose arrests were a daily news bulletin on Russian and Yiddish newspapers in interwar 
Chişinău.   
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There are many examples of Jewish over-representation in the Bessarabian communist 
movement.  The Soviet policy in Bessarabia was to directly foment a government overthrow 
through propaganda and agitation, a plan that failed through effective crushing of communist 
cells.  There was something of a cat and mouse game throughout the interwar years between the 
underground press and the Siguranţa.  Underground papers Bessarabskii Kommunist 
(Bessarabian Communist) and later Krasnyi Flag (Red Flag) were published with small presses 
that were located in Jewish homes.  Sometimes entire families were involved in the communist 
cause.  Locations were discovered, for example, in May 1920, in February 1921, and again in 
June 1924—on all three occasions, the press had been secretly hidden in Jewish homes.  Jews 
were instrumental not only in publishing in Chişinău and other Bessarabian towns, but as 
communications and instruction liaisons between Tiraspol and Chişinău, usually using the Orhei 
crossing of the Dniester River.  Riva Grinshpun, who was one of the river crossers that carried 
literature across the Dniester, went to Moscow in 1920 for a six-month ―party training course‖ 
and was returned to Bessarabia and promoted.   In 1920 there was an intense crackdown on 
communist activity in Chişinău, so much so that the central base for Bessarabian underground 
activities was moved to Iaşi across the Prut and Bălţi in northern Bessarabia.  Many of the 
leading members arrested that year were Jews.
151
  This state of affairs continued throughout the 
interwar years: in 1935, a military court sentenced 10 communists for publishing illegal 
literature, of whom 9 were Jews.
152
   
The actual size of the underground movement is difficult to determine, although it was 
clearly a fraction of the size of Jewish national movements.  Michael Bruchis estimates that there 
were some 800 communists in Bessarabia in 1919 prior to military crackdown; likely no more 
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than 320 in 1931 and still as few as 375 as late as 1940.  Such estimates are likely too low, and in 
fact it is impossible to make an exact estimate because Bessarabian communists worked hard to 
maintain secrecy while attempting to publicly inflate their numbers.
153
  Bruchis is not specific 
with his definition of a communist—likely these numbers represent the number of full-time 
revolutionaries, although this presupposes a much more numerous support structure of 
sympathizers.  Both the Romanian and Soviet governments also attempted to show that this 
number was much greater than in reality; the latter to stake a claim about the strength of the 
movement and the harsh dictatorial rule of the ―Romanian bourgeoisie‖ against local aspirations 
for worker equality, while the former to emphasize the danger of the communist threat to 
national security in order to justify policies that might be criticized as repressive.   
Yet, despite the clear importance of Jews to the communist movement, it was not only 
tiny in actual political influence but clearly more of a menacing presence in the Romanian 
imagination than on the ground in Bessarabia.  Sober reporting from the Siguranţa, when it took 
place, point to this as well.  On November 5, 1929 the Lapuşna county police chief noted that the 
overwhelming majority of Jewish activism is in a cultural direction—especially among the 
Zionist youth.  Jewish political activism takes place within general political groupings in the 
country and not outside them (like communism).
154
  Despite such information circulating 
through the state‘s own bureaucracy, Jews made too convenient and useful a scapegoat to 
seriously undertake amending public attitudes.  A central aspect of Bucharest‘s view was the 
national question—communism in Bessarabia was not accepted as a genuine workers‘ movement 
aimed at alleviating genuinely abhorrent conditions and minority discrimination, but rather a 
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deliberate policy from Moscow to sever Bessarabia from the ―motherland‖ and undermine 
Romanian ―unity.‖155  In fact geopolitics was certainly an important aspect of the Soviet policy.  
Self-legitimating ideology on both sides undermined the granting of any agency to local 
communists; Jews were caught in the middle of the struggle between Moscow and Bucharest.   
Yet, the key to understanding Jewish motivations in participation in the underground 
communist movement was precisely lacking in historiographic and contemporary treatment. 
Bruchis, who deals specifically with the question of Jewish communism, sympathizes with the 
Romanian national argument, agreeing that Jewish involvement in communism undermined the 
Romanian nation-state and that Jews were misguided in placing their loyalty with Soviet 
interests.  Yet Bruchis‘s criticism, because it is built on the understanding that Bessarabian 
Jewish communists were actively and deliberately anti-Romanian, is problematic.  Certainly for 
professional revolutionaries that led the cause, this is a questionable identity imposed by 
hindsight—Vladimir Tismaneanu notes that such Jews were in fact ―supra-national,‖ true 
internationalists that did not subscribe to any nationality but sought to undermine nationality as a 
matter of principle.  Their goals were loftier, aimed at not only solving the Jewish Question but 
indeed the problems of humanity; there could be no bother with undermining just the Romanian 
state or serving the interests of only the Jews.  Their dream was also, like for the Zionists, 
focused on restoring human dignity to the downtrodden, and like the Zionist radicals they too 
believed the system was broken and beyond repair.  Jews of this type were willing and ready to 
sever all ties with their Judaism in the name of their political and ideological ideals and desires, 
as Issac Deutscher put it, they were ―non-Jewish Jews.‖  Tismaneanu succinctly explains why 
communism was appealing to Romanian Jews: 
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Dissatisfied with the status quo, disgusted with bourgeois values, victimized by discriminatory 
measures, and appalled by the rise of Nazism, they indulged in fantasies about a worldwide 
communist revolution that would create a climate conducive to what Marx had called the 
‗realization of the human essence‘ and thus excise the cancer of antisemitism.  Their dream was to 
overcome their Jewishness, to be part of a universal movement whose aspirations and promises 
transcended national, religious, and racial boundaries.  Their romanticized image of the Soviet 
Union functioned as compensation for their frustrations and humiliations.
156
 
 
Forced underground, Bessarabian communists would struggle to maintain their programs 
and recruit new members in the face of considerable danger from the Romanian Siguranţa.  In 
many of the very public trials that the Romanian government carried out against the communist 
underground, many and often most of those given severe sentences, especially death, were Jews: 
―the trial of the 108‖ in August 1919, 6 of the 19 convicted to death were Jews; ―the case of the 
48‖ in January-February 1921, most of those given death were Jews.157  The Romanian Siguranţa 
held an unparalleled reputation for brutality; its special prison for communist conspirators where 
many executions were conducted, called Doftana, was a place deeply feared by communists and 
recognized as one of the worst prisons in Europe.
158
 
 Nevertheless, repression did not stop the communist movement.  Cracking down on the 
Bund drove some proponents of national-cultural autonomy in Bessarabia away from the 
political and more into the cultural realm, such as the Yiddish Cultural League, and but forced 
many that would not leave politics into the communist underground movement—some Jews on 
the left in Bessarabia were in fact pushed toward communism by Romanian policies.  
Furthermore, by forcing communism in the region underground, the Romanian government 
directly contributed to the strengthening of Soviet influence over Bessarabian communism, if 
only because of the unavailability of funds from any other source.  This was the very situation 
Romanian leaders desired to avoid.   
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The Komsomol in the MASSR 
 On the Soviet side of the Dniester, Zionism was equally as strong during the years of 
civil war and chaos following the Great War and the Russian Revolution, but by the end of 1924 
it was effectively but by no means completely silenced by continued Soviet attacks on Zionism 
as backward bourgeois nationalism.  By 1924 but especially after, many Jewish young people in 
the MASSR found their way into the ranks of the Communist League of Youth, or Komsomol.  
While many such youth were wholeheartedly behind the project of building communism, many 
among them embraced the Komsomol organization for reasons that were not unlike those that 
drove hordes of Jewish youth into Zionist sporting, farming, and communal-aid organizations 
across the political divide.   
 While the pull of communist internationalism was in many ways diametrically opposed to 
building a Jewish nation, there were numerous points of connection.  Both Zionism and the 
Komsomol attracted young Jews who wished to engage in building a better world, something 
that appeals to young people of every generation.  Both groups desired change for Jews, seeing 
no future in what they imagined as the stunted, religious, shtetl existence of the past.  Even if by 
embracing communism they professed allegiance with a philosophy that denounced religion, 
including their own, their interpretation of Soviet aspirations in the 1920s, when many young 
Jews flocked to the Komsomol just as many Jews in general flocked to the Communist Party, 
was in tune with their already existing anti-religious sensibilities.  Bolshevism promised an end 
to Judaism, not Jewry.  For many secular youths of the revolutionary era, religion was already a 
much less central part of life than it had been for their fathers and grandfathers—giving it up was 
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not only not much of a sacrifice, but liberating.
159
  For many Jews that jumped on board, Soviet 
policies allowed them to make religious Jews into an Other, thereby removing themselves from 
persecution and joining the persecutors.
160
  As far as they were concerned, the strong, proud and 
modern Jew of the future would be removed from the religious ways of the past.  Yuri Slezkine, 
making use of Isaac Babel, puts it best: ―In Soviet Russia, young Jews had, in fact, grabbed the 
‗rings attached to heaven and earth, and pulled heaven down to earth.‖161 
 Evsektsiia activists and party leaders above them were quite aware of the uses of the 
Komsomol among young Jews growing up in the ruins of East European shtetls.  What was 
sought, after all, was a ―fundamental change in the virtues of men, in their habits, in their 
feelings and desires, in the way they lived their daily life, in their byt.‖162 Their successful 
―selling‖ of Soviet-Jewish identity was largely accomplished through the promise of 
empowerment that could be attained by participating in constructing communism.  Not only Jews 
but many others, inspired by Bolshevik culture, desired to change their byt.  Their embracing of a 
modern, universally dynamic ideology of equality, historical progress, purpose and self-
improvement made many ready to embrace Bolshevik ideology and serve as its willing 
disseminators and administrators.  There was much within revolutionary culture that drew roots 
from pre-revolutionary traditions of the Russian intelligentsia, especially the desire to see oneself 
and the world around as in flux and subject to the will, to be made better according to rational 
human ideals—in short, modern.163  Secularizing Jews in the Russian Empire deeply internalized 
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this dream of the intelligentsia and applied it first as a means of transforming Jews toward 
acceptance from Russian society, later in the service of constructing a Jewish national soul 
through a new, historically-usable folk culture.
164
  Many were thus quite ready by the 1920s to 
embrace revolutionary culture as a more radical expression of the very things they had already 
accepted, even if resentment at the closing down of Jewish parties after 1918 lingered among 
some.   
For such lofty dreams, sacrifices were understandably necessary.  The establishment of 
the Komsomol meant suppression of other youth groups, even pro-Bolshevik ones, since 
otherwise control could not be ensured.
165
  As Lenin himself proclaimed, the New Man that was 
being constructed, as Komsomol activists were repeatedly told at congresses, was characterized, 
in part, by the creation ―out of the will of the millions and hundreds of millions…a single 
will.‖166 The hallmark of a good Komsomolist was to obey, and thereby join the single, unified 
will of the workers and peasants.  Jewish young people proved eager to join and become equals.  
In May 1926 in Rybnitsa, for example, efforts to recruit young Jews into the komsomol were 
accompanied with directives to shut down the illegal heders while simultaneously bringing 
together Jewish workers in the town centers to celebrate a new Jewish holiday: Sholem-
Aleichem day.
167
  The authors and architects of Soviet-Jewish culture, in celebrating the Yiddish 
language and the proletariat identity of Jews throughout history at the expense of religious 
tradition, sought to include Jewish young people who desired a new identity as Jews themselves.  
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To a large extent they were successful, and were able to utilize Jewish young people to 
implement a wide range of anti-religious, anti-Zionist and anti-traditional policies on the Jewish 
street—and not only on the Jewish street in the shtetls, but also in the collective farm and the 
new urban areas to which many Jews brought their traditions during these years of violence and 
mass motion.   
 A statistical view of the komsomol in Transnistria tells a similar story to Jews in the 
communist party as a whole.  The organization grew rapidly in Transnistria throughout the 
1920s, increasing in membership much more than the national fourfold increase during these 
years.
168
  Jews were significantly over-represented relative to their population, and apparently 
more heavily in Transnistria than in most other locales.  In 1934, the Komsomol organization in 
Transnistria numbered 1073 persons in the system—761 members and 312 candidates for 
membership, including 145 women among both groups.  In terms of nationalities, there were 237 
Moldovans in the Komsomol, 297 Ukrainians, 206 Russians, 283 Jews, and 50 belonging to 
other ethnic and national groups.  Thus, Jews represented more than 37% of Komsomol 
membership despite being less than 9% of the MASSR population.
169
  In Jewish collective farms, 
it appears that support for Komsomol activities was greater than among most other nationalities, 
especially Germans, although resentment was still quite strong.
170
   
For the generation that came up during the 1920s, joining the communist party was not 
only about dreams of a more equal and empowering modernity, however, but also about 
opportunism.  Joining the communist movement, via the Komsomol as was the norm for young 
people, meant becoming empowered, gaining status, and paving the way toward a better life for 
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themselves and their families.  Many continued to believe that they were also doing good for 
their co-religionists, and when confronted by suffering on the Jewish street resulting from the 
implementation of communist cultural and economic rules and norms, they tended to blame their 
own people for failing to grasp the revolutionary benefits being offered them by the Soviet state.  
Their thirst for modernity was powerful, and so was the desire to get out of the ruins of their pre-
war lives, in Transnistria more true than in many other places, where as late as 1929 many 
Jewish towns were plagued by more than half of their working population classified as lishentsy.  
The bright socialist future represented in every possible way, it seemed, that which was desirable 
as much as the dark ruins of the shtetl represented everything unwanted.  The coding of this 
binary was very much in masculine/feminine: the public over the private, the ―masses‖ over the 
family, the proletariat collective over bourgeois domesticity.
171
    
Komsomol activists were very often placed in charge of kolkhozes, socialist cultural 
societies and economic enterprises precisely because they were on their way to becoming party 
members in a region where insufficient party representation existed.  In many locations around 
the communist state, including Transnistria, the Komsomol activist was the only representative 
of  state power well into the 1920s, serving as an organizer of campaigns and enforcer of 
policies—the very personification of ―a progressive force for cultural change‖ that policy makers 
wanted people to see the state as.
172
  Given that Komsomol activists were typically young people 
(those placed in charge of enterprises were usually in their early twenties), this typically created 
tremendous resentment from the older, more specialized and competent Jews who were, 
nonetheless, less fluent in party ideology and less trusted than Komsomolists.  Nowhere did this 
cause more problems in the MASSR than on Jewish collective farms.  The Komsomol members 
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assigned to the collective Der Shtern, for example, complained that workers were not being 
properly supervised; that women workers especially were failing to show up for work, and that 
the collective property—especially the cafeteria—were in an ―unsanitary state.‖  One referred to 
it as a ―svinarnik‖ (a pig sty).  This could hardly have been an ideal place to live, but many of the 
Jews here knew each other, having been resettled together—the Komsomolist was an outsider 
and a young person without respect: such criticism was vehemently unappreciated.  Despite 
continued efforts at ―re-education‖ from several Komsomol activists assigned to the commune 
over the late 1920s and 1930s, they were never welcomed by older, more traditional Jews and 
Der Shtern experienced serious problems throughout its existence, finally failing completely 
before the war began.
173
 
Not only did party faith in and use of Komsomol activists breed resentment and division 
among Jews, however.  In a borderland area like Transnistria, often lacking in competent literate 
cadre potential, Jews were even more concentrated as heads of institutions than other 
nationalities.  Such concentration of Jews in quite visible places of authority had an impact on 
Jewish relations with the wider local population, which commonly continued to harbor anti-
Jewish sentiment.
174
  Such sentiment often exploded, particularly in rural settings where the 
reach of the party was stretched and the Komsomolist was the only representative of socialist 
culture and ideology, particularly in collective farms or small villages.  Dreams of socialist 
modernity proved much more unambiguous than its reality in the Transnistrian countryside. 
Even in settings where everyone involved was Jewish, violence against Komsomolists 
sometimes erupted because of their excessive socialist zeal.  For example, on December 14, 1933 
the Tiraspol City Control Commission received a hand-written letter from an Aaron Leibovich 
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Krasnolobov admitting that he did strike a Komsomolets at the rural enterprise that he ran, but 
arguing that he was justified in doing so because the Komsomolets, also a Jew, was drunk and 
abusing his power.  He pointed out that he had been a party member since 1927 and had never 
before violated party ethics or discipline—while having been very active in the state 
collectivization campaign.  His letter (in very ungrammatical Russian with mistakes typical for a 
native Yiddish speaker) did not help him: he was fired from his post the next month.
175
  
The zeal of young Jewish komsomol activists was a common, indeed, a stereotypical 
occurrence.  In zealously carrying out party ideology, they were accused of sowing division 
among the Jewish people; of betraying Jewish interests for foreign ones.  Komsomol activists 
were indeed key in keeping Jewish enterprises of all variety in line within communist ideology.  
In the case of Jewish collective farms, for example, Jewish Komsomolists were imperative for 
maintaining state control of the enterprise since non-Jews could not achieve the same level of 
access into Jewish society.  In December 1930, a scathing assessment of the Jewish collective 
farm Der Shtern was submitted to the Rybnitsa raikom by the 15 Komsomol members stationed 
there.  The brunt of the letter was concerned with two temporary appointees to the farm 
administration: the report called these farm leaders abusive of collective rules and the goodwill 
of the other members.  Having completely undermined morale, they convinced many members to 
leave.  What was worse, they were corrupt: they demand leather for themselves to sell for profit 
and use farm resources to provide for themselves a life in Kiev, where they spend much of their 
time.
176
  In some cases, such as this one, the intervention of a Komsomolist proved beneficial in 
correcting an abuse and was well received.  But often the actions of the Komsomol were called 
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into question, as when they reported that many of the farmers at Der Shtern were lazy and 
ideologically ―weak.‖177  
In other cases the effect of Komsomol members activity was seen as nothing short of 
treasonous to Jewish interests.  In May 1934, Komsomol activists assigned to the large Tiraspol-
based artisan artel ―Kust‘prom‖ informed the raikom of problems at the artel.  These included 
minor infringements, such as the irregularity with which the artel newspaper was published and 
the unsanitary conditions at some of the artel‘s shops, such as the bakery run by Gomelfarb.  But 
more seriously, Gomelfarb was accused of profiteering from his bread sales and paying off the 
artel enforcement official, Kapilevich, to keep his mouth shut.  Most serious of all, the 
Komsomolists exposed the artel administrators for keeping hundreds of local lishtentsy illegally 
on its payroll.  The accusations were investigated and led to a ―cleansing‖ of the artel 
membership in July.
178
  The artel was supporting, and no doubt profiting from, hundreds of 
Jewish artisans whose livelihood was undermined by the Soviet system.   Here was an unusually 
large example of the maintenance of Jewish communal contacts and support networks adjusting 
to a new system as best they could, being exposed by, as they saw it, Jewish traitors.  Cases such 
as this certainly contributed toward making the zeal of komsomol activists something to fear for 
many Jews and something to use by the state; they alienated traditional Jews even further and 
helplessly divided Jewish communities.   
Their presence was very important in an undergoverned region like Transnistria: 
Komsomol activists were instrumental in encouraging people to vote during elections and 
contribute teaching Marxism-Leninism at political literacy circles for adults.
179
  Convinced in the 
ability of Jews to help the party and the party as the means to change Jews into something better, 
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Jewish Komsomol activists were eager to foment knowledge of and loyalty for the Communist 
Party.  They helped keep close tabs on the enrollment, attendance and participation of Evshkoly 
pupils and teachers (and often pupils‘ parents) and of various communist groups and 
organizations.
180
  In 1925/26, 790 Jewish pupils, or 25.5% of all schoolchildren in MASSR 
Evshkoly, were members of the Young Pioneers organization, 305 were Octobrists, and 8 were 
members of the Komsomol; one Jewish teacher was a Communist Party member, 2 were 
candidates and four were members of the Komsomol.
181
     
 
Reactions and Resistance 
 In Soviet Transnistria reform came to the Jewish street largely through Jewish 
communists who owed their allegiance to the Communist Party; thus they desired to crush any 
Jewish debate and impose upon them state and party policy instead.  In Romanian Bessarabia the 
impact of a state representing an alien national culture was to spark frantic and vibrant debate 
that triggered reform from within.  As such, it was deeply ironic that the changes wrought by the 
alien state were arguably not nearly as devastating to traditional Jewish life, at least before the 
foreign state turned to mass murder after 1940, as were those imposed by Jewish activists 
representing Soviet power, whose result was to create a Jewish culture, if it can be called that, 
which was more alien than that in Bessarabia.  Certainly, the arrival of policy directives with 
Jewish representatives in many cases prevented a quick rise in opposition to Bolshevik 
ideologies, nevertheless, once traditional Jews understood the meaning of normalization as 
purported by the Jewish commissars, many attempted as much as possible to prevent what they 
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perceived as the destruction of their traditional life and faith.  Becoming Jewish without Judaism 
remained, as might be expected, unaaceptale to many Jews living within interwar Soviet borders.  
There was considerable effort to maintain traditional communal institutions and their functions.  
In comparing Jewish dreams across the political divide, this desire to preserve as much as 
possible of traditional Jewish culture is what I call Soviet autonomism. 
 As described previously, re-education was a primary pillar of Soviet activists‘ efforts to 
transform Jews into Soviet citizens.  This campaign depended not only on new schooling and 
occupational retraining, but also on re-educating traditional Jews through the printed word that 
was intended, together with other means, to foster a socialist consciousness.  Socialist ideology 
in Yiddish appeared in several formats, geared toward various readerships: Der Emes (Pravda) 
particularly but also Der Shtern (The Star) were the primary newspapers of Soviet ideas for 
Jewish readers.  For younger readers, particularly the active Komsomol and Pioneer 
organizations members, Iunge Gvardie (Young Guard) and Zai Greit (Be Ready) were 
influential.  These newspapers began circulating in Transnistria before the formation of the 
autonomous government in 1924, but their circulation, despite consistent efforts of Evsektsiia 
activists, was rather modest.  For example in the Rybnitsa raion, with a Jewish population of 
nearly 4000, the total number of subscriptions to state-sponsored Yiddish-language newspapers 
had reached only 108 by 1928.
182
   Not only was the level of interest among Jews for pro-Soviet 
Yiddish papers questionable, but there were additional obstacles.  Some older Jews in shtetls 
surrounding the town of Rybnitsa actually organized an effort to sabotage the circulation of 
Yiddish newspapers in 1928, believing them blasphemous.
183
  Outside the Jewish community, 
many among the local postmen, it was discovered by the raion agitprop committee, were not 
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delivering Yiddish-language papers because they believed that Jews, like everybody else, should 
be reading Pravda in Russian and not receiving ―special treatment.‖184  Local conditions also 
proved difficult for indoctrinating a socialist ethos into the Jewish population, sometimes 
exposing a surreal level of bureaucratic detachment and obstinacy: in the shtetl of Gershanovka, 
an anti-religious rally intended to focus on describing the false basis of Jewish religious holidays 
throughout history, planned for September 28, 1928, was cancelled on account of starvation 
among the targeted audience.
185
 
Sovietization was slowed, Evsektsiia activists often discovered with anger, not only by 
difficult circumstances or problematic neighbors, however, but especially by the Jews 
themselves.  Of the more than dozen collective farms begun in the MASSR by 1929, only a few 
survived as Jewish collectives after Stalin‘s forced collectivization campaign of 1929/30.  The 
farm Der Shtern was a notable example—it was also a place where its members fought hard to 
preserve their traditional Jewish culture.  There was surprisingly little infiltration of official 
Soviet culture into the community, other than Komsomol activists.  Members were mostly all 
déclassé poor artisans from Tiraspol (more than 80%) and maintained traditional culture as much 
as they could: Soviet cultural-enlightenment activity had to be carried out by ―imports‖ from 
outside the farm membership, and they were actively rejected by farm community members.
186
  
The reach of the youth organizations such as the Komsomol was limited during the early 1930s, 
and the youth remained to a large degree under the sway of their parents.  Even within the 
collective, private initiative did not end but was eventually stamped out by state agenda: more 
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enterprising and able people established themselves, but were by June 1930 removed from the 
community as kulaks.
187
 
 Perhaps most telling, and undoubtedly most troubling to socialist cultural activists who 
reported on such issues, was the persistence of traditional Jewish communes in one form or 
another that continued to serve as a source of authority and cultural cohesion for many Jews 
despite the efforts of proponents of Soviet authority to eliminate any and all competitors.  In 
Rybnitsa, for example, members of the raion natsmen committee complained in 1929 that many 
struggling local artisans refused to abandon their trade and join the agricultural resettlement 
program, instead choosing to remain in their craft and turn to the remnants of the communal 
council for support in order to do so.  Aided by leaders from the former communal government, 
the kehilla (it had been formally dissolved in 1924), they successfully used their influence and 
respect in the community to organize the local artisans into an unofficial self-aid organization in 
Rybnitsa (very much like the kasses that functioned in Bessarabia) whereby they pooled their 
resources to help each other through troubling times.
188
  In other places, such as rural Kamenka, 
Jews were observed by natsmen workers to ―have a tendency to form their own sel‘soviets‖ 
(village communes) to the exclusion of other peoples, a clear attempt to refashion the kehilla.
189
  
Natsmen activists were rightly concerned that such solidarity permitted struggling Jewish 
artisans to function underground despite state sanctions on their operation.  Such ―anti-Soviet‖ 
cooperatives as they called them slowed the effective growth of state-sponsored trade 
cooperatives in the region, which were in any case challenged by the distance of this borderland 
from administrative centers and by the significant lawlessness there.  Together with the 
continued functioning of Jewish organizations such as OZE (which remained open in Rybnitsa 
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until 1930 thanks in part to support from Jewish contacts from Soroca across the Dniester), pro-
Soviet Jewish cultural activists called such homegrown institutions ―tendencies of the past‖ that 
were ―dangerous national trends that upset communal harmony.‖190  Activists consistently called 
for greater support from the oblast committee to stamp out such communal associations; it was 
not until the early 1930s, particularly when famine swept the region, that they were in almost all 
cases finally liquidated.  
 In the economic sphere, Jewish artisans, petty merchants and businessmen in Transnistria 
strove to maintain regional businesses functioning under the new regime.  Despite the massive 
problems created for small, individual artisans and craftsmen by state-sponsored cooperatives 
and artels, many traditional business contacts survived throughout the NEP years.  The 
crackdown on private trade during Stalin‘s revolution ushered in new forms of underground 
trade made possible through well-established regional contacts among Jewish businesses.  Again, 
the distance from centers of Soviet power, the lack of competent cadres and the survival of 
traditional networks despite state and party efforts to enforce its firm control over industry and 
trade made arrests and trials of especially Jews for black marketeering a common occurrence 
during the first half of the 1930s.   
A particularly prominent trial over a large illegal trade network took place in Tiraspol in 
1934 that highlighted the extent of the striving for economic autonomy among a wide range of 
Jewish businessmen.  The president and accountant of trade artel ―Melkyi roznichnik,‖ comrades 
Groisman and Greenberg, were arrested for failure to pay taxes, accused of keeping the revenue 
for themselves.  As their books became public and the investigation deepened in 1934, state 
finance officials deduced that the artel owed altogether, including penalties, just over 46,000 
rubles.  At a time when a weekly wage was several rubles, people across Ukraine were truly 
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shocked by the size of this figure that they read about in the press, especially for a ―backwater‖ 
town like Tiraspol, even as they understood that it was almost certainly inflated.  Soon after it 
was determined that this Tiraspol artel was being used as cover for a thriving black market 
business that included similar enterprises in Odessa, Kiev, and Birzuli.  The illegal trade 
included cigarette paper, chalk, hats, scarves, and locks; but especially candy and sausages.  By 
the beginning of 1934, black market trade between several artels had done more than 250,000 
rubles worth of business in 19 months.  These included the Odessa ―Gasporon‖ sweets factory 
run by comrade Friedman, the paper factory ―Soglasie‖ run by Rosenberg and Muchnik, 
chemical artel and factory ―Tekhno-khemic‖ run by Schwartz, and in Kiev the ―Kust‘ product‖ 
candy factory, along with small trade artels in Tiraspol and Birzuli, the latter headed by a 
comrade Nuhgaer.  On January 16, 1934, Melkyi roznichnik purchased from their Odessa 
contacts, according to Gorfinotdel statistics, 3653 rubles worth of products for 1746 rubles (47% 
markdown) which they then sold to Tiraspol consumers for 5400 rubles.  Groisman and 
Greenberg were charged with speculation, tax avoidance, including concealing their books from 
Gorfinotdel—all criminal charges.191  Beyond the importance of the case as an indicator of the 
growing state crackdown on free trade, the case is a clear indicator of a surviving network of 
Jewish regional contacts, a continuation, despite the turmoil of the past two decades, of 
traditional contacts among Jews.  Such contacts and efforts to maintain economic autonomy 
existed in many places in Soviet society and among many groups—in the southwestern former 
Pale, with its history of wheeling and dealing, such contacts among Jews clearly persisted and 
did not end without harsh state intervention. 
  The pro-Soviet activists were by no means dependable either.  The cases of Jewish 
communists accused of various charges such as vreditel’stvo (wrecking) or razbazarivanie 
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(market selling) increased dramatically after 1933.  Largely, this was the result of increased party 
cleansing, but also clearly connected to the desperate circumstances that arose from the famine 
that began in 1932 but hit Transnistria particularly hard in 1933.  Jews were on both sides—as 
receivers and givers of charges.  A Jewish Comrade Gurevich, head of the Ukrainian meat artel, 
lambasted his Moldovan subordinates in a secret letter for the shameful state of the MASSR 
meat industry, demanding that it be cleansed of ―former merchants, speculators, former white 
army officers, and priests.‖192  The result was a dramatic cleansing of the MASSR meat industry: 
by January 1, 1934, a list of 46 communists to be cleansed from various food industries in 
Tiraspol alone was compiled, including many Jews.  Simon Schreibman from Odessa was 
accused of concealing 200 poods of meat; Lev Tarnopolsky from Tiraspol 250 poods; Avrahm 
Schierer from Akkerman (Bessarabia) 170 poods.  Such was the scapegoating method used to 
blame enemies of the people for the party‘s failings.193 
 Recriminations would of course only escalate, and in fact its was during the years of 
terror at the end of the 1930s that lines between personal interests became more brightly visible.  
As scholarship of recent years on the terror has shown, much suffering was caused not by the 
direct repression of the state but by the appropriation by ordinary citizens of state ideology as a 
weapon against others and in service of their own interests.  Jewish Transnistria was no 
exception, but what is of particular interest is the efforts at maintaining a sense of loyalty to 
Jewish identity among those of the older generation that is arguably lost, at least to some extent, 
by the youth.  At the Tiraspol Evshkola, a pupil named Trakhtenbroit found a book owned by a 
recently arrested teacher in October 1937 and turned it over to the NKVD as further evidence 
against him.  One of the boy‘s teachers, a Rashkovsky, scolded him for ―getting involved in 
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things you shouldn‘t.‖  Trakhtenbroit reported Rashkovsky, who was arrested.  In his report the 
school principal called Rashkovsky‘s behavior anti-communist and anti-social, but after further 
investigating the case he learned that Trakhtenbroit did not like Rashkovsky and always caused 
problems in his class.
194
  Similarly, Trakhtenbroit‘s math teacher, a Mrs. Shitsman, also yelled at 
him over the book incident, telling him that he ―should be studying and not taking trips to the 
secret police.‖  He informed on her as well and she too was arrested; later the principal learned 
that Trakhtenbroit wanted to transfer out of the Evshkola to a Russian school and Shitsman 
would not let him, so he took the opportunity to have her removed.
195
  An older history teacher 
named Reznik heard a younger colleague‘s complaints that too few books on Soviet history were 
available in Yiddish, to which he replied ―may they burn in Moscow.‖  He was arrested.196  A 
younger student confronted his teacher for missing their class, to which the teacher replied 
philosophically ―to this knot of sorrow we have to add yet new sorrows.‖  The teacher was 
arrested; the pupil was promoted to the Young Pioneers in Tiraspol.
197
  Taken together, it is 
apparent that would was transpiring during these years was the death knell of a unified Jewish 
community, undermined from within as well as without.  Despite the pressure, already felt by 
these years, to change professions, political parties, places of residence, expressions of religion, 
etc. it had been possible for people to entertain adversarial perspectives quietly, or secretly.  This 
became increasingly dangerous as sentiment founded on preserving Jewish cultural identity came 
in conflict, at numerous points, with a pro-socialist ideology that the youth came in ever greater 
numbers to espouse.  The Soviet state and bureaucracy proved much better at dividing traditional 
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and religious communities than the exclusionary policies being pursued by Romanian governors 
across the Dniester in Bessarabia.   
 
Conclusion 
After 1918, significantly different political regimes instituted powerfully different ruling 
methods upon subject peoples that had until that time lived in similar ways.  One illustrative and 
enlightening means of ascertaining the persistence of similar perspectives, desires, and dreams 
among subject populations is to examine the similarities in indigenous political movements that 
either resisted the leveling programs of the states or used them to serve achieve their own 
agendas.  In this way, the similarities in innate concerns for a Jewish future as evidenced in 
youth Zionism and activism in the Komsomol, as well as autonomist sentiment evidenced in both 
the Yiddish Cultural League in Bessarabia and resistance to communist policies by everyday 
Jews in Soviet Transnistria, serve to transcend the new and sudden political barrier that went up 
in 1918 between Greater Romania and the Soviet Union.  Jewish political activists, writers, and 
thinkers on both the left and right on both sides of the Dniester had matured in a pre-WWI world 
of Jewish correspondence across the vast territory of the former Pale of Settlement, traveling 
between far-flung communities in Poland, Belarus, Ukraine, Lithuania, and Bessarabia to share 
ideas about the future of the Jewish people and the means to achieve it.  After the collapse of 
empires, they found themselves separated by new boundaries jealously guarded by the young 
national regimes of Eastern Europe.   
But the ideas remained that saw Jews as one people across political boundaries, in fact, 
they intensified.  Most clearly this was expressed in Zionism, which, despite being divided into 
myriad perspectives on the political left, right, and center, shared basic features.  Most 
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importantly, these included the creation of a Jewish nation-state in Palestine, and also the 
physical, social, and economic regeneration of the Jewish people to create new, modern and 
masculine Jews.  These ideas were a product of their era across Europe, informed by broader 
medical, national and racial ideologies concerned with the degeneration of society.  Russia, and 
later the Soviet Union, was part of these concerns, which was reflected in Bolshevik desires to 
inculcate traits necessary to build a new society—the New Man.  These desires were in evidence 
among Jewish communists as well, including the youth activists in the Komsomol, who wanted 
to refashion ―backward‖ shtetl Jews into strong, physical new Jews.  Such ideas spanned newly 
constructed political borders.  
Finally, the transnational connection between voices that called for alternatives must not 
be overlooked.  These included the desire for an autonomist future, meaning progressive in terms 
of its receptivity to modern, secular ideologies but turned to serve a non-Zionist agenda.  Also 
important were voices of tradition that were first and foremost concerned with preserving the 
Jewish religion, avoiding mass assimilation of the Jewish people into the surrounding populace, 
and maintaining the Jewish communal government, the kehilla, in some form as the best 
institution to achieve these goals.      
Nevertheless, the political regimes in which these dreams of the future played out could 
not be ignored, and in many ways shaped the direction of political activism.  In Bessarabia, 
Zionists challenged the traditional ruling authority of religious leaders in communal affairs, just 
as Zionist ideology in the broadest sense spread from the youth among the populace and became 
intricately intertwined with Jewish life, politics and philanthropy.  While comparatively few 
Jews were actually able to make aliyah, thousands benefited from new pride, comradery and 
activism in social causes that helped weather the rising antisemitism and Jewish isolation in the 
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country.  Across the Dniester, Komsomol activists were important in bringing the message of the 
party to rural areas where there was no other presence of the ruling culture or ideology.  As the 
only representatives of Soviet power they often caused anger and division among battered Jewish 
communities, thus helping to establish Soviet power by weakening alternatives to it at the local 
level.  They also helped in many cases in providing care for a suffering population, however, 
enticing some Jews, especially the young, to their cause because of their own zealous faith in 
communism.   
The autonomists also had to work within the framework of the new states in which they 
found themselves.  In Romanian Bessarabia, the Yiddishists turned primarily to culture and the 
inculcation of love and respect of the Yiddish language, the Jewish vernacular, as the means of 
maintaining Jewish difference.  Their aspirations were closely tied with socialist idealism, which 
was sufficient to bring the wrath of the Siguranţa upon them.  In Soviet Transnistria, 
autonomism, much more difficult to locate in the sources, was primarily found in resistance to 
Soviet cultural, educational and anti-religious campaigns, such as the desires to maintain 
communal connections or means to help independent Jewish artisans that the party wished to 
shut down.  Resistance in Bessarabia also sometimes moved passed a state-accepted Jewish 
cultural agenda and moved toward the revolutionary underground, fed ideologically from across 
the border and supported, as much as possible, financially.  Jews were important participants in 
this movement but my no means its only supporters, despite the generally successful efforts of 
the state and the secret and military police to portray Jews as the only supporters of communism.  
Despite the coercive power of the ruling regimes, Jewish dreams of control over their own future 
persisted throughout the interwar years, and could not be strictly limited to the national space 
even if the Jews themselves physically could be.  
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Figure 16:  Execution by firing squad of a communist revolutionary in a Romanian prison, most likely Doftana near 
Benderi (Tighina) in Bessarabia, kneeling with his hands tied behind his back, not later than 1925;  
photo taken from ANRM photograph collection, #24922. 
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Epilogue  
When Soviet troops invaded Romanian Bessarabia (again) in 1944,
1
 army officers kept 
detailed records of the state in which they found local conditions after three years of war-time 
fascist administration.  Romanian forces had not stopped at the Dniester River when they first 
attacked the Red Army after the Nazi assault on the Soviet Union in summer 1941.  They 
captured the entire region between the Dniester and Bug Rivers, including Odessa, which they 
called Transnistria.  More than twenty years of dedicated, underground communist agitation 
seemed to have come to naught, as the Romanian Army proceeded to cleanse the entire region, 
including Bukovina, Bessarabia, and extended Transnistria, of foreigners and undesirables, 
especially Jews and communists.  Romanian-run work and death camps for the Jews of the entire 
region, including Bessarabia, Bukovina, Herţa and Odessa, were constructed in Transnistria.2 
Bessarabian Jews had been systematically rounded up in the Chişinău ghetto and several 
camps in northern Bessarabian towns prior to their movement into concentration camps across 
the Dniester in Transnistria.  Many were driven by foot in the late autumn, falling dead from 
abuse along the way to the camps.  Soviet soldiers interviewed many locals about what they saw 
in 1944.  Mrs. Solovieva from the town of Rybnitsa noted, in emotional language, the plight of 
Jews on their way to camps not far from her town: 
Romanian soldiers came on, speaking an indecipherable Romanian language. At night there were 
screams of chickens, and in the morning only the remainder of chicken bones and feathers.  All 
along the main roads, connecting the villages with Rybnitsa, laid the bodies of Jewish women, 
children, and old men.  Later, when the Romanian administrators arrived to revive a stopped life, 
scattered, several people at a time, parties of Bessarabian Jews began coming.  Tortured, tired and 
hungry, some of them could not make it and fell and died on the way, under the sticks of 
animalistic Romanian soldiers.  I remember the soldiers were building a church, for which they 
destroyed the homes of living people—and used as labor Jews imprisoned in a nearby camp, work 
                                                 
1
 Soviet troops had initially entered the province in June-July 1940, in accordance with the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact 
by which the Nazis granted Bessarabia, along with eastern Poland, to the Soviet Union to buy their silence in the 
face of planned Nazi aggression across Europe. 
2
 See Radu Ioanid, The Holocaust in Romania: The Destruction of Jews and Gypsies Under the Antonescu Regime, 
1940-1944 (Chicago, 2000) for broader treatment of the Holocaust in Bessarabia and Transnistria. 
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for which they were unpaid and unfed.  They worked under the gaze of those with sticks, and it 
was enough to make the slightest mistake and the blows would rain down on the head and back of 
the guilty…Before the Rybnitsa jail, in the building of the former border control brigade, they 
stopped all the parties of Jews passing through Rybnitsa.  Here dozens of people died every day 
from hunger, wounds, exhaustion and disease.  The path of this movement from Rybnitsa to the 
camp at Slobodka through the villages of Shmalena, Andreevka, Kolbasnaia, and Timkovo was 
throughout marked by the buried bodies of Jews…The Romanian soldiers were likewise 
unbelievably animalistic toward Soviet prisoners, especially during their retreat from Soviet 
territory, just like they had been when they force marched the Jews.
3
     
 
Another eyewitness account from an unnamed source interviewed by the Soviet 
commission for determining the circumstances of the Romanian wartime occupation of the 
autonomous region noted that the Jews were stripped to the nude by the Romanian troops; they 
stood freezing in November before the Romanian troops.  The Jews were driven, like animals, 
including men, women, children and the elderly, many of whom were killed on the way.  The 
dead lay in piles up to the windows of the military barracks, and the living Jews were forced to 
dig holes for them—there were 15 such holes that this person witnessed dug, with hundreds of 
bodies thrown into them.  Residents of the village of Colbasna reported how the road through the 
village from Rybnitsa was littered with bodies, none of whom were identified prior to mass 
burial, partly because the peasants did not known any of them.  The report of the Soviet 
authorities explains that the Romanian forces drove a large number of Jews into the camps in 
November 1941, where they were driven into buildings without any heating or other facilities, 
and packed in so tight that they were forced to stand the entire time for days.  Many died 
standing in this manner.
4
 
Dniester Jews, divided for a generation by competing, ideologically antagonistic regimes 
when Romanian troops seized Bessarabia, were re-united in extermination when the Romanian 
Army extended its control past the Dniester all the way to the Bug.  From 1941 to 1944, the 
                                                 
3
 AOSPRM, f. 3, op. 1, d. 718, ll. 13-15.  
4
 AOSPRM, f. 3, op. 1, d. 718, ll. 18.  
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regime of the Conducator, Marshal Ion Antonescu, was responsible for the murder of at least 
250,000 Bessarabian, Bukovinan, Transnistrian and Ukrainian Jews.
5
  As part of the ultra-
modern pursuit of racial perfection, Ion Antonescu decided to remake multi-ethnic Bessarabia 
into a model, racially-pure Romanian province.  Bessarabia was a good choice in that it was 
problematic both in terms of ethnic unity and state security, and the plan to cleanse to province 
of ―foreign elements‖ promised to solve both issues.  The efforts of the Antonescu regime to 
cleanse Bessarabia of Jews were a logical conclusion to the local manifestation of a broader 
European intellectual faith in racial purity as the foundation of successful modern society, as 
well as a generation of political interaction that was headed for collision since at least 1918 as a 
result.  In that sense, the story of the Romanian Holocaust is not dramatically different from the 
Nazi one—except that Jews in much of the country, particularly the Old Kingdom, survived.   
Yet focusing on the Holocuast has not been the primary objective of this project.  
Holocaust studies have arguably overwhelmed 20
th
 century Jewish historiography and to a 
considerable extent contemporary Jewish identity.
6
  Writing about Jewish history in Europe from 
the tragic perspective alone anachronizes the tragedy and colors the interpretation of Jewish 
culture before the Holocaust with our own sense of the impending doom that those we write 
about could not of course feel.  In fact, as this study has tried to show, this was a time of 
tremendous hope in the future.  The interwar years were a time of unbounded cultural and 
political creativity and activity for Jews in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, precisely 
because so many people across a much broader social spectrum, no longer just the intellectual, 
                                                 
5
 This is a lower estimate presented by Solonari. Iziaslav Levit estimates that about 350,000 were killed; see Ashes 
of the Past, 8.  According to statistics compiled by an independent commission of the U.S. Holocaust Museum‘s 
Center for Advanced Holocaust Studies, the number of Jewish victims in Transnistria was between 280,000 and 
380,000.  Dennis Deletant, basing his statistics on the Holocaust museum‘s research led by Radu Ioanid, reports that 
90,000 of the Jewish dead in Transnistrian camps were from Bessarabia and Bukovina, while 170,000 were local 
Ukrainian Jews.  Deletant, ―The Holocaust in Transnistria: An Overview in the Light of Recent Research,‖ in 
Occasional Papers of Romanian Studies, No. 3: Moldova, Bessarabia, and Transnistria, 143-161. 
6
 For example in American Jewish life: Peter Novick, The Holocaust in American Life (Boston, 1999). 
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religious, or economic elite, believed that creating a better Jewish future was within their reach.  
The tremendously varied and conflicting debates over the direction and shape of this future paint 
a fascinating picture and needs not be lost because it was cut short.  No place in the Jewish world 
was untouched by this debate, including the otherwise provincial regions of Bessarabia and 
Transnistria. 
This has thus been a project focused on radical change and the individual and collective 
reactions to it.  In particular, the focus on modern universalism, as engendered in a Western 
European notion of the modern, proved a powerful, arguably inevitable and unstoppable force 
for change that triggered an entire system of reactions within communities of religious, ethnic, 
and/or linguistic difference.
7
  Jews, arguably as Europe‘s best known ―mobilized diaspora,‖ 
provides an excellent perspective for examining the spread, accommodation and resistance of 
modern, particularly nationalist and socialist, ideas.  Jews of the Dniester River borderland 
between Romanian and Slavic civilizations were confronted with such circumstances long before 
the interwar years, but it was during this time that these changes came to a crisis state that led 
either toward assimilation of communist identity in the multi-ethnic MASSR within Soviet 
Ukraine or displacement, marginalization, and finally extermination in a mono-ethnic, 
increasingly racialized homeland for blood Romanians in Bessarabia. 
Not only were these changes traumatic in terms of their violent displacement on 
numerous levels of Jewish particularity, but also because, as is the story of the Jewish experience 
                                                 
7
 The study of social change of particularistic cultures under pressure of Universalist modernity is not a new field 
and was not pioneered by historians.  Perhaps best known is the work of anthropologist Clifford Geertz, The 
Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays (New York, 1973), particularly Ritual and Social Change: A Javanese 
Example, 142-169.  A great example of traumatic cultural change such as this is Chinua Achebe‘s Things Fall Apart 
(New York, 1994) about the pressures on traditional Ibo communities in Nigeria after the arrival of Christianity as a 
precursor to European imperialism. 
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with modernity, deeply divisive.
8
  In Romanian Bessarabia, the Jewish community, already 
divided in late Imperial Russia, was further splintered between Orthodox traditionalists, 
democratic secularists, autonomists, Zionists of numerous stripes, socialists and underground 
communists.  In Soviet Transnistria, the devastated provincial Jewish towns were divided 
primarily between the pro-Bolshevik party and state bureaucrats and activists and, everybody 
else that desired a different future, including underground Zionists, the religiously devout, etc. 
The Jews of this region, whom I have called Dniester Jews for purposes of ascertaining 
their common versus separate fate, were clearly invested in the multi-ethnicity of this borderland; 
it was during Russian Imperial rule a region shared by many ethnic and national groups, however 
turbulently, and not claimed exclusively by any one of them (Russians were of course most 
privileged in government and the military, but Jews controlled the economy and the Moldovans 
were indispensable in agriculture).  This changed most clearly in the larger former Russian 
gubernia of Bessarabia, where a policy of Romanianization, or pro-Romanian ethnic affirmative 
action together with discrimination against others, was enforced with growing conviction much 
to the detriment of competing national and religious groups, particularly the Jews, who were seen 
by security police as foreigners, invaders, capitalist usurpers and communist traitors.  On the 
opposite bank, the Bolshevik revolutionaries began construction of a multi-national, utopian 
communist system that was short on qualified personnel, particularly in places like Transnistria, 
provincial and distant from their power centers.  Jews were welcomed into the party and helped 
extend Soviet control and Bolshevik culture in the region, just as they led in efforts to extend 
revolutionary agitation across the border into Bessarabia, which was considered rightfully Soviet 
land.  However, by the 1930s Soviet power was firmly established and Jews (like other 
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 See Eli Lederhendler, Jewish Responses to Modernity: New Voices in America and Eastern Europe (New York, 
1994). 
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minorities) were no longer as needed; indigenization policies designed to bring native peoples 
into the party in their own languages were discontinued. 
The claim that the division between Western and Eastern Jews ran along the Dniester 
River (among other places), along with the ideological divide between democracy and 
nationalism on the one hand and communist internationalism on the other, although true to a 
significant extent, cannot fully explain the complex reality on the ground.  Romanian Jewry itself 
was divided between the two classifications (Union of Romanian Jews versus Jewish National 
Party), a fact that had important political ramifications for Jewish political activism and broader 
relations with their host state.  Divisions were not limited to individual communities: differences 
of opinion broadened between Bucharest Jews that were familiar with Romanian culture and 
Jews in the new territories that were not.  Under Soviet administrative centralization also, some 
Jews appropriated aspects of official ideology that resonated with Jewish collective goals while 
others maintained communal traditions and/or secret/underground organizations when they did 
not.  The regime in power determined what was forced underground, communism in Romanian 
Bessarabia, Zionism in Soviet Transnistria; what was consistent was the pursuit of Jewish 
interests that refused definition by state interests alone. 
As documents from police files, local communist party correspondence, the press and 
interviews show, Jews were not simply silenced victims, all-powerful capitalists, or ―enemies of 
the Romanian nation,‖ nor were they necessarily all dedicated communists—all common 
stereotypes at the time.  Rather, Jews helped shape state policies just as they were shaped by 
them; they were eager subjects and ardent revolutionaries, devout believers and dedicated 
atheists.  This was true in Romanian Bessarabia even though Jews were blocked from exercising 
political power—political power was undeniably shaped in part by their presence.  The 
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kaleidoscope of perspectives reflects the complexity and confusion of finding meaning in a 
modernity that opened the possibility for Jews to determine their own future, both as individuals 
and members of a collective, just as national political agendas sought to suppress that choice.  
We can see this not only in the Jewish responses to state policies, but also efforts to create an 
alternate Jewish future that refused to succumb to state attempts to create model subject, such as 
efforts by young Zionists to take up agriculture to prepare young Jews for Palestine; or spread 
Jewish participation in gymnastics in effort to make Jewish youths to become masculine and 
tough.  This same sentiment was expressed enthusiastically by Soviet Jewish youth across the 
border through means available to them—agricultural campaigns and zealous involvement in the 
Komsomol.  The choices made available to Jews in the Soviet system directed their activism in 
support of the state agenda, or at least not in direct opposition to it, while in Romanian 
Bessarabia Jews were outsiders; their agendas were tolerated if deemed harmless to the 
Romanian nation and persecuted with extreme prejudice when determined to be against the state.  
In many aspects of everyday life and political mobilization, there was a common Jewish 
response to state policies.   
But were common desires across the Dniester border, common in fact much more broadly 
among East European Jews during these years, sufficient to claim an identity that resisted 
national classification?  Clearly, transnational ideological interests and concerns for suffering co-
religionists in particular could not be neatly contained within national borders as national leaders 
would have liked.  Nonetheless, such cross-border sentiments quickly began succumbing to the 
political realities of competing projects of national identity construction, social engineering and 
population control.  Jewish underground revolutionaries in Bessarabia, despite continued 
activism, were waging a losing war; contrary to post-1945 Soviet accounts of the victorious 
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revolutionary struggle for communism in Romanian Bessarabia, it was the Red Army that 
brought communism, not the interwar underground movement.
9
  Despite the flight of Jewish 
refugees across the Dniester and their constant presence in refugee camps in Chişinău, the 
everyday reality of attending the Soviet Evshkoly or Romanian state schools; of maintaining a 
job despite limitations on Jewish employment in Bessarabia or the affliction of a lishenets status 
in Transnistria; or encountering virulent popular antisemitism or having to conceal one‘s 
devotion to God; these everyday realities proved most central to any discussion of transnational 
regional identity. 
So was there such a thing as Dniester Jews?  Was there a Jewish identity in this 
borderland region between Romania and the Soviet Union that refused to be constrained within 
the constructed and ascribed national identities of these two modern states?  The answer is an 
ambivalent maybe.  This ambivalence is logical and important: it points to the profound level of 
transformation of society and culture that was underway during these years of rapid change and 
the difficulty in grabbing onto any particular ideology to anchor one‘s place in a world where 
constant change became the norm.  Scholars of Jewish history in Eastern Europe have pointed to 
this for a few years.  Jewish actors and playwrights did not perform and write works that neatly 
conformed to ―national in form, socialist in content,‖ rather they strove to conform to 
expectations while expressing internal sentiment toward Jewish nationalism at the same time.
10
  
In terms of the production of Soviet-Jewish culture in Yiddish, the writers, poets and journalists 
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 For example, Artem Lazarev, Moldavskaia sovetskaia gosudarstvennost’ I bessarabskii  
vopros (Kishinev, 1974) and Jakob Mikhailovich Kopansky, Mezhdunarodnaia podderzhka bor’by trudiashchikhsia 
Bessarabii za vossoedinenie s sovetskoi rodinoi (Kishinev, 1975). 
10
 Jeffrey Veidlinger, The Moscow State Yiddish Theater. 
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who engaged in such construction also became increasingly ambivalent about their project of 
destroying the Jewish ―thick‖ culture that they had grown up with.11     
Jews in Bessarabia were ambivalent about becoming part of the Romanian state; they 
were only more wary twenty years later, not only because of antisemitism but also corruption, 
economic mismanagement and anti-communist labeling and persecution.  Clearly there was little 
chance, as their political activity bears witness, that sentiment as Romanian Jews developed in 
Bessarabia to any significant extent.  Similarly, state policies to construct a new Soviet Jewish 
culture through planned and controlled resettlement and re-education and Jewish reception of 
such policies proved ambivalent: a failure through poor implementation and a lack of 
commitment over time. By 1939, a quarter of Jews had left the MASSR, mostly for large cities 
inside the Soviet Union, thereby bypassing Yiddish schools for a more practical education in 
Russia for themselves or their children.  Most of the rest struggled on in poverty in shtetls of the 
former Pale of Settlement and were mostly wiped out, both individually and as a culture, during 
the Romanian invasion of Soviet Ukraine during World War II up to the Bug River, including 
Odessa.  What survived after the war for Jews was an integrated, unmistakably Soviet urban 
culture.
12
  Jews in the Dniester borderland may have had considerable family, business, 
confessional and even political (in terms of international Jewish projects) connections at the 
beginning of the interwar years, but these were successfully broken down over the course of the 
1920s and 1930s.  What remained were national connections—for most, even Jewish communist 
activists in the Soviet Union, being Jewish was difficult to erase (and would become consistently 
more difficult after nationality became an item on one‘s passport) despite the efforts of many to 
do so.  In Romania, erasing one‘s Jewish identity was always difficult; in interwar Romanian 
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 David Shneer, Yiddish and the Creation of Soviet Jewish Culture. 
12
 Anna Shternshis, Soviet and Kosher, 182. 
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Bessarabia it was near impossible.  ―Dniester Jews‖ may have become more than a regional 
notion, like Galician Jews or Macedonian Jews, but they were shaped by competing state policies 
into Soviet Jews on the one hand and Jewish Bessarabians on the other, and shaped as much by 
the state policies as by their failure; as much by their acquiescence to them as their resistance.   
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